Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...and agents of the State of Florida in their efforts to serve said illegal warrant did break open the outer door of defendant’s dwelling house, without giving due notice of their authority and purpose prior to their entry therein, as is required by Section 933.09 F.S.A., and that the said officers and agents of the State of Florida, in executing the said purported search warrant wilfully exceeded their’ authority, contrary to Section 933.17 F.S.A.”; (d) because the information “is based u...

...l evidence because (1) the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based contained misleading information or omitted material facts; (2) the officers conducting the search did not "knock and announce" their identities and purpose in violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989); and (3) the search warrant was invalid because it contained the wrong name of the owner of the house....

...During the subsequent search, police found a small amount of cocaine in Bamber's pants pocket and a small quantity of marijuana. Bamber was charged with simple possession of cocaine and marijuana. The trial court granted Bamber's motion to suppress the drugs and the district court affirmed, ruling that section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989), requires officers to knock and announce their presence and purpose before forcibly entering a residence....

...e opportunity to voluntarily admit the officer into his home" instead of suffering damage to his property. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) (2d ed. 1987) (footnote omitted). Our legislature has codified this knock-and-announce rule in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides that an officer may forcibly enter a home to execute a search warrant only after announcing his or her authority and purpose and being refused entry: 933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant....

...— The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. § 933.09, Fla....

...First, according to the warrant's plain language, it is a standard, not a no-knock, warrant. Even if it were a no-knock warrant, such a warrant is without legal effect in Florida, as explained above. [5] Second, no exigent circumstances appear in the record to excuse police from following section 933.09's dictates: Nothing shows that police had reason to fear at the time of entry that Bamber was likely to destroy evidence, [6] or even that a readily disposable quantity of drugs was involved....

...On July 11, 1974, the Senate voted by a two-to-one margin to repeal the "no-knock" provision of the 1970 Act, once again making "no-knock" searches illegal under the federal "knock-and-announce" rule. [5] We find the State's "good faith" claim to be without merit in light of section 933.09's clear language and the fact that nothing in the warrant itself authorizes police to dispense with section 933.09's requirements....

...hnson did not establish a broadly applicable exclusionary rule for all statutory violations. See id. at 32. Further, the Second District also distinguished application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the "knock-and-announce" requirement of section 933.09 of the Florida Statutes (2005) because that statutory context must be understood in the context of the deep-seated common law and Fourth Amendment concerns presented by unannounced entries....

...The motion was submitted to the trial court for ruling on the basis of a stipulated statement of facts and no testimony was heard. On May 20, 1971, the trial judge entered an order granting defendant's motion on the ground that the search warrant was not executed in compliance with Fla. Stat. § 933.09, F.S.A., requiring prior "due notice of authority and purpose" and refusal of admittance before "the officer may break open any outer door," window, etc....

...and stated: (260 So.2d 905) "The exception sought is that where the amount of drugs is small the drugs may be easily disposed of by flushing them down a toilet or other drain, and that compliance with the `Knock and Announce' requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, would afford those inside the building time enough to dispose of any drugs before the officers gained entrance....

...Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. STRINGER, J., and BAILEY, JENNIFER D., Associate Judge, Concur. NOTES [1] Mr. Pilieci's motion to suppress also sought to exclude evidence based upon a violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule. See § 933.09, Fla....

...nt to a search warrant. We affirm the suppression order because the state failed to establish an exigent circumstance that would have allowed the police to dispense with the "knock-and-announce" requirements at the time the search was performed. See § 933.09, Fla....

...July 26, 1991). On August 18, 1989, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office applied for a search warrant to search Mr. Bamber's home. It also requested authority to execute the warrant without complying with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The magistrate issued the search warrant and attached the deputy's affidavit to the warrant to establish the probable cause for the warrant. The magistrate, however, did not modify the language of the standard warrant in an attempt to create a preestablished right to dispense with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 933.09....

..."no-knock" warrant, Florida is not one of those jurisdictions. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(g) (2d ed. 1987). Thus, the magistrate in this case correctly issued a standard search warrant without any order overriding the requirements of section 933.09....

...The issue on this interlocutory appeal by the state is whether or not the trial court correctly suppressed evidence seized by officers of the Winter Park Police Department in the execution of a search warrant, on the ground that the execution of the warrant was not in compliance with the requirements imposed by F.S. Section 933.09, F.S.A....

...at the door which was open or partially open when the officers arrived at the entrance. McDonnell testified that there was no knocking or other request for permission to enter before the officers entered the premises. The controlling statute is F.S. Section 933.09, F.S.A....

...he purpose of his presence at the residence (i.e., to execute a search warrant). See Benefield v. State, Fla. 1964, 160 So.2d 706, where the Florida Supreme Court construed F.S. Section 901.19(1), F.S.A. 1969, which is closely *454 analogous to F.S. Section 933.09, F.S.A....

...The only significant difference between the two statutes is that the former governs official entries for the purpose of effecting an arrest while the latter governs official entries for the purpose of executing a search warrant. Benefield v. State, supra, is, therefore, persuasive authority for the construction of F.S. Section 933.09, F.S.A....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. CASANUEVA, Judge. Mr. Richardson appeals the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress arguing that law enforcement officers failed to comply with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999), the "knock and announce" rule, by failing to wait a reasonable amount of time before forcibly entering his residence....

...unreasonable searches. Article I, section 12, of the Constitution of the State of Florida provides the identical guarantee. It is against the backdrop of this vital constitutional right that the government's procedure in this case must be measured. Section 933.09 permits law enforcement, in the execution of a search warrant, to break open an outer door where "after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose, he or she is refused admittance to said house." The policy underlying section 933.09 "derives from the sentiment that there `is nothing more terrifying to the occupants than to be suddenly confronted in the privacy of their home by a police officer decorated with guns and the insignia of his office....

...Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 1053 (Fla.1994) (quoting Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla.1964)). Where officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09....

...ime to respond, and, consequently, none was provided. We find this defect in training troubling because of its impact upon a basic constitutional and statutory protection. Before law enforcement may forcibly enter a home to execute a search warrant, section 933.09 imposes two requirements....

...DAVIS, J., concurs. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., concurs specially. ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge, Concurring. I fully concur in this opinion. However, in 1990 I suggested that the exclusionary rule was neither an essential remedy nor the best method to enforce section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...onary rule. This court could not realistically order police education and monitor compliance. A trial court has no authority to *911 fine a department for a violation or to reprimand specific police officers, especially when the officers who violate section 933.09 are not parties before the court....

