Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...llowing the judgment. [2] These fees are not at issue here. Under section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2004), the condemning authority was required to pay attorneys' fees and reasonable costs incurred in the circuit court eminent domain proceedings. Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides for calculation of statutory attorneys' fees on the basis of the benefits achieved for the client, except under certain circumstances set forth in the chapter that are not pertinent here....

...traditional factors. The statute mandates a finding regarding attorneys' time and labor (lodestar method) and takes into consideration offers of judgment. The basic lodestar factors are contained within these criteria. That statute reads as follows: 73.092 Attorney's fees....

...shall be deemed to be rejected. (9) For the purposes of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, a condemning authority shall be considered a party defending against a claim at any time after the entry of an order of taking in any condemnation action. § 73.092, Fla....

...We have for review Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Schick, 580 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), ( Schick IV ), in which the district court certified the following question of great public importance: IN DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD MADE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE ROWE [ [1] ] CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER APPLICABLE IN AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION, BASED UPON A RECORD IN WHICH IT IS CLEARLY APPARENT THAT IT WAS INITIALLY HIGHLY UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS WOULD PREVAIL ON THE THRESHOLD ISSUE OF A TAKING? Id....

...Recognizing that its holding in Schick III appeared to be in conflict with Quanstrom, the district court reversed the award of multiplier-enhanced attorney's fees, and remanded with directions to determine the attorney's fee award based solely on the factors set forth under section 73.092....

...ng point for computing a reasonable fee in eminent domain and most other proceedings). The district court properly construed our decision in Quanstrom as effectively overruling Schick III. This is because the legislature has specifically included in section 73.092 the criteria to be considered in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 73.091, and neither the contingent nature of the fee arrangement nor the risk of nonpayment of fees is an authorized consideration....

...In its order awarding attorney's fees, the trial court set forth extensive findings in support of enhancement with risk multipliers. Although the trial court did refer to the risk of nonpayment of fees, it also made a number of findings that relate to factors enumerated in section 73.092....

...Schick, 580 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). See Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965) (except in unusual circumstances where manifest injustice would result, an appellate court should not reconsider a point of law previously decided on a former appeal). [5] Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1987), reads in pertinent part: Attorney's fees....

...actions, that the paralegals performed merely clerical work, and that his attorneys ran up the fees due to their inexperience. The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla.1950). Methodology Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1991) governs the award of attorney's fees to a condemnee in eminent domain proceedings. Section 73.092(1) provides, "In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall give the greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered." § 73.092(1), Fla....

...(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause. (c) The amount of money involved. (d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney. (e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e), Fla....

...Finally, the statute instructs that, [i]n determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of fees and costs. § 73.092(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). Aside from requiring the "greatest weight" be given to the benefits to the client resulting from the attorney's services rendered, § 73.092 does not contain any methodology for making the fee calculation....

...Parker. Rather, we have consistently followed, as did the court below, Byrne's method of calculating the fee award by looking at the benefits obtained by the attorneys for the client, determining the appropriate lodestar using the factors listed in § 73.092(2), and then deciding whether to adjust that figure based on the total benefits obtained....

...not have considered this as a benefit within the meaning of the statute, since the result was obtained solely through the efforts of DOT's attorneys. See Florida Inland Navigation Dist. v. Humphrys, 616 So.2d 494, 497 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)("[S]ection 73.092 does not allow a trial court to attribute a benefit to a defendant owner's attorney for a ruling obtained by the condemning authority which precludes a potential damage claim by the owner"). Secondary Factors DOT also challenges the court's findings regarding the secondary factors listed in section 73.092....

...ively "the condemnee"), $110,000 for attorneys' fees and $1,950.50 for expert witness fees in this condemnation case. The DOT argues that the trial court erred because it failed to calculate the attorneys' fees in conformity with sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) [1] , and this court's rulings....

...See In *785 re Estate of Platt, 586 So.2d 328, 335 (Fla. 1991); Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828 (Fla.1990); Schick v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 599 So.2d 641 (Fla.1992). The correct procedure to establish a fee consistent with section 73.092 is for the trial court to consider the various factors set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v....

...hout any adjustment for the cost of the environmental clean up. Under the applicable statute, one of the factors the court was required to consider in assessing attorney's fees was the "[b]enefits resulting to the client from the services rendered." § 73.092(1), Fla.Stat....

...e by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Although in a successful inverse condemnation action the property owner is entitled to attorney's fees, [12] the award of nominal or insubstantial damages in a subsequent trial is controlled by the court and must bear both on the propriety and amount of any fee award. See also § 73.092, Fla....

...Seminole County (County), appeals the final order awarding attorneys' fees in this eminent domain action, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in calculating the awards. Because the trial court failed to calculate the fees in accordance with section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993), we must reverse....

...The trial court accepted the parties' settlement agreement, incorporated the agreement into the final judgment, and reserved jurisdiction to determine attorneys' fees and costs. Butler, Superwash, and Express thereafter filed motions to assess attorneys' fees pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...In calculating this fee, the court first applied the lodestar considerations of time expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The court then added the lodestar fee to a weighted percentage of the "benefit" received in the case, yielding a fee award which calculates to a rate of $551 per hour. Section 73.092(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), defines "benefit" as: ......

...Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), this court disapproved of awarding attorney's fees in eminent domain actions based upon the calculation of adding a percentage of the benefit received by the landowner to the lodestar fee. We concluded that, although section 73.092 provides little guidance to practitioners and trial judges concerning the proper method to determine a reasonable fee, this "double-decker" approach was certainly not contemplated by the legislature....

...McIntosh's fee, the trial court applied a version of the " Parker Formula" similar to that used in calculating Mr. Wilson's fees. In applying the formula, the trial court considered the $139,375 in rent collected to be a "benefit" as contemplated by section 73.092(1)(a)....

...McIntosh's fee, the trial court also improperly calculated the amount of rent recovered by Mr. McIntosh as the "benefit" to Butler. There is no statutory authority to tie such a fee to a percentage of the total rents since rent proceeds do not fall within the statute's definition of "benefit." See § 73.092(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...ure Partners and Against all Defendant's Including Case Number Case No: CA 04 8739 AN, Which is Part of this Case Herein" and a "Notice of the Automatic Payment of all *1186 Attorney Fee's, Costs by the State of Florida, Required by Florida Statutes § 73.092." Additionally, since March 2004, May has initiated eleven other proceedings in this Court....

...The only witness called on at the hearing on attorneys fees also testified that the case was worth a fee between $85,000 and $90,000. The judge awarded $85,000. We are of the opinion that the fee was high, but find it difficult to reverse and *101 remand as an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes, recently enacted, provides as follows: In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall consider: (1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...Malcolm Clayton. COBB, Judge. This appeal challenges the validity of an attorney's fees award in an eminent domain action. Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1993), applicable to this case, provides: Costs of the proceedings. — Except as provided in s. 73.092, the petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable appraisal fees, and, when business damages are compensable, a reasonable accountant's fee, to be assessed by that court. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) contains the factors applicable in assessing a reasonable attorney's fee....

...at a value of $1,450,000.00 for the property. The case was settled without trial for the amount of $700,000.00, and the assessment of a reasonable fee for the landowner's attorneys was left to the trial court. The court, utilizing the provisions of section 73.092, found that a reasonable fee based on hourly rates was $25,425.00, and then added to that amount twenty percent of the "benefit" — i.e., the difference between the settlement amount and the County's initial offer....

...This percentage award of $133,836.00, added to the hourly award, resulted in a total fee to the landowner's attorneys of $159,261.00. This "double decker" application of the statute by the trial court resulted in an effective hourly rate for Arndt's counsel of $1,276.64 per hour. Whatever section 73.092 may mean, and it admittedly is lacking in specificity, it cannot reasonably have been intended by the Florida Legislature to produce this result....

...Indeed, appellate courts will closely scrutinize attorney fee awards to ensure their reasonableness. See, e.g., Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1995). The assessment of attorney's fees in a condemnation action is determined pursuant to those specific factors found in section 73.092, Florida Statutes, Downtown Square Associates v....

...We do not deem that "full compensation" allowed by Article 10, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution means any more than reasonable compensation. 622 So.2d at 1014. The County contends that regulation of attorney's fees is a judicial function and that section 73.092 is an "offensive encroachment" upon that function resulting in the award of excessive fees....

...Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). The County also maintains that, in order to achieve consistency, the trial courts must be provided with a formula or method for calculating fees, such as lodestar, rather than the provisions of section 73.092....

...a generous percentage award. Indeed, the percentage figure used to determine the "bonus" in this case is the same percentage figure — i.e., twenty percent — that was used to determine the entire fee in Humphrys. The trial court's interpretation of section 73.092, which effectively awards a dual fee, would render the statute unconstitutional as applied in this case....

...d confine its considerations to the specific statutory criteria set forth by the legislature. We did not hold in Humphrys, nor have we ever held, that a percentage figure must be used to arrive at a reasonable fee award pursuant to the provisions of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1991). Furthermore, we note that the effective hourly rate of compensation resulting from our decision in Humphrys came to $375.00, or about one-third of the hourly rate sanctioned here. Even absent this "double decker" application of section 73.092, Florida Statutes, the *366 award here constitutes an excessive and unreasonable fee....

...We have no hesitation in striking down the fee here which amounts to some $1,276.64 per hour. Accordingly, we reverse the attorney fee award and remand for reconsideration of a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to the specific statutory factors enumerated in section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993). REVERSED AND REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J. and W. SHARP, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) provides, in pertinent part: (1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...Thus, the award of attorneys' fees in this case was within the range of the expert testimony. The primary thrust of appellants' contention that the attorneys' fees in this case were excessive is predicated upon a time and hourly rate basis. This approach disregards the factors set forth in Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1977), to be used in assessing attorneys' fees in eminent domain proceedings....

...However, under no circumstances shall the attorney's fees be based solely on a percentage of the award." Additionally, those factors set forth in Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR2-106, are to be considered. In applying the factors set forth in Section 73.092 to the instant case, we note: (1) The benefit to the client in this case was the ultimate recovery of $5,537,308.22....

...greater. Delco claimed that the attorney's services increased the ultimate settlement award by $270,000 *1164 and that twenty-five percent of the benefits [1] totalled $67,500. The County recognized its obligation to pay a reasonable fee pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) but contested the amount claimed....

...00 would not change, because of the figure's relationship to the betterment. It did not matter that the fee works out to well over two thousand dollars per hour of attorney labor. The statute that governs the award of attorney's fees in this case is section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause. (c) The amount of money involved. (d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney. (e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e), Fla.Stat....

...Finally, the statute instructs that: In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of fees and costs. § 73.092(4), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). The legislative history indicates that the deficiency in section 73.092 sought to be corrected by the 1990 amendment was the following: When assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings under section 73.092, F.S., courts must consider the benefits resulting to the client, the skill of the attorney, the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions involved, the amount of money *1166 involved, and the responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney....

...In certain types of cases, however, the legislature has, by statute, altered the case law criteria for calculating an attorney's fee. In the case of eminent domain, for example, the legislature has provided in section 73.091 that the condemning authority will pay a "reasonable fee" except as provided in 73.092. This language means either that the exception is found in the offer of judgment provisions of section 73.092, or it means that the legislature intended to approve the award of an "unreasonable" attorney's fee to a landowner....

...nevertheless be a "reasonable" fee properly awardable by a Florida court and collectible by a Florida attorney simply because it was authorized by statute. Based on the language of section 73.091, and to avoid any constitutional issue, we interpret section 73.092 to make fee awards subject to the overarching requirement that the fee be reasonable....

...ion, the question becomes exactly what the statute requires. The problem is that, apart from requiring the "greatest weight" be given to the benefits to the client resulting from the attorney's services rendered, there is no methodology contained in section 73.092 for making the fee calculation. It is significant, however, that section 73.092 reflects the same factors as the lodestar approach approved in Rowe. As the supreme court has explained: "The statute [73.092] mandates a finding regarding attorneys' time and labor (lodestar method).... The basic lodestar factors are contained within these criteria." In re Estate of Platt, 586 So.2d 328, 335 (Fla.1991). [5] Accepting the Florida Supreme Court's characterization of the factors contained in section 73.092, we conclude, as other courts before us have done in attempting to puzzle out the correct fee calculation methodology in condemnation cases, that the place to begin a proper fee calculation should be at the lodestar-like secondary statutory factors....

...See Parker, 622 So.2d at 1013; Lee County v. Tohari, 582 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); City of Orlando v. Kensington, Ltd., 580 So.2d 830 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Then the eminent domain equivalent of "the amount involved and the results obtained" Rowe factor, which section 73.092 defines as "benefits obtained," should be used to adjust that figure up or down....

...A "contingent" case is one where payment depends on winning and collecting. The term is simply irrelevant to an eminent domain proceeding. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 833, 835. We note that a variety of formulae are currently being used by trial judges in Seminole county to calculate fees under section 73.092, all of which involve percentages of the benefit....

