Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...of the Supreme Court” in the Office of the Clerk. See § 25.211, Fla. Stat. (2013); § 25.221, Fla. Stat. (2013). The Legislature has also required the Clerk to maintain registries of certain types of individuals, such as vexatious litigants. See § 68.093, Fla....

...State, 730 So.2d 265 (Fla.1999) (holding that all such motions must be filed by August 16, 1997). Although our affirmance is without prejudice, we note that continuous filings that are deemed insufficient in nature can potentially subject Appellant to "vexatious *950 litigant" sanctions under section 68.093(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2006), or other sanctions available under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Rehearing Denied October 25, 2007. *206 Glenn Smith, Indiantown, pro se. Mitchel Chusid and Scott M. Teich of Ritter Chusid Bivona & Cohen, LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee. GROSS, J. We write primarily to address the constitutionality of the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2005) under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution....

...Fisher, a physician at Martin Correctional Institution, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The complaint was based on the quality of cream that Fisher prescribed for Smith's "itching condition." Fisher moved for an order requiring Smith to provide security pursuant to section 68.093. The motion noted that in the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint in this case, Smith had commenced five or more cases that had been "finally and adversely determined against" him. § 68.093(2)(d)1, Fla. Stat. (2005). [1] Smith responded with a motion that section 68.093 be declared unconstitutional. *207 Judge Schack conducted a telephonic hearing and found that Smith was a vexatious litigant under "[s]ection 68.093(3)." Later, Judge Makemson ordered Smith to furnish $600 in security within 60 days pursuant to section 68.093(3)(b)....

...4 (5th Cir.1980). The $600 security required was reasonable on its face, far less than is typically incurred in a civil rights case to cover a "defendant's anticipated, reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees and taxable costs." § 68.093(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). Smith primarily argues that section 68.093 [2] violates Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." This case pits...

...to be administered in all cases with delay. A frivolous case presents no "injury" to be redressed. Requiring defendants to endure lengthy proceedings to resolve meritless lawsuits is not administering justice "without . . . delay." Early in a case, section 68.093 procedure identifies lawsuits likely to be frivolous and subjects them to an expedited process....

...t, and finds that there is no alternative method of meeting such public necessity. Psychiatric Assocs., 610 So.2d at 424; see Cmty. Hosp. of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Guerrero, 579 So.2d 304, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), aff'd, 610 So.2d 418 (Fla.1992). Section 68.093 satisfies the second Kluger test....

..."Narrowly tailored" means that "the method for remedying the asserted malady must be strictly tailored to remedy *209 the problem in the most effective way and must not restrict a person's rights more than absolutely necessary." Mitchell, 786 So.2d at 527. The compelling state interest behind section 68.093 is to prevent vexatious litigation from interfering with the business of the court system....

...ss section of the Florida Bar proposed section 68.091 to the legislature. Neveils, 25 Nova L.Rev. at 353. The Senate sponsor of the bill observed that the law was "aimed at those individuals with a propensity for filing harassing civil actions." Id. Section 68.093 remedies the problem of meritless litigation in the most effective way and does not restrict the vexatious litigant's rights more than absolutely necessary....

...mmediately preceding 5-year period, has commenced, prosecuted or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in any court in this state [excluding small claims cases], which actions have been finally and adversely determined against such person." § 68.093(2)(d)1, Fla....

...essional Responsibility and statutes such as section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2005) adequately screen against frivolous lawsuits when an attorney is involved in the filing decision. By relying on a litigant's recent history to define vexatiousness, section 68.093 is unlike those problematic statutes that restrict access to the courts without any determination "that the [litigant] has ever filed a frivolous or other improper action." Mitchell, 786 So.2d at 525....

...Significantly, the determination that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant does not shut the courthouse door. A defendant must move for a hearing to establish that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant who "is not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits of the action against the moving defendant." *210 § 68.093(3)(a), Fla....

...After a hearing, if a court determines that a defendant is both a "vexatious litigant" and "not reasonably likely to prevail on the merits," the court "shall order the plaintiff to furnish security [5] to the moving defendant in an amount and within such time as the court deems appropriate." § 68.093(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the plaintiff fails to post the required security, "the court shall immediately issue an order dismissing the action with prejudice as to the defendant for whose benefit the security was ordered." § 68.093(3)(c), Fla....