...See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scalise, 387 Mass. 413, 439 N.E.2d 818 (1982). We reverse the order of suppression and remand this matter for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The "knock and announce" rule, embodied in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989) provides: 933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant....

...We have then for consideration the propriety of the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress. Appellants initially attack the search warrant for failure to properly designate the residence to be searched. We reject that contention. The second point raises the alleged violation of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), by the police officer in serving the search warrant....

...reason to believe that the quantity is very large. As we understand the current law on the question of when police are justified in believing that there will be an attempt to destroy evidence, the Benefield-Clarke [3] exceptions, infra, engrafted on Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), do not authorize an intrusion into a residence to serve a search warrant without complying with Section 933.09, unless the police "had reason to fear at the time of entry the destruction of evidence." [4] Unquestionably, that means the police must have some facts pertaining to the case at hand which would reasonably cause such apprehension....

...adily disposable as to warrant intrusion without knocking and announcing as required by the statute. In Earman v. State, 265 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1972), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based upon evidence garnered by entry without compliance with Section 933.09 and absent any circumstances which would constitute an exception under Benefield....

...ourt noted that the trial and appellate courts had failed to consider the Clarke exceptions. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that there are three hypothetical situations in which the police might be called upon to consider the applicability of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977) vis a vis the fourth Benefield exception involving destruction of evidence....

...Thirdly, the situation in the case at bar where the police do not know and do not have a reasonably founded suspicion that the quantity and nature of the contraband is readily disposable. It is only in the first situation that the police are justified under that exception in not complying fully with Section 933.09....

...seize whatever they can find. The conduct of the police here was not of this nature, but the danger of a precedent to this effect is what convinces me the majority opinion is indeed correct. NOTES [1] Agent Carroll was in charge of the mission. [2] Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...James M. Russ of Law Offices of James M. Russ, Orlando, for appellee. SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge. Once again, this Court is presented with problems arising from the application *13 of the "knock-and-announce" statutes, F.S. § 901.19(1); F.S. § 933.09; see the leading case of Benefield v....

...he feared when he entered the room. [2] The "knock-and-announce" rules applicable under F.S. § 901.19(1) to a search which follows even a justified arrest without a warrant, see Benefield v. State, supra, are identical to those involved, under F.S. § 933.09, when, as in Collier and Yenke, a seizure follows the execution of a search warrant....

...izing the officer for the magistrates's error, rather than *1248 his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 104 S.Ct. at 3420. We also note that Detective Matosky and the other officers fully complied with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1983), and entered the Bernies' premises only after announcing their authority and purpose and properly executing the warrant....

...ocks of crack cocaine. The trial court suppressed the evidence because the deputy sheriffs who executed the search warrant of the defendant's home did not provide prior "due notice of [their] authority and purpose" before forcibly entering the home. § 933.09, Fla....

...2d DCA), cert. denied, 373 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1979). In this case, the trial court's decision has the appropriate evidentiary support. As a matter of law, the opening of an unlocked screen door is a breaking which invokes the due notice requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...compel the trial court to find an exigent circumstance. Hunsucker v. State, 379 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see also Bouknight. II. Both the trial court and this court are required to use the exclusionary rule as the remedy for any violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...last twenty-six years. At this *733 point, we believe it would be constructive for the supreme court to reconsider the exclusion of evidence as an essential remedy in cases where the police have obtained a proper search warrant and the violation of section 933.09 results from a negligent execution of the warrant which results in no significant personal injury or property damage....

...orized as a matter of negligence or good faith mistake, not for those cases in which the statutory violation is deliberate or willful. See § 933.17, Fla. Stat. (1989). We make this proposal because we believe that it will strengthen compliance with section 933.09 and the privacy rights which the statute promotes....

...This system results in frequent disciplinary actions by departments against their own officers. Although these steps have not created a perfect law enforcement system, they have established a system which is better able to enforce the requirements of section 933.09 and similar laws....

...More important, the system should also be able to effectively supervise, correct, and discipline police errors in this area with only limited judicial involvement. Thus, it is not as apparent in 1990 that the courts must exclude evidence in all violations of section 933.09 to prevent police misconduct....

...rocedure in which the courts abandon their obligation to carefully monitor police misconduct. While the supreme court should adopt the best possible procedure, the following proposal may be adequate. If a trial court finds that a search has violated section 933.09, before ordering the suppression of the evidence the state should be given an opportunity to establish that the specific case is not one in which the exclusionary rule should be employed....

...unreasonable search and seizure, the constitutional exclusionary rule was mandated for state use several years before Benefield. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Thus, the question is whether a statutory violation of section 933.09 is a constitutional violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and mandates use of the federal exclusionary rule. Unless the boundaries of section 933.09 are identical to the fourth amendment, it is possible that an error in police procedure can be a statutory violation without resulting in a constitutional violation....

...Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). In light of the changes in Florida law as well as the developments in the rule of inevitable discovery, the constitutional balance may now permit the introduction of this evidence. If any violation of section 933.09 falls outside the fourth amendment or the federal exclusionary rule, this violation would seem to be such a violation....

...The police discovered the drugs during the search of an apartment rented by Hernandez's girlfriend, Eveyette Swaskee. Holding a valid search warrant, the police broke in through the front door of the apartment. Hernandez argues that the police violated the Florida and Federal Constitutions and section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999). We find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Section 933.09 provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...We find no constitutional or statutory violation. Recently, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that a fifteen to twenty second wait before forcible entry satisfied both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which is almost identical to section 933.09....

...to suppress cocaine seized in their home. It appears that the police SWAT unit gained entry to the defendants' apartment by breaking down the front door of the residence without first knocking at the door and announcing their presence as mandated by section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985) ("knock and announce" statute)....

...Further, there was no evidence that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence would be destroyed or that their safety would be threatened by knocking and announcing. Earman vs. State, 265 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1972), State v. Collier, 270 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). [5] Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...e, that if the officers knocked and announced their authority and purpose, they did so with such haste that Craft did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond. Therefore, the officers did not follow the knock-and-announce procedures set forth in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...See Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048; Benefield, 160 So.2d 706. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the defendant be discharged because the issues raised in the motion to suppress were dispositive. FRANK, C.J., and PATTERSON and FULMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 933.09 provides: "The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to sai...

...However, the state maintains that the delivery of the twenty pounds of marijuana was independent of the search warrant; that Bower and Riffle were properly in the home and witnessed appellee commit the crime with which he is charged. We agree. The requirements of the knock and announce statute, 933.09, F.S....

