Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...on the state’s death row who have (1) completed their direct appeal, state postconviction proceeding, and federal habeas proceeding or (2) “[a]llowed the time permitted for filing a habeas petition in federal court to expire.” Fla. Stat. § 922.052....

...destruction, and requests for the production of public records in capital postconviction proceedings. Although the statute generally mirrors Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, the two are not identical. Ch. 2013-216, § 8, Laws of Fla. Section 922.052: Issuance of Warrant of Execution Under the prior version of section 922.052, the Governor, in his or her sole discretion, was authorized to issue a warrant to execute the sentence of death for any convicted capital defendant whose sentence was final. See § 922.052, Fla. 2....

...As a result, the Act will not be invalidated as facially unconstitutional simply because it could operate unconstitutionally under some hypothetical circumstances. With this standard in mind, we begin our analysis with the Petitioners’ separation of powers challenges to amended section 922.052. Section 922.052: Issuance of Warrant of Execution Infringement on This Court’s Rulemaking Authority The Petitioners first allege that amended section 922.052 directly intrudes on the constitutional authority of this Court to regulate the practice and procedure of courts in this State by creating specific time requirements that automatically require the issuance of a warrant of execution...

...with the intent to improve the efficiency of capital cases. However, simply because the Timely Justice Act and the DPRA share a similar purpose does not render the warrant issuance provision of the Act unconstitutional. To the contrary, amended section 922.052 is materially distinguishable from the unconstitutional provisions of the DPRA. -8-  In Allen, we explained that the DPRA expressly: (1) barred postconviction actions unless a fully pl...

...sive motion. Id. at 56. We held the statute to be unconstitutional because these statutory modifications directly and substantially altered the procedural rules adopted by this Court for capital postconviction proceedings. Id. at 55. In contrast, section 922.052 merely addresses matters related to the issuance of a warrant for execution....

...mechanisms of the judicial process because it does not alter the timelines of capital postconviction proceedings. Cf. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 55 (noting that the “DPRA significantly changes Florida’s capital postconviction procedures.”). While section 922.052 does require the Clerk of this Court to certify that a capital defendant has completed certain postconviction proceedings, that certification is only one of at least three factors that impact the warrant issuance process....

...is under no statutory obligation to issue a warrant. Third, even if the Clerk does provide information to the Governor concerning the status of a defendant’s case, this certification alone does not mandate the signing of a warrant. Rather, the plain language of amended section 922.052 demonstrates that no warrants can be signed unless the executive clemency process has concluded....

...Act is distinguishable from the DPRA and is not facially unconstitutional because it narrowly modifies only those procedures associated with the issuance of warrants. The Act does not facially intrude on the constitutional authority of this 3. Before section 922.052 was modified by the Act, the statute did not require the Governor to complete clemency proceedings before signing a warrant, and the Governor was authorized to issue a warrant at any time after the receipt of a certified copy of a capital defendant’s conviction and sentence. See § 922.052, Fla....

...The Governor could, therefore, issue a warrant any time after a capital inmate’s conviction and sentence became final without any concession for successive or postconviction litigation that was not pending before a court in this State. Thus, by modifying section 922.052, the Act has not eliminated any statutory right to file successive postconviction motions, because that right did not exist under the prior version of the statute. - 11 - Court to regulate the...

...Nothing in the Act nor in this opinion even remotely hints at the possibility that the Act has modified or altered this Court’s ability to stay capital proceedings. Legislative and Gubernatorial Oversight The Petitioners next contend that amended section 922.052 unconstitutionally empowers the Legislature to direct the Clerk of this Court to certify to the Governor when a capital defendant has completed requisite postconviction proceedings....

...See § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2013). While these statutes do not address capital litigation, they do demonstrate that the Legislature retains the authority to direct the Clerk to collect information for the benefit of other branches of government. Amended section 922.052(2)(a) essentially requires the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court to maintain a tracking and notification system that monitors the progress of capital appeals and to share that information with the Governor....