...nally, twice one-third of the benefits plus lodestar divided by three. This is not what the statute requires and to the extent that use of *1168 these formulae give rise to an unreasonably high fee, they are improper. [7] Because of the structure of section 73.092, the meaning of subsection 73.092(4) is a matter of debate....

...Some lawyers apparently have succeeded in advancing the position that this provision means that the court must pretend the eminent domain case is the equivalent of a case in which recovery of a fee is contingent upon success. Because an eminent domain case is the very antithesis of a contingent fee case, however, whatever 73.092(4) may mean, we are confident it does not mean that....

...onclusions reached by the trial court in its order. First of all, the court observed that the contract for the attorney's fee in this case provided for the attorney to receive twenty-five percent of the benefits resulting to the client as defined by section 73.092....

...lm of the absurd. The 1990 amendments plainly indicate the legislature did not intend the fee agreement to affect the fee award; the legislation expressly contemplated that a landowner might opt to contract to pay a fee greater than the fee awarded. § 73.092(5), Fla.Stat....

...This result, though peculiar, is mandated by the legislature. § 73.131(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB, HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] For purposes of calculating an attorney's fee in eminent domain cases, "benefit" is defined by section 73.092, Florida Statutes to be: [T]he difference between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...igher fee. The statute contemplates that the fee awarded under the statute may be less than the fee the landowner has agreed to pay and requires that the amount of fees payable under a fee agreement be reduced by the amount awarded by the court. See § 73.092(5), Fla.Stat....

...We note too that the effective hourly rate of compensation resulting from our decision in Humphrys came to about $375.00. Clayton, 665 So.2d at 365. [7] We acknowledge that in 1994 the legislature again amended this statute, resulting in use of a straight percentage. § 73.092, Fla.Stat....

...Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla. 1992) (stating that "prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987)")....

...the amount of $347,800.00. This award arose from an eminent domain proceeding it filed to acquire 96 acres of land for the purpose of constructing a soil disposal site. Both the appellant and the appellees (Humphryses) agree the award is governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1991), which provides: (1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...1992), wherein the supreme court stated that the contingency risk multiplier, as set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), was not applicable to inverse condemnation actions. The trial court also noted that previous language of section 73.092, which stated that under no circumstances should attorney's fees be based solely on a percentage of the award, had been deleted by 1990 revisions of the statute. In referring to subsection (4) of section 73.092, the court held: The guide is nonexistent in that, by statute, the governmental agency is liable to pay the landowners' attorney's fees. There is therefore no evidence available as to what sum a landowner would ordinarily pay his attorney if the governmental agency were not responsible for the fees. It is a ghost guide and therefore cannot be employed. The factors set forth in section 73.092(2) and the benefits resulting to the landowner from the services rendered are the criteria upon which the fees must be based....

...y, an agreement was for the attorney to be paid only what was awarded by the court. It was under this framework that the trial court felt restricted to the benefits to the landowner and the traditional considerations for attorney's fees set forth in section 73.092(2)....

...On appeal, FIND first contends that the trial court, in determining a fee award on the basis of a percentage of benefits without regard to an hourly rate, presents a conflict with Schick. We do not agree. The order of the trial court shows that it relied on section 73.092, as amended in 1990, and gave primary consideration to the benefits resulting to the Humphryses....

...This ruling, of course, could not be a legal benefit to the Humphryses in regard to any subsequent zoning dispute they may have with Brevard County for the simple reason that the latter was not a party to this litigation. As argued by the appellant, section 73.092 does not allow a trial court to attribute a benefit to a defendant owner's attorney for a ruling obtained by the condemning authority which precludes a potential damage claim by the owner....

...I am unable to find any evidence in the record supporting the trial court's award of a "blended rate" of 20 percent of the benefits received. I speculate that this award was a compromise arrived at because of the trial court's expressed difficulty in applying subparagraph 4 of the attorney's fees statute, section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1991), which reads: (4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected *498 to pay if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of fees and costs....

...Under the statutory scheme involved here, the legislature plainly contemplated that the fee assessed against the condemning authority might be different from (and greater than) the fee the landowner might be obligated to pay the attorney. What else could section 73.092(5) mean: The amount of attorney's fees to be paid by the defendant pursuant to a fee agreement entered into between the defendant and his attorney must be reduced by the amount of any attorney's fees awarded by the court. § 73.092(5), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Boyer opined that a reasonable fee would be somewhere between $60,000 and $72,000. FP & L's expert, Noah McKinnon, an eminent domain practictioner in Daytona Beach, testified that a reasonable fee would be between $17,500 and $22,500. The court awarded $40,250. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1983) governs the awarding of attorney's fees in condemnation actions and provides: In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall consider: (1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...SCHOONOVER, Judge. The State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT), challenges the amount of attorney's fees awarded to appellee, Cracker House Craftiques, Inc., in an eminent domain action. We find that the trial court erroneously applied section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995), rather than section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), in determining the award. We, accordingly, reverse and remand for the entry of an award pursuant to section 73.092(1)....

...Prior to the commencement of the action, DOT offered the appellee $50,400 for its property. The offer was refused. After DOT filed its petition and obtained an order of taking, the parties stipulated that the property was worth $54,200. A judgment for that amount was entered. The trial court, pursuant to section 73.092(2), awarded fees to the appellee in the amount of $3672.50. DOT filed a timely notice of appeal from that order. In eminent domain proceedings, attorney's fees are awarded under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 73.092(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client." When attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to section 73.092(1), the amount is determined by the use of a schedule. In this case the schedule would allow a fee of thirty-three percent of the benefit received by the appellee. § 73.092(1)(c). The exception referred to in section 73.092(1) is found in section 73.092(2). Under section 73.092(2), the award is based upon a "lodestar" analysis....

...supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for...." Since DOT used chapter 74, Florida Statutes (1995), entitled "PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL TO EMINENT DOMAIN," the trial court held that an assessment of attorney's fees had to be based upon section 73.092(2) because the fees were incurred for "other supplemental proceedings." Based upon the "lodestar" analysis required by section 73.092(1), the court awarded the appellee a fee of $3672.50. This was error. Section 73.092(2) is only applicable when attorney's fees, not otherwise provided for, are incurred for required proceedings that do not result in a monetary benefit upon which a fee can be based, e.g. in defeating an order of taking, a hearing on apportionment or other supplemental proceeding held for the purpose of determining the parties respective rights as a result of the action. § 73.092(2); State of Florida, Dep't of Transp....

...See also Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 143 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). Although the "quick take" procedure allowed by chapter 74 is called a supplemental proceeding, fees incurred during such a proceeding are "otherwise provided for" by virtue of section 73.092(1)....

...ceeding commenced under chapter 73. § 74.011, Fla. Stat. (1995). When an action brought pursuant to both chapters results in an award of benefits to the property owner, as it did in this case, attorney's fees are assessed based upon those benefits. § 73.092(1). Since the benefit to the appellee in this case amounted to $3800, the attorney's fee award should have been thirty-three percent of that amount, i.e. $1254. § 73.092(1)(c)....

...Appellant, Lee County, challenges the amount of attorney's fees awarded appellees, Peter F. Pierpont and Mary J. Pierpont, in an eminent domain action. We reverse and remand for a recalculation of the attorney's fees to be awarded. The principal issue in this appeal involves the application of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), to the circumstances of this case. By its terms, section 73.092, as amended in 1994, applies to all actions filed after October 1, 1994. It is, therefore, applicable to this case. The pertinent parts of section 73.092 provide as follows: 73.092 Attorney's fees.— 1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...The case was ultimately settled by a stipulated final judgment rendered on September 8, 1995, in which the parties agreed that appellees would receive $87,500 as full compensation for their property. The dispute as to the amount of attorney's fees awarded appellees arises over whether the section 73.092 statutory benefits achieved for appellees by their attorney should be calculated based on the difference between the final judgment amount of $87,500 and the county attorney's offer of $82,800, or the difference between the final judgment of $87,500 and the good faith estimate of the declaration of taking of $69,000. We conclude that the intent of section 73.092 as to the proper measure of the "benefits achieved" requires that the calculation be based on the difference between the final judgment amount and the amount contained in the offer by the county attorney in his letter of April 19, 1995. We make this conclusion because we do not perceive it to have been the legislature's intent to equate the statutorily mandated "good faith estimate of value" required by section 74.031 with the "written offer" contemplated in section 73.092. If that was the intent, section 73.092 should have made reference to the good faith estimate contained in and required by section 74.031. It does not. On the contrary, section 73.092 uses the specific term "written offer." The good faith estimate is not a "written offer." In fact, the good faith estimate is not even required or a part of a proceeding in eminent domain unless the condemning authority desires to acquire possession of and title to the property prior to entry of final judgment....

...In short, we conclude that the "good faith estimate" of value contained within a declaration of taking pursuant to Proceedings Supplemental to Eminent Domain contained in chapter 74 has no relationship to the "written offer" contemplated by the legislature in enacting section 73.092....

...Jack's Quick Cash, Inc., 748 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1998) governs the award of fees and costs in eminent domain proceedings, and provides: (1) The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s. 73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages are compensable, a reasonable accountant's fee, to be assessed by that court....

...tectural fees: $2,500.00 Upsala's surveying fees: $1,600.00 [4] We do not decide whether contingent fees for expert witnesses are improper because we conclude that Zook and Morris do not have contingent fee agreements. Interestingly, we observe that section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1998) mandates that in most cases, attorney's fees in eminent domain cases are contingent on the outcome of the case....

...of Goren, Cherof, Doody & Ezrol, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Erskine C. Rogers, III of Rutherford Mulhall, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellees Theodore Ryan and Gerhart Degen. STONE, J. In this eminent domain action, we reverse an order awarding attorney's fees under section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...calculating attorney's fees. The trial court measured the award from the first letter containing the lower "offer." We agree with City that the second letter was the offer applicable to computing the benefit to Appellees under the statutory scheme. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, provides, in part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s....

...In City of Jacksonville v. Tresca, 692 So.2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), which we deem instructive, the city negotiated an option to purchase to the landowner's property within 180 days for $107,000; the court held that this did not constitute an offer under section 73.092....

...Id. at 993. Appellees rely on Department of Transportation v. Lakepointe Associates, 745 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). In that case, the issue was whether the department's unsigned letter to the landowner constituted an "offer" within the meaning of section 73.092....

...(1997)(stating that an agency shall not formalize a contract to purchase property acquired by eminent domain for a period of thirty days, "to allow public review of the transaction"). Hence, it would be unreasonable to interpret the offer requirement of 73.092 to mean that the condemning authority must submit a self-executing offer that becomes a binding contract immediately upon acceptance....

...ettlement figure (without trial) was $815,000 together with accrued interest resulting in a contract fee of $69,267.60. This fee was paid by Kensington out of the settlement figure. At the subsequent hearing for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1989), the trial court, aware that it could not approve a fee based solely on a percentage of the award, heard testimony that it might have taken nonexpert attorneys up to 400 hours to achieve the settlement result a...

...ts of this case, was nevertheless reasonable at the time it was entered into and that unless the property owner recovers this amount (since it has paid it) it will in effect be denied full value for its property. But this misconstrues the purpose of section 73.092 in determining attorneys fees....

...Maguire, Clearwater, for Appellees. PATTERSON, Judge. The Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals from an award of attorney's fees in an eminent domain proceeding. We reverse and remand for further evidentiary proceedings to determine reasonable attorney's fees under section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The property owners then filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the agreement would have been consummated were it not for DOT's decision to indefinitely postpone the project and that section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), was controlling on the issue of the amount of attorney's fees. The court then awarded the property owners $331,400 in attorney's fees, which represented the percentage of benefits achieved based on the amount of $1,300,000 using the schedule contained in section 73.092(1)(c)....

...3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So.2d 20 (Fla.1976); City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253 So.2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The issue presented in this case of first impression is the procedure the trial court must use in awarding attorney's fees under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1995), when there has been a voluntary dismissal. The statute does not directly address this situation. Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: 73.092 Attorney's fees.— (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...e by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. Section 73.092(1) clearly does not apply in this case because the property owners received no benefits as detailed in section 73.092(1)(a). The predecessor statute, section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993), provided for consideration of factors other than the benefits to the client. That statute provided: 73.092 Attorney's fees— (1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

...(c) The amount of money involved. (d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney. (e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client. In 1994, the legislature revised section 73.092(2), with the intention of establishing mathematical certainty in the award of fees and to discourage property owners from rejecting DOT's reasonable offers of purchase. [1] Section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which applies in this case, states: (2) In assessing attorney's fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the c...

...(f) The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal services of a comparable or similar nature. (g) Any attorney's fee award made under subsection (1). This section is basically a restatement of the "secondary considerations" provided for in the 1993 version of the statute. See § 73.092(2), Fla....

...s of this case. We, therefore, reverse the award of attorney's fees and remand to the trial court for further evidentiary proceedings to determine a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the property owners' attorney using the criteria provided in section 73.092(2)....

...ant to article V, section 3(b)(3) and (4) of the Florida Constitution. The certified question reads as follows: WHETHER THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY'S GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE OF VALUE CAN BE CONSIDERED AN "OFFER" FOR THE CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1994)? Lee County v....