...tendered to Agent Bower because the twenty pounds of marijuana was seized independently of and prior to the alleged illegal execution of the search warrant. The controlling statute concerning execution of a search warrant in the situation at bar is Section 933.09, Florida Statutes 1971, F.S.A....

..., seized the marijuana incident to the arrest, and then signaled the other police officers to execute the warrant. Since it is clear that all of the evidence taken from the defendant was seized under the search warrant, the police had to comply with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A, or face suppression of all the evidence....

...In Koptyra, which was factually similar to the instant case, the trial court admitted marijuana as evidence in a drug possession charge. That case, however, has two important distinguishing factors. The seizure of mairjuana in Koptyra was not conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Therefore, the statutory mandate of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., (that the police officer knock and announce his authority and purpose) was not a prerequisite to entrance into the residence....

...When the agent, an invitee, arrested one participant before the officers broke into the house, this act put the others within the house on notice of the assisting officer's authority and purpose. This would constitute an exception to the mandates of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and compliance with that statute would be unnecessary. In the instant case, the officers broke into the house prior to the arrest. Since the police officers failed to comply with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., a prerequisite for legal execution of a search warrant, I would affirm the trial court's decision suppressing the twenty pounds of marijuana seized pursuant to the warrant.

...The officers forced open the door, entered the home, searched it, and arrested Mr. Holloway after finding marijuana. Only a couple of seconds elapsed between announcing "police with a search warrant" and ramming the door, a fact undisputed by the State. The knock-and-announce rule is codified in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1995), and provides that a law enforcement officer may forcibly enter a home for the purpose of executing a search warrant only after announcing his or her authority and purpose and, thereafter, being refused entry to the premises....

...ons. Because the evidence failed to prove the officer peril exception, and because the officers knocked and announced their authority and purpose with such haste that Mr. Holloway did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violated section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Webb of Carlson, Meissner, Webb & Crider, New Port Richey, for appellee. PATTERSON, Judge. Appellee Julio Avendano was charged with trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams on September 18, 1987. Asserting that a Pasco County deputy sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987), Avendano moved to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful search and seizure. After an evidentiary hearing on July 7, 1988, the trial court entered an order suppressing the cocaine and any inculpatory statements pertaining to it. We reverse. Section 933.09 requires a police officer, in the execution of a search warrant, to announce his purpose and authority and to give the occupant enough time to voluntarily open the door before the officer may enter forcibly....

...Although the testimony of the officers conflicted, it is clear that they failed to allow enough time after their announcement to permit anyone inside to open the door voluntarily. Unless the facts of this case fall within an exception to the requirements of section 933.09, the trial court's ruling should be upheld. It is not necessary for law enforcement officers to meet the section 933.09 requirements when "the officer's peril would have been increased had he demanded entrance and stated the purpose." Benefield v....

...We determine that the facts of this case fall within the Benefield exception and that the officers acted within their lawful authority. Appellee relies on several cases wherein it was held that information of firearms likely to be present on the premises did not justify the officer peril exception to section 933.09....

...religious ruse, to gain entry into premises in order to serve and execute a search warrant? and (2) Did the affidavit upon which the warrant was based present sufficient facts for a finding of probable cause? We answer both questions affirmatively. Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985), Florida's "knock and announce" rule, provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notic...

...However, it has been widely addressed in other jurisdictions, particularly the federal courts, which have held, almost universally, that such entry by ruse or deception does not violate the "knock and announce" rule as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the language of which is almost identical to that in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...residence for a lawful purpose, that is, execution of a search warrant. The Court having concluded that based upon the testimony and the evidence, this was not a "no-knock" search for the reasons set forth above but was executed in accordance with F.S. 933.09 and F.S....

...lain from the above that the police forcibly entered the defendant's apartment after announcing their authority and purpose — but before they had been *1298 denied admittance to the house. As the trial court recognized, this action plainly violated Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides: "933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant....

...There is a dispute as to exactly how they entered, but there is no dispute that they entered without permission, but before any occupant refused their admission. In view of the finding, the trial court held that the officers had failed to comply with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977). [1] The State submits that the officers scrupulously observed the procedures enumerated in Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), prior to entering the residence which was the subject of the search warrant....

...The greater portion of appellees' argument is focused upon their own testimony that the officers thrust open the door and entered without announcing their purpose, without permission, and consequently in total abrogation of the procedures prescribed in Section 933.09....

...nor were they denied permission by the appellees. The error which we perceive is not in the finding of fact, but rather in the legal conclusion ascribed thereto by the trial court; that is, that the uninvited entry invalidated the entire procedure. Section 933.09 is the statutory embodiment of a common law rule which has its roots in a tradition of respect and privacy afforded a man in his own home. Such a concept, that the sanctity of a man's home is inviolate, can be traced back as early as Thirteenth Century England. [2] In commenting *221 on the federal counterpart [3] to Section 933.09, the United States Supreme Court stated in Miller v....

...The concept of a breaking is not limited nor synonymous with that of force. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), has strictly construed the federal statute, substantially similar in form to Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), to apply to an entry by officers through a closed, but unlocked, door....

...th knocked and announced prior to stepping inside the appellees' residence. Since the knock resulted in the door's being voluntarily opened by an occupant, the officers never had to resort to a "breaking" to gain entry. Consequently, the language in Section 933.09 requiring an officer be "refused admittance" before "breaking open" any portion of the residence *222 to gain entry was not applicable....

...s who had come for an illegal purpose. Thus, the potential for violence was somewhat reduced. Second, since the occupants saw fit to open the door before inquiring who was there, their expectations of privacy were greatly diminished. The language in 933.09 pertaining to "refused admittance" is included to provide an occupant with time sufficient to voluntarily open the door and thereby avoid unnecessary destruction of property....

...refusal or approval by the occupants before entering the apartment. Accordingly, we reverse the order appealed from and remand the cause for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions. BERANEK and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant....

...§ 3109. [4] Although Benefield deals with section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1961), the right of officers to break into a building to make an arrest, the requirements to knock and announce, as well as the reasons therefor, are the same as those found in Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), the right of an officer to break into a house to execute a warrant....

...The State seeks reversal of an order granting appellee's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to execution of a search warrant. We reverse. Appellee's motion to suppress evidence was grounded upon an alleged violation of Section 901.19 and Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977) [1] which require law enforcement officers to announce their authority and purpose prior to breaking into any premises....

