Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Said holding of the district court of appeal might have been a correct interpretation of § 901.15 if the officers had found petitioner out on the commons and were attempting to arrest him. In this case petitioner was in his home and the officers were proceeding under § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. They were bound by the requirements of that act and what we have said here relates to the execution of it. There was no attempt whatever to comply with § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the two acts relate to a different kind of arrest....

...the home was entered? In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, that court recognized that the lawfulness of an arrest by a state officer for an offense against a state is to be determined by state law. Ker v. California, supra. Section 901.19(1), the applicable Florida Statute, provides: "An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building...

...For all the record shows, there is no material difference in the entrance here from that in the Dickens case. In that case they entered the back door without permission, while in this case they entered the front door without permission. They were trespassers in both cases. They completely ignored every requirement of § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., so everything they did inside the home was done as trespassers in total disregard of the responsibility the law imposed on them to knock, give notice and the purpose of their mission....

...We do not attempt to prescribe what would constitute a reasonable search except to say that what was done here was unreasonable under any standard that would be approved by a free country. *710 The state argues that the Ker case, supra, involved a California statute similar to § 901.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., permitted an unannounced entry because of the fact that the evidence [narcotics] could have easily been destroyed....

...standards of reasonableness. Even if we had authority to do so, we find no reason to engraft judicial exceptions on the statute in this case. If these amount to amendments to the common law rule, they would have to be done by statute in this state. Section 901.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., like its counterpart California statute, appears to represent a codification of the English common law which recognized the fundamental sanctity of one's home yet nevertheless provides that an arresting offic...

...166, 170 [10 Am.Dec. 110]; see, Restatement, Torts, § 306, comment d. Without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide these questions in the first instance." As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...by the classic method of flushing it down the drain. This argument must be rejected in the face of the practical difficulties inherent in disposing of $3,000 in small bills by that method. Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was violated and that its violation is not excused by any of the exceptions discussed herein and for this reason the fruits of the search being the product of an unlawful arrest and a search incident thereto, should have been excluded by the trial court upon proper motion....

...to serious danger. In light of these factors the warrantless entry into appellant's apartment was justified. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir.1970). Appellant further argues that the officers' intrusion into his dwelling violated section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981) — The Knock and Announce Statute....

...Here, strong argument can be made that there was substantial compliance with the statute notwithstanding a failure to announce the officers' purpose. Moreover, under certain limited exceptions an officer may enter a dwelling to effect an arrest without complying with section 901.19(1). Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945 (Fla. 1977). This Court, in Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964), advanced several exceptions to the knock and announce requirements of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, stating in pertinent part: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...Accordingly, the officers were reasonable in concluding that an announcement of purpose would have increased their peril. See Williams v. State, 403 So.2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Inasmuch as there were exigent circumstances present and full compliance with section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), would have further endangered the lives of the officers, their failure to comply with the Knock and Announce Statute was justified....

...The only point on appeal material to our review of the District Court's decision is Petitioner's contention that the evidence taken from his parents' home should not have been admitted at trial because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest made without warrant or compliance with the provisions of F.S. Section 901.19(1), F.S.A....

...when "He reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has *697 committed or is committing it." If the suspected felon is within a building, however, strict adherence to F.S. Section 901.19(1), F.S.A., is necessary....

...Section 901.15 (3), F.S.A. However, it erroneously concluded the unannounced entry into the Earman home for the purpose of making that arrest was proper. The District Court said: "... the officers' failure to comply with the statutory requirements of F.S. Section 901.19(1), F.S.A., comes within the exception announced by this court in the case of State v....

...When authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a *631 warrant, an officer may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose. Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., F.S.A....

...as committing a felony, but he did not announce his authority and purpose before entering the premises to make the arrest. The appellant contends that the method of entry into the Hardin dwelling constituted a "constructive breaking" in violation of Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., F.S.A., and that this rendered the arrest and subsequent search illegal under the rule of the Benefield case....

...hat an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted. Affirmance of the conviction resulted from the fact that Justice Harlan concurred in the result for other reasons. The method of entry here did not involve a breaking within the meaning of Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., F.S.A., as construed in Benefield....

...of attempted abortion. This appeal followed. Prior to the trial, the appellants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the raid and the trial court denied the motion. The appellants have assigned this as error and assert as authority for reversal Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and Benefield v. State, Fla. 1964, 160 So.2d 706. Section 901.19(1) provides: "An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrest...

...* * *" (Emphasis supplied.) * * * * * * The appellee counters that the court in Benefield, supra, clearly sets forth four specific exceptions to this rule on page 710 as follows: * * * * * * "As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...None of the officers testified that they believed Policewoman Williams was in "imminent peril of bodily harm". Under the particular facts in this case, there appears to be no valid reasons to justify such a belief; therefore, the general rule of Benefield should apply, and not the exception. Since Section 901.19(1) was not complied with the fruits of the subsequent search should have been excluded by the trial court upon proper motion....

...1959, 112 So.2d 864; Savage v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 566, 1959. In so doing, if the record reveals that the facts known to the arresting officers before their entry are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on their part that compliance with § 901.19(1) Fla....

...Williams was not physically harmed or otherwise in any way." * * * * * * It appears to me that these facts, known to the officers at the time they broke in, are consistent with a good faith belief on their part that they were excused from compliance with § 901.19(1) Fla....

...without a warrant on grounds that they believed a felony was being committed and that the persons inside were committing it. [2] We now turn to the issue of whether the lawfulness of the arrest was vitiated by the means used to enter the apartment. Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: "An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building in wh...

...d entry because evidence could have easily been destroyed, it does not violate federal constitutional standards of reasonableness. At least twenty-six states have codified the common law rule prohibiting forcible entry in statutes similar to Florida Section 901.19(1)....

...ing valid consent in denying appellant's motion to suppress. In the third issue raised, appellant maintains that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained after the police failed to knock and announce before entering his home, pursuant to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, 1987. He argues that the failure of Officer Benfield to announce the purpose of his entry makes his arrest illegal and the subsequent search conducted of the premises invalid under section 901.19(1). Urquhart v. State, 211 So.2d 79 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968). We find this argument unavailing. Under section 901.19(1), police may break into a residence to make a valid warrantless felony arrest only when they have *960 been denied access after announcing their authority and purpose. Failure to "knock and announce" will vitiate the lawfulness of the arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present. Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964); Urquhart v. State, supra . However, section 901.19(1) is not violated when officers are voluntarily admitted....

...lawful. The circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity reversed, and this petition for writ of common law certiorari followed timely. An officer is limited in making a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed within his lawful presence by section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), entitled "Right of officer to break into building," which provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warran...

...State, 302 So.2d 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Prather v. State, 182 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); see Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964). Furthermore, Benefield made it crystal clear that the limitations on an officer's authority contained in section 901.19 are to be very strictly adhered to where the building to be entered is a person's home. The act of opening an unlocked screen door constitutes a "breaking" or entry within the meaning of section 901.19....

...The Court invalidated a New York statute which authorized police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and by force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest, holding that the fourth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, prohibits such action. Since section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), suffers the same defect, the requirements of Payton must be applied to petitioner's arrest here....