...A stipulated order of taking was then entered. Subsequently, the parties entered into a stipulated final judgment awarding Barnett $1,060,000 for its property. In each case, there was a dispute over the attorney's fees to be paid by the county. The argument turned on an interpretation of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which reads in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...In each instance, the trial court accepted the landowner's argument and awarded the larger amount of attorney's fees. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the orders on the premise that the good-faith estimate of value did not constitute a written offer as contemplated by section 73.092(1)(a)....

...Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla.1950); Schick v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 586 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 143 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). They contend that in order to uphold the constitutionality of section 73.092, we must interpret the term "written offer" to include a goodfaith estimate of value....

...The county responds that the legislature must be assumed to have used the word "offer" according to its traditional legal meaning and that a good-faith estimate of value is nothing more than that and is not a binding offer. The county asserts that before the enactment of section 73.092, the law encouraged protracted litigation and unnecessary expense, whereas the statute now authorizes an attorney's fee commensurate with the benefits obtained through the attorney's services....

...5th DCA), review denied, 686 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1996). Moreover, we do not believe that the constitution constrains us from accepting the county's interpretation of the statute. We hold that a good-faith estimate of value does not constitute a written offer as set forth in section 73.092....

...perty rights, and the court's determination that the estimate was made in good faith based upon a valid appraisal is not a finding of just compensation. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Broward County, 421 So.2d 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The language of section 73.092 does not permit us to conclude that a good-faith estimate of value is the equivalent of a written offer. Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative. However, we do not foreclose the possibility that under certain circumstances section 73.092 could be unconstitutional as applied....

...present statute. However, I believe Judge Blue's dissent has substantial merit and that the legislature should consider amending the statute so that the good-faith estimate of value in the quicktaking procedure equates to the "offer" referred to in section 73.092, Florida Statutes. A good-faith estimate upon which the government acquires title to land should be in fact the government's good-faith amount that it would advisedly pay for the land. Equating this amount to the "offer" referred to in section 73.092 would provide a logical procedure....

...Trussell, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee-State of Florida, Department of Transportation. STONE, Judge. We reverse trial court orders in this eminent domain action that deny Appellant's recovery of that portion of attorney's fees and costs incurred subsequent to Appellee's offer of judgment. Section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987), the agreed applicable eminent domain provision, reads, in pertinent part: Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner ......

...In this case, the order does not fully accomplish this task. Finally, the trial court's order awarded $25,000 for "the benefit obtained." The benefit resulting to a client is an important factor in determining an appropriate attorney's fee in an eminent domain proceeding. § 73.092, Fla....

...Graessle, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees. ROBERTS, J. In this eminent domain action, the JEA appeals a final order awarding additional attorney's fees. The JEA argues that the trial court erred in finding that the first letter to the appellees constituted an offer under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...A stipulated final judgment was entered requiring the JEA to pay the appellees $2 million for both parcels. On April 13, 2007, the trial court entered an amended order taxing statutory attorney's fees. The trial court found that the first letter constituted the JEA's "first written offer" for the purposes of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2004), and that the appellees had thereafter hired condemnation counsel....

...the right to a reasonable fee for the landowner's counsel. Tosohatchee Game Preserve, Inc. v. Cent. & S. Flood Control Dist., 265 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1972). The Legislature has made a provision for the award of attorney's fees in eminent domain cases in section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides, in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...If no written offer is made before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. Once the "benefits" are determined, the attorney's fees are computed using a formula also found in section 73.092....

...The JEA argues that the attorney's fees should be based on the difference between the third offer of $500,000 and the $2 million awarded by the trial court. The JEA asserts that the first letter was an offer to purchase property in an arm's length real estate transaction, thereby rendering section 73.092 inapplicable....

...rather the initiation of presuit negotiations as contemplated by section 73.015, Florida Statutes. Thus, the appellees sought the advice and services of a condemnation attorney. The JEA also argues that the first letter was not a binding offer under section 73.092 because it sought to acquire a different interest on the original property and less total property than the final taking. The JEA asserts that section 73.092 should be construed only to compute attorney's fees based on the first offer after the condemning authority finalizes its plans for the project. However, such a construction is not supported by the text of section 73.092 and judicial interpretation of the statute is not appropriate where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. See Citizens of the State of Fla. v. *846 Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 435 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1983). Section 73.092 states that attorney's fees are computed based on the difference between the last written offer before the landowner has hired counsel and the final judgment....

...The JEA further argues that the first letter was not a binding offer because it did not contain definite terms. The JEA cites City of Jacksonville v. Tresca, 692 So.2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that an offer must be binding for it to constitute an offer under section 73.092....

...but rather had entered into an option contract whereby the city could purchase the property at a designated amount if it elected to do so. Because an option contract did not obligate the city to purchase the property, it could not be an offer under section 73.092....

...The agreement could be executed immediately at the appellees' discretion. The letter did not include any conditional language regarding its obligation to purchase the property. As such, the JEA was bound to the terms of the first letter, thus making it an offer under section 73.092....

...Lee County, 710 So.2d 958, 960 (Fla.1998). We conclude that the trial court properly computed attorney's fees based on the difference between the amount of the offer in the first letter and the stipulated final judgment amount. Because we find that the trial court correctly applied section 73.092, the order is AFFIRMED. KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This proposition is inconsistent with the position advanced by the JEA that the third offer is controlling for the purposes of section 73.092 because the resolution was passed preceding the second offer.

...ch the attorneys were entitled. With the exception of one portion of the attorneys' fee award that is not contested, we reverse because the balance of the attorneys' fees awarded should have been based on the defeat of a whole take *1174 pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1997), instead of being based on obtaining a nonmonetary benefit pursuant to section 73.092(1)(b)....

...Thereafter, Mr. Patel's attorneys filed a motion to tax costs and attorneys' fees. Counsel for the parties stipulated to the attorneys' fee to be awarded to Mr. Patel's attorneys as determined by the percentage of the benefit achieved in accordance with section 73.092(1)(a). However, the parties disputed whether Mr. Patel's attorneys were entitled to an additional fee based on a nonmonetary benefit pursuant to section 73.092(1)(b). A hearing was held on that question. At the hearing, Mr. Patel's attorneys argued that they were entitled to an additional fee, pursuant to section 73.092(1)(b), because they had obtained three nonmonetary benefits for Mr....

...to an additional fee based upon the nonmonetary benefit the attorneys achieved in defeating the motion. *1175 Relying on the testimony of Mr. Patel's experts, the trial court concluded that the nonmonetary benefits totaled $148,469 and, pursuant to section 73.092(1)(b), awarded his attorneys 33% of that amount as an additional fee, which totaled $48,995....

...that saving the remainder does not constitute a nonmonetary benefit. We agree. Under the unique facts of this case, the most that can be said is that Mr. Patel's attorneys defeated a whole taking for which attorneys' fees may be awarded, pursuant to section 73.092(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees for obtaining nonmonetary benefits and remand to the trial court to consider an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 73.092(2)....

MAY, C.J. This appeal challenges the trial court’s application of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2008), to award attorney’s fees in an eminent domain proceeding....

...The owner was represented by counsel from the inception of this acquisition. The owner rejected the offer. The government subsequently filed an eminent domain action, resulting in a final judgment taking the property. The owner then requested attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 73.092....

...ng which writing constituted the first written offer for calculating attorney’s fees, it involves a question of law for which we have de novo review. See Osborne v. Dumoulin, 55 So.3d 577, 581 (Fla.2011). The calculation of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 uses a benefits approach....

...e by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092(1), Fla....

...The second letter, which referenced section 73.015, indicated the commission had already approved the acquisition. Id. at 1100 . We emphasized that where the condemning authority is not bound by an owner’s acceptance, an offer is irrelevant for the purpose of calculating attorney’s fees under section 73.092....

...The last letter sent by certified mail to the owner, in accordance with section 73.015, expressed the government’s offer to purchase the property in certain, definite terms; was immediately binding upon the owner’s acceptance; and, contained no contingencies. It was the “first written offer” for purposes of section 73.092....

...omain proceeding. It also requires the condemning authority to inform the property owner that all or a portion of the property is necessary for a project, the nature of the project, and the property owner's statutory rights under sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...mpensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.” This case involves an award of attorney’s fees in an eminent domain proceeding. The award of such fees is governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2014),1 which provides, in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s....

...The jury found that the land had a fair market value of $5,744,830. Id. Thereafter, Doerr and Ministry (collectively the Landowners) filed a motion for attorney’s fees. Id. The Authority sought to limit the fees to the benefits achieved formula under section 73.092(1), which generated an award of $227,652.25. Id. On the other hand, the Landowners asserted that they were entitled to attorney’s fees under section 73.092(2), which requires a trial court to consider qualitative and quantitative factors in determining the amount of a fee 3....

...The trial court awarded fees under subsection (2) because it concluded that the Authority’s presuit written offer was insufficient to calculate the benefits achieved by each Landowner in the final judgment so as to permit a fee award under subsection (1). Id. at 414. Applying the factors listed in section 73.092(2), the trial court awarded the Landowners $816,000 in attorney’s fees for the proceedings that involved the valuation of Parcel 406....

...s a total of $672,000. It was also paid $150,000 for the cost phase of the trial. Id. at 413. Although the Fifth District concluded that the attorney’s fees for the valuation proceedings were limited to those allowed by section 73.092(1), it remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Landowners’ claim that the -5- application of the benefits achieved formula violated their constitutional right to full compensation because the Authority caused excessive litigation....

...testified as to what would constitute a reasonable fee, including the Authority’s expert, agreed that it would be unreasonable, given the circumstances of this case, to limit the Landowners to the $227,652.25 capped fee that the benefits achieved formula in section 73.092(1) generated.4 The court explained: Applying this Court’s conclusion that $350 an hour is a reasonable rate to such a fee would mean that [the Landowners] could only expend 650 attorney hours and no paralegal...

...s the particular facts of the litigation.” -7-  case, if [the Authority] was permitted to expend more than five (5) times the number of hours than [the Landowners]. The trial court held that section 73.092(1) was unconstitutional as applied under the facts of this case because it operated to deny the Landowners their right to full compensation....

...This is especially true since it was [the Authority] that was primarily responsible for the excessive litigation because of its decision to use Fishkind. The court noted that in determining the fee, it had considered and applied the factors delineated in sections 73.092(2) and (3). On appeal, the Fifth District again reversed....

...IN A FEE THAT COMPENSATES THE LANDOWNER’S ATTORNEYS AT A LOWER-THAN-MARKET FEE, WHEN MEASURED BY THE TIME INVOLVED, IS THE STATUTORY FEE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, ENTITLING THE LANDOWNER TO PURSUE A FEE UNDER SECTION 73.092(2)? Id. For purposes of our review, we rephrase the question as follows: IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING, WHEN THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY ENGAGES IN TACTICS THAT CAUSE EXCESSIVE LITIGATION, IS THE BENEFITS ACHIEVED FORMULA IN SECTION 73.092(1), FLORIDA STATUTES, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO CALCULATE ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR THE HOURS INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE EXCESSIVE LITIGATION? ANALYSIS...

...Legislature has intended to deprive the owner of the property of the full protection which belongs to him as a matter of right. Dade Cnty. v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 1950) (emphasis supplied). Section 73.092 The benefits achieved formula set forth in section 73.092 has encroached on this fundamental right, but has previously withstood a facial constitutional challenge. In Seminole County v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 691 So. 2d 614, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District rejected an assertion that section 73.092 is unconstitutional because it divests the judiciary of the ability - 11 - to determine reasonable attorney’s fees for a private property owner....

...1992)], the supreme court stated that the legislature can enact attorney’s fees provisions which “it deems will result in a reasonable award.” Id. at 644. Id. at 615. Subsequent to Seminole County, this Court addressed the benefits achieved formula in section 73.092(1) and notwithstanding the compromise of “full compensation” allowed the Florida Legislature to enact “reasonable” provisions to govern attorney’s fees awards in eminent domain proceedings. Pierpont v. Lee Cnty., 710 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 1998). Consistent with Pierpont and Seminole County, and in accordance with the directives of the statute, Florida courts have awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(1) where subsection (2) has no application....

...ard that it runs afoul of the constitutional - 12 - guarantee that private property owners receive full compensation for a taking of their property. Indeed, in Pierpont we acknowledged the possibility that section 73.092 could be unconstitutional as applied in certain situations....

...s experts who testified as to what would be a reasonable fee, including the expert for the Authority, agreed that given the circumstances of this case, it would be unreasonable to limit the Landowners to the capped fee generated by the formula in section 73.092(1). We agree with the Landowners that where a condemning authority is responsible for excessive litigation, the application of subsection (1) to limit a fee award places private property owners at a considerable disadvantage because government entities, such as the Authority,6 possess potentially unlimited resources to allocate to abusive litigation and legal representation. See generally Shell, 135 So. 2d at 861. Further, it is important to note that section 73.092 applies only to attorney’s fees for private property owners....