...e an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be." § 933.09 "The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or acce...

...Although Johnson expresses a willingness to use the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for the violation of statutory requirements where the legislature has not addressed the issue of remedies, it by no means establishes a broadly applicable exclusionary rule for all statutory violations. Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2005), contains a knock-and-announce requirement for the execution of search warrants; section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), contains the same requirement with respect to entry to make an arrest....

...901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1959)); State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) ("Both the trial court and this court are required to use the exclusionary rule as the remedy for any violation of the [knock-and-announce requirements] of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. HERSEY, Judge. At issue in this appeal is the validity of a search where the law enforcement officers failed to comply with the "knock and announce" requirement. The statutory provision applicable here is Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1983), which relates to searches....

...Prior to trial, defendants filed separate motions to suppress the evidence which had been seized from their residence, arguing that the search of their residence was illegal because the police officers had entered without complying with the knock-and-announce rule set forth in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ced at the suppression hearing established that the Orlando Police Department properly decided to forego compliance with the knock-and-announce rule out of fear that, had they complied with the rule, the defendants would have destroyed the evidence. Section 933.09 of the Florida Statutes (1985) sets forth the knock-and-announce rule: 933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant....

...Norris, Certified Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for Appellee. VAN NORTWICK, Judge. Curtis Wilson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the search warrant was unlawfully executed since the police did not comply with the knock-and-announce provisions of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Wilson was later arrested, in possession of a firearm, and admitted that the cocaine found in the Irvington Avenue house belonged to him. [3] Wilson moved to suppress the evidence against him contending, among other things, that the warrant was illegally executed contrary to section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1993), which requires officers to knock and announce their presence before forcibly entering a residence....

...The law so interpreted is nothing more than another expression of the moral emphasis placed on liberty and the sanctity of the home in a free country. As most states, [5] Florida has adopted the knock-and-announce requirement by statute. See, Florida Statutes, sections 901.19 (making arrest) and 933.09 (1995) (executing search warrant)....

...The parties here have not raised, and we do not decide, whether Florida's knock-and-announce rule and its exceptions, as applied here, are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of Wilson v. Arkansas . Our consideration here is limited to whether the unannounced entry in the instant case is lawful under section 933.09 and Benefield and its progeny....

...icers' particular knowledge or belief that they, as officers, would be in peril if they followed the *511 knock-and-announce provisions of the statute. The state first responds that the entry here complies with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 933.09....

...The state distinguishes Craft on the grounds that Officer Koivisto had personal knowledge that made him reasonably believe that Wilson could have been armed or have access to arms. At the outset, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the police did not comply with section 933.09....

...uncement "sheriff's department, search warrant." Craft, 638 So.2d at 1012. Thus, in order to sustain the trial court's order in the instant case, the facts of this case must fall within one of the exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirements of section 933.09....

...." State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 1055 (Fla.1994). An officer to whom a search warrant is directed "may break open any outer door ... to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house." § 933.09, Fla.Stat....

...Accordingly, the ruling on Simmons' motion to suppress is properly before this court for review. Simmons argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers executing the search warrant failed to knock and announce in compliance with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2003). In the alternative he argues that the officers failed to wait a reasonable time for him to respond to their knock. Section 933.09 provides that law enforcement officers may forcibly enter a home to execute a search warrant only after announcing their authority and purpose and then being refused entry....

...Appellant, Leangelo Kellom, appeals the trial court's denial of his dispositive motion to suppress the contraband discovered in his residence. Appellant contends that the officers who executed the search warrant violated the "knock and announce" rule codified in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...927, 930, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). The knock and announce rule has been recognized as a part of the common law of Florida. Wilson v. State, 673 So.2d 505, 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The Florida Legislature codified the knock and announce rule in section 933.09, which provides as follows: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything *394 therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. Section 933.09 imposes two requirements....

...State, 787 So.2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The statute also requires that law enforcement be refused admittance, which can be express or implied. Id. A lack of response is deemed a refusal. Id. Regardless of whether the ultimate refusal will be express or implied, section 933.09 and case law interpreting such require that some quantity of time, sufficient under the particular circumstances, be permitted for an occupant to respond. Id. The policy underlying section 933.09 "derives from the sentiment that there `is nothing more terrifying to the occupants than to be suddenly confronted in the privacy of their home by a police officer decorated with guns and the insignia of his office....

...Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 1053 (Fla.1994) (quoting Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla.1964)). Where officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and then enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09....

...O'Leary's affidavit did not mention the possibility of weapons because he had no knowledge of such at that time either. Based upon these circumstances, we hold that the officers' execution of the search warrant violated the knock and announce rule in section 933.09....

...was sufficient because there was no noise coming from the suspect's small motel room and because the officers had been informed by two women who had just bought cocaine from the suspect that he was likely to destroy the contraband). Because we conclude that the officers in this case violated section 933.09 by failing to provide appellant with due notice before forcibly entering his residence, we must also determine whether any exigent circumstances existed to excuse the officers' actions....

...d must be grounded on something more than his or her generalized knowledge as a police officer. See Bamber, 630 So.2d at 1055. In holding such, the supreme court rejected the State's argument that a "blanket approach" should apply as an exception to section 933.09 and should excuse forcible entry if police generally believed that a small quantity of drugs were present in a residence with standard plumbing....

...As O'Leary's testimony demonstrates, the officers' actions resulted from their generalized belief that individuals in possession of contraband will "usually get rid" of such. However, this generalized belief is not sufficient to excuse the officers' violation of section 933.09....

...See Bamber, 630 So.2d at 1055. Therefore, because the officers had no particularized belief that appellant was likely to destroy the contraband or that he was likely to be armed, no exigent circumstances existed to excuse the officers' violation of section 933.09. The State also contends on appeal that if the officers' actions violated section 933.09 and were not excused through exigent circumstances, suppression of the contraband would be unnecessary as the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. However, we conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable in cases in which section 933.09 is violated, as the application of the doctrine to evidence seized in violation of the knock and announce rule would render section 933.09 and the policy behind the rule meaningless....

...ence from suppression as a result of a violation of the knock and announce rule). As such, the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, because the officers violated section 933.09 and because no exigent circumstances existed at the time of entry to excuse the violation, we reverse and remand with directions that appellant be discharged....

...warrant. We reverse. The bases for appellees' motion were (1) that the affidavit for issuance of the warrant and the warrant itself were legally insufficient, and (2) that the officers who executed the warrant violated the "knock and announce rule", Section 933.09, Florida Statutes....