...igency to avoid even the filing fees. See Kreager v. Glickman, 519 So.2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (discussing pro se litigant whose litigiousness resulted in a $1.5 million judgment against him, without "deter[ing] his activities in the least"). Section 68.093 does not present the problems of statutes found to contravene Article I, Section 21....

...The statute does not require the posting of security regardless of the merits of the lawsuit. Cf. Psychiatric Assocs., 610 So.2d at 425; Cmty. Hosp. of the Palm Beaches, 579 So.2d at 304 (relying on dissent in *211 Guerrero v. Humana, Inc., 548 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). For these reasons we hold that section 68.093 satisfies the second Kluger test and affirm....

...[5] "Security" is defined by the statute as "an undertaking by a vexatious litigant to ensure payment to a defendant in an amount reasonably sufficient to cover the defendant's anticipated, reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees and taxable costs." § 68.093(2)(c), Fla....

...By use of the word "undertaking," the statute contemplates a bond, cash or otherwise, that could be taxed at the conclusion of the case. [6] Because it was not raised in this case, we do not reach the issue of the constitutionality of that provision of section 68.093(3)(c), authorizing the dismissal of an action "with prejudice." We leave for another day whether that provision satisfies the "narrowly tailored" requirement of strict scrutiny analysis.

...sanctions. It is so ordered. WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, C.J., recused. NOTES [1] The Fourth District considered a challenge to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's application of the Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2003), to the petitioner....

...Crosby, 870 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Mazer v. Orange County, 811 So.2d 857, 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Further, the de novo standard of review is applied when considering an order granting a motion to dismiss. See Mazer, 811 So.2d at 858. Section 68.093(4), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part: The court in any judicial circuit may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing, pro se, any new action in the courts of that circuit without first obtaining leave of the administrative judge of that circuit. § 68.093(4), Fla. Stat. (2007). Further, section 68.093(5), Florida Statutes, provides, "The clerk of the court shall not file any new action by a vexatious litigant pro se unless the vexatious litigant has obtained an order from the administrative judge permitting such filing." See § 68.093(5), Fla....

...Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So.2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). A requirement that pleadings be accompanied by an attorney's signature is not a restraint which amounts to a complete denial of access to courts. Id.; May v. Barthet, 886 So.2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); see also § 68.093, Fla....

...Hart, Glenn Schaeffer, and Michael Ensign (collectively the "appellees"). No legal basis for reversal is apparent from appellant's brief. The brief is rambling and largely unintelligible. Appellant is the subject of two orders entered by the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit under Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The filing of such a notice shall automatically stay the litigation against all defendants to the action. The administrative judge shall automatically dismiss the action with prejudice within 10 days after the filing of such notice unless the plaintiff files a motion for leave to file the action. § 68.093(5)....

...long as Caron continues to pay $300 per month toward his child support obligation was error. Trial courts generally do not have the authority to restrict a litigant's access to the courts, unless the litigant is abusing the legal process. See, e.g., § 68.093, Fla. Stat. (2008) (Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law); Smith v. Fisher, 965 So.2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes, is constitutional and remedies the problem of meritless litigation without unduly restricting the vexatious litigant's access to courts); Sibley v....

...Kozich's lawsuit pending in his division. On September 21, 2004, Mr. Kozich was found to be a vexatious litigant by the 17th Judicial Circuit and the clerk sent notice to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court for inclusion in the Vexatious Litigant Registry pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 68.093(6)....

...at request for sanctions under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. 6. Sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) Mr. Kozich has established a clear pattern as a vexatious litigant, and while I am not authorized by the express terms [1] of Fla. Stat. § 68.093 to impose sanctions under that statute, neither am I required to turn a blind eye toward Mr....

...r recklessly frivolous, and that the filing and pursuit of the litigation were undertaken for the purpose of harassing the defendants. As noted above, the fact that Mr. Kozich has already been found to be a vexatious litigant, pursuant to Fla. Stat. section 68.093, by the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and has been barred from filing pro se causes of action in that circuit, is not lost on this court....

...atter. 5. The court reserves jurisdiction to enforce the dictates of this order. Failure to fully comply with this ruling will be found to be contemptuous *957 and may result in the imposition of a fine, confinement, or both. NOTES [1] By its terms, § 68.093 applies to actions "governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and proceedings governed by the Florida Probate Rules," with certain exclusions.