...The Authority is a State agency. See § 348.753(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). - 14 - 265 So. 2d at 684-85; JEA, 978 So. 2d at 845. Accordingly, without a remedy to protect private property owners under such circumstances, section 73.092(1) would be unconstitutional as applied. Therefore, to construe section 73.092(1) in a manner that preserves its constitutionality, as we have a duty to do, see Crist, 978 So. 2d at 139, while simultaneously protecting the right of private property owners to full compensation, we hold that when a condemning authority engages in tactics that cause excessive litigation, the trial court shall utilize section 73.092(2) to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee, but only for those hours incurred in defending against the excessive litigation or that portion that is considered to be in response to or caused by the excessive tactics. The remainder of the fee shall be calculated pursuant to the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1)....

...uld be in the category of excessive litigation that resulted from the excessive tactics. There was no need for the trial judge to do so at that time because the limits established by this decision were not in place. The trial court concluded that section 73.092(1) 7....

...- was unconstitutional as applied and did not employ the benefits achieved formula to calculate any portion of the attorney’s fee award. As a result, 2,200 attorney hours and 400 paralegal hours were multiplied by reasonable hourly rates under section 73.092(2) to obtain an award of $816,000. We conclude that application of a simple and normal hourly multiplication to calculate the attorney’s fee award is inconsistent with the language of section 73.092(1), which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section and s....

...litigation conduct caused by the Authority and may be determined to be that portion of the total work performed attributable to the excessive actions of the condemning counsel or party. For solely those hours, the trial court shall calculate a fee pursuant to section 73.092(2). This additional amount shall be added to the amount resulting from the application of section 73.092(1), which must be applied to determine the remainder of the fee based on benefit, which in this case is $227,652.25. - 17 -  Sanctions The Fift...

...faith conduct or was motivated by improper considerations. Therefore, we reject the contention that the - 18 - Landowners were required to pursue sanctions in lieu of challenging the constitutionality of section 73.092(1) as applied where the Authority was responsible for excessive litigation. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative. We hold that when a condemning authority engages in tactics that cause excessive litigation, section 73.092(2) shall be used separately and additionally to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee for the hours expended which are attributable to defending against the excessive litigation or actions. This will result in an amount that must be added to the remainder of the fee calculated utilizing the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1)....

...it of $58,098. Appellants claim that they are entitled to an additional attorney's fees award of 33% of the profit they earned during the extension period. The trial court found that there were no monetary or nonmonetary benefits to appellants under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1995), and denied entitlement to attorney's fees as to the business profit. All parties stipulated that appellants are not entitled to business damages because DOT sought a "whole taking." CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES (1995) Appellants argue, for the first time on appeal, that section 73.092, Florida *1229 Statutes (1995), is unconstitutional as applied and interpreted by the lower court to the factual circumstances of this case....

...e." Id. The right to attorney's fees incurred in seeking business damages or a "nonmonetary benefit" is not a fundamental right. Appellants waived their constitutional argument by not raising it below. FAILURE TO AWARD ENTITLEMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995) provides, inter alia, that: the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client. (Emphasis supplied). Section 73.092(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) provides: The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney.......

...Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that profits of a business derived after the condemning authority has consented to extend possession are benefits achieved for the client, such that additional attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to section 73.092....

...In case number 96-2704, Judith P. Tresca and Sylvia F. Sinclair appeal from a judgment awarding attorney's fees in the same eminent domain action as case number 96-2425. Tresca and Sinclair assert that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 73.092, Florida Statutes, by determining that an offer of an option to purchase Tresca's property constituted a valid offer under the statute....

...After the return of the verdict, Tresca and Sinclair filed a motion to assess attorney's fees. At the hearing on this motion, counsel for the landowners presented a proposed judgment as to attorney's fees based on the fact that the city's last written offer was the good-faith deposit of $50,000; therefore, pursuant to section 73.092(1)(c)1, Florida Statutes (1995), the benefit obtained for the landowners was $132,000 ($182,000 minus $50,000), 33 percent of which (the statutory fee) amounted to $43,560....

...benefit to the landowners rather than the $50,000 which was the good-faith deposit by the city in the condemnation action. Based on the $107,000 figure, the trial court awarded a fee in the amount of $24,750 (33 percent of $182,000 minus $107,000). Section 73.092, Florida Statutes, provides for attorney's fees in eminent domain cases as follows: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, *993 shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. In Lee County v. Pierpont, 693 So.2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the second district attempted to define the word "offer" as used in section 73.092, and stated, An "offer" has been defined as follows: A proposal to do a thing or pay an amount, usually accompanied by an expected acceptance, counter-offer, return promise or act....

...emand to utilize the $50,000 figure as urged by appellants. JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Counsel for petitioner does not assert on appeal or in the trial court that the "good faith deposit" does not constitute an offer pursuant to § 73.092, Fla.Stat....

...Accordingly, we reverse. We also reverse the $400 expert witness fee award. Barnett Bank called Mr. Hume to testify as an expert witness on the question of attorney's fees. Mr. Hume's testimony consisted only of his opinion as to the legal interpretation of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...nt its motion to certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: WHETHER THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY'S GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE OF VALUE CAN BE CONSIDERED AN "OFFER" FOR THE CALCULATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1994)? *35 Rehearing and clarification denied; question certified....

...ication of Amoco's entitlement to recover costs. However, we write to explain our conclusion that the trial court erred in finding that the post-judgment costs hearing does not fall within the type of "other supplemental proceedings" contemplated in section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Weekly Supp. 79 (Fla. 6th Jud. Cir. Sept. 11, 1998) (where FDOT elected to litigate defendant's motion to tax costs after entry of final judgment, attorney's fees and costs *113 incurred by defendant in connection with that litigation were incurred in § 73.092(2) "supplemental proceedings," and defendant was entitled to recover those fees and costs from FDOT). Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, deals with eminent domain. The statute titled "Costs of the proceedings" states in pertinent part: The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s. 73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages, are compensable, a reasonable accountant's fees, to be assessed by that court....

...In eminent domain proceedings, attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to the statute titled "Attorney's fees," which states initially: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney's fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client. § 73.092(1), Fla....

...urt may also consider nonmonetary benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified. § 73.092(1)(b), Fla....

...The next section of the statute provides: In assessing attorney's fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider [various factors set forth in subsections (a) through (g)]. § 73.092(2), Fla....

...Some costs were disputed, and a costs hearing was held in February 1999, after which the court entered its order awarding a substantial portion of the amount requested in Amoco's Motion to Tax Costs. Although the costs hearing constituted a "supplemental proceeding," as contemplated in section 73.092(2), the trial court correctly found that the matter of attorney's fees already had been fully resolved pursuant to the parties' own agreement, so that Amoco's motion for additional fees was properly denied....

...Without regard to the trial court's jurisdiction, it entered a final order that was timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction to review that order and conclude that the matter is better resolved on the primary legal issue. III. NONMONETARY BENEFITS AS A BASIS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES Section 73.092(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), [4] states that when determining the amount of attorneys' fees awarded in an eminent domain proceeding, *1166 [t]he court may also consider nonmonetary benefits obtained for the client through the effort...

...Prior to 1990, attorneys' fees in eminent domain proceedings were set utilizing a different and more generous set of factors. In 1994, the statute was amended to establish a policy of setting fees "solely on the benefits achieved for the client." Ch. 94-162, Laws of Fla.; § 73.092(1)....

...The court is entitled to award fees based on a percentage of the value of the nonmonetary benefit. Also added in 1994 is the requirement that the nonmonetary benefit be specifically identified by the court and quantified within a reasonable degree of certainty. See § 73.092(2)(b). In this case, there can be little question that the lawyers "helped" their client and performed a valuable service for RFT. The harder question is whether this help was a "benefit" "in eminent domain proceedings." § 73.092(1)....

...[3] We are not called upon to determine whether the attorneys' fees, if appropriate, would be based on a measure of the change in value of the property or the presumably smaller cost to correct the change in grade at the intersection. [4] The language of section 73.092 has not been substantially amended since 1995....

...urly rate of $38,500 ($226,400 + $38,500 = $264,900) and then divided this total by 3 for a fee of $88,300 ($264,900 ÷ 3 = $88,300). On appeal, Seminole County advances several constitutional challenges to the eminent domain attorney's fee statute, section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...This case is controlled by our recent decisions in Delco Oil and Clayton. In these cases, we rejected the County's constitutional challenges to the attorney's fees statute. However, we agreed with the County that the methods utilized by the trial courts in those cases did not comport with the statutory requirements of section 73.092....

...On 30 January 1995, DEP moved to voluntarily dismiss its petition, alleging that access to Gibbins' property was no longer necessary. The trial court granted the motion. On the same day, Gibbins filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes, asserting that he had defeated "an order of taking." On 6 July 1995, the court ruled that DEP's administrative order for site access and petition for injunctive relief constituted a taking....

...The court finds that the administrative proceedings and the complaint filed herein constitute a "taking" of [Gibbins'] property as defined by Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. (1968). [2] 2. [Gibbins] is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the "taking" pursuant to § 73.091 and § 73.092, Fla....

...The State of Florida, Department of Transportation (the Department), appeals an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Smithbilt Industries, Inc. (Smithbilt), on a business damages claim in an eminent domain proceeding. We affirm the trial court's decision to award fees pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1995), because the claim for statutory business damages was tried after the issue of taking had been resolved and after all elements of constitutional compensation had been awarded and was, therefore, a "supplemen...

...the value of the land taken, severance damages, and cost to cure. The Department `s first written offer on these claims totaled $57,000 and the final settlement was $138,000. For these claims, the attorneys' fees were properly determined pursuant to section 73.092(1), using the "benefits achieved" method, which allowed for an award of 33% of the difference between the first written offer and the final settlement....

...The parties were unable to settle Smithbilt's claim for business damages. The Department never made any written offer to settle this claim. Neither party made a formal offer of judgment, and a jury ultimately awarded $35,000 to Smithbilt. Thereafter, Smithbilt sought attorneys' fees pursuant to section 73.092(2). The Department maintained that fees should be awarded pursuant to section 73.092(1) on the theory that its failure to make any written offer should be equated with a written "offer" of zero dollars. Thus, according to the Department, the fees to be awarded should have been 33% of the jury's award, i.e., $11,665.50. The trial court agreed with Smithbilt and awarded fees of *965 $35,000 pursuant to section 73.092(2). [1] Chapter 94-162 of the Laws of Florida amended section 73.092 for all actions filed after October 1, 1994....

...t by the amount of any attorney's fees awarded by the court. Prior to the 1994 amendments, fees were established with emphasis upon the benefits achieved but with secondary consideration of the first five factors now contained in subsection (2). See § 73.092, Fla....

...to include cases in which the Department makes no true offer. In addition, we question whether a bad faith offer of $1 would actually circumvent Smithbilt's argument, but we have no need to reach that issue in this case. We are inclined to hold that section 73.092(2) should govern awards of attorneys' *967 fees in all eminent domain proceedings in which the condemning authority fails to make a written offer to settle the claim or which otherwise cannot be resolved using the benefit analysis in section (1). In this case, however, we can fashion a narrower holding. Section 73.092 contains no definition of "other supplemental proceeding." In normal usage, a supplemental proceeding occurs at the end of a proceeding, usually after a final judgment has been entered....

...See § 56.29, Fla. Stat. (1997). Oddly, in chapter 74, the quick-take provisions used in eminent domain in advance of a final judgment are referred to as "proceedings supplemental." These proceedings, however, are not the "supplemental proceedings" described in section 73.092. State, Dep't of Transp. v. LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So.2d 947, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). [4] The grammar in the initial sentence of section 73.092(2) could be improved, but it suggests that even a proceeding in which a taking is defeated is a supplemental proceeding. Thus, the legislature's definition of "other supplemental proceedings" in section 73.092(2) is open to some speculation....

...hold that subsection (2) should be used to determine attorneys' fees in an eminent domain trial that is limited to the issue of business damages. Affirmed. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] This award was based on the factors in section 73.092(2). It is coincidental that the attorneys' fees equal the jury's verdict on business damages. [2] In addition to amending section 73.092, chapter 94-162 also amended section 73.032 in order to allow a defendant in an eminent domain proceeding to make an offer of judgment....

...and (3), even if the Department has made a written offer under subsection (1). See § 73.032(6), Fla. Stat. (1995). Because Smithbilt made no offer of judgment, this provision has no direct application in this case. [3] The written offer required by section 73.092(1) includes written offers that do not comply with all of the requirements to create an offer of judgment under section 73.032. [4] Dicta in the LaBelle Phoenix case suggested that section 73.092(2) is "only applicable when attorneys' fees, not otherwise provided for, are incurred for required proceedings that do not result in a monetary benefit upon which a fee can be based." LaBelle Phoenix, 696 So.2d at 948. LaBelle Phoenix involved a written offer from the Department and circumstances in which section 73.092(1) could be applied. Although we have a monetary benefit in this case, it is not one upon which a fee can be based due to the definition of "benefit" in section 73.092(1).