...The officer's act in following the defendant into his home was viewed as within the scope of authority given the officer under section 901.22 to retake an arrested person who has escaped. Here, however, petitioner was at all times within his home. Section 901.19 and the cases decided thereunder do not give an officer the power to exercise control over and arrest a person who is wholly within the confines of his home....

...Both the state and Robert William Hume petition this Court to review State v. Hume, 463 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), in which the district court construed article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution (the new search-and-seizure section), and applied section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1985) (knock-and-announce statute)....

...intent to distribute. This cause concerns two search and seizure issues: (1) the recorded conversation in Hume's home by the undercover agent and (2) the asserted failure of the arresting officers to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19, Florida Statutes....

...*189 Statutory Knock-and-Announce Requirements In the second issue, the trial court suppressed the seized contraband observed by the undercover agent in the bedroom because the arresting officers, in entering Hume's apartment with the arrest warrant, failed to comply with Florida's knock-and-announce statute, section 901.19(1), and because the warrantless seizure was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement....

...s apartment prior to accomplishing the arrest: "While it is arguable that this fact constitutes a distinction without a difference ... we are not prepared to so hold as a matter of law, especially given the mandate to strictly construe exceptions to Section 901.19(1)." 463 So.2d at 501-02....

...Since the undercover agent had already lawfully intruded into Hume's apartment and since he could have arrested Hume inside the premises at any time, we find that the enlistment of additional officers waiting outside the home did not constitute an intrusion offensive to section 901.19(1) or Hume's claimed expectations of privacy. To rule otherwise would be contrary, in our view, to the intent of section 901.19(1) and would compromise an officer's safety....

...Guilt Phase Appellant contends that his conviction should be vacated because: (1) his confession was erroneously admitted because it was not shown to have been voluntarily given and because it was the fruit of an unlawful, warrantless arrest at his residence without compliance with Florida's knock-and-announce statute, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981); (2) evidence obtained from the warrantless search of a storeroom was improperly admitted since the consent to search was not voluntarily given; (3) the consideration promised to a key state witness was not...

...sonably believing the suspect to be inside, were authorized to break the close and enter the residence if reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958); §§ 901.15, 901.19, Fla....

...[2] The provisions of section 901.15(7) which allow a law enforcement officer to arrest a person for an act of domestic violence without a warrant do not permit the forcible entry into the person's home to effectuate the arrest based on a misdemeanor offense. See § 901.19(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); Green v. State, 632 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) ("Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes the police to enter a dwelling without a warrant only if the police are authorized to make a felony arrest."); Ortiz (holding that police cannot make a warrantless entry into a house in order to mak...

..."the officer may break open any outer door," window, etc. The district court affirmed, citing this Court's decision in Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964), which listed the following *15 exceptions to the requirements of similar Fla. Stat. § 901.19(1), F.S.A., requiring prior announcement by the officer of his authority and purpose before using force to enter....

...(260 So.2d 905) "The exception sought is that where the amount of drugs is small the drugs may be easily disposed of by flushing them down a toilet or other drain, and that compliance with the `Knock and Announce' requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, would afford those inside the building time enough to dispose of any drugs before the officers gained entrance....

...But the Supreme Court also recognized that under certain circumstances the Constitution did not require announcement. The Court agreed that the exceptions to the announcement rule as recognized under the common law were not prohibited. The basis for recognizing the exceptions to Fla. Stat. § 901.19(1), F.S.A., in Benefield was that the statute was a codification of the common law rule and the exceptions were a part of that rule....

...These rings were labeled as State's Exhibit No. 1. Exhibits Nos. 2-7 consisted of personal property taken from the home of Mrs. Salgado following defendant's arrest. All these exhibits were admitted into evidence over defendant's objection that they were unlawfully seized. Florida Statute § 901.19(1), F.S.A., provides: "An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose." Inspector Salla's actions in pushing open the door constituted a breaking within the meaning of Section 901.19(1)....

...1952, 59 So.2d 775. From his above-quoted testimony it is clear that Inspector Salla did not announce his purpose and he did not wait until he was refused admittance before pushing open the door. Therefore, Inspector Salla failed to comply with the provisions of 901.19(1)....

...Such failure, unless justified, makes the subsequent arrest and incidental search invalid and any evidence seized as a result thereof is inadmissible. Benefield v. State, supra. In Benefield the Florida Supreme Court listed four justifications [5] for not complying with 901.19(1), stating at 160 So.2d page 710: "As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...elief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted. * *" The inspector offered no testimony which would place him under one of the four exceptions and thereby justify his non-compliance with the statute. Thus, due to the violation of § 901.19(1), committed by the officer while in the process of arresting defendant, the exhibits were illegally seized and the court committed reversible error by admitting them into evidence. [6] In addition to violating § 901.19(1) and thereby causing the resulting search and seizure of Exhibits 1-7 to be invalid, the seizure of Exhibits 2-7 would be invalid under the authority of O'Neil v....

...Flores, Fla.App.2d 1974, 305 So.2d 292. [2] In view of our disposition of this case, we need not pass on appellant's further contentions that assuming probable cause, (1) a search warrant should have been procured, and (2) there was a failure of compliance with Fla. Stat. § 901.19.

...requesting admittance and without announcing their authority and purpose. The Supreme Court held that such acts vitiated the entry and subsequent arrest of the accused inside the home because the officers failed to comply with the provisions of F.S. Section 901.19 (1), F.S.A., which reads as follows: "An officer, in order to make an arrest * * * when authorized * * * for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reason...

...officers. Prior to trial the defense filed a motion to suppress, based on the argument that the original entry into the trailer by Burnette without a warrant was an unreasonable entry violative of the United States and Florida Constitutions, and of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...In effect, the trial court directed a verdict on this issue during the course of trial. This was error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on Count Three of the information, as reduced to the charge of resisting arrest without violence. SHARP, and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), states in pertinent part: (1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest fo...

...his authority (i.e., officer of the Winter Park Police Department) and the purpose of his presence at the residence (i.e., to execute a search warrant). See Benefield v. State, Fla. 1964, 160 So.2d 706, where the Florida Supreme Court construed F.S. Section 901.19(1), F.S.A....

...One of the points urged by appellant [1] for reversal is that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized since it was obtained as a result of an invalidly effectuated arrest. We find merit in appellant's contention and reverse. Fla. Stat., § 901.19(1), F.S.A., [2] provides: "If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he m...

...nable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be." [Emphasis supplied.] In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that the arrest was not made in accordance with the provisions of § 901.19(1), Fla....

...Alternatively, appellant states that the "arrest" by Bowers was not an arrest at all, *1232 but merely a detainment; the real arrest was made by the Dade County Public Safety Officers. That arrest was illegal, according to appellant, in that the officers failed to "knock and announce," as required by § 901.19(1), Fla....

...Even if Mobley and Belcher were committing a trespass in the presence of the officer that crime is a misdemeanor and the arrest was made without a warrant. The officers were not authorized to break open the door in order to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor, F.S. Section 901.19, F.S.A....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant. James M. Russ of Law Offices of James M. Russ, Orlando, for appellee. SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge. Once again, this Court is presented with problems arising from the application *13 of the "knock-and-announce" statutes, F.S. § 901.19(1); F.S....