...that Mr. [G.W.] filed pro se.” The order also directed the clerk to provide a copy of that order to G.W., as well as an earlier order issued by Judge Donnellan signed December 29, 2006, that decreed G.W. to be a vexatious litigant as authorized by section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2006), and instructed the clerk “not to accept any pleadings, notices or other documents from Petitioner [G.W.] unless signed by a member in good standing of the Florida Bar.” Judge Donnellan’s order determining G.W....

...ppropriately addressed to this court. . We have observed that G.W.’s disputes with L.M. appear to be associated with a paternity case, governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, and he may not qualify for vexatious litigant status. See § 68.093(2)(a), Fla....

...gant.” That Court and the Fourth District Court of Appeal have likewise found him in subsequent cases to be a vexatious litigant and have caused him to be included in the Florida Supreme Court’s Vexatious Litigant Registry pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 68.093 (6)....

...rections officers, or was subject to discretionary disclosure under section 945.10(3). The court concluded that Smith did not establish a basis for mandamus relief. The court also entered an order finding Smith to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2007), and prohibiting him from commencing pro se actions without leave of court....

...v. Fisher, 965 So.2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). On appeal, Smith challenges the propriety of the denial of his records request and the determination that he is a vexatious litigant. Smith also raises constitutional challenges to sections 945.10(3) and 68.093(4). We find no error in the court's denial of Smith's petition for writ of mandamus. Further, we find no constitutional infirmity in sections 945.10(3) and 68.093(4)....

authorized under Florida’s Vexatious Litigant Law. § 68.093(4), Fla. Stat.; see also id. (“Leave of court

...denied, 537 U.S. 1127 , 123 S.Ct. 899 , 154 L.Ed.2d 812 (2003). Even Florida’s Vexatious-Litigant Law only permits a circuit court to enter an order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from commencing any new actions without leave in that particular court. § 68.093(4), Fla....

...County Attorney, for appellees. Before EMAS, C.J., and HENDON and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Devon Brown appeals two orders dismissing Brown’s complaint with prejudice, and a third order that declares Brown a vexatious litigant under section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2020)....

...See G&S Dev. Corp. v. Seitlin, 47 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Brown has failed to establish the existence of any such error. We find the trial court complied with the requirements of section 68.093, and reject Brown’s claim that the statute violates his right to access to the courts as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. While the Florida Constitution does indeed provide a right of access to the courts, see Art....

...has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in any court in this state, except an action governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules, which actions have been finally and adversely determined against such person or entity. § 68.093(2)(d)1., Fla....

...The administrative judge may 1 This law is known as the “Florida Vexatious Litigant Law.” 4  condition the filing of the proposed action upon the furnishing of security as provided in this section. § 68.093(4), Fla....

...at 209-10. Further, a review of the County’s motion, seeking the court to declare Brown a vexatious litigant, properly set forth the “five or more civil actions” which had been “commenced, prosecuted or maintained pro se” by Brown “over the immediately preceding 5-year period,” see section 68.093(2)(d)1., and the exhibits attached to the motion established that each of those actions “have been finally and adversely determined against” Brown....

...complaint against Appellees, employees of the Department of Corrections who Appellant alleges committed criminal acts and intentional torts against him in the scope of their employment, and an order deeming him to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093, Florida Statutes. In finding that Appellant was a vexatious litigant, the trial court explained, as follows: [T]his Court finds that the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law of Section 68.093 ......

...rior to ruling on the other issues which have been raised. The Court reserves ruling on those issues and may do so without further notice or hearing. This Court finds that the Plaintiff met the threshold for being declared a vexatious litigant under Section 68.093 ......

...We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Appellant is a vexatious litigant, and we reject Appellant’s arguments that the trial court deprived him of his right to due process, was not impartial, and abused its discretion in not appointing counsel for him. We also reject Appellant’s argument that section 68.093 is unconstitutional....

...ly result in lost gain time; and does not increase the punishment for the crime of which Appellant was convicted, but only promotes punishment for filing frivolous claims. We REVERSE, however, the finding that Appellant is a vexatious litigant under section 68.093, Florida Statutes, because there was no competent substantial evidence to support the finding that Appellant had commenced five or more pro se actions in the immediately preceding five years that had been finally and adversely determined against him....