...NOTES [1] Hereinafter referred to as the 1976 decision. [2] Hereinafter referred to as the 1978 decision. [3] We note that we affirmed an award for fees that broke down to $340 per hour in an eminent domain proceeding, when such award complied with Section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...value for the properties taken by the Department of Transportation (DOT), appellants filed two separate motions for attorney's fees. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted their motions and awarded them attorney's fees pursuant to section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), based on the monetary benefit achieved. However, the court denied appellant's request for additional fees pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), "as there has been no defeat of an order of taking, apportionment proceedings, or other supplementary proceeding...." Further, the court declined to award fees for the hours spent litigating the issue as to the amount of attorney's fees. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ation v. LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So.2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In LaBelle, as here, the parties stipulated as to value of property taken by the DOT. Our sister court reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the property owners under section 73.092(2) and remanded for a determination of a fee pursuant to section 73.092(1)....

...it of which inures solely to its attorney." AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. W. SHARP, J., concurs specially, with opinion. W. SHARP, Judge, concurring specially. I concur with the result in this case, but write because I believe that the language of section 73.092(2), is fraught with problems and may be constitutionally defective....

...ee recovery to those fees incurred "in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings." See State, Dept. of Transportation v. LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So.2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The limitation contained in section 73.092(2) prohibits recovery of attorneys fees in certain cases....

...a Statutes, on May 25, 1989, to acquire a portion of the landowners' property. On the same day that the petition was filed, the County served the landowners with an offer of judgment pursuant to rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987), in the amount of $123,900, exclusive of costs and fees....

...Alford, 444 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1984). Hence, the prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987). See Phillips v. Parrish, 585 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The trial court was correct in striking the offer of judgment. We affirm. DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 73.092(7) provides, in pertinent part, that: Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner, pursuant to the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure, is either rejected or expires and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of j...

...er court reached in a former appeal, and correction of the error would make an appeal to a higher court unnecessary. Id. The present case in our judgment fits squarely into that exception, and, because manifest injustice to the state would result if section 73.092 is erroneously interpreted to include the use of a multiplier in determining attorney fee awards, we consider it is our responsibility to reject strict adherence to the law of the case and revisit the issue....

...ttorney's fee, that specific statute controls — not Rowe — and if the statute does not contemplate the use of additional factors, such as multipliers, then those factors cannot be considered in determining the award. The applicable statute at bar, section 73.092, lists six specific criteria that must be considered when assessing fees....

...Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying a contingency risk multiplier in the instant case. The award entered, therefore, must be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court with directions that it determine the attorney's fee award based solely on the factors set forth under section 73.092....

...ances" one would not be justified. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 835. It would seem from our reading of Quanstrom, however, that any unusual circumstance justifying the application of a risk multiplier would pertain only to the six factors specified under section 73.092....

...e in an inverse condemnation action. For example, in Department of Natural Resources v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 374 So.2d 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 1980), the Third District not only applied the factors set forth in section 73.092, but considered as well Canon 2 of the Professional Code of Responsibility, which authorizes consideration of the contingent nature of the fee arrangement. For all the above reasons, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: IN DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD MADE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73.092, FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE ROWE CONTINGENCY RISK MULTIPLIER APPLICABLE IN AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION, BASED UPON A RECORD IN WHICH IT IS CLEARLY APPARENT THAT IT WAS INITIALLY HIGHLY UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS WOULD PREVAIL ON...

...ney’s fees. Section 73.091 sets forth the parameters within which to award attorney’s fees. It basically provides that “the petitioner,” which in eminent domain cases is the condemning authority, “shall pay attorney’s fees as provided in s. 73.092.” 1 Section 73.092 provides the criteria to be used to determine the amount of the attorney’s fees award and contemplates that the condemning authority make a written offer by which the “benefits achieved” can be measured....

...governed by the provisions of sections 73.091-.092, Florida Statutes (1985), rather than Rowe.”). The owners would have us disregard this clear supreme court precedent because the owners in Schick assumed without question that sections 73.091 and 73.092 applied....

...1st DCA 1966) (affirming the award of attorney’s fees because it would be absurd for the Department to be liable for fees if it instituted an eminent domain action, but escaped liability if it unlawfully appropriated a citizen’s property without instituting such an action). Section 73.092(2) states: (2) In assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider: (a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved....

...(e) The attorney’s time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client. (f) The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal services of a comparable or similar nature. (g) Any attorney’s fee award made under subsection (1). When section 73.092(2) applies, application of the Rowe risk multiplier is inappropriate to determine the attorney’s fee award because the statute sets forth the statutory factors to consider in an inverse condemnation action....

...offer, because it made no offer to settle. In eminent domain proceedings, the condemning authority generally tenders a settlement offer because the condemning authority acknowledges that there has been a taking from the outset. In such cases, under section 73.092(l)(a), the condemning authority would preserve its statutory right to limit an attorney’s fee award. On the other hand, when an authority, like the City in this case, defends an inverse condemnation action, it undertakes the position that the City’s actions did not constitute a taking. Section 73.092(1) provides the measure to set an award of fees “based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.” Section 73.092(l)(a) calculates that fee based on the difference between the final result and the condemning authority’s last written offer. The plain language of section 73.092(l)(a) thus establishes a written offer as a prerequisite to the application of section 73.092(1)....

...See State Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithbilt Indus., Inc., 715 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The definition of ‘benefits’ in subsection (l)(a) unquestionably requires that the condemn *355 ing authority make a written settlement offer.”). Section 73.092(1), however, does not provide a method to calculate a fee award when the condemning authority fails to make a written offer. We thus conclude that a written offer is mandated to award attorney’s fees based solely on the “benefits achieved” under section 73.092(1) and hold that a limitation on the fee award is inappropriate to inverse condemnation cases where the condemning authority makes no written offer. In this inverse condemnation case, there is no written offer. Attorney’s fees must thus be awarded under the enumerated factors set forth in section 73.092(2), applicable to supplemental proceedings....

...n of the award, and remand the cause with directions to award attorney’s fees in the amount of $48,260. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded. . Costs of the proceedings.— (1) The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s. 73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees and, when business damages are compensa-ble, a reasonable accountant's fee, to be assessed by that court. . Specifically, section 73.092(1) provides, in pertinent part: Attorney's fees....

(Supp. 1994), and 73.131(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). Section 73.092(1) provides that generally an award of attorney’s

...The court denied Hess's motion for attorney's fees based on nonmonetary benefits as well as its motion to strike DOT's settlement offer. This appeal followed. By law, attorney's fees in eminent domain cases are to be awarded solely on the basis of the benefits achieved for the client by the attorney. See § 73.092(1), Fla. Stat. Monetary benefits are defined as "the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney." § 73.092(1)(a), Fla....

...Both sides submitted conflicting evidence on the issue of nonmonetary benefits. Nonmonetary benefits may only be awarded by the court "to the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified." *278 § 73.092(1)(b), Fla....

...Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority (“OOCEA”) appeals a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $816,000 in an eminent domain proceeding. The primary issue on appeal concerns the lower court’s refusal to limit attorney’s fees awarded to the landowners to those permitted by section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2006), based on a pre-suit offer made by OOCEA....

...s. Following entry of the verdict, Landowners filed a separate motion to recover their “statutory” fees and/or any fees permitted by article X, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. OOCEA sought to limit attorney’s fees to those permitted by section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2006), which requires the court to award fees “solely on the benefits achieved for the client.” Id. (emphasis added). Landowners argued they were entitled to the more generous “reasonable” attorney’s fees allowed by section 73.092(2), and/or the Florida Constitution. The issue was brought before the court on a motion filed by Landowners to preclude application of section 73.092(1). The trial court ultimately agreed with Landowners that section 73.092(1) could not be used to award fees in this case, but that fees should be awarded pursuant to the “reasonable fee” provision of section 73.092(2), using the factors set forth in the statute. As part of its ruling, the court rejected OOCEA’s argument that Landowners had waived the right to challenge an award of fees under the “benefits achieved” provisions of section 73.092(1). It further found that FMW’s fee agreement, which obligated the firm to accept “statutory” fees, did not limit it to fees pursuant to section 73.092(1). OOCEA’s argument that the separate bonus already paid to FMW must be deducted from any fee award was mooted by FMWs agreement to return the bonus to its clients. Because section 73.092(1) was found inapplicable, the trial judge did not reach Landowners’ argument that application of the statute would be unconstitutional under the facts and circumstances existing in this case....

...The fees collected by OOCEA’s attorneys were similarly sizable. 5 OOCEA has now appealed the fees awarded to Landowners for the “valuation” portion of the proceedings. 6 OOCEA argues that Landowners should have been limited to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to subsection (1) of section 73.092. The statute instructs the court that, “except as otherwise provided in this section and section 73.015,” the sole factor to consider in awarding fees in an eminent domain proceeding is the “benefits achieved” for the client. § 73.092(1), Fla. Stat. Fees are calculated as a percentage of the “benefits achieved.” § 73.092(l)(c), Fla. Stat. The attorneys are entitled to thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000, twenty-five percent of a benefit between $250,000 and $1 million, and twenty percent of any benefit exceeding $1 million. § 73.092(l)(c), 1.-3., Fla. Stat. ■ Subsection (1) of section 73.092 must be compared with subsection (2) of the same statute, which applies to “attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for....” § 73.092(2), Fla....

...quately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client; (6) the fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal services of a comparable or similar nature; and (7) any attorney’s fee award made under subsection (1). § 73.092(2)(a)-(g), Fla....

...etween landowners. The statute nonetheless appears to contain a “gap.” See Sarasota Cnty. v. Curry, 861 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 2d *414 DCA 2003); Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithbilt Ind., Inc., 715 So.2d 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The gap arises because section 73.092(1) requires a condemning authority to make a written offer to a landowner, before its limiting provisions can come into play, due to the definition of “benefits achieved” set forth in the statute....

...e by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Moreover, section 73.092(2) is limited by its terms to fees incurred “in defeating an order of taking and in supplemental proceedings, when fees are not otherwise provided for.” The gap occurs with respect to fees incurred in valuation proceedings, when no written offer is made. Curry, 861 So.2d at 1242 (explaining “section 73.092 contains a ‘gap’ by failing to provide a method for calculating attorney’s fees in cases in which the benefits analysis is not applicable and the proceeding is not a supplemental one.”); Smithbilt, 715 So.2d at 966 (stating “...

...As to these cases, courts have determined that fees should be awarded pursuant to subsection (2), even though the statute does not appear to apply by its terms. See, e.g., Curry, 861 So.2d at 1242 . 7 The dispute in this case over the application of section 73.092(1) centers on whether a valid written offer was made to Landowners, so as to permit the lower court to ascertain the “benefits achieved” by Landowners under section 73.092(1), when measured against the final verdict of $5,744,830....

...“insufficiently certain and/or definite,” and accepted Landowners’ argument that the offer was insufficient to permit the court to calculate the “benefits achieved” by each defendant in the final judgment, so as to permit a fee award under section 73.092(1). The lower court found that Landowners were entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(2). OOCEA argues in this appeal that the only “written offer” required by section 73.092(1) is a written offer to Landowners for the entire fee, and that the statute cannot be construed to require it to separately state the interests of each individual condemnee, as this conflicts with the pre-suit offer requirements imposed on condemning authorities by section 73.015, Florida Statutes (2006). OOCEA theorizes that the pre-suit written offer made to Doerr on June 5, 2006, to “purchase Parcel 406 for $4,914,221.00, subject to all apportionment claims,” constituted a written offer for purposes of section 73.092(1), that simply made clear the offer was intended *415 to cover all who held an interest in the property....

...er for the value of the fee owner’s interest, exclusive of the leasehold or other interests of third parties in the fee. Regardless, they contend that the offer that was made cannot be used as the basis of a “benefits achieved” fee award under section 73.092(1)....

...They insist that because of the failure to specify a dollar amount for the Landowners’ interests, as distinguishable from those of Florida Container, the “benefits achieved” by Landowners in the valuation proceedings cannot be calculated, precluding a fee award pursuant to section 73.092(1)....

...2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.02[6][f] (3d ed. 2006). 10 Despite the unified offer made in this case, we reject Landowners’ argument that OOCEA’s pre-suit offer does not permit an award of fees based on the “benefits achieved ” by Landowners, as required by section 73.092(1). The statute initially defines “benefits” to mean “the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final judgment or settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney.” § 73.092(l)(a), Fla....

...The offer was made six years after suit had been brought. It was accepted by the landowners and final judgment was entered in accordance with the offer. The court accepted the county’s contention that the offer of judgment constituted a “written offer” for purposes of section 73.092(1), but nevertheless found that fees could not be awarded to Curry, one of the landowners, under the subsection....