...llins College dormitory room for the purpose of arresting him, without a warrant, for possession and delivery of cannabis, and granted Roman's motion to suppress the marijuana which had been seized from the room as a result of the arrest, under F.S. § 901.19(1) and "pursuant to the principles as [stated] in State v....

...A few moments later, he returned, accompanied by two other officers, all of them with guns drawn. Although Beckstrom testified he knocked before entering, neither officer in the room, and none of the students there, heard such a knock (or any announcement of authority as required by F.S. § 901.19(1); see Benefield v....

...Apparently, then, according to his own avowed actions, he did not think that a knock or an announcement would have led to the dire results he said at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he feared when he entered the room. [2] The "knock-and-announce" rules applicable under F.S. § 901.19(1) to a search which follows even a justified arrest without a warrant, see Benefield v....

...tem. In his motion to suppress and on appeal, Bennett argues that a pick-up order is not a warrant and did not authorize the officer's entry into the premises. The State convinced the trial court that the officer's warrantless entry was justified by section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 901.19 Right of officer to break into building....

...ommitted by *1186 the person to be arrested, and (2) allowed an officer, announcing his office and purpose, to break into a building after being refused admittance. Id. at 578 n. 6., 100 S.Ct. 1371 In fact, the Supreme Court cited Florida's statute, section 901.19, in its discussion of similar statutes enacted by some twenty-four states, id....

...plished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present. Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting with approval United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir.1978)). Thus, the State's reliance on probable cause and section 901.19 is misplaced....

...elonious transaction (but in reality to obtain reinforcements) while another officer or officers remain inside the premises, does the officer who left have an implied invitation to reenter the premises freely or must he comply with the provisions of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), in order to make a lawful reentry? (2) Does the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), prohibit the sort of reentry described in question (1) even though the officer seeking reentry complies with Section 901.19(1)? DOWNEY and MOORE, JJ., concur....

...elonious transaction (but in reality to obtain reinforcements) while another officer or officers remain inside the premises, does the officer who left have an implied invitation to reenter the premises freely or must he comply with the provisions of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), in order to make a lawful reentry? 2. Does the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), prohibit the sort of reentry described in question (1) even though the officer seeking reentry complies with Section 901.19(1)? Petitioner Griffin pled nolo contendere to criminal conspiracy and was placed on five years probation with the first six months to be spent in jail....

...for rehearing again certified the two questions above. The answer to the first question, under the facts in this case, is that the officer that left the house had an implied invitation to reenter and did not have to "knock and announce" pursuant to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes....

...The agent left the house for a very short period of time, his return was expected and encouraged, and his return was a necessary part of the uncompleted, ongoing transaction pursuant to which he had first been invited. In this situation, he did not need to comply with the provisions of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, before reentering petitioner Griffin's home....

...The second question certified by the district court, concerns whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), prohibits the sort of reentry described in the first question even though the reentering officer complies with section 901.19(1)....

...he testified that he was unaware of this when the arrest was made. Dyer filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and the cannabis. He argued that the arrest violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and also section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...re not violated when officers followed him in hot pursuit and finally arrested him in his garage for driving under the influence. The statutory analysis portion of the trial court's order reads in part as follows: The Defendant, however, argues that § 901.19(1) limits warrantless entries into one's home or onto one's property to felony arrests and cites to several cases in support of his position. * * * * * * * * This Court declines to extend F.S. 901.19 to instances where the police in hot pursuit chase a suspect into a yard they had no reason to believe was the Defendant's, to arrest the Defendant without a warrant for a misdemeanor, especially in light of the exigent circumstances which existed at the time and the reasonableness of the officer's actions. The decision not to expand § 901.19 any further than it already has been expanded is based in part on the original intent of the statute....

...It addresses when force may be used to enter any building or property. This statute does not address and does not appear to be concerned with those situations where force is not required. We agree with the trial judge's reasoning that Florida Statute 901.19 (1995), as its title clearly states, is intended to apply to those situations where an officer breaks into a building. Ortiz v. State, 600 So.2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), which is cited by the defendant to support his argument that section 901.19 vitiates his arrest in this case, is distinguishable. That case involved entry into an apartment and clearly states that "[s]ection 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989), defines the authority of a law enforcement officer to make a nonconsensual entry into a building in order to make an arrest." Id. at 531. This interpretation makes sense because it is difficult to see how section 901.19, Florida's "knock and announce" statute, could realistically be applied to a situation *615 where a fleeing suspect is apprehended in a back yard....

...In so holding the Court specifically stated that it would use the principles for determining the validity of a search without a warrant in determining the validity of an arrest without a warrant. Florida has long recognized the particular sanctity of the home and enacted Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1939), the knock and announce law, to protect this interest. Florida courts require that Section 901.19(1) be strictly adhered to....

...Earman v. State, 265 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1972); Hurt v. State, 388 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Moreno v. State, 277 So.2d 81 (Fla.3d DCA 1973). Only under certain limited exceptions may an officer enter a residence to effect an arrest without complying with Section 901.19(1). Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945 (Fla. 1977); Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964). [1] Because the officers failed to announce their purpose, they did not comply with Section 901.19(1). Moreno, supra . Increase of an officer's peril had he demanded entry and stated his purpose, however, is a recognized exception to Section 901.19(1)....

...Defendants' arrest would likewise have been proper, and their inculpatory statements admissible. See Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The crucial issue in this case, therefore, is the propriety of the officer's entry into the building. Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., provides that: "An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window of any buil...

...cers in the belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Appellant concedes that the arresting officer's entry into the building in the instant case was an entry by breaking within the meaning of F.S. § 901.19(1), F.S.A., as interpreted by Benefield....

...he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. The trial court was of the opinion that there was insufficient justification for entry of the arresting officer into appellant's premises without announcing his authority and purpose within the meaning of Section 901.19(1), as construed in the Benefield case....

...Judge Barkdull in his concurring opinion in Rodriguez, supra, observed in part: "* * * [I]f the record reveals that the facts known to the arresting officers before their entry are not inconsistent with a good faith belief on their part that compliance with § 901.19(1) Fla....

...e increased had he announced himself." We ought instead to evaluate the circumstances of the situation guided by the test of good faith and reasonableness and ascertain (1) whether the circumstances were such as to reflect good faith compliance with Section 901.19, and (2) whether under such circumstances any prudent police officer would have reasonably taken similar action under the assumption that had he done otherwise he would have increased his peril....

...The majority, however, overlooks the fact that the building, or at least that part of it in which defendant was found, was in actuality defendant's dwelling place or "home." The Florida Supreme Court in Benefield v. State, supra, set forth the requirements of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., for police entry into a building, including several exceptions to the general rule that the officer must first knock and announce his purpose. The court took pains to point out, however, that the requirements of § 901.19(1) should be strictly observed if the building happened to be one's home....

...The fact that a building is in part used as a business does not deprive those parts used as living quarters of their status as a private dwelling. Cf. Section 933.18(7), Florida Statutes 1969. The occupant of such a dwelling is entitled to insist on strict compliance by police with the requirements of § 901.19(1)....