...The so-called "knock and announce rule" was designed to protect the right of the citizen to privacy in his own home. Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964). The rule imposes certain obligations on law enforcement officers preliminary to their forcible entry into a private residence. § 933.09, Fla....

...relies explicitly ties the "knock and announce rule" to forcible entry. Prickett says: The police officers failed to announce either their authority or their purpose prior to entering the house to execute the search warrant as required by Fla. Stat. § 933.09....

...Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence following a jury trial where he was found guilty of five counts of possession of child pornography. He alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the illicit photographs because of the police’s failure to comply with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2011), the knock- and-announce statute....

...However, we remand for corrections to appellant’s judgment and sentence and criminal punishment code sentencing scoresheet. General Law Before an officer may enter a home with reasonable and necessary force in order to execute a search warrant, the officer must knock, announce his presence, and announce his purpose. See § 933.09, Fla....

...Facts Here, officers executed a search pursuant to an unchallenged warrant and, as a result, found five pornographic photographs of a minor on appellant’s laptop. Appellant challenged the validity of the search’s execution, claiming that the officers had failed to properly knock and announce pursuant to section 933.09....

...Anderson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Allyn M. Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. ALTENBERND, Judge. The State appeals an order suppressing evidence under the knock-and-announce rule, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...In Richardson, this court suppressed evidence when the police waited for only ten seconds before conducting a forceful entry into the home. It might arguably assist the police if the legislature established waiting periods that presumptively satisfied section 933.09 under most sets of circumstances....

...deputies first confronted Mr. Cassells until they entered the home. Thus, although the formal knock and announce at the door occurred only a few seconds before the door was forced open, *400 the announcement to Mr. Cassells had occurred far earlier. Section 933.09 states: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...In this case, counsel filed an Anders brief because no alternative method had been provided by this court. This court gave Mr. Cassells an opportunity to file a pro se brief, and no such brief was filed. Accordingly, we dismiss this cross-appeal. WHATLEY and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] For example, section 933.09 could provide that, absent exigent circumstances, if the police waited twenty seconds during hours that occupants are awake or forty seconds during times when occupants are expected to be asleep at a typical residence, the waiting period would create a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the statute....

...n authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be.[ 2 ] *438 A separate statute, section 933.09, Fla....

...red by [section 901.19(1) ], the evidence must be suppressed.”); Kistner v. State, 379 So.2d 128, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (reversing trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress where sheriff failed to comply with knock- and-announce statute — section 933.09 (citing Benefield)); Moreno v....

...1964). See Whisnant v. State, 303 So.2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. den., 323 So.2d 273; Berryman v. State, 368 So.2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Moreno v. State, 277 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); State v. Collier, 270 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1971); Jester v. State, 339 So.2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Crawford v. State, 334 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Wigfall v. State, 323 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Rosenwasser v. Smith, 308 So.2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1975); and Fla.R....

...The State of Florida appeals a suppression order in which the trial court determined that Georgette A. Washington had standing to challenge the search of a home pursuant to a search warrant and that the search warrant was executed in violation of Florida's knock and announce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2001). Because we conclude that Ms. Washington lacked standing to object to the search, we do not reach the issue of whether the search warrant was executed in compliance *98 with section 933.09....

...through the use of a nightscope. *548 At the hearing there was disputed testimony as to the method by which the search was implemented. The State's witnesses testified that the entry was pursuant to the knock and announce procedures provided for in Section 933.09 of the Florida Statutes....

...ing in this cause, to apply the Youthful Offender Act. See State v. Goodson, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1981); Warren v. State, 391 So.2d 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The trial court found that the police, in the execution of the search warrant, complied with section 933.09, Florida Statutes....

...and the execution of the search warrant at 9:30 P.M. would not justify granting Thomas's motion to suppress, I cannot accept the view that this court's opinion in State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), provides an exception to the knock and announce requirement of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991), in all instances where the subject of the search warrant consists of small quantities of drugs....

...The subsequent search resulted in the seizure of two firearms, marijuana, heroin, electronic scales, currency, and documents. Pruitt filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search on the basis that the forced entry violated Florida's knock-and-announce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...d by competent, substantial evidence. However, we review the trial court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598 (Fla.2001). Section 933.09 states: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...as insufficient time to respond at an hour when the occupants were most likely asleep and no sounds were heard coming from within the house. The problem with attempting to analyze whether the time delay was long enough so as to be in compliance with section 933.09 is that there is insufficient case law covering the plethora of factual permutations, such as the fact pattern in this appeal, that might occur in any given case....

...violent crimes was unsupported by the affidavit or warrant. Based on this, the trial court concluded that there were "no particularized facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that the officers would *1026 be in greater peril had they complied with section 933.09." As the trial court correctly stated in its order, in order to invoke the officer peril exception to the knock-and-announce requirement, the police must have a reasonable basis to believe that they would face greater peril by complyin...

...y him to commit a murder, even if given an extra second or two, would gracefully respond by allowing police entry and access to evidence that could be used to imprison him. The trial court correctly noted that if law enforcement fails to comply with section 933.09 on the basis of officer peril or any other exception, the information upon which the exception is claimed must have some temporal proximity to the execution of the warrant....

...for a response after knocking where the warrant was executed at 5:30 a.m. However, in Richardson, there was no mention of firearms or threat of violence; the court engaged in a straightforward analysis of what should be a reasonable time vis-à-vis section 933.09 under the facts of that case....

...In its order granting Pruitt's motion to suppress, the trial court pointed out that in Hudson, the Supreme Court's analysis of the knock-and-announce rule was based on the Fourth Amendment, whereas the issue in this case is the purported violation of a state statute, section 933.09. The trial court concluded that because "greater protections [than those based on constitutional protections] may be afforded to citizens via state statute," section 933.09 provides a greater degree of protection than the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution, and Hudson did not apply....

...of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant. The Florida version (section 933.09), originally codified in 1923, [6] is an almost verbatim copy of the federal version: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if af...

...v. State, 863 So.2d 484, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court in Banks had held that a fifteen-to twenty-second wait before forcible entry "satisfied both the Fourth *1032 Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 3109, which is almost identical to section 933.09")....

...ld v. State, 155 P.3d 826, 833 (Okla.Crim.App.2007) (questioning, in dicta, whether Oklahoma's knock-and-announce statute might offer broader protection than the application of the rule under federal law). I also note that nothing in the language of section 933.09 requires suppression of the evidence if the rule is violated....