...See John v. Dep’t of Corrs., 124 So.3d 381 , 2013 WL 5744428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (pleadings filed by pro se inmates should be viewed with lenity). The circuit court also erred as a matter of law by finding appellant to be a vexatious litigant under section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2012), without issuing an order to show cause to give him an opportunity to be heard on the matter....

...The clerk of this court directed to accept no further pro se filings from Peter E. Pflaum; if received, the filings shall be returned to the sender without filing and with reference to this order. *581 Appellees have asked this court to certify that Peter E. Pflaum is a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 68.093, Florida Statutes....

...After Eric Welch appealed the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing his action, the Florida Department of Corrections filed a cross-appeal of the portion of the order denying its motion seeking a determination that Welch was a “vexatious litigant” pursuant to section 68.093, Florida Statutes, and seeking to sanction him accordingly....

...At issue is the Department’s motion to declare Welch a “vexatious litigant.” In the pertinent part of the motion in question, the Department and other defendants requested that the circuit court “declare Mr. Welch a vexatious litigant under section 68.093 and order Welch to show cause why he should not be sanctioned with limitations on his ability to file pro se matters.” Welch then filed his notice of dismissal pursuant to rule 1.420(a)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure....

...The court acknowledged Welch’s voluntary dismissal, formally dismissed the case, and summarily denied the Department and other defendants’ motion for various relief, including their request for a determination that Welch was a vexatious litigant under section 68.093. On appeal, the Department challenges the circuit court’s summary denial of its motion, asserting that the court’s entry of the order without conducting the scheduled hearing violated section 68.093(3)....

...The Department raises no other basis for reversal other than the failure to hold a hearing. Undoubtedly Welch is vexatious in the colloquial sense. But the circuit court’s summary denial of the Department’s motion did not violate the clear language of section 68.093(3), which is the only section that speaks to a “hearing” in such matters. 2 Rule 1.420(a) allows a plaintiff to dismiss his or her action prior to trial without further order of the court....

...court upon the defendant’s objection to dismissal. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(2). 2 Subsection (3) provides that a defendant, the Department in this case, “may move the court . . . for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security.” § 68.093(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Upon the filing of a “motion for an order to post security,” the action is stayed until the court rules on the motion. § 68.093(3)(d), Fla. Stat. Section 68.093(3)(b) describes “the hearing upon any defendant’s motion for an order to post security,” requiring the court to consider “any evidence” relevant to the motion at such hearing. The Department’s motion did not seek an o...

...the statute as “an undertaking by a vexatious litigant to ensure payment to a defendant in an amount reasonably sufficient to cover the defendant’s anticipated, reasonable expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees and taxable costs.” § 68.093(2)(c), Fla. Stat....

...he need for a hearing; in other words, the trial court was entitled to adjudicate the Department’s motion without a hearing under that subsection. The court’s summary denial of this request without a hearing did not violate any provision of section 68.093 based on what the Department requested. Since the Department did not move for Welch to post security—the only potential sanction under section 68.093(3) for which a hearing may be deemed necessary—the circuit court did not err by denying the Department’s motion without holding a hearing. The Department sought, pursuant to section 68.093(4) to prohibit Welch from filing any new action. On appeal, however, it has not challenged the merits of the denial of its motion under section 68.093(4)—it has only contested the lack of a hearing. Because the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing, it did not act improperly....

...None of the cases produced a meaningful result for the plaintiff. (citation omitted). The trial court found Prater to be a "vexatious litigant" as "at least 5 of his previous actions have been finally and adversely determined against [him]" in accordance with section 68.093(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2005)....

pursuant to Florida's Vexatious Litigant Law, section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2022). Knezevich argues

...A vexatious litigant is a person who, during a five-year period, “has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in any court in this state, except an action governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules, which actions have been finally and adversely determined against such person.” § 68.093(d)1., Fla....

...1st DCA 2011) (“It is well-settled that courts have the inherent authority and duty to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se litigants.”). Indeed, the Florida Legislature recently expanded the definition of “vexatious litigant” in section 68.093(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2025), the Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, to include any self-represented person who, “[a]fter an action has been finally and adversely determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts...

...required by section 57.085(7), minus the copies. Contrary to the arguments of the parties, the trial court did not definitively determine that appellant is a vexatious litigant, and any such determination must be reached in compliance with section 68.093, Florida Statutes (2012). REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. PADOVANO, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR. 3