...able entries than would be afforded those living in houses or residential areas. No one disputes the need for effective law enforcement in metropolitan areas as discussed in the McErlean case cited by the majority. What is disputed, however, is that § 901.19(1) affords citizens living in these areas less protection than people living elsewhere. The court here analogizes the test for determining reasonableness of entry under § 901.19(1) to that of determining the reasonableness of an arrest without a warrant. The persuasiveness of this analogy is, I believe, open to serious question. Benefield v. State, supra, established that not only must police have probable cause to arrest a person, but that they must strictly comply with § 901.19(1) if an entry into a home is made to effect the arrest....

...fficient basis for reversal. The mere fact that an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion if presented with the facts in the first instance does not of itself justify reversal. In conclusion, considering the strict requirements of § 901.19(1) and the Benefield case, and in light of the record as a whole, I do not see how it can be said that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling....

...One of the detectives opened the door and yelled, "Police. Halt!" *435 The detectives could smell the odor of marijuana and heard someone running through the house. The State conceded that they did not comply with the "knock and announce" Statute, Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...to arrest the defendant and a co-defendant, whereupon the defendant attempted to stop their entry. The defendants were arrested and the contraband was seized. The trial court found that this conduct violated the Florida "knock and announce" statute, Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: 901.19 Right of officer to break into building (1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a...

...It is an altogether different matter for them to use plain view as a pretext for a warrantless search of a building when they know a search warrant should first be obtained before entry is allowed. The state, however, alternatively defends the entry on the ground it was justified by the provisions of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977), the "knock and announce" statute. Section 901.19(1) permits a warrantless entry into a building "where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be" if the officer first knocks and announces his authority for the purpose of making "an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, ..." While Section 901.19(1) does not require that an arresting officer be aware of the actual identity of the person he seeks to arrest, it necessarily presumes the existence of someone, as well as the officer's reasonable belief the person sought to be arrested is present at a certain location....

...ng officers are without facts leading them to believe anyone is within for them to arrest, and when their avowed purpose for being on the premises is not to arrest, but to secure the building while awaiting the delivery of a search warrant. Assuming Section 901.19(1) may be interpreted as permitting the officers' entry, even in the absence of facts reasonably causing them to believe the presence of occupants, the seizure must still be invalidated because they failed to comply with the provisions of the statute. Although, as found by the trial judge, the officers knocked and, as the door was opened, announced their identity, they nevertheless did not announce their purpose. The cases interpreting Section 901.19(1) clearly hold *284 that law enforcement officers, prior to opening or entering through a doorway, must first knock, announce their name and authority, and their purpose....

...1964); Earman v. State, 265 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1972); Moreno v. State, 277 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Kistner v. State, 379 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). As observed in Benefield v. State, supra , arresting officers must comply strictly with the requirements of Section 901.19(1)....

...efield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 709 (Fla. 1964). There, Mr. Justice Terrell condemned the search of a person's home without warrant, although the search and arrest might have been based upon probable cause, due to the failure of the police to follow Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1963), the right of an officer to break into buildings to effect arrest....

...When the agent returned, he was followed (on a pre-arranged signal) by various back-up teams of officers with guns drawn. None of these officers knocked, or announced their presence, or performed the requirements *476 of the `knock and announce law', § 901.19(1), Fla....

...This Court does not agree." In light of the facts of this case, this Court is compelled to grant the Motion to Suppress under the recent authority of Hansen v. State, 372 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), and State v. Roman, 309 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).[ [1] ] The applicability of Section 901.19(1), Fla....

...This Court, most respectfully, disagrees with these decisions when applied to the facts of this case. As the Second District Court correctly reasoned in Koptyra v. State, supra, [172 So.2d] at 631-632: `The method of entry here did not involve a breaking within the meaning of Section 901.19, Fla.Stats., F.S.A., as construed in Benefield....

...ht to challenge any and all subsequent police intrusions into his home. [8] As in Lawrence, we have determined to certify this cause to the supreme court as one which involves questions of great public importance concerning the applicability of Sec. 901.19(1), Fla....

...Once Walker established he had standing and that a warrantless intrusion into his room had occurred which, in turn, resulted in a warrantless arrest, search and seizure, the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate that the police officers had acted within a recognized exception to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), or that there were exigent circumstances to obviate compliance with that section....

...hot pursuit of a person sought to be arrested may open a door of a residence into which the person pursued went. An officer is not authorized to break open a door in a private dwelling in order to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor. § 901.19, F.S.; Prather v....

...In this case the private home was entered under circumstances where the court held that even if probable cause existed for the arrest of the person inside, that the Statute was violated by an unannounced intrusion contrary to the provisions of Florida Statute § 901.19(1), F.S.A. In this case the court said: "As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...The marijuana was contained in several plastic garbage bags in plain view, ready for delivery to the undercover officers. Neither of the undercover officers participated in the arrest or seizure and one was actually "arrested" along with appellants. Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without...

...The cocaine was seized inside an apartment when police officers entered it to detain another man they believed was a wanted felon. Thompson moved to suppress the drugs, contending that the officers who discovered them had failed to comply with the "knock and announce" requirement of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2000), and that no exigent circumstances supported the officers' unauthorized entry into the home....

...o anything therein. [2] Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). Therein the Supreme Court traces the common law development of the knock and announce rule. [3] 18 U.S.C. § 3109. [4] Although Benefield deals with section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1961), the right of officers to break into a building to make an arrest, the requirements to knock and announce, as well as the reasons therefor, are the same as those found in Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), the right of an officer to break into a house to execute a warrant....

...Jones, West Palm Beach, for appellee. MOORE, Judge. The State seeks reversal of an order granting appellee's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to execution of a search warrant. We reverse. Appellee's motion to suppress evidence was grounded upon an alleged violation of Section 901.19 and Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977) [1] which require law enforcement officers to announce their authority and purpose prior to breaking into any premises....

...of cocaine into the toilet. Her efforts to flush the toilet were thwarted by the officer in the cherry picker, who held her at bay through the use of a long pole. Nineteen "decks" of cocaine were subsequently retrieved from the toilet. In discussing Section 901.19(1), the Florida Supreme Court, in Benefield v....

...Appellee's reliance on Berryman is therefore misplaced. The order granting the motion to suppress the evidence in the instant case is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. REVERSED and REMANDED. DOWNEY, C.J., and CROSS, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 901.19(1) "If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use all necessary an...

...Ortiz filed a motion to suppress the evidence found inside the apartment. He argued that the officers could not legally enter the apartment without a warrant unless they had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and unless they complied with Florida's "knock and announce" statute, section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989). The State argued that the officers were in "hot pursuit" of Ortiz and therefore could enter the apartment regardless of the type of crime — misdemeanor or felony — and without complying with section 901.19....

...crime [and] the officer has the right to go into the house if it's fresh pursuit regardless of the level of the crime. Whether it be a misdemeanor or felony." The court denied the motion to suppress. Ortiz was convicted at trial and has appealed. Subsection 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1989), states: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without...

...ere the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. (Emphasis added). Ortiz argues that the officers exceeded their statutory authority by entering the apartment without a warrant in order to arrest him for a misdemeanor. [3] We agree. Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989), defines the authority of a law enforcement officer to make a nonconsensual entry into a building in order to make an arrest. The statute authorizes entry with a warrant. Id. § 901.19(1)....