...as therefore impossible to determine the “benefits achieved” from his final settlement, which resulted in a payment to him of $7,666.67. The Curry court went on to hold that under the circumstances of the case, fees should be awarded pursuant to section 73.092(2), despite recognition that “[a] plain language reading of that subsection suggests that it would be inapplicable in this case because the underlying action was not a ‘supplemental proceeding.’ ” 861 So.2d at 1242 . The court nonetheless felt that application of subsection (2) was necessary in “gap” proceedings “to give effect to the legislature’s intent that the landowner receive attorney’s fees under section 73.092 based on the landowners’ constitutional right to full compensation in eminent domain proceedings.” Id....

...Once these fee limits are determined, we see no reason why the trial judge cannot allocate the benefits among those who went to trial, much as he apportions the value of the property during supplemental proceedings. 15 Nonetheless, we leave that issue for another day. We believe that our construction of section 73.092(1) gives maximum effect to the legislature’s intent to limit fees during the valuation portion of the condemnation proceedings to those derived in achieving benefits on behalf of a landowner....

...& S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 265 So.2d 681, 683 (Fla.1972) (attorney’s fees are part of constitutional right to full compensation). Because we agree with OOCEA that Landowners’ attorney’s fees are limited in this case to those permitted by section 73.092(1), we remand for further consideration of Landowners’ argument that applying section 73.092(1) to limit the fees sought in this case denies them their constitutional right to full compensation, because the condemning authority caused *419 “excessive litigation.” The judge never reached this argument because he found that Landowners were entitled to reasonable fees pursuant to section 73.092(2)....

...It was also paid $150,000 for the cost phase of the trial. . OOCEA does not challenge the fees awarded for the supplemental proceedings. . The Third District has also determined that fees in inverse condemnation cases, which obviously do not involve a written offer, are governed by section 73.092(2)....

...*373 THOMPSON, Judge. Seminole County appeals from an order awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $36,300 to Cumberland Farms, Inc. Seminole County argues that the formula suggested by Cumberland Farm's expert and used by the court did not comply with section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...He reached the amount of $36,700 for attorney's fees. The trial court used the second formula, but with a slightly smaller lodestar amount, and arrived at a fee of $36,300. [1] The final judgment awarding fees did not refer to the factors required by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993) to be utilized in determining the benefit to the property owner....

...and this court’s order by awarding an amount less than that sought by Ryan, the zero award went too far, effectively converting section 73.131 to a prevailing party fee statute. Trial Level Fees Incurred in Connection with Motions for Disbursement Florida Statutes section 73.092(2) governs the award of fees incurred in the trial court, providing for the assessment of fees “incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for.” Co...

...eviewed by a de novo standard. See Univ. of Fla., Bd. of Trustees v. Sanal, 837 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Thomas v. Perkins, 723 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Attorney's fees incurred in litigating entitlement to recover costs are authorized by section 73.092(2), [1] because a post-judgment costs hearing is included within "other supplemental proceedings" contemplated by that provision....

...g Professional Investment Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D555 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar.5, 2004) (holding that a post-trial proceeding to recover attorney's fees and costs under section 73.091(1) is a "supplemental proceeding" under section 73.092(2))....

PER CURIAM. This eminent domain case is here for the second time. In Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority v. Tuscan Ridge, LLC, 84 So.3d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), we reversed Appellee landowners’ attorney’s fee award, determined under section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (2006), and remanded with instructions that the trial court recalculate the fee using section 73.092(1), unless it declared section 73.092(1) unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. On remand, the trial court did just that — ruling that, because Appellant had been the cause of “excessive litigation,” the utilization of the formula set forth in section 73.092(1) would amount to a denial of full compensation under article X, section 6, Florida Constitution. Having reached that conclusion, the trial court again utilized section 73.092(2) to set the fee, multiplying the number of hours times a reasonable hourly rate....

...TATUTORY FEE FORMULA RESULTS IN A FEE THAT COMPENSATES THE LANDOWNER’S ATTORNEYS AT A LOWER-THAN-MARKET FEE, WHEN MEASURED BY THE TIME INVOLVED, IS THE STATUTORY FEE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, ENTITLING THE LANDOWNER TO PURSUE A FEE UNDER SECTION 73.092(2)? REVERSED AND REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED....

...The legislature apparently reacted to the court’s concern by revising the statute in 1999 with the passage of section 73.015, Florida Statutes (2000). See Sarasota Cnty. v. Curry, 861 So.2d 1239 , 1242 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (noting that statutory revision resolved concerns regarding constitutionality of section 73.092).

...Chapter 73 of the Florida Statutes pertains to eminent domain proceedings. Section 73.091(1) of the Florida Statutes authorizes Florida’s courts to direct DOT to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the property owner in defense of the proceeding. Section 73.092(2) speaks solely to the issue of attorney’s fees, expressly authorizing the award of such fees incurred in “supplemental proceedings.” Post-judgment cost proceedings constitute “supplemental proceedings” under this statute....

...ttorney’s fees incurred in litigating the motion for costs because the landowner had no contractual obligation to pay its experts for their efforts, reasoning: Attorney’s fees incurred in litigating entitlement to recover costs are authorized by section 73.092(2), [footnote omitted] because a post-judgment costs hearing is included within “other supplemental proceedings” contemplated by that provision....

...We also note that the Second District has expressly followed Amoco in Enterprising Professional Investment Corp. v. Dep’t of Transportation, 882 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that a post-trial proceeding to recover attorney’s fees and costs under section 73.091(1) is a “supplemental proceeding” under section 73.092(2))....

...The jury rejected both positions and returned a verdict of $1,301,243. After the verdict, Lakepointe sought attorney’s fees based on the full amount of the damages awarded by the jury. Lake-pointe argued that the Department’s February 9, 1995, letter was not a written offer as contemplated by section 73.092, Florida Statutes, because it was not signed, and because it did not create a power of acceptance....

...In support of this position, the Department argued that the letter was a valid offer for the purpose of assessing attorney’s fees, despite the absence of the Administrator’s signature. The trial court was persuaded that the Department’s letter did not qualify as an offer under section 73.092, but disagreed with Lakepointe’s proposed method of computing the fees....

...red by comparing the Department’s trial testimony regarding the value of the property with the value set by the jury verdict. Following the denial of a motion for rehearing, the Department filed a timely appeal to this court. We begin by examining section 73.092, Florida Statutes, which governs the award of attorney’s fees in eminent domain cases....

...with the following schedule: 1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to $250,000; plus 2. Twenty-five percent of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1 million; plus 3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit exceeding $1 million. § 73.092(l)(c) Fla. Stat. (1997). Taken as a whole, the attorney’s fee provisions in section 73.092, Florida Statutes are designed to promote early settlement of eminent domain cases....

...At the same time, the landowner must accept a reasonable offer to minimize the risk that the litigation expenses will not be fully recovered. One significant feature of this statutory scheme is that it assumes the condemning authority will make an offer to purchase the landowner’s property. Section 73.092 does not explain the method of computing attorney’s fees if the condemning authority fails to make an offer....

...the landowner’s property. In any event, we need not determine the proper method of calculating attorney’s fees in the absence of an offer, because we conclude that the Department’s February 9, 1995, letter was a valid offer as contemplated by section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...By the terms of the letter, the Department expressed its “assent to certain definite terms” upon which it would be willing to purchase Lake-pointe’s property. The supreme court decided in Pierpont that a good faith estimate of the value of property is not the equivalent of an offer under section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...the landowner in City of Jacksonville v. Tresca, 692 So.2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). In Tresca , the city obtained an option to purchase the landowner’s property at a set price. We concluded that the option was not the equivalent of an offer under section 73.092, because it did not obligate the city to purchase the property....

...the property for the amount stated in the offer. Lakepointe argues that the Department’s offer is not valid because it was unsigned, but there is nothing in the statute that indicates an offer by a condemning authority must be signed to be valid. Section 73.092 states in several places that the offer by the condemning authority must be “written” but it does not state or imply that the offer must be signed....

...of the Department’s offer. The signature requirement imposed by the Statute of Frauds applies to the contract, not to the offer to make a contract. See § 725.01, Fla. Stat. (1997); Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, Chapter 4 (4th ed.1990). Section 73.092 was not enacted to provide a method of enforcing a contract for the sale of land....

...(1997) (stating that an agency shall not formalize a contract to purchase property acquired by eminent domain for a period of thirty days, “to allow public review of the transaction”). Hence, it would be unreasonable to interpret the offer requirement of 73.092 to mean that the condemning authority must submit a self-executing offer that becomes a binding contract immediately upon acceptance....

...The Department could not lawfully meet such a requirement in any case. For these reasons, we conclude that the Department’s February 9, 1995, letter was a valid offer to purchase Lakepointe’s property. Consequently, the attorney’s fees should have been computed under section 73.092, Florida Statutes, based on the difference between the amount of the offer and the amount of the jury verdict....

...of Scott, Harris, Bryan, Barra & Jorgensen, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellant. Marc Peoples, Tallahassee, for appellee. CONNER, J. In this appeal, we decide whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the property owner under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2012), in eminent domain proceedings brought by the Florida Department of Transportation....

...The RAP offer was rejected. Subsequently, the final 2 judgment awarded $800,000 for the parcel.1 General Commercial sought an award of attorney’s fees using the “benefits” achieved standard set forth in section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2012). Section 73.092(1)(a) defines “benefits” as the difference between the final judgment amount and the “first written offer” made after the defendant hired an attorney, if no offer was made prior to the defendant hiring an attorney....

...During such negotiations, the condemning authority must provide the owner with a written offer. Id. The award of fees in an eminent domain proceeding is tied to the amount offered to purchase the property by the condemning authority prior to suit being filed. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2012), details the method for calculation of fees: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s....

...authority before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. § 73.092, Fla....

...he benefit is the amount of fees owed. Id. However, when a condemning authority engages in an ordinary arm’s length transaction to purchase property, the property owner has no entitlement to attorney’s fees, and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092 does not apply....

...We discuss the two most pertinent counterarguments. DOT asserts that the EAP offer was its attempt to acquire properties outside of its eminent domain power, using a voluntary process when no threat of taking is pending; thus, the EAP offer cannot serve as the basis for the calculation of attorney’s fees under section 73.092....

...When the case returned to the trial court, the trial court conducted a five day hearing on attorney’s fees, in which the property owners requested an award of fees for the entire ten year period of litigation. The Department argued that fees should be computed under the sliding scale of section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2009), rather than under the multi-factor analysis of section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 73.092(1) requires that an attorney’s fee award be based solely on the benefits received by the property owner, measured from the condemning authority’s last written offer to the property owner prior to the owner hiring an attorney....

...In bold, the letter said, “By signing the postcard and receiving the payment, you do not waive your right to participate in litigation that may arise as a result of the Citrus Canker Eradication Program.” The trial court rejected the Department’s position that the letters were “written offers” within the meaning of section 73.092(1)....

...and one client. The court also dismissed these contentions. In two orders, one 12 pages long and one 57 pages long, which thoroughly analyzed all of the issues, the trial court ultimately awarded attorney’s fees using the multi-factor analysis of section 73.092(2)....

...Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 , 556, 130 S.Ct. 1662 , 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010), the court used the class counsels’ current hourly rates, rather than historic rates, to calculate the amount of fees. The Department appeals the final judgment awarding fees. Rejection of Section 73.092(1) as Basis of Award of Attorney’s Fees Just as the state must pay for the landowner’s attorney’s fees in cases where it initiates a taking of private property, so too must the state pay attorney’s fees when a property owner pr...

...& Consumer Servs., 599 So.2d 641 , 642 n. 3 (Fla.1992). Because the right to fees in an eminent domain proceeding is statutory, fees awarded in an inverse condemnation also must be determined within the statutory framework of section 73.091 and 73.092. Id. *254 Section 73.092 contains two different methods of determining attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings. Section 73.092(1) provides that attorney’s fees must be calculated based upon benefits achieved: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s....

...before the defendant hires an attorney. If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. The statute also provides in 73.092(2) for a multi-factor analysis in cases where section 73.092(1) does not apply: (2) In assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider: (a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved....

...efits resulting to the client. (f) The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for legal services of a comparable or similar nature. (g)Any attorney’s fee award made under subsection (1). The Department challenges the trial court’s rejection of section 73.092(1) as the appropriate method for calculating the fee. In order to utilize section 73.092(1), the condemning authority must have submitted a written offer to the property owner....

...The court viewed the word “offer” as a term of art, and ruled that the Department did not submit a written offer to the class. We agree with the trial court. Whether the trial court has applied the correct law in determining whether a writing constitutes a written offer under section 73.092(1) is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Pompano Beach Cmty. Redev. Agency v. Holland, 82 So.3d 1034, 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Section 73.092(1) does not define what constitutes a “written offer” for purposes of determining the benefits received by the client....

...“It is an accepted maxim of statutory construction that a law should be construed together with and in harmony with any other statute relating to the same subject matter or having the same purpose, even though the statutes were not enacted at the same time.” Garner v. Ward, 251 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla.1971). Section 73.092(1) refers to 73.015, which provides further context for what constitutes a written offer....

...In addition, no later than the written offer, the condemning authority must notify the *255 owner of various requirements, including the nature of the project for which the taking is considered necessary and the fee owner’s statutory rights under section 73.091 and 73.092....