...By contrast, some of Florida's statutes contain provisions specifically allowing for suppression of evidence obtained when law enforcement fails to comply with the statute. See §§ 901.151(6) ("Stop and Frisk Law"); 934.06 (illegally intercepted wire or oral communications), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 933.09 contains no such provision....

...Presumably, if the legislature wanted to include the sanction of suppression as part of the statute, it could have chosen to do so. This absent sanction thus belies any presumption that the legislature intended to statutorily create higher protections in section 933.09 than those determined to exist under state or federal constitutional interpretation of the knock-and-announce rule....

...vidence, subject to Pruitt's ability to dispose of it before then or meet the officers with violence. Therefore, unlike the majority, I would have held in the alternative that even if the TACT team's entry in this case could be said to have violated section 933.09, Pruitt is not entitled to suppression of the evidence seized during the search pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson....

...rant was executed by a person to whom it was directed, and who had statutory authority to serve the warrant in Palm Beach County; and lastly that the warrant's description of "U.S. currency" was legally sufficient to identify the goods to be seized. Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981) requires the officer executing a search warrant to have given due notice of his authority and purpose and be refused admittance before breaking open any door or window of a house. The trial court found the police violated Section 933.09 by failing to give "due notice." We recognize that "due notice" constitutes a factual question for the trial court....

...The Fifth District has held that facts nearly identical to these were not fatal to the State's case. See Malone v. State, 651 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Elkhill further contends that, if the search warrant was valid, it was executed in violation of the knock and announce rule, § 933.09, Fla....

...The first officer to enter explained that he did not knock and announce his authority and purpose because of the possibility that the evidence he sought would be destroyed by the occupants. The officer estimated that evidence had been destroyed in half the instances in which he complied with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1979), before entering....

...Turning now to the merits of this controversy, we think it is plain that the trial judge correctly granted the motion to suppress. The police officers failed to announce either their authority or their purpose prior to entering the house to execute the search warrant as required by Fla. Stat. § 933.09....

...BOARDMAN, Judge. Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia following the execution of a search warrant at his home. He contends on appeal that the evidence seized should have been suppressed because the officers violated Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1979) when executing the search warrant. We agree and reverse. The evidence was undisputed that the police officers opened an unlocked screen door and stepped into the house without first knocking and giving notice of their authority and purpose as required by section 933.09....

...marijuana plants from a shed in his back yard. As part of his plea, Falcon preserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his dispositive motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that (1) the deputies had violated Florida's "knock-and-announce" statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2013), and (2) the search warrant had issued on insufficient probable cause....

...or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer's authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. § 933.09. The policy underlying section 933.09 derives from the sentiment that "[t]here is nothing more terrifying to the occupants than to be suddenly confronted in the privacy of their home by a police officer decorated with guns and the insignia of his office. This is why the law protects its entrance so rigidly." State v....

...1994) (quoting Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1964)). Where officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and then enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09. Holloway v. State, 718 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). And absent certain exigencies, a violation of section 933.09 warrants suppression....

...3d 434, 444 (Fla. 2010) (reaffirming suppression as remedy for violation of parallel knock-and-announce provision of § 901.19(1)); see also Benefield, 160 So. 2d at 710 (identifying exigencies that justify unannounced intrusion that would otherwise violate section 933.09). Significantly, however, section 933.09 does not provide how long "after due notice" the officer must wait before forcibly entering the residence, and case law provides -4- no bright-line rule, although "[t]his court has note...

...The state appeals the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant by officers who obtained consent to enter Gray's home by disguising themselves as water department employees. The trial court granted the defense motion to suppress because the officers had violated Florida's "knock and announce" statute. § 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...First, we find the plain language of the statute restricts its applicability. A literal reading of the statute reveals that the requirements are applicable only when an officer desires to effect a forcible entry into a residence. The statute in question, section 933.09, provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

set forth in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991). We disagree and reverse. Section 933.09 allows an

...Randall pleaded no contest to the charges, reserving her right to appeal a dispositive motion to suppress the drugs found in her bedroom. Because the Bradenton police officers who executed the search warrant failed to comply with the "knock-and-announce" rule in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999), by not affording Ms....

...aine and straws with cocaine residue, and a loaded semiautomatic pistol. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to suppress the cocaine, paraphernalia, and handgun seized in the search of the defendants' residence for failure to comply with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989), in executing a search warrant for a residence....

...The state contends that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motions to suppress for failure to comply with the knock and announce rule where the police had a valid concern that the defendants would have destroyed the evidence. We agree. The knock and announce rule, which is contained in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...The State of Florida appeals an order suppressing evidence obtained during the execution of a duly-issued search warrant. Based upon an evidentiary hearing and findings that (1) the law enforcement officers executing the warrant violated Florida's "knock-and-announce" statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2009), and (2) no exigent circumstances existed to justify the violation of that statute, the trial court granted the motion to suppress....

...rior gates were knocked down to gain entry. The notion that the S.W.A.T. team should have knocked on the front door after overcoming the successive wrought-iron gates, waited a few more moments, and then asked permission to enter, seems impractical. Section 933.09 refers to "due notice of the officer's authority and purpose," and the record in this case (but not in Benefield ) contains evidence of at least some efforts to convey that authority and purpose....

there was substantial compliance with F.S. Section 933.09, F.S.A. The narcotics paraphernalia and firearms

...Petersburg police officer with a search warrant. He entered without waiting for a reply. Both the door to the porch and the inner door into the home were open. Officer Ambrosio found cocaine and marijuana inside the house. The trial judge apparently accepted the defendant’s argument that section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987), Florida’s “knock and announce” statute, applied....

...ors and wait for admittance or a refusal, after which force would be justified. We disagree. In State v. Gray, 518 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 584 (Fla.1988), this court indicated: [T]he plain language of the statute [section 933.09] restricts its applicability....

...A literal reading of the statute reveals that the requirements are applicable only when an officer desires to effect a forcible entry into a residence.... Nothing in the statute reflects that the enumerated steps [notice and wait for response] must precede a peaceful entry that does not involve force. We think section 933.09 does not apply to the facts at bar....

...[T]he controlled buy alone is sufficient factual premise from which the affiant and the magistrate could conclude that additional contraband remained on the premises. [ 328 So.2d at 17, 18 ] *711 Crews also asserts that the search warrant was executed in such a manner as to violate Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, the “knock and announce” statute....