...se to believe that Ortiz had committed a misdemeanor. The record does not support the State's argument that the officers had probable cause to believe Ortiz had committed a felony. [5] Therefore, *532 the officers did not have the authority under subsection 901.19(1) to enter Ortiz' apartment....

...police are in "hot pursuit" and if they believe the person has only committed a misdemeanor. Gasset is of no assistance to the State. Gasset involved entry into an open garage, and was decided solely on Fourth Amendment principles. 490 So.2d at 98. Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989), was nowhere discussed. In the present case section 901.19 has been raised by way of defense and the point is well taken....

...addressed the issue of remedies, it by no means establishes a broadly applicable exclusionary rule for all statutory violations. Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2005), contains a knock-and-announce requirement for the execution of search warrants; section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), contains the same requirement with respect to entry to make an arrest....

...The exclusionary rule has been applied as a remedy for violations of these knock-and-announce statutory provisions. See Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706, 711 (Fla.1964) (applying exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of knock-and-announce requirements of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1959)); State v....

...where appellee had earlier that same day shown the officer cocaine, sensemilla buds, and drug paraphernalia — and seized the described contraband. The *501 trial court found that in effecting appellee's arrest the officers had failed to comply with Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), the "knock and announce" statute....

...[3] The trial court also found that the warrantless seizure of contraband from appellee's bedroom closet was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Hence, the trial court held, all physical evidence seized subsequent to appellee's arrest must be suppressed. Concerning the alleged violation of Section 901.19(1), we note first the well-settled rule that the statute must be strictly complied with....

...We note, as the state points out, that the arresting officers possessed a warrant for appellee's arrest and performed no act to gain entry to appellee's residence because the undercover officer opened the door for the arresting officers. Thus, the state argues, the case at bar presents no facts requiring suppression based on Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes....

...While it is arguable that this fact constitutes a distinction *502 without a difference, with respect to the rationale identified in Steffani, we are not prepared to so hold as a matter of law, especially given the mandate to strictly construe exceptions to Section 901.19(1)....

...h articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution. [2] Neither party has challenged in this court the trial court's findings of fact. [3] Section 901.19(1) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use al...

...ouse or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. The "knock and announce" rule is more commonly encountered in the application of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1983), governing official entries for the purpose of making an arrest....

...Liberty without virtue is much like a spirited horse, apt to go beserk on slight provocation if not restrained by a severe bit. Id. at 709. The court in Benefield next proceeded to analyze the statute against a backdrop of common law applications: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...Chapman argues an alternative basis for granting his motion to suppress. He claims that the police violated both state and federal statutory law by their failure either to announce their authority and purpose, or to await a refusal of admittance before using force to enter the home. F.S.A. § 901.19(1); 18 U.S.C....

...PADOVANO and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur. . The trial court found that the townhome, including the garage area, was Appellant’s residence. Because the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support this finding of fact, we defer to the trial court’s finding. . Likewise, section 901.19, Florida Statutes— the "knock and announce” statute — has no bearing on the issue on appeal because that statute does not contemplate a chase or pursuit, and the entry into the residence in this case did not involve any "necessar...

...Cable was charged by information with trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence against her on the ground that the warrant for her arrest was illegally executed in violation of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2005)— Florida’s statute requiring police to announce their authority and purpose before entering a building to arrest an individual....

...The Second District reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying Cable’s motion to suppress. Cable, 18 So.3d at 38-39 . The district court reasoned that “by failing to announce his purpose before entering the motel room, the officer acted in violation of section 901.19(1).” Id....

...More recently, the Third District Court of Appeal relied on Hudson to conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to statutory knock-and-announce violations. See State v. Brown, 36 So.3d 770, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In Brown , the defendant argued that section 901.19(1), the knock-and-announce statute, supported the trial court’s suppression of inculpatory evidence against him....

...We next discuss whether we should recede from Benefield and conclude that we should not. Thus, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. Finally, we discuss the application of Benefield to the facts of this case. Florida’s Knock-and-Announce Statute and the Exclusionary Rule Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), 1 provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for...

...door or window to gain admission to the building and make the arrest. If the building happens to be one’s home, these requirements should be strictly observed. Id. The Court then concluded: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...n made aware of the presence of someone outside are then engaged in activities which justify the officers in the belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted.... ... Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was violated and that its violation is not excused by any of the exceptions discussed herein and for this reason the fruits of the search being the product of an unlawful arrest and a search incident thereto, should have been excluded by the trial court upon proper motion. *439 Id. at 710-11. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that “[s]ection 901.19, Florida Statutes, ......

...Since Benefield , the district courts of appeal have applied the exclusionary rule to violations of the knock-and-announce statutes. See Guerrie v. State, 691 So.2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Here, because the officers failed to announce their purpose as required by [section 901.19(1) ], the evidence must be suppressed.”); Kistner v....

...ock- and-announce statute — section 933.09 (citing Benefield)); Moreno v. State, 277 So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (concluding that trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of an arrest effectuated in violation of section 901.19(1) (citing Benefield))....

...Instead, the issue is whether suppression of the evidence is a remedy that must be applied for the violation of the statutory knock-and-announce provision. The Florida case law recognizes the common law and constitutional background for the knock-and-announce statute. See Benefield, 160 So.2d at 710 (stating that section 901.19 “appears to represent a codification of the English common law which recognized the fundamental sanctity of one’s home”); State v....

...urpose in seeking entry is to execute an arrest warrant or search warrant. Before law enforcement officials may properly enter a private building to effect an arrest and “use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property,” § 901.19(1), Fla....

...We remand to the Second District for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., concurs. CANADY, C.J., recused. . The 2010 version of section 901.19 remains the same as the 2005 version. . At the time of the Benefield decision, the language of section 901.19(1) provided: An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, may break open a door or window *438 of any building in which the person to be ar...

...ERVIN, Judge. King and Morris appeal their convictions for the offense of delivery of marijuana. They argue the lower court erred in denying their motion to suppress the evidence taken from Morris' home following an alleged illegal entry in violation of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1975), and without Morris' voluntary consent....

...orney and to refuse the search. Morris was also told that if he refused permission to search, the residence would be secured and an attempt made to obtain a search warrant. Defendant responded that they might as well go back in and obtain the drugs. Section 901.19(1) provides: (1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may us...

...d reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. In the last opinion written by Justice Terrell before his death, Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964), it was held that Section 901.19(1) prohibited an unannounced intrusion into any building even though probable cause existed for the arrest of a person except (1) where the person within was already aware of the officer's authority and purpose; (2) where the officer i...

...a felony was then being committed, and the statute would have had no applicability. State v. Roman, 309 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Moreover, even though an officer conceals his identity and obtains entry by trick or ruse, there is no violation of Section 901.19 because the entry was peaceably attained....

...The record shows that the officer who arrested Cable knocked and announced his presence and authority but failed to announce his purpose before entering the motel room and arresting Cable. We agree with Cable that by failing to announce his purpose before entering the motel room, the officer acted in violation of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), Florida's knock-and-announce arrest statute, which requires that before effecting an arrest by entering premises without consent, an officer must "announce[] her or his authority and purpose." In Benefield v....