...homeowners were not written offers under the statute. In Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So.2d 958 (Fla.1998), the court considered whether a good faith estimate of value filed pursuant to section 74.031 constituted a written offer within the meaning of section 73.092....

...A good faith estimate of value did not bind the governmental agency which was free to argue for an amount higher or lower at the jury trial. Id. at 960-61 . An offer which is subject to contingencies and does not obligate the government to purchase the property is not a written offer within the meaning of section 73.092....

...Pompano Beach, 82 So.3d at 1037 (holding that unexecuted contract to purchase property proposed by redevelopment agency, which was subject to contingencies of commission approval and appropriation of funds, was not a written offer within meaning of section 73.092(1)). In contrast, an offer which is definite and contains no contingencies may be a written offer within the meaning of section 73.092(1)....

...In fact, the letter offering the cash payments pursuant to section 581.1845, Florida Statute (2001) explained that the homeowners were not giving up their rights to pursue inverse condemnation. The letters made no mention of the homeowners’ rights to attorney’s fees and the limitations of section 73.092....

...erty owner. See § 73.015(l)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2009). Thus, the letters did not constitute an expression of specific terms to which the other party could agree, because the letters were deficient for failure to explain the homeowners’ rights under section 73.092(1) and (2)....

...It appears that the letters were carefully worded so that the Department would not imply that it owed compensation for the value of the trees. For all of these reasons, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the letters did not constitute written offers pursuant to section 73.092(1). Where there are no written offers, as there were none in this inverse condemnation proceeding, attorney’s fees must be based upon the multi-factor analysis of section 73.092(2)....

...e which exceeds the contingent fee schedule contained in the rules of professional responsibility is per se excessive. We reject this approach. While the contingent fee schedule of the rule may be one factor that the trial court could consider under section 73.092(2)(f) to illustrate comparable fees, it is but one of several factors to establish a reasonable fee....

domain cases, as relevant here, are governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2019), 2 which states that

...Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the petitioner in an eminent domain proceeding “shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by that court.” In assessing attorney’s fees, section 73.092 requires the court to consider the following criteria: (1) Benefits resulting to the ....

...nt. These proceedings are still continuing and, thus, attorneys’ fees may not be awarded until after their completion. When this action is concluded, the trial court may then award attorneys’ fees to the defendants, pursuant to the guidelines in section 73.092....

...the eminent domain proceedings. Regarding the motions to tax attorney’s fees and costs, section 73.091, Florida Statutes (2000), obligates the Department to pay attorney’s fees and all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings. Section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the trial court shall award attorney’s fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client. Section 73.092(l)(b) states that the trial court may also consider nonmonetary benefits that were obtained through the attorney’s efforts, to the extent that such benefits are specifically identified by the court and can be quantified within a reasonable degree of certainty....

...On remand, in order to recover their fees and costs, GCR and the Holloways must prove their allegations that they are interested in the property within the meaning of section 73.051, and they must prove the amount of their recoverable fees and costs pursuant to sections 73.091 and 73.092....

KELLY, Judge. In this eminent domain proceeding, the landowner, Enterprising Professional Investment Corporation (EPIC), appeals an order denying its motion for an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092(2), *1015 Florida Statutes (2001). The motion sought to recover fees EPIC had incurred during posttrial proceedings to recover the cost of its experts under section 73.091(1), Florida Statutes (2001). We conclude that those posttrial proceedings are supplemental proceedings under section 73.092(2) and that EPIC is entitled to recover the attorney’s fees it incurred in those proceedings....

...At the conclusion of these proceedings, EPIC filed a second motion for attorney’s fees seeking to recover the fees it had incurred in the proceedings to recover the experts’ fees. EPIC argued that the award of fees was proper because these were supplementary proceedings under section 73.092(2). The trial court denied EPIC’s motion. In State, Department of Transportation v. Smithbilt Industries, Inc., 715 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), this court recognized that section 73.092(2) contains no definition of'“other supplemental proceedings,” but noted that “in normal usage, a supplemental proceeding occurs at the end of the proceeding, usually after final judgment has been entered.” In Amoco Oil Co....

this parcel.” Hall filed a motion pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes, for attorney’s fees and

landowners’ recovery. Under the 1993 version of section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes, applicable here, in setting

...The department filed a petition to condemn property in June 1989. In December 1992, it made an offer of judgment of $181,-000.00 which Daystar rejected. The department’s offer stated that it was being made “pursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 73.032, 73.092 and the Rules of the Florida Supreme Court.” Daystar recovered a judgment, including interest, of $179,772.83....

...The trial court subsequently quashed the department’s offer of judgment and entered a judgment for attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Daystar. The department, by virtue of the order quashing the offer of judgment, lost the benefit of the following provision in section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1989): Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner, pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is either rejected or expires and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of judgment,...

...73.032 in its offer, “in an abundance of caution,” even though that statute was not effective as to previously filed actions. Section 73.032 supplies procedural rules for offers made in an eminent domain proceeding that were previously found in section 73.092 and the rules of civil procedure. There was no confusion created by the department’s offer as it was clearly substantively founded on section 73.092....

...in question, were applicable. We also reject Daystar’s argument that by the department’s reference, in the offer of judgment to the later-adopted section 73.032, it must be inferred that the offer was not intended to refer to the 1989 version of section 73.092, which was in effect at the time of filing the petition....

...The vagueness, if any, in the department’s offer may be as to which procedural rules to apply. However, Tim-mons, in effect at the time of the offer, resolves any such ambiguity, as Timmons directs application of the procedure in section 768.79. By referring to section 73.092 in its offer of judgment, the department placed Daystar on notice of the substantive section on which it was relying....

...a rule of the supreme court. Therefore, we reverse the judgment for attorney’s fees and costs and remand for further proceedings for an award of attorney’s fees to Daystar that takes into consideration the department’s offer of judgment under section 73.092(7)....

.... No Appearance for Remaining Appellee. March 1, 2024 PER CURIAM. Landowner, RI CS2, LLC (“Appellant”), appeals the trial court’s order granting apportionment of the statutory benefit fee awardable pursuant to section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (2021), with tenant, Circle K Stores, Inc....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by the Department of Transportation of an attorney’s fee award in an eminent domain action. The fee award in this case must be affirmed but we remind the trial court that under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993), the “benefit” received by the property owner is relevant in determining a reasonable fee....

fees, which they sought on the authority of section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1997), for legal services

...Both offers were rejected and the case was ultimately settled for $15,000. The court awarded the landowner an attorney’s fee in the amount of $18,112.50 and an expert witness fee in the amount of $962.50. The award of the attorney’s fee in this eminent domain case was generally governed by section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1995). In determining the amount of that fee, the trial court incorrectly applied subsection 73.092(2), which sets forth factors to be considered in determining such an award....

...See State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithbilt Indus., Inc., 715 So.2d 963 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The present case involved none of the foregoing; thus, it was incumbent upon the trial court to determine the attorney’s fee by applying the calculation set forth in subsection 73.092(l)(c)l., which limits the attorney’s fee to thirty-three percent of the benefits received....

...Because this calculation was readily determinable without resort to expert testimony in the present case, we also hold that the trial court erred in granting the expert witness fee. Upon remand, the trial court shall calculate the award of attorney’s fees by applying subsection 73.092(l)(c)l., Florida Statutes (1995)....

PLEUS, J. The issue in this condemnation case is whether a variance obtained by the property owner’s attorney constitutes a nonmonetary benefit for which the attorney is entitled to a fee under section 73.092, Florida Statutes....

...NL’s property with a new development to the immediate east of CNL’s property. Establishing the required cross-easement involved substantial negotiations with adjacent property owners and the city. DOT did not participate in the variance request. Section 73.092(l)(b) states that, in considering the amount of the fees to be awarded: The court may also consider nonmone-tary benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to the extent such nonmonetary benefits are specifically identified by the court and can, within a reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified. The trial court properly found that CNL presented competent evidence to satisfy all the requirements of section 73.092(l)(b)....

DAUKSCH, Judge. Appellant, Seminole County, appeals an order awarding appellee, M.G. Investments of Orlando, Inc., attorney’s fees in the amount of $126,475. The fees were awarded following a condemnation proceeding pursuant to section 73.092(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...rse the proceeds to Estate. The trial court reserved jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees “in accordance with law or by agreement between the parties.” Estate was paid $1,599,544.92. *1068 Appellee thereafter moved for attorney’s fees under section 73.092(l)(a)....

...een appellant’s first written offer of $1,174,000 to Continental [or Estate] and the final judgment amount of $1,600,000 [for the, value of the property]. Appellant appealed. The issue in this appeal is governed by this court’s interpretation of section 73.092(l)(a) which provides in part the following: 73.092 Attorney’s fees.— (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client....

...If no written offer is made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired. Once the benefits to the client are determined, fees are then awarded on a percentage basis in accordance with section 73.092(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its construction of section 73.092(l)(a) because the statute defines the benefits achieved for the client as the difference between the final judgment and settlement and the first written offer....

...Appellee contends in response that the benefits achieved for the client, Estate, is the difference between appellant’s first written offer to Estate in the amount of $1,174,100, after its attorney was hired, and the final judgment amount of $1,600,000. It contends that section 73.092(l)(a), clear on its face, does not identify the offeree because the legislature did not want to restrict the amount of attorney’s fees which the condemning authority is obligated to pay based upon “a change of the owner’s name.�...

...2d DCA 1984), contends the court was without authority to make such an award prior to conclusion of the proceedings. We agree. There may be instances of extended litigation where a partial award of attorney’s fees would be desirable. However, such awards are governed by sections 73.091 and 73.092, Florida Statutes (1985), and the legislature has made no provision for interim awards of fees in condemnation proceedings. Accordingly, we quash the order awarding partial attorney’s fees. When the case is concluded, the trial court may award attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092....

...Once a final judgment has been rendered and the time for filing a motion for rehearing or, new trial has passed, the rights and obligations of the parties are determined and fixed thereby. See Jared v. Jackson, 483 So.2d 51, 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Second, section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes, specifically provides that, in eminent domain proceedings, attorney’s fees awards shall be “based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.” (emphasis added)....

...WARNER, J. After a stipulated final judgment was entered in a condemnation case, appellants filed a claim for attorneys’ fees. The appellee Department of Transportation moved to strike the claim on grounds it failed to meet the requirements of section 73.092(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...Appellants reserved the right to seek attorneys’ fees based upon non-monetary benefits. After the entry of a final judgment, which incorporated the settlement reached at mediation, appellants filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 73.092(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). The DOT filed a motion to strike appellants’ motion to tax attorneys’ fees and costs on grounds it failed to meet the requirements of section 73.092(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because the efforts of the attorneys had not produced the non- monetary benefit of eliminating the jug handle; rather, the change was due solely to DOT’s efforts. Section 73.092(1) and subsection (b) provide: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s....

....79, Florida Statutes.” See also Lee County v. Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (“prejudgment interest is a part of the judgment in determining whether the award is below the level which activates entitlement to fees and costs pursuant to section 73.092(7), Florida Statutes (1987)”)....

...compensation, local governments may consider amending their land development regulations to formalize the employment of TDRs as compensation for a regulatory taking. Accordingly, local governments and practitioners may wish to keep close tabs on marketplace transactions 14 Section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes provides that, in eminent domain proceedings, when a written offer is made by the government to an owner, attorney’s fees are awardable to the owner based solely on the “benefits achieved for the client.” § 73.092(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). Section 73.092 is applicable also in inverse condemnation proceedings. City of N. Miami Beach v. Reed, 863 So. 2d 351, 352-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). While Section 73.092(1)(a) generally defines “benefits” as the difference between the final judgment and the government’s written offer, section 73.092(1)(b) expressly authorizes the trial court, in determining whether an attorney has provided a “benefit” to the client, to consider nonmonetary benefits obtained, so long as such nonmonetary benefits can be easily quantified....

...Presumably, to give effect to the majority’s constitutional dictate that TDRs are to be considered on the just compensation side of the takings equation, a trial court judge, in determining whether an attorney has provided a benefit to the client for section 73.092’s purposes, must also now consider the value of TDRs (i.e., a nonmonetary benefit) contained in a written settlement offer made pursuant to section 73.092. 33 relating to TDRs so that the accurate valuation of such TDRs can be readily accessed....

...Florida Gas Transmission (“FGT”) appeals a final order awarding attorney’s fees related to a protracted eminent domain action. FGT argues the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to subsection (2), rather than subsection (1), of section 73.092, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...tionally low. Ultimately, the trial court awarded Johnson hourly attorney’s fees pursuant to subsection (2) of the statute in the amount of $611,441.50. On appeal, FGT argues the trial court erred by calculating attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(2), the lodestar method, rather than section 73.092(1), the benefits achieved method, as there is no valid offer. Section 73.092(1) provides, in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section and s. 73.015, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the clie...