...evidence seized at his home that supported the charges. Mr. Spradley argues on appeal that the police violated Florida’s knock-and-announce statute by failing to wait a reasonable time before entering his residence to execute a search warrant. See § 933.09, Fla....

...They also found his girlfriend and daughter upstairs. There were no other occupants of this home. Mr. Spradley’s girlfriend testified that she heard the distraction device but did not hear the officer knock and announce. II. THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE Section 933.09 provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. Section 933.09 thus requires law enforcement to provide due notice of their authority and purpose and to be “refused admittance” before they are authorized to forcibly enter a home....

...1st DCA 2003). The refusal can be express or implied by a lack of response. Id. Wfiiere officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09....

...927, 933 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), and courts have regularly enforced this statute by invoking the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Richardson, 787 So.2d 906 ; State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730, 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). III. STANDING TO ENFORCE SECTION 933.09 AND ENTITLEMENT TO THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY Although neither party has raised the issue, a careful reader of the facts will notice that Mr. Spradley was not inside the home at the time of the knock and announce. Thus Mr. Spradley’s standing to challenge a violation of this statute and to demand the remedy of exclusion of evidence due to the violation may be questioned. Section 933.09 does not state that a defendant must be present inside the house in order to have standing to enforce this right or to obtain the remedy of the exclusionary rule....

...on of private property, Mr. Spradley’s interests are implicated by the damage occurring to his two front doors. IV. WAITING FIFTEEN SECONDS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE POLICE TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN REFUSED ADMITTANCE Section 933.09 does not contain any express period that an officer must wait at *55 a door following his knock and announce before he is authorized to enter the home with force....

appeal is whether there was compliance with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977) by law enforcement

...defendant upon the arrival of Officer Johnson within twenty (20) minutes after the initial police entry. Moreover, it is undisputed that the officers properly entered the premises after announcing tlieir authority and purpose in full compliance with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...eir initial knock and announcement and the forced entry was reasonable. The trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Sowerby, 73 So.3d at 331. The Florida Legislature codified the common law knock-and-announce rule at section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2012), which provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of the house, or any part of the house or anything *467 therein, to execute a search warrant, if after due notice of the officer�...

...The refusal can be either express or implied by a lack of response. See Kellom v. State, 849 So.2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “Where officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09.” Spradley v. State, 933 So.2d 51, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Richardson v. State, 787 So.2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)). Section 933.09 does not set forth a certain period of time that an officer must wait following his knock and announcement before he is authorized to force entry into the home....

...utor were tantamount to comment on appellant’s failure to testify. 4. The evidence was insufficient to establish guilt. We find merit in appellant’s first point and reverse thereon. Statutory guidance for execution of search warrants is found in Section 933.09, F.S.A., wherein it is stated: “(An) officer may break open any outer door, inner door * * * or any part of a house * * * to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house...

...rt fell short. Reluctant though we may be to disturb the findings made by the trial court regarding admissibility of evidence, we are nevertheless impelled to hold here that a finding to the effect that the searching officers did in fact comply with Section 933.09, supra is manifestly against the weight of the evidence....

warrant herein substantially complied with Section '933.09 F.S.A. or its cousin Federal statute .3109

...The appellant challenges his convictions for possession of cocaine and cannabis, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. Because police officers did not comply with the knock and announce procedures of section 933.09, Florida Statutes, we reverse....

...the locked outer door of the residence. Cocaine and cannabis were found inside, and the appellant was thereafter charged with possession of the narcotics. Arguing that the police officers had not complied with the knock and announce requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes, the appellant moved the trial court to suppress the evidence found in the residence....

ZEHMER, Judge. Appellants Burden and Dillman appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to suppress physical evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. 1 They contend the warrant was executed in violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981), the “knock and announce” statute....

...On February 24, 1983, appellants Burden and Dillman were arrested for possession of controlled substances after a search warrant was executed at their dwelling in Jacksonville. Prior to trial, appellants moved to suppress the physical evidence seized under the warrant, alleging the warrant was executed in violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1st DCA 1981), concedes that for the present there is no good faith exception to the knock-and-announce rule in Florida, but urges this point to preserve its right to appellate review of that issue. We adhere to Walden and decline to fashion such an exception. Section 933.09 provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...The concept of breaking is not limited to or synonymous with the use of force. Manning , citing Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 , 88 S.Ct. 1755 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court strictly construed the federal statute equivalent to section 933.09 to apply to an officer’s entry through a closed but unlocked door, quotes the following from Sabbath : An unannounced intrusion into a dwelling — what § 3109 basically proscribes— is no less an unannounced intrusion whether offi...

...Kelly, 287 So.2d 13 (Fla.1973), a detective, upon reaching the front door of the house, opened an exterior screen door and turned the knob of the front door. The door opened and the detective entered and then announced. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding that the warrant was not executed pursuant to section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...good faith intentions provide no exception to the statutory mandate. The record contains no suggestion that the officers entered without knocking out of fear that evidence would be destroyed. We hold that the officer’s entry in this case violated section 933.09, and reverse the denial of the motion to suppress....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a judgment based on the denial of a dispositive motion to suppress, and an appeal of sentences as cruel and unusual punishment. Appellants contend that Florida’s knock and announce statute, § 933.09, was illegally violated by officers’ entry into defendants’ home, and that the imposition of mandatory minimum sentence provided by § 893.135, Florida Statutes, is violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm. The officers in this case did not adhere to the requirements of the knock and announce statute, § 933.09, in their search pursuant to a warrant....

...State, 433 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). No showing of prejudice was made here. State v. Henderson, 253 So.2d 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). We also find no basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the search warrant was in validly executed. Neither section 933.09 nor section 933.11, Florida Statutes (1989) is violated when an officer, without immediate physical possession of a warrant, enters and secures the premises for which the warrant has been issued....

executing this warrant the police violated Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), which prohibits forcible

The “knock and announce” rule, embodied in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Officer

...Based on these purchases, the police obtained a search warrant. When the police executed the search warrant, they knocked, announced, and within a few seconds, entered the mobile home. They did not wait to be refused admittance, as required by the knock-and-announce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991). 1 Inside the trailer the officers found cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the immediate entry did not comply with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991), and that the search was unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment....

...2 It is evident that the entry and search in the present case do not measure up to the exigent circumstances standard set forth in Bamber . We reverse the conviction and remand with directions to grant the motion to suppress, and for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed and remanded. . 933.09....

...Susan L. Gerstenberger challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress and the imposition of certain conditions of probation. We affirm on the suppression issue since the officers complied with the knock and announce requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1993)....

