CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 1136434, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 4431
...on February 2, 2004, but for A.M.’s refusal to enter the stall. Sufficient evidence, therefore, supports Hernandez’s conviction of attempted first-degree murder. Constitutional Challenge to Charging Hernandez as an Adult In the third issue raised on appeal, Hernandez urges us to hold that section 985.557(1), Florida Statutes (2004), violates due process because it grants prosecutors the discretion to direct file indictments of juveniles in criminal, rather than juvenile, court....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 11752, 2011 WL 3108800
...Because Florida abolished parole, a life sentence is without the possibility of parole. See §
921.002, Fla. Stat. (2007) ("The provisions of chapter 947, relating to parole, shall not apply to persons sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code.”). . The State direct filed against the defendant, pursuant to section
985.557, Florida Statutes (2007)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 2496476
...d an information against the appellee, to the juvenile division. We reverse based on our holding that the state attorney had discretion to direct-file an information in adult court, notwithstanding the fact that the appellee was seventeen years old. Section 985.557(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that, "[w]ith respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state attorney may file an information when in the state attorney's judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed." The charges against the juvenile included a felony criminal mischief count. [1] Section 985.557(6) affords the prosecutor the discretion to direct-file an information against this appellee....
...NOTES [1] A misdemeanor charge against a juvenile may not be direct-filed "unless the child has had at least two previous adjudications or adjudications withheld for delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified as a felony under state law." § 985.557(b), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...That
motion asserted that the adult trial court lacked divisional jurisdiction
over the case when it initially proceeded to trial. Particularly, it noted that
vehicular homicide was not a criminal act for which a fifteen-year-old
defendant’s case could be direct-filed in adult court, pursuant to section
985.557(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016)....
...enumerated in the direct-file statute. Further, it argued that Brown had
indeed waived juvenile division jurisdiction by proceeding to trial in the
adult division. While reiterating her position on the matter, defense
counsel countered that nothing in section 985.557 indicated that lesser-
included offenses were part of the statutory provision allowing for direct-
file.
On the issue of Brown’s waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the trial
judge explained:...
...explicitly provided for such a severe sanction.”); Am. Bankers Life,
212 So.
2d at 778 (“Had the legislature intended the statute to import a more
specific and definite meaning, it could easily have chosen words to express
any limitation it wished to impose.”).
According to section
985.557(1)(a):
With respect to any child who was 14 or 15 years of age at the
time the alleged offense was committed, the state attorney
may file an information when in the state attorney’s judgment
and discreti...
...offense
charged is for the commission of, attempt to commit, or
conspiracy to commit:
....
8. Murder;
9. Manslaughter;
....
(Emphasis added).
Lesser-included offenses are not included by silent incorporation into
section 985.557(1)(a)....
...3d 1083,
1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), under the plain language of the statute,
vehicular homicide was not included by the legislature within the list of
crimes providing the state with divisional prosecutorial discretion. See §
4
985.557(1)(a). Likewise, there are a number of offenses listed in section
985.557(1)(a) with lesser-included offenses also expressly enumerated in
the statute....
...guaranteed to a defendant,
but is one that can be waived by mere inaction. See, e.g., Snider v.
2 Illustratively, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense to the charge of murder,
as are the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. See §
985.557(1)(a)(6), (8), (9), and (12); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2. Similarly,
aggravated assault is also a lesser of manslaughter, yet both crimes are listed
separately in the statute. See § 985.557(1)(a)(6) and (9). Additionally, a lewd and
lascivious offense on a victim under the age of 16 is a lesser included offense of
sexual battery; both crimes are also separately included in the enumerated list.
See § 985.557(1)(a)(2) and (13); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.4. Robbery is a
lesser of home invasion robbery, yet both are enumerated. See § 985.557(1)(a)(3)
and (17); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 15.3. Finally, grand theft in the first degree
is a lesser of home invasion robbery, and both are specifically enumerated. See
§ 985.557(1)(a)(15) and (17); Fla....
...As explained below, appellant did not waive juvenile jurisdiction and, as
the majority acknowledges, no statutory exception applies to his vehicular
homicide charge. Vehicular homicide is not included in the list of criminal
charges that may be direct-filed in adult court under section 985.557(1)(a),
Florida Statutes.
Appellant cannot be said to have waived his right to be treated as a
juvenile, because, here, the trial court was made aware of the improper
direct-filing of his case at the trial level before sentencing....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 12248, 2011 WL 3331232
...The numerous gunshot wounds to the victim resulted in blindness in one eye and other serious injuries. Appellant asserts that the trial court fundamentally erred by allowing the prosecution to charge Appellant as an adult and proceed in felony criminal court, pursuant to section 985.557, Florida Statutes, without a jury determination of fact to justify exposure of Appellant to a criminal sentence rather than the less severe juvenile sanctions....