...Instead, the issue is whether suppression of the evidence is a remedy that must be applied for the violation of the statutory knock-and-announce provision. The Florida case law recognizes the common law and constitutional background for the knock-and-announce statute. See Benefield, 160 So.2d at 710 (stating that section 901.19 "appears to represent a codification of the English common law which recognized the fundamental sanctity of one's home"); State v....

...nor consent to enter. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court noted that the warrant listed the apartment as the suspect’s address, and the officers verified that the warrant was still active. Therefore, the court concluded that pursuant to section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2000), the officers had the ability to enter the apartment, even without consent, if they “believe it to be where the person to be arrested is or reasonably believed to be....

...oses, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). Section 901.19(1) similarly provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without...

...This argument is without merit because the Plaintiff's claim does not focus solely on his arrest, but on the Officer Defendant's alleged entry into his home without a warrant, which is not permitted under Florida law, or under the Fourth Amendment. See Fla. Stat. § 901.19 (limiting the instances where an officer can make a warrantless entry into a building to felony arrests only)....

...The trial court granted a defense motion to suppress, concluding in part that Brown's action "would have been a misdemeanor, and the officer cannot follow him into the home for that purpose." We conclude however that (1) no constitutional violation occurred; and (2) Brown's reliance on the knock and announce statute, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), is misplaced....

...overwhelming reasons to follow Brown into the home. In accordance with Ulysse and Gasset, we therefore find that no constitutional violation was involved in this case. III Brown's argument for affirmance is based on the "knock and announce" statute, § 901.19(1), Fla....

...After watching the defendant for thirty minutes, officers decided to question him. When Ortiz saw the officers approaching, he ran into an apartment, dropping a misdemeanor amount of marijuana—conduct unrelated to the reason for the chase. Relying on section 901.19, this court concluded the officers' warrant-and-knock and announce-less entry after him was unlawful....

...v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (stating test as whether there are objectively reasonable circumstances that convey to a police officer an articulable, reasonable belief that the exigency exists; the exigency need not, in fact, exist). [2] Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a...

...Rodriguez case. First is this holding announced by Judge Barkdull: "It appears to me that these facts, known to the officers at the time they broke in, are consistent with a good faith belief on their part that they were excused from compliance with § 901.19(1) Fla....

...returns instead with police officers who effect arrests therein, both the returning undercover officer and other accompanying officers have an implied consent to reenter the premises and need not knock and announce their authority and purpose under Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1985), prior to such reentry to arrest persons therein....

...e." In suppressing the evidence, the trial judge reasoned that the police created any exigent circumstances which may have existed. Thus, he concluded that in entering the house the arresting officers had violated Florida's "knock and announce" law, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...By prearranged signal from one of the undercover officers, other officers entered the residence through an unlocked door and placed the defendants under arrest. A quantity of marijuana in plain view was seized incident to the arrest. Our sister court held that under section 901.19(1) the arresting officers could only enter the premises after knocking and announcing their authority and purpose....

...nstitutional. The First District Court of Appeal has so ruled in a similar case. Bibby v. State, 423 So.2d 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). I agree with that result, which clearly conflicts with our decision here. NOTES [1] The knock and announce statute is section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides that: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a fe...

...2d DCA 1998). And absent certain exigencies, a violation of section 933.09 warrants suppression. See generally State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434, 444 (Fla. 2010) (reaffirming suppression as remedy for violation of parallel knock-and-announce provision of § 901.19(1)); see also Benefield, 160 So....

...followed him into the home when the defendant again voluntarily admitted him without knowing his official status or purpose. This court held that the evidence was properly admitted, finding that the entry did not involve a "breaking" *303 subject to § 901.19 because "[t]he entry was gained peaceably by ruse." Id....

...est either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. § 901.19(1), Fla....

...The trial court granted a defense motion to suppress, concluding in part that Brown’s action “would have been a misdemeanor, and the officer cannot follow him into the home for that purpose.” We conclude however that (1) no constitutional violation occurred; and (2) Brown’s reliance on the knock and announce statute, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), is misplaced....

...lming reasons to follow Brown into the home. In accordance with Ulysse and Gasset , we therefore find that no constitutional violation was involved in this case. Ill Brown’s argument for affirmance is based on the “knock and announce” statute, § 901.19(1), Fla....

...After watching the defendant for thirty minutes, officers decided to question him. When Ortiz saw the officers approaching, he ran into an apartment, dropping a misdemeanor amount of marijuana — conduct unrelated to the reason for the chase. Relying on section 901.19, this court concluded the officers’ warrant-and-knoek and announce-less entry after him was unlawful....

...e v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (stating test as whether there are objectively reasonable circumstances that convey to a police officer an articulable, reasonable belief that the exigency exists; the exigency need not, in fact, exist). . Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a...

...elony offender. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Appellant's first issue involves the propriety of admitting evidence seized during a search and seizure conducted by the police in the absence of compliance with Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1987), the "Knock and Announce" statute....

...1992), which recently held that sentencing under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), is permissive, not mandatory. AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JOANOS, C.J., and MINER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 901.19(1) provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use al...

...Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of the search was not a relevant constitutional consideration. Marullo v. United States, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1964). The contention made by petitioner that the arresting police officers did *279 not comply with Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, concerning the right of an officer to break in a door or window of a building is not well taken....

...the defendant-appellee standing at the commode which contained 19 to 25 packets of suspected heroin. In Benefield v. State, Fla. 1964, 160 So.2d 706, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...aludes seized without a warrant from defendant Coster's house. *17 As grounds for suppressing the evidence, defendants Pridgeon, Rodriguez, and Reyes challenge the validity of the police officers' entry into a private dwelling without complying with Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977), the "knock and announce law"....

...nd, therefore, unless the entry into his home was unlawful, the arrest was valid. Appellee contends that the entry into his house was unlawful because the officers did not first announce their purpose as required by our “knock and announce” law, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. The question we must resolve is whether the statute requires that an officer announce his purpose before he may, with the consent of the homeowner, enter the premises. On its face, section 901.19 allows an officer to break into a building after he has announced his authority and purpose....

...On the premise that an individual’s home is his or her “castle,” the law has long recognized that a law enforcement officer may not break into a suspect’s house to effect an arrest without first announcing his authority and purpose. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958). Section 901.19 is a *816 codification of the common law which recognized that fundamental protection....

...Accordingly, the order granting appel-lee’s motion to suppress is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, A. C. J., and OTT, J., concur. . Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), severely limited the constitutional application of section 901.19....

failed to comply with Fla.Stat. § 901.19.1 We find that Fla.Stat. § 901.19 is inapplicable to the instant

the “knock and announce” requirements of F.S. section 901.19(1), F.S.A., the arrest was illegal and hence

...Guidry, II, Orlando, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the revised motion to suppress filed by Malcon Lee Taylor (“Defendant”) based on the failure of the police to comply with Florida’s knock-and-announce statute found in section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2015). 1 We note parenthetically that the trial court denied Defendant’s initial motion to suppress, which prompted him to file his revised motion alleging the failure of the police to comply with section 901.19(1) and the holding in State v....

...However, the Florida Supreme Court in Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964), held that exceptions to the statute may apply. Specifically, the court in Cable quoted the following part of the Benefield decision: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking a...