..., means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion.” Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 732. Furthermore, the cases referenced by the Petitioners to support the claim that section 922.052 violates the separation of powers are factually distinguishable because they do not address legislative infringement upon the responsibilities of the Clerk of this Court....

...2d at 458. The Petitioners additionally contend that the Act unconstitutionally empowers the Governor to oversee and direct the Clerk because it permits the Governor to sign warrants after he or she has determined that the Clerk has failed to comply with the certification requirements. We disagree. Section 922.052(2)(c) states that if the Governor determines that the Clerk has not complied with the certification obligation, then “the Governor may sign a warrant of execution for such person where the executive clemency process has concluded.” See ch....

...The Act instead provides a statutory mechanism by which the Governor may issue warrants in the event that the Clerk of this Court fails to provide the status information that a capital defendant has completed the requisite postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that amended section 922.052 does not unconstitutionally infringe on this Court’s power to direct the duties of the Clerk or authorize the Governor to give the Clerk directives or pass on the quality of the Clerk’s performance. The Gover...

...Governor must sign a warrant once the Clerk issues a certification. There are two provisions in the Act that direct the Governor to perform certain actions within designated time limits, and we conclude that neither provision amounts to a separation of powers violation. First, section 922.052(2)(b) provides that the Governor shall issue a warrant for execution within thirty days of receiving certification from the Clerk, if the - 17 - clemency process has concluded....

...orida have vested ‘sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive in exercising this act of grace.’ ” (quoting Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977))), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2762 (2013). Second, section 922.052(2)(b) provides that after the Governor has issued a warrant, he or she must direct the warden to execute the sentence within 180 days. Over eighty years ago, this Court recognized that “[t]here being no regulation of the subject...

...We also conclude the Act does not infringe on the Governor’s clemency power or unfettered discretion to issue warrants, and that this claim lacks merit. Due Process - 19 -  The Petitioners next allege that section 922.052 violates due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment....

...procedural due process have been met. Id. Courts instead consider the individualized facts of each case to determine whether the defendant has been accorded the process which the state and federal constitutions demand. Id. The Petitioners contend that amended section 922.052 violates due process because it restricts successive postconviction proceedings by creating a “time- certain deadline for execution.” This claim lacks merit because, as explained above, the Act does not create a time-certain de...

...tions before these procedures have been completed. Accordingly, we conclude that the Act does not deprive the Petitioners of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest and reject this claim. The Petitioners next contend that section 922.052 violates due process because the Act imprecisely describes capital postconviction procedures and fails to contemplate the complexity of these proceedings....

...date the [Florida] Supreme Court issues a mandate on a direct appeal or the United States Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari, whichever is later.” § 940.03, Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis supplied). When read together, section 940.03 and amended section 922.052 demonstrate that the warrant issuance procedures under the Act cannot cut off certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court because: (1) the Act prohibits the issuance of warrants of execution until the clemency process is c...

...The party that alleges that a statute violates equal protection bears the burden to demonstrate that there is no rational basis for the classification. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). The Petitioners rely predominantly on Allen to contend that the amendment to section 922.052 violates equal protection....

...- 24 - motions that a capital defendant may file. Accordingly, our holding in Allen does not lend support to the Petitioners’ equal protection claim. The crux of the Petitioners’ equal protection claim is that amended section 922.052 restricts the time in which a capital defendant may file postconviction motions, whereas non-capital defendants have no such restriction on the filing of their postconviction motions. This argument is substantially similar to the Petitioners’ previous separation of powers argument that amended section 922.052 creates a time-certain deadline after which a warrant must be signed, thereby restricting the time in which they may file successive motions. However, because the amended statute does not create a time-certain deadline or otherwise limit the time in which successive motions may be filed, we conclude that equal protection is not implicated, and the amendment to section 922.052 does not unjustifiably treat capital defendants differently than non-capital defendants. Furthermore, even if we were to find that equal protection is implicated, there is no constitutional violation....