...First, unlike Apprendi , the sentence in this case did not result from a post-trial enhancement of a guidelines sentence for the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The decision to proceed in the adult court rather than the juvenile court was a pre-trial choice made by the state attorney, pursuant to section 985.557, Florida Statutes. This decision is not a sentence enhancement determination. Section 985.557 authorizes the state attorney to file an information in adult court against a 14- or 15-yr.-old accused of — among other listed crimes — robbery, murder, and attempts of those crimes, “when in the state attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.” § 985.557(1)(a), Fla....
...ju *1150 venile to the adult criminal justice system.”); In re Welfare of J.C.P., 716 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn.App.2006); State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224, 227 (Alaska App.2005). Secondly, the determination by the state attorney to direct file under section 985.557, Florida Statutes is not a fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum....
...e statute. Under these circumstances, the Legislature provides the state attorney with the option to direct file “when in the state attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.” § 985.557, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Id.
2
In Sims' petition before this court, he argues that the trial
court erred in imposing pretrial detention under the circumstances
of this case because there was no substantial change in
circumstances after his first appearance in criminal court. He
maintains that pursuant to section 985.557(2), Florida Statutes
(2020), once the State direct filed three of his cases in criminal
court, it was required to file the juvenile allegations in his fourth
case as felony charges in criminal court....
...case. The only change after
first appearance was the State's transfer of the juvenile allegations
into criminal court. But that change was statutorily required once
the State direct filed the charges in the three other criminal court
cases. See § 985.557(2)(b) ("When a child is transferred for criminal
that "[a] motion for pretrial detention may be filed at any time prior
to trial."
4
prosecution as an adult, the court shall immediately transfer and...
...Here, the alleged
5
petition for writ of habeas corpus and quashed the order of pretrial
detention. Nevertheless, we certify the following question to the
Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
WHEN THE STATE DIRECT FILES CHARGES AGAINST A
JUVENILE UNDER SECTION 985.557(1), FLORIDA
STATUTES (2020), AND BOND IS SET ON THE
CHARGES, DOES THE STATE'S SUBSEQUENT
TRANSFER UNDER SECTION 985.557(2) OF
ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE JUVENILE
FILED IN A SEPARATE JUVENILE CASE, POTENTIALLY
EXPOSING THE JUVENILE TO ADULT SANCTIONS IN
THAT CASE, MEET THE REQUIREMENT UNDER BUSH
V....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...We affirm on the other issues.
While a resident at Martin Girls Academy, a high and maximum-risk
Department of Juvenile Justice program, Little threw a shelf at an
instructor, hitting her in the face and causing injury. The State direct-
filed the case in adult court pursuant to section 985.557(1)(a), Florida
Statutes (2016)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8936
...d an information against the appellee, to the juvenile division. We reverse based on our holding that the state attorney had discretion to direct-file an information in adult court, notwithstanding the fact that the appellee was seventeen years old. Section 985.557(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that, “[w]ith respect to any child who was 16 or 17 years of age at the time the alleged offense was committed, the state attorney may file an information when in the state attorney’s judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed.” The charges against the juvenile included a felony criminal mischief count. 1 Section 985.557(6) affords the prosecutor the discretion to direct-file an information against this appellee....
...A misdemeanor charge against a juvenile may not be direct-filed "unless the child has had at least two previous adjudications or adjudications withheld for delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified as a felony under state law.” § 985.557(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...We affirm, because the issue was not preserved.
Even if it was preserved, because he was an adult at sentencing, the
omission was harmless.
Appellant was charged with lewd and lascivious battery on a child. At
the time he was seventeen, but the state attorney exercised its discretion
under section 985.557(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), and filed charges
against appellant as an adult....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
judicial circuit. He contends that, under section
985.557(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2017), transfer to
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 3208, 2009 WL 996815
...tutes applicable to juveniles charged by mandatory direct-file informations. We agree, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. The State charged sixteen-year-old Allen with armed robbery by a mandatory direct-filed information pursuant to section
985.557(2)(d)(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2008). Section
985.557(2)(d)(l)(a) requires the State to direct-file an information in adult court when the juvenile is sixteen or seventeen years old at the time he or she commits the alleged offense, when the offense is one listed in section
775.087(2)(a)...