...d in activities which justify the officers in the belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted . . . . . . . Under the peculiar facts of this case, we are convinced that § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was violated and that its violation is not excused by any of the exceptions discussed herein and for this reason the fruits of the search being the product of an unlawf...

...This contraband was seized from a house occupied by Defendant. 2 51 So. 3d at 438 (quoting Benefield, 160 So. 2d at 710-11). The court in Cable refused to recede from Benefield, thus leaving these exceptions applicable to instances where violations of section 901.19(1) are alleged....

...Soto’s conviction and sentence for trafficking in heroin are reversed because the trial court did not but should have granted his motion to suppress the contraband found in his home after the police entered without complying with the “knock-and-announce” statute, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005). It is admitted that, although the police announced their presence at the door, there was fatally no evidence that they announced their purpose, which was to execute an arrest warrant, as the statute requires. § 901.19(1) (If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest ..., the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be.”); see Miller v....

...The law is equally well settled that a noneonsensual police entry into private premises to effect an arrest therein is unlawful if, subject to certain exceptions, the police fail to announce their authority and purpose prior to entering the premises. See, e.g., § 901.19(1), Fla.Stat....

...fter the arrest, as urged, so as to somehow retroactively validate the backup officers’ reentry. Such a rule would clearly secure no additional privacy for the defendant’s home or further any of the historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment or Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...[3] The suspected crime in Benefield was an attempt to commit grand larceny (by offering to help a bowling alley secure a liquor license for $5000 in small bills). The Supreme Court found that "the officers did not make the slightest effort to comply with [the knock-and-announce arrest statute, section 901.19(1)]." Id....

...er, as the suppression order below was entered March 22, 2010, and our decision in Brown was issued May 12, 2010. In addition, the entry in Brown was a warrantless "hot pursuit" arrest implicating a similar but separate knock-and-announce provision, section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The defendant raises two arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, because the defendant’s arrest was unlawful— specifically, the officers failed to follow the “knock-and-announce” rule, pursuant to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2020), before entering the third-party residence where the officers located the defendant; and (2) the defendant was entitled to a twelve-person jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We affirm on both arguments....

...n the residence’s patio, and simply walked through the open patio door to execute the arrest warrant. Thus, the knock-and-announce argument does not apply to this case. See Markus v. State, 160 So. 3d 488, 490 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[S]ection 901.19, Florida Statutes—the knock and announce statute—has no bearing on the issue on appeal because … the entry into the residence in this case did not involve any necessary and reasonable force to cross the threshold of the home.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2....

...�� as we do here — upon the authority of the capias for validation of appellant’s seizure and detention. We interpolate that at least with respect to entry of the commonly occupied portions of the mobile home, the “knock and announce" statute (Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, does not apply, since the entry was by consent....

Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964); § 901.19(1), Fla.Stat. (1981); although that law has recently

...the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of the search was not a relevant constitutional consideration. Marullo v. United States, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1964). The contention made by petitioner that the arresting police officers did not comply with Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, concerning the right of an officer to break in a door or window of a building is not well taken....

to the “knock and announce” requirements of Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, as elucidated in Benefield

602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ; § 901.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). After they entered the

...e staying there. Because the law enforcement officers reasonably believed the subjects of the arrest warrants were present in Appellant’s residence, the officers were allowed to enter the residence. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980); § 901.19(1), Fla. Stat....

...s that right?” He responded: “Not necessarily expected to find it. I had not been in the apartment. I didn’t know what was there.” Before entering the room Dempsey ordered the person inside to open the door, but said nothing about a warrant. Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in relevant part: Right of officer to break into building.— (1) If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make *1103 an arrest either b...

...Although an outstanding warrant for Roundtree existed in Tampa for a bad-check charge, the officer made no announcement of his purpose to effectuate that warrant. Appellee argues that the trial court should be affirmed,-because the instant case involves one or more of the exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19, as recognized as follows in Benefield v....

...invitation of the proprietor or manager.” (Citations omitted.) In that no issue has been raised regarding appellants’ standing to object to the alleged unlawful entry of the motel room that they occupied, they were entitled to the protections of section 901.19, which has been generally construed as requiring strict compliance....

its order .also referred to subsection (1) of § 901.19, F.S.A. Section 933.09 provides as follows: “The

...ped into the house without first knocking and giving notice of their authority and purpose. Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 395 So.2d 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), the act of opening an unlocked screen door constituted a “breaking” within the ambit of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979)....

controlling on the facts presented here. Nor was § 901.19 (1), entitled “Right of officer to break into

with the knock-and-announce requirements of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1987) was denied. Houston

...spect with a weapon, were overwhelming reasons to follow Brown into the home. In accordance with Ulysse and Gas-set, we therefore find that no constitutional violation was involved in this case. Id. at 773 . . Cases that turned on the application of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1989) (Florida’s knock and announce statute), also correspond with the conclusion that minor offenses are generally not sufficient to give rise to exigent circumstances....

...State, 600 So.2d 530, 531-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) ("When Ortiz ran into the apartment, he dropped the small baggie of marijuana, and the police had probable cause to believe that Ortiz had committed a misdemeanor. ... Therefore, the officers did not have the authority under subsection 901.19(1) to enter Ortiz’ apartment.’’); Johnson v. State, 395 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (“Understate law [section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979),] there is simply no authority given to a police officer to enter a building to effect a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor.”)....

...Parker, Jr., Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry, Tallahassee, FL and Joan Fowler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, FL, for defendants. OMNIBUS ORDER PAINE, District Judge. This matter comes before the court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 5), the Plaintiffs' Motion to Declare Florida Statutes Section 901.19(1) Unconstitutional (DE 10), and the Defendants' Motion for Continuance (DE 34)....

...f their home. The Defendants answered the complaint, and then filed the instant motion for summary judgment. In the summary judgment motion, the Defendants assert that they were justified in entering the McClain residence pursuant to Florida Statute Section 901.19(1) and that they violated no constitutional rights. The McClains, in turn, have moved to declare Section 901.19(1) unconstitutional....

...10A Charles A. Miller, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 at 124 (2d ed. 1983) (citing Adickes ). In this case, the Defendants assert that they were justified in entering the McClain's residence pursuant to Florida Statute Section 901.19(1) and that they violated no constitutional rights. Section 901.19(1) reads: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. Assuming for the moment that Section 901.19(1) is constitutional, the court still must conclude that the Defendant are not entitled to summary judgment. Section 901.19(1) requires, inter alia, that a law enforcement officer "use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be." Jennifer McClain has stated in an af...

...at 2513 ("[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge"). Thus, the court shall deny the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. B. Constitutional Analysis of Section 901.19(1) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: *900 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warr...

...484, 487-88 (1934) (observing that this section has the same meaning, and uses almost identically the same language, as the Fourth Amendment). In the instant motion, the McClains, citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), assert that the wording of Section 901.19(1) unconstitutionally authorizes law enforcement officers armed solely with an arrest warrant, and absent exigent circumstances or consent, to use all necessary and reasonable force to enter the house of a third party, not the subject of said warrant, when they reasonably believe that the suspect is inside....