...P. 3.851, with Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. Accordingly, we conclude that the Act bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and hold that there is no equal protection violation. The Petitioners next allege that the amendment to section 922.052 violates equal protection because it denies capital defendants whose initial proceedings will be completed after the effective date of the Act the same opportunity to present successive motions as is provided to capital defendants who completed their initial proceedings before the effective date of the Act....

...651, 667 (1977) (internal citations omitted). In short, the Eighth Amendment restricts the circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed and the manner in which the death penalty may be carried out. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972). Amended section 922.052 does not impose a punishment, delineate the crimes for which the death penalty may be imposed, or prescribe the method of execution. Rather, the Act governs the administrative procedure under which a death warrant is issued. Therefore, we conclude that the amendment to section 922.052 does not implicate or violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 27.7045: Constitutionally Deficient Representation In this claim, the Petitioners allege that section 27.7045 unconstitu...

warrant period of 180 days is reasonable. See § 922.052(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; Abdool , 141 So.3d

...“Timely Justice Act of 2013” (the Act),15 in which the Legislature amended a number of statutes relating to certain aspects of capital postconviction representation and the issuance of death warrants in capital cases. Muhammad challenges the constitutionality of amendments to section 922.052, Florida Statutes, that direct the Clerk of this Court to certify in writing to the Governor that a person sentenced to death has completed direct appeal and initial postconviction proceedings in state court and habeas corpus proceedings and appeal therefrom in federal court, or has allowed that time to expire. See § 922.052(2)(a)1. & (a)2., 15. Ch. 2013-216, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2013. - 36 - Fla. Stat. (2013). He also challenges as unconstitutional the amendments to section 922.052 directing the Governor to sign a death warrant within thirty days after receiving the certification from the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court “if the executive clemency process has concluded, [and] directing the warden to execute the sentence within 180 days, at a time designated in the warrant.” § 922.052(2)(b), Fla....

...(2013). The amendments further provide that if the Governor determines that the Clerk has not complied with subsection (2)(a), the Governor may sign a warrant of execution for any person “where the executive clemency process has concluded.” § 922.052(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2013). The remainder of section 922.052 remains unchanged....

...matters of clemency and issuance of death warrants; thus, he contends, his death warrant cannot stand. The circuit court denied the claim and concluded the amendments were not unconstitutional. We do not reach Muhammad‟s constitutional challenge to the amendments to section 922.052 pursuant to the Act....

...n inmate and medical records. Therefore, the Florida Department of Corrections is hereby ordered to immediately provide Muhammad‟s counsel with copies of Muhammad‟s inmate 22. As noted earlier, the constitutionality of the amendments to section 922.052, Florida Statutes (2013), is not determined in this proceeding and our affirmance of the circuit court‟s denial of postconviction relief is not a ruling on the merits concerning the constitutionality of any portion of the “Timely...

...accordingly no appeal had been filed—when the Governor signed the death warrant. Thus, Bolin contends that his selection while claims were still pending violates his right to due process. In Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla. 2014), this Court reviewed whether section 922.052 violates due process, recognizing that while “no single test ....

...e may make an oral presentation, each not to exceed 15 minutes collectively." Id. at (H). Then the Board votes on whether to grant clemency. Only after "the executive clemency process has concluded" may the Governor issue a death warrant. Fla. Stat. § 922.052 ....

...In 1988, Henry was convicted of the first-degree murders of Phyllis Harris and Janet Thermidor, armed robbery with a deadly weapon, and arson. Henry now appeals the denial of his second successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851; the denial of his motion to declare section 922.052, Florida Statutes (2013), unconstitutional; and his motion to dismiss his death warrant....

...im that Henry‟s death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the jury recommendations were nonunanimous. In addition, -7- Henry filed: (1) a motion arguing that section 922.052—as amended by the Timely Justice Act (Act), ch....