...” Defense counsel also pointed out that the investigating detective stated that he would not be opposed to the court’s imposing juvenile sanctions. The State objected to any juvenile sentence, arguing that such a sentence was not permitted under section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a)....
...ogram with aftercare until his twenty-first birthday, thus imposing a period of supervision of four years. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court did not have the discretion to impose this sentence. The State is correct. Subsections 985.557(2)(d)(2) and (2)(d)(3) set forth the sentencing options available to the trial court when a juvenile is charged by mandatory direct-file information under section 985.557(2)(d)(1): 2....
...Upon transfer, any child who is charged under this paragraph, but who does not meet the requirements specified in subparagraph 2., shall be sentenced under s.
985.565; however, if the court imposes a juvenile sanction, the court must commit the child to a high-risk or maximum-risk juvenile facility. §
985.557(2)(d) (emphasis added)....
...available to it: 1. If the court found that Allen had been previously adjudicated or had previously had adjudication withheld for an offense involving a firearm, it could sentence him under section
775.087(2)(a), the 10/20/ Life statute, pursuant to section
985.557(2)(d)(2)(a); or *458 2....
...as a youthful offender pursuant to section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(b); or c. as a juvenile pursuant to section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(c). However, if the court chose to impose juvenile sanctions under section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(c), it was required to commit Allen to a high-risk or maximum-risk juvenile facility pursuant to section
985.557(2)(d)(3)....
...At the pretrial hearing, the trial court found, after argument from the parties, that Allen did not have a prior adjudication for an offense involving a firearm. Based on that finding, the trial court determined that it was not required to sentence Allen under the 10/20/Life statute pursuant to section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a). Instead, the trial court sentenced Allen to a moderate-risk juvenile program, which was improper. As outlined above, once the trial court found that Allen did not qualify for sentencing under section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a), the sentencing options available to it were adult sanctions, youthful offender sanctions, or commitment to a high-risk or maximum-risk juvenile facility....
...Commitment to a moderate-risk facility was not a legal sentencing option. Accordingly, we must reverse Allen’s sentence and remand for further proceedings. In this appeal, the State argues that, on remand, the trial court should be required to sentence Allen under the 10/20/Life statute pursuant to section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) because Allen had a pri- or adjudication for an offense involving a firearm....
...theft of a firearm charge, but that adjudication occurred after Allen had committed the armed robbery at issue. Faced with these facts, Allen argued that he had not been “previously adjudicated” for an offense involving a firearm as required by section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) because he committed the armed robbery before he was adjudicated on the grand theft charge. Thus, according to Allen, the trial court was not required to sentence him under section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) because he did not have a prior adjudication for an offense involving a firearm when he committed the offense at issue. In contrast, the State argued that the trial court was required to sentence Allen under section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) because he had a prior adjudication for an offense involving a firearm when he appeared for sentencing on the pending charge. The trial court focused on Allen’s status when he committed the offense at issue and found that, at that time, Allen had a pending charge, not a prior adjudication. Thus, the court found that Allen did not qualify for sentencing under section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a). The State challenges this ruling in this appeal. However, because section 985.577(2)(d)(2)(a) is ambiguous as to when the “previous!] adjudication]” must occur, the rule of lenity supports the trial court’s ruling. As noted above, section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) states, in pertinent part, *459 2....
...Drury,
829 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the rule of lenity permitted the trial court to sentence a juvenile to a youthful offender sentence rather than a 10/20/Life sentence when the juvenile was charged under the previous version of section
985.557(2)(d)(l)). The ambiguity in the language of section
985.557(2)(d)(2)(a) is apparent when it is compared with the language of section
985.557(2)(a)....
...conspiracy to commit murder, sexual battery, armed or strong-armed robbery, carjacking, home-invasion robbery, aggravated battery, or aggravated assault, and the child is currently charged with a second or subsequent violent crime against a person. § 985.557(2)(a) (emphasis added). Under that section, it is clear that the prior adjudication must occur before the information is filed. No such comparable language relating to the timing of the prior adjudication appears in section 985.557(2)(d)(2)(a). Indeed, the only possible “timing” language in section 985.557(2)(d)(2) is “upon transfer”; however, no “transfer” of the case occurs when an information is direct filed against a juvenile....
...On remand, the trial court may sentence Allen as an adult pursuant to section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(a); as a youthful offender pursuant to section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(b); or as a juvenile pursuant to section
985.565(4)(a)(2)(c), but any juvenile sentence must be commitment to a high-risk or maximum-risk juvenile facility pursuant to section
985.557(2)(d)(3)....