...In response, the State of Florida argues that this statute, enacted in 1939, has never been found unconstitutional. As the McClains observe, however, research indicates that no court previously has considered this specific constitutional issue. Neither the Defendants nor the State of Florida has attempted to reconcile Section 901.19(1) with Steagald....

...De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1457 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 *901 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987) (recognizing that "[a]n arrest warrant alone is an insufficient basis for searching a third party's home for those named in the warrant"). As the McClains correctly observe, Section 901.19(1) is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Steagald. Section 901.19(1) authorizes law enforcement officers to enter a third-party residence based solely upon an arrest warrant....

...The instant facts illustrate the direct conflict between the state statute and the federal case. Assuming, for purposes of this analysis, that there were no exigent circumstances and that the McClains did not consent to the search of their home, [2] Section 901.19(1) still would recognize the Sheriff Deputies' search to be valid as long as the officers used all necessary and reasonable force to enter the McClain residence and they reasonably believed that Haston was inside....

...of a search warrant. We see no reason to depart from the settled course when the search of a home is for a person rather than an object. The undersigned also "see[s] no reason to depart from the settled course," and therefore, this court finds that Section 901.19(1) is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. [3] *902 In the instant motion, the McClains ask this court to declare Section 901.19(1) both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied in this case....

...The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since the Supreme Court has not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limits of the First Amendment. Id. Section 901.19(1) sets forth the "knock and announce" rule governing official entries for the purpose of making an arrest....

...; the cold may penetrate it and his dog may sleep beneath the front steps, but it is his castle that the king may not enter and his men dare not cross the threshold without his permission. Id. at 709. The court in Benefield then continued to analyze Section 901.19(1) under a number of common law applications: As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to § 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, exce...

...that the unannounced entry of the officers in this case violated the statute and vitiated the arrest made pursuant to probable cause without warrant. Id. at 710. See Van Allen v. State, 454 So.2d 49, 50-1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.App.1984). Upon examining Section 901.19(1) and the case law interpreting the statute, the court must conclude that the statute is not facially unconstitutional because "circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100. For example, a law enforcement officer does not commit a constitutional violation when that officer, armed solely with an arrest warrant, uses all necessary and reasonable force, pursuant to Section 901.19(1), to enter the home of the subject of that warrant when there is reason to believe that the suspect is inside....

...s when there is reason to believe the suspect is within") (emphasis added). However, because the statute authorizes a law enforcement officer, armed only with an arrest warrant, to enter "any building or property," including a third-party residence, Section 901.19(1) is unconstitutional as applied under Steagald and the facts of this case. III. CONCLUSION In view of all the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: (1) the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 5) is DENIED. (2) the Plaintiffs' Motion to Declare Florida Statutes Section 901.19(1) Unconstitutional (DE 10) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. While Section 901.19(1) is not facially unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional as applied under Steagald and the facts of this case....

charge is based. In addition, they argue that section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1979), which contains Florida’s

PER CURIAM. Section 901.19, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes the police to enter a dwelling without

...themselves by name. They did not, however, as the lower court apparently believed the statute required, disclose the purpose of their visit. We reverse and remand. We find there was no violation of the knock and announce rule, codified at Section's 901.19 and 933.09, Florida Statutes, simply because the rule is inapplicable to a situation in which entry is obtained by the owner’s or lawful possessor’s permission....

...2d DCA 1980) (“[wjhere entry is gained peaceably, as by invitation, the ‘knock and announce’ requirement does not apply.”); Koptyra v. State, 172 So.2d 628, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (an officer’s concealment of his identity, used to gain admission into a house, does not constitute a breaking within the meaning of 901.19)....

...This was the marijuana which was the subject of the motion to suppress below. Appellant concedes that Officer Martinez had probable cause to believe that a felony had or was being committed. Appellant, however, maintains that Officer Martinez’ failure to knock and announce his authority and purpose violated Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1977) (“knock and announce statute”) and therefore vitiated a valid arrest and rendered the fruits of the search and seizure inadmissible....

...Statutes (2017), which permits a warrantless arrest when the police have "probable cause to believe that [a] person has committed an act of domestic violence." It is possible that the warrantless entry to effect Mr. Nieves's arrest would be authorized as a statutory matter. See § 901.19 (authorizing warrantless entry to effect an arrest "[i]f a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority -5-  No one in this case has disp...

...5th DCA 2001) (treating a deputy's reaching through a screen-covered window to grab a domestic violence suspect who had barricaded himself inside as a warrantless entry); cf. Johnson v. State, 395 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding that the act of opening an unlocked screen door was an "entry" for purposes of section 901.19(1))....

...e conclusion argued by the State here in State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1973)); Bennett, 46 So. 3d at 1185-86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that a warrantless arrest was unconstitutional under Payton even though authorized by sections 901.15 and 901.19); Johnson v....

...The officers had no warrant and did not announce their purpose before entering. Absent exceptional circumstances, uninvited entry by law enforcement officers into a private dwelling without announcing their purpose, even with probable cause to arrest, is unlawful. Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony withou...

..., for at trial and on appeal the state steadfastly contends that no violation of the statute occurred. In determining whether the statute was violated, we are guided by the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of a substantially similar statute, Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes....

...It is urged by Appellant that the facts in this case support an additional exception to those set forth in the case of Benefield v. State (Fla.1964), 160 So.2d 706 , wherein the Supreme Court of Florida stated: “As we interpret the common law authorities in relation to 901.19(1) Florida Statutes, F.S.A., we conclude that even if probable cause exists for the arrest of a person, our statute is violated by an unannounced intrusion in the form of a breaking and entering any building, including a private home, except (...

...ay break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. Section 901.19(1) Florida Statutes, F.S....

...(Emphasis ours) The exception sought is that where the amount of drugs is small the drugs may be easily disposed of by flushing them down a toilet or other drain, and that compliance with the “Knock and Announce” requirement of Sections 933.09 and 901.19 (1), Florida Statutes, would afford those inside the building time enough to dispose of any drugs before the officers gained entrance....

...being committed so as to justify an arrest and search of the subject premises. See Mc-Dougall v. State, 316 So.2d 624 (Fla.App.4th 1975); State v. Profera, 239 So.2d 867 (Fla.App.4th 1970); State v. Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla.App.4th 1971); see also section 901.19(1), F.S....

...therein, to execute the [search] warrant, if after due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein. There is a similar provision regarding arrest warrants, section 901.19, which provides in subsection (1) that [i]f a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be. Because both sections 933.09 and 901.19 “impose the same salutary requirement of knock and announce, and both are grounded in the same policy considerations,” case law about one of these statutes is considered as persuasive authority for the other. Van Allen v....

...ts. Yes, knock-and- announce requirements for arrest warrants are set out in a different statute than the search warrant statute here. But we cannot set aside Cable on such a technical distinction. In discussing the knock-and-announce requirement of section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes, the Court emphasized that section 933.09, Florida Statutes, “parallels this language for search warrants.” Cable, 51 So....

...And throughout its analysis, the Court referred to “statutory knock-and-announce violations” and “violations of the knock-and-announce statutes,” even citing a series of district court decisions where the exclusionary rule had been applied to violations not only of section 901.19 but also section 933.09....