...hires an attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written offer after the attorney is hired . . . . Under subsection (1), once the benefits achieved is determined, a formula is applied to determine the attorney’s fees owed. § 73.092(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Under subsection (2), a defendant may be awarded attorney’s fees “incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings” using the lodestar method. § 73.092(2), Fla. Stat. 2  Based on the plain reading of the statute, the benefits achieved method must be applied where there is a written offer and subsequent final judgment. However, section 73.092 does not define what constitutes a “written offer.” Here, Johnson argues the initial offer submitted by FGT is not a valid offer because there was a change in the scope of the easement after the offer was made. However, we are constrained by this Court’s decision in JEA v. Williams, 978 So....

...This Court affirmed the lower court’s order holding the first letter offering to purchase an easement was a written offer in pre-suit eminent domain proceedings for the purposes of calculating attorney’s fees. Id. at 846. This Court held: [S]uch a construction is not supported by the text of section 73.092 and judicial interpretation of the statute is not appropriate where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Section 73.092 states that attorney’s fees are computed based on the difference between the last written offer before the landowner has hired counsel and the final judgment....

enumerated in section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1993), in *1266fashioning the fee award. Section 73.092 provides

SMITH, Chief Judge. Petitioners seek review of an order denying their motion to strike the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) offers of judgment on certain parcels in a condemnation proceeding. The offers were made pursuant to the newly enacted section 73.092(7)-(9), Florida Statutes (1987). 1 We agree with DOT that the offers did not place counsel for petitioners in an ethical dilemma and that section 73.092(7)-(9) does not impermissibly infringe upon a condemnee’s right to full compensation....

...and is always required to evaluate a settlement offer on the basis of his client’s interest, without considering his own interest in obtaining a fee. Evans, 106 S.Ct. at 538 n. 14. Next, with respect to petitioner’s argument that application of section 73.092(7)-(9) will result in the denial of full compensation to'them, it is true that attorney’s fees are part of the full compensation guaranteed by the constitution....

...t should be made in taking private property for public use; and that these declarations, while not conclusive or binding, are persuasive and will be upheld unless clearly contrary to the judicial view of the matter. Daniels, 170 So.2d at 853 . Under section 73.092(7)-(9), if petitioners accept DOT’s offer, then attorney’s fees are paid in full for the work done and there is no denial of full compensation....

...hat they should hire an attorney. The County's June 2006 letter also referenced an attached brochure entitled "The Real Estate Acquisition Process." The brochure referenced various attorney fee provisions in chapter 73, including sections 73.015 and 73.092, Florida Statutes, which, along with the letter, "clearly invite[d] the property owners to make offers to settle the compensation issues pre-suit with assurances that the costs of preparation of the experts' reports" would be the County's responsibility....

...orized by a statute, rule or contract. Hubbel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 758 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 2000). Chapter 73, Florida Statutes, governing eminent domain actions in Florida, provides for attorney's fee awards in three sections: 73.015, 73.091 and 73.092....

...ior to a lawsuit being filed, the property or business owner who settles compensation claims in lieu of condemnation shall be entitled to recover costs in the same manner as provided in s. 73.091 and attorney's fees in the same manner as provided in s. 73.092,.......

...5th DCA 2009) (discussing the principle of statutory construction "expression unius est exclusion alterius," which means the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another). Section 73.091(1) states in pertinent part that: "The petitioner shall pay attorney's fees as provided in s. 73.092 as well as all reasonable costs incurred in the defense of the proceedings in the circuit court, including, but not limited to, reasonable appraisal fees ..." (Emphasis added)....

...For purposes of awarding fees under this statute, this court has previously held that "[n]othing short of a petition which adheres to the statutory guidelines will commence condemnation proceedings under chapter 73." Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gibbins, 696 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Section 73.092 primarily sets forth the methods prescribed for determining a fee award when authorized by the eminent domain statute. Subsection 73.092(1) requires the trial court to award attorney's *627 fees "based solely on the benefits achieved for the client" in the "eminent domain proceeding" and defines "benefits" as "the difference, exclusive of interest, between the final jud...

...settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires an attorney...." [4] By its plain language, this subsection presumes either a settlement or suit as a precondition to the award of attorney's fees. Subsection 73.092(2) sets forth an alternative method for determining the amount of a compensable fee "incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for...." By its plain l...

...Describing the party responsible for fees as the petitioner presumes that the eminent domain complaint has been filed. [4] If no written offer is made before the defendant hires an attorney, this subsection dictates that benefits be measured from the first written offer made after the attorney is hired. § 73.092(1)(a), Fla....

...When the State institutes a Chapter 73 proceeding in the circuit court, Section 73.091 provides: The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by that court. Section 73.092, Florida Statutes (1983), furnishes the criteria which the court shall consider in awarding fees: Attorney’s fees.—In assessing attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, the court shall consider: (1) Benefits resulting to the client from the services rendered....

STRINGER, Judge. Sarasota County seeks review of an award of attorney’s fees to Fannie Curry in this eminent domain action. Because the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the fees based on section 73.092(1), Florida Statutes (1995), we reverse....

...Following entry of the stipulated final judgment, each of the three potential landowners filed separate motions for attorney’s fees and costs. The only fee at issue is that of attorney Connolly for his representation of Curry. The court awarded Curry attorney’s fees of $9900 pursuant to section 73.092(1). Section 73.092(1) provides, “[T]he court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client.” In cases when the condemning authority does not make a written offer before the defendant hires an attorney, “benefits” are defined as the difference between the final judgment and the first written offer after an attorney is hired. § 73.092(l)(a). Attorney’s fees based on benefits up to $250,000 equal thirty-three percent of the benefits. § 73.092(l)(c)(l). Section 73.092(1) does not provide for the consideration of any factor other than the benefits to the client in awarding attorney’s fees....

...In this case,- the award of attorney’s fees appears to be based on “benefits” calculated as the difference between the unapportioned stipulated final, judgment and an offer of zero. The good faith estimate does not, constitute a “written offer” under section 73.092(1). Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So.2d 958, 960 (Fla.1998). The trial court declined to consider the offer of judgment as a “written offer” under section 73.092(1) because it was made so late in the proceedings. We review an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 for an abuse of discretion....

...Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 788 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). While we share the court’s frustration with the late timing of Sarasota County’s offer of judgment, the offer of judgment clearly constitutes a “written offer” for purposes of section 73.092(1). Sarasota County argues that, if the offer of judgment constitutes a “written offer,” Curry is not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 73.092(1) because the “benefits,” or the difference between the stipulated final judgment and the offer of judgment, are $0....

...ment, but the record does not reflect how much of the $30,025 offer was intended for Curry. The benefits to Curry are thus impossible to ascertain, and the court abused its discretion in *1242 awarding Curry attorney’s fees based on benefits under section 73.092(1). 2 Instead, the court should have based its attorney’s fee award on section 73.092(2). See Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithbilt Indus., Inc., 715 So.2d 963, 966-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Section 73.092(2) provides factors for an attorney’s fee consideration “[i]n assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for.” A plai...

...fees in all eminent domain proceedings in which the condemning authority fails to make a written offer to settle the claim or which otherwise cannot be resolved using the benefits analysis in section (1).” 715 So.2d at 966-67 . This is so because section 73.092 contains a “gap” by failing to provide a method for calculating attorney’s fees in cases in which the benefits analysis is not applicable and the proceeding is not a supplemental one. Id. at 966 . Application of subsection (2) in those proceedings is necessary to give effect to the legislature’s intent that the landowner receive attorney’s fees under section 73.092 based on the landowner’s constitutional right to full compensation in eminent domain proceedings. 3 Id.; see also City of N. Miami Beach v. Reed, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2219 , - So.2d -, 2003 WL 22187977 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept.24, 2003) (holding that section 73.092(2) should be applied to determine an attorney’s fee award in eminent domain proceedings when no offer is made by the condemning authority, thus making subsection (1) inapplicable). Because it was impossible to measure the benefits to Curry in the underlying proceeding, the trial court abused its discretion in applying section 73.092(1), and we reverse and remand for reconsideration of attorney’s fees under section 73.092(2)....

...Even if the benefits were zero, it would be an abuse of discretion to apply subsection (1) when it would work to deny attorney's fees in contravention of the landowners' constitutional right-to full compensation. See, e.g., Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So.2d 958 , 961 n. 2 (Fla.1998) (noting that section 73.092 could be unconstitutional as applied if "the condemning authority could thwart an award of attorney’s fees by making its first offer of real value during the trial”); Teeter v....

...cases, including attorneys fees”). . In 1999, the legislature added a statutory provision extending presuit negotiation requirements to all condemning authorities which appears to alleviate our concerns regarding the constitutional application of section 73.092....

...is one of the owners of the property that DOT sought to take or because he seeks compensation for his time spent prior to the time DOT filed suit. 1 Rather, DOT contends that if any fee is awarded to O’Donnell, it should be calculated pursuant to section 73.092(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...However, we find, based on these unique facts and circumstances, that a reasonable fee can only be calculated on a finding of the number of hours the attorney reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable *992 hourly rate and taking into consideration the factors contained in section 73.092(2)....

...Although we are inclined to believe that the nonmonetary benefit achieved in this case had some economic value, the record supports the circuit court’s decision that Mr. Ward did not quantify that benefit with reasonable certainty as required by section 73.092(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...section on or before September 30, 2002, or pay Mr. Ward $10,000 per month, prorated daily, for the delay. The County and Mr. Ward agreed that his attorneys were entitled to a statutory fee of $52,483.20 for the monetary component of this award. See § 73.092(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). They could not agree on the fee, if any, that should be awarded for the inclusion of the performance clause in the mediation agreement. As a result, that dispute was submitted to the circuit court for resolution. Section 73.092(2)(b) *894 permits a circuit court considering the proper award of attorneys’ fees in an eminent domain proceeding to “consider non-monetary benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the attorney, to the extent such n...

...3d DCA 1998) (citing Palma and declining to award fees for fees under section 57.105 and section 768.79); Dep’t of Transp., State of Fla. v. Robbins & Robbins, Inc., 700 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (citing Palma and declining to award fees for fees under section 73.092). However, this court has also distinguished Palma in holding that an award of fees for fees is permissible in certain contexts....

...SHAW, Judge. Southwest Florida Water Management District (the District) appeals a final order awarding $380,000 in attorney’s fees to Raymond J. Shea and Mary Lou Shea in an eminent domain proceeding. The District challenges the fees awarded under section 73.092(l)(b) and (2), Florida Statutes (2010). On cross-appeal, the Sheas argue that the trial court erred by awarding fees under section 73.092(l)(a), where it should have applied the lodestar factors listed in section 73.092(2). We affirm without further comment the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(l)(a) and (b). However, because contesting an order of taking does not constitute a supplemental proceeding contemplated by section 73.092(2), we reverse the $160,000 in attorney’s fees awarded under that section and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion....

...Following the settlement, the Sheas filed a motion for attorney’s fees, requesting the trial court to determine the proper method for calculating fees. After an initial hearing on the motion, the trial court concluded that the Sheas were entitled to $163,750 in attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(l)(a). The trial court also stated that the issue of fees for nonmonetary benefits under section 73.092(l)(b) would be determined, and it concluded that the order of taking hearing constituted a “supplemental proceeding within the definition of [section] 73.092(2).” A different judge presided over a second hearing on the Sheas’ motion for attorney’s fees. At the hearing, the trial court questioned the previous ruling that the order of taking hearing was a supplemental proceeding. Despite this uncertainty, the trial court did not revisit the issue, and it awarded the Sheas $160,000 in fees under section 73.092(2). The trial court also awarded a nonmonetary benefit fee of $56,250 under section 73.092(l)(b)....

...fees necessary to enforce the property owner’s rights, including fees incurred in proceedings arising out of, and ancillary to, the original condemnation proceeding.”). The method for calculating fees in eminent domain proceedings is outlined in section 73.092. “We review an award of attorney’s fees under section 73.092 for an abuse of discretion.” Sarasota Cnty....

...However, issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 765 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reviewing de novo the issue of whether a hearing on post-judgment costs constitutes “other supplemental proceedings” contemplated by section 73.092(2)). We conclude that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the Sheas pursuant to section 73.092(2) because contesting an order of taking does not constitute a supplemental proceeding contemplated by the statute. Section 73.092(2) applies to fees “incurred in defeating an order of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, when not otherwise provided for.” Therefore, the statute “is only applicable when attorney’s fees, not other...

...e provided for, are incurred for required proceedings that do not result in a monetary benefit upon which a fee can be based.” Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So.2d 947, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). While this court has noted that section 73.092 provides no definition of “other supplemental proceeding,” “[i]n normal usage, a supplemental proceeding occurs at the end of a proceeding, usually after a final judgment has been entered.” Fla....

...2d DCA 1998). Here, contesting the order of taking was a fundamental part of the proceedings that led to the final order of taking. Accordingly, we hold that contesting an order of taking does not constitute a supplemental proceeding contemplated by section 73.092(2). And because the Sheas have been fully compensated for fees under section 73.092(l)(a), we reverse the $160,000 in attorney’s fees awarded to the Sheas under section 73.092(2)....

entered pursuant to section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Section 73.092 provides, in part, that