ERVIN, Judge. The state appeals suppression of evidence found during the search of an apartment pursuant to a search warrant. The search was held invalid on the ground that it violated Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, the “knock and announce” statute....

...by name. They did not, however, as the lower court apparently believed the statute required, disclose the purpose of their visit. We reverse and remand. We find there was no violation of the knock and announce rule, codified at Section's 901.19 and 933.09, Florida Statutes, simply because the rule is inapplicable to a situation in which entry is obtained by the owner’s or lawful possessor’s permission....

...State, 419 So.2d 320 (Fla.1982), where the Florida Supreme Court ruled that an undercover officer, already invited onto the premises, was free to leave the premises and bring additional officers with him upon his return. REVERSED and REMANDED. NIMMONS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . Section 933.09 authorizes an officer to break into a house in order to execute a search warrant, "if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house_”

...escription. He was thereafter sentenced to 15 years in prison. The evidence at trial indicated that on March 29, 2002, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence using a “knock and announce procedure.” See Florida Statutes § 933.09 (2002)....

PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals the denial of his motions to suppress contraband he claims was illegally seized in violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes. We agree that the search did not meet the requirements of section 933.09, Florida Statutes, and that exigent circumstances did not exist to create an exception to the “knock and announce” rule of section 933.09....

violation of Florida’s knock-and-an-nounce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1995). State v. Bamber,

emphasize that such a technical violation of section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1991) is, in my opinion

...no attempt by the officers to actually enter the house, and that the officers then knocked on the inner wooden door, announcing their authority and purpose. The trial court found these actions did not constitute a violation of the statute. We agree. Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...ent with State v. Robinson, 565 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review dismissed, 574 So.2d 143 (Fla.1990), wherein it was held that, as a matter of law, the opening of an unlocked screen door is a breaking which invokes the due notice requirements of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The State of Florida appeals a suppression order in which the trial court determined that Georgette A. Washington had standing to challenge the search of a home pursuant to a search warrant and that the search warrant was executed in violation of Florida’s knock and announce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2001). Because we conclude that Ms. Washington lacked standing to object to the search, we do not reach the issue of whether the search warrant was executed in compliance *98 with section 933.09....

...The trial judge heard no testimony, but entered his order on the basis of a stipulated statement of facts. The trial judge entered his order granting the Motion to Suppress on the ground that the search warrant had not been executed in compliance with Section 933.09 Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...sence of someone outside are then engaged in activities which justify the officers in the belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted.” The Court later said: “Time and experience will no doubt suggest other exceptions.” Section 933.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein....

...purpose. (Emphasis ours) The exception sought is that where the amount of drugs is small the drugs may be easily disposed of by flushing them down a toilet or other drain, and that compliance with the “Knock and Announce” requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19 (1), Florida Statutes, would afford those inside the building time enough to dispose of any drugs before the officers gained entrance....

that the warrant was executed in violation of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1975). By its decision,

...They demanded that someone was to come to the door. However, it was not until seconds before entry that an officer stated that the police were in possession of a search warrant. Times moved to suppress the fruits of the search arguing the officers violated section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2020), the “knock-and-announce” statute. 1 After a hearing at which the senior police officer of the unit executing the warrant testified, the trial court concluded that the officers did not comply with section 933.09. As it has long been the law in Florida that a violation of a 1 Section 933.09 is one of two “knock-and-announce” statutes in Florida. Section 933.09 pertains to searches and provides that an officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the [search] warrant, if after due notice of the...

...zed to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. Because both sections 933.09 and 901.19 “impose the same salutary requirement of knock and announce, and both are grounded in the same policy considerations,” case law about one of these statutes is considered as persuasive authority for the other. Van Allen v....

...ready been made to breach the door and not to wait for a response. “Where officers knock, announce their authority and purpose, and then enter with such haste that the occupant does not have a reasonable opportunity to respond, the search violates section 933.09.” Kellom, 849 So....

...4  While the State implies that the words “search warrant” should not be imbued with any thaumaturgic quality, the controlling statute mandates that police officers announce the authority by which they seek entry. Indeed, section 933.09 plainly states that first, “due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose” has to be given....

...type of exception to violations of the knock-and-announce statutes, this court has already rejected this exception. See Kellom, 849 So. 2d at 394. There, we stated, “We conclude that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable in cases in which section 933.09 is violated, as the application of the doctrine to evidence seized in violation of the knock and announce rule would render section 933.09 and the policy behind the rule meaningless.” Kellom, 849 So....

...ies to violation of the statutory requirement of an officer to knock and announce, we are compelled to comply. In sum, because there is competent and substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the police officers violated section 933.09, and because the State offers no meritorious reason for not applying the exclusionary rule here, we AFFIRM. Nonetheless, as the State points out in its initial brief, the holding in Cable requiring suppression for a knock-and-announce...

...We therefore certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: WHETHER EVIDENCE OBTAINED UNDER A VALID SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED TO REMEDY A VIOLATION OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 933.09, FLORIDA STATUTES? AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED. ROBERTS, J., concurs; NORDBY, J., specially concurs with opinion. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla....

...7 NORDBY, J., specially concurring. I agree we must affirm. Officer testimony and police camera footage support the trial court’s conclusion that law enforcement did not comply with Florida’s “knock-and-announce” requirement under section 933.09, Florida Statutes....

...In the same breath that the police officer announced the search warrant, he directed the home’s occupants to “step away from the door to avoid injury.” There was simply no opportunity to discern whether the occupants “refused admittance” following such “due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose.” § 933.09, Fla....

...Yes, knock-and- announce requirements for arrest warrants are set out in a different statute than the search warrant statute here. But we cannot set aside Cable on such a technical distinction. In discussing the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, the Court emphasized that section 933.09, Florida Statutes, “parallels this language for search warrants.” Cable, 51 So....

...And throughout its analysis, the Court referred to “statutory knock-and-announce violations” and “violations of the knock-and-announce statutes,” even citing a series of district court decisions where the exclusionary rule had been applied to violations not only of section 901.19 but also section 933.09....

...Cable thus treated the exclusionary rule as equally applicable to violations of either statute. Noteworthy too is State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994), which fell between Benefield and Cable. The Court in Bamber addressed a no-knock search conducted under a search warrant in violation of section 933.09 and refused to expand the exclusionary rule exceptions recognized under Benefield to include a blanket exception “any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing.” 630 So....