...on to dismiss his death warrant, asserting that the warrant was fatally defective for not stating a time of execution. On February 26, 2014, the postconviction court denied Henry‟s amended motion for postconviction relief, his motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional, and his motion to dismiss the death warrant. Regarding the first part of Henry‟s as-applied challenge, the postconviction court reasoned that Henry‟s claim that due to his mental health, the use of mida...

...3d 1158 (Fla. 2013), the postconviction court denied Henry‟s claim that his death sentences are unconstitutional as a result of nonunanimous jury recommendations. In a separate order, the postconviction court denied Henry‟s motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional....

...The postconviction court concluded that because the Office of Executive Clemency began Henry‟s clemency proceeding before the passage of the Act, Henry‟s motion should be denied under Muhammad, in which this Court declined to reach Muhammad‟s constitutional challenge to section 922.052....

...is death warrant. State v. Henry, No. 87- 018628CF10A (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct. order filed Feb. 26, 2014). Henry appealed in this Court, raising three claims. Henry argued that the postconviction court erred by denying his motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional, denying his motion to dismiss his death warrant, and summarily denying his as-applied challenge to the lethal injection protocol. After considering Henry‟s argument and the State‟s response, on March 6,...

...to testify about the likely effect on Henry of intravenous administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam. On March 11, 2014, the postconviction court again denied Henry‟s as-applied challenge. In addition to his claims on appeal regarding his motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional and his motion to dismiss the death warrant, Henry now appeals the denial of his claim that Florida‟s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional as applied to him and has filed a motion for stay of execution....

...For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of relief and deny Henry‟s motion for a stay of execution. - 10 -  II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Declare Section 922.052 Unconstitutional In his first issue on appeal, Henry argues that section 922.052, as amended by the Act, violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Florida Constitution, art....

...The determination of a statute‟s constitutionality is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 2013). In this case, the postconviction court did not err by relying on Muhammad—in which this Court declined to reach a similar constitutional challenge to section 922.052—to deny Henry‟s motion. In his initial brief, Henry concedes that his clemency proceeding began in February 2012, whereas the Florida Legislature did not pass the Act until April 2013, and the Governor did not sign it into law until June 2013....

...Based on the foregoing, as in Muhammad‟s case, this Court cannot conclude that Henry‟s “death warrant would not have been signed but for the Act.” - 11 - Muhammad, 38 Fla. L. Weekly at S925. Thus, the postconviction court did not err in denying Henry‟s motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional. B. Motion to Dismiss Death Warrant In his second issue on appeal, Henry contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his motion to dismiss his death warrant. Henry asserts that the plain language of sections 922.052(2)(b) and 922.052(3) requires the time of execution to be “designated in the warrant” and that his execution cannot proceed because the warrant in his case does not designate a time of execution....

...Despite the clear time designation in the cover letter, Henry contends that his execution cannot proceed because the time was not designated in the document actually titled “Death Warrant.” Henry‟s motion to dismiss his warrant was properly denied because section 922.052 does not grant death-sentenced inmates a right to challenge the Governor‟s exercise of discretion in issuing death warrants....

...Henry, like Jarvis and Tompkins, does not offer any authority to support his claim that his sentence should be delayed or commuted as a result of any noncompliance with a statute governing the issuance of a death warrant. Moreover, when sections 922.052 and 922.06 are read as a whole, the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that a time designation in the warrant is not essential to carrying out the sentence. See State v. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d 1006, 1009 - 14 - (Fla. 2000) (“[S]tatutes which relate to the same or closely related subjects should be read in pari materia.”). Section 922.052(2)(b) states: “Within 30 days after receiving the letter of certification from the clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, the Governor shall issue a warrant for execution if the executive clemency process has concluded, directing the warden to execute the sentence within 180 days, at a time designated in the warrant.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, section 922.052(3) provides: “The sentence shall not be executed until the Governor issues a warrant, attaches it to the copy of the record, and transmits it to the warden, directing the warden to execute the sentence at a time designated in the warrant.” (Emphasis added.) Section 922.052(4), however, explains that “[i]f, for any reason, the sentence is not executed during the week designated, the warrant shall remain in full force and effect and the sentence shall be carried out as provided in s....

...Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in denying his second successive postconviction motion. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the postconviction court‟s denial of Henry‟s second successive motion for postconviction relief, his motion to declare section 922.052 unconstitutional, and his motion to dismiss the death warrant. Additionally, we deny Henry‟s motion for a stay of execution....

...orpus proceedings and appeal in federal court, and to serve a copy of the notification on the - 12 - defendant’s counsel. This new rule is intended to assist the Clerk of this Court in complying with section 922.052, Florida Statutes (2013).3 Turning next to Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production), we amend the rule as proposed by the Subcommittee, with some modifications, in an effort to streamline the public records production process....

...y of the records to the central records repository. If the motion is not timely filed, the in camera inspection will be deemed waived. We also amend subdivision (g) (Demand for 3. In the Timely Justice Act, the Florida Legislature amended section 922.052, Florida Statutes, to require the Clerk of this Court to inform the Governor when a person convicted and sentenced to death has completed his or her direct appeal and initial postconviction proceedings in state court, as well as his or her habeas corpus proceedings and appeal in federal court....

...Finally, the amended rule requires the Attorney General to inform the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court and the defendant’s counsel of record when a defendant has completed his or her litigation in order for the Clerk to report to the Governor pursuant to Florida Statute 922.052. RULE 3.852....

...viction proceedings in state court, and habeas cor *1176 pus proceedings and appeal in federal court, and to serve a copy of the notification on the defendant’s counsel. This new rule is intended to assist the Clerk of this Court in complying with section 922.052, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...sult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct; and to explain a matter to the client to the extent necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions. . In the Timely Justice Act, the Florida Legislature amended section 922.052, Florida Statutes, to require the Clerk of this Court to inform the Governor when a person convicted and sentenced to death has completed his or her direct appeal and initial postconviction proceedings in state court, as well as his or her habeas corpus proceedings and appeal in federal court....

...orpus proceedings and appeal in federal court, and to serve a copy of the notification on the - 12 - defendant’s counsel. This new rule is intended to assist the Clerk of this Court in complying with section 922.052, Florida Statutes (2013).3 Turning next to Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production), we amend the rule as proposed by the Subcommittee, with some modifications, in an effort to streamline the public records production process....

...y of the records to the central records repository. If the motion is not timely filed, the in camera inspection will be deemed waived. We also amend subdivision (g) (Demand for 3. In the Timely Justice Act, the Florida Legislature amended section 922.052, Florida Statutes, to require the Clerk of this Court to inform the Governor when a person convicted and sentenced to death has completed his or her direct appeal and initial postconviction proceedings in state court, as well as his or her habeas corpus proceedings and appeal in federal court....

...Finally, the amended rule requires the Attorney General to inform the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court and the defendant’s counsel of record when a defendant has completed his or her litigation in order for the Clerk to report to the Governor pursuant to Florida Statute 922.052. RULE 3.852....

...on the state’s death row who have (1) completed their direct appeal, state postconviction proceeding, and federal habeas proceeding or (2) “[a]llowed the time permitted for filing a habeas petition in federal court to expire.” Fla. Stat. § 922.052....

...3d -3- 529 (Fla. 2014), Tanzi sought to invoke this Court’s mandamus and all writs jurisdiction to declare portions of the Timely Justice Act of 2013 unconstitutional and enjoin their enforcement. Among other claims, he challenged the constitutionality of section 922.052(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), which required the Governor, after issuing a warrant, to “direct the warden to execute the sentence within 180 days.” Abdool, 141 So....

...warden to execute the sentence within 180 days” after a death warrant is signed. Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 543. Here, Tanzi has made no new challenge to the statute, nor has Tanzi made any argument that the Governor has violated the requirements of section 922.052(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2024)....