Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ndant has breached the contract. [6] When a pretrial' detainee is released on his or her own recognizance, section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), requires that the release is conditioned upon the defendant refraining from criminal activity. Section 903.0471 provides that a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release....

...4th DCA 2000). Among other things, the new laws authorize trial courts to order pretrial detention for persons on pretrial release who commit a new crime under certain circumstances where there is "probable cause to believe the defendant committed a new crime." § 903.0471, Fla....

...n of the court, supports a finding that no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at trial. Ch. 2000-229, § 2, Laws of Fla. The Legislature also created section 903.0471, which provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release....

...termination was made that en banc consideration was unnecessary in light of the 2000 legislative amendments. See id. at 530-31. Most recently, in Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fourth District upheld the constitutionality of section 903.0471 and concluded that the Legislature had not intended that section 907.041 be followed after a defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. Although newly-enacted section 903.0471 is a free-standing provision authorizing pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release, as stated in footnote 1, the constitutionality of that provision is not before us in this case....

...and pretrial release, even to the extent that the amendments repeal Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131 and 3.132 "to the extent that the rules are inconsistent with this act." Ch.2000-178, § 5 at 1470, Laws of Fla. Additionally, by enacting section 903.0471 and section 907.045(4)(b)7, the Legislature used the term "pretrial detention" in a way that signifies that the term applies to a revocation of an existing bond....

...The State gives the Court the authority to do that. That's what I'm doing. On this case the calendar call is November 9th. The trial date is November 13th. Parker was remanded into custody without bond. He later filed a motion to reconsider the bond revocation, contending that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), is unconstitutional....

...statute constitutional, and denied the motion. [1] Parker *874 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court; the court denied the petition. Parker sought review before this Court. The issue posed in the present case is whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), is constitutional. At the hearing on October 17, 2000, the trial court heard argument of counsel concerning the constitutionality of section 903.0471 and declared the statute constitutional....

...ditions may be, the court shall consider: . . . . (j) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). And finally, the Legislature enacted section 903.0471, which provides as follows: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.—Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.0471, Fla....

...2001), holding that the above enactments did not apply retroactively and were inapplicable to Paul. [7] Unlike the situation in *877 Paul, however, the crimes in the present case took place after the effective dates of the above enactments and are governed by the enactments. IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 903.0471 Parker claims that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional for three reasons: it violates the plain language of article I, section 14, Florida Constitution; it violates substantive due process; and it violates procedural due process. A. The Plain Language of Section 14 Parker's main claim is that section 903.0471 violates the plain language of article I, section 14, because it fails to require specific findings. We disagree. The district court below addressed this claim as follows: Parker argues that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional as violating Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution which allows pretrial detention if "no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the pr...

...state constitution, but to be coextensive with it. Barns [v. State], 768 So.2d [529] at 532-33 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ]. Barns, as we said earlier, involved a violation of a condition which was not a new crime, and thus was analyzed under 907.041, not section 903.0471. Our conclusion, however, that the trial judge's decision to deny pretrial release was still circumscribed by the Florida Constitution, would be equally applicable where the defendant committed a new crime and was being detained under section 903.0471....

...rial releasee unquestionably impugns the integrity of the judicial process—the defendant in effect is "thumbing his nose" at the court. After section 903.047 was enacted, the Legislature later gave "teeth" to that section's proscription by enacting section 903.0471. As noted earlier, section 903.0471 provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.— Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.0471, Fla....

...ee committed a new crime. Contrary to violating the plain language of article I, section 14, this statutory section works hand-in-hand with section 14 to "assure the integrity of the judicial process." B. Substantive Due Process Parker contends that section 903.0471 violates substantive due process because the "probable cause" burden of proof is too low a burden on which to base pretrial detention. We disagree. The district court below addressed this claim thusly: Parker also argues that section 903.0471 violates substantive due process because it authorizes a court to deny a second pretrial release upon finding probable cause that a defendant committed a new crime, which is less than the burden on the state when pretrial detention is sought under section 907.041....

...[12] The type of proceeding that is at issue in the present case, i.e., a revocation of pretrial release, is similar in nature to a revocation of probation, for both proceedings involve the revocation of a significant form of legal restraint. Similarly, the "probable cause" standard that is called for in section 903.0471 is no more onerous for a defendant than the "in the conscience of the court" standard that traditionally has been used in revocation of probation proceedings....

...he "substantial probability" standard, [14] it is logical for a court to apply a less forgiving standard (i.e., "probable cause") when a detainee seeks release following a subsequent violation. C. Procedural Due Process Finally, Parker contends that section 903.0471 violates procedural due process because it does not require an adversarial hearing prior to revocation of pretrial release....

...In light of the fact that a Florida defendant is accorded a full adversarial hearing under section 907.041 upon his or her initial application for pretrial release, the requirements of article I, section 14, Florida Constitution, are satisfied by the dictates of section 903.0471 upon subsequent violation. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we approve Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and hold that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), comports with article I, section 14, Florida Constitution, and with the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as explained herein....

...Although I agree that the revocation of Parker's pretrial release did not violate his constitutional rights, I believe that the majority has gone further than necessary to reach this conclusion. In this case, the trial court denied pretrial release under section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, finding probable cause to believe that Parker had committed a crime while on pretrial release, and also finding, in a subsequent hearing, "consistent with Article I, Section 14, that detention was necessary to protect the community from the risk of physical harm." Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Based on the trial court's findings as to both probable cause and the existence of one of the criteria of article I, section 14, the Fourth District rejected Parker's constitutional challenges to section 903.0471. Regarding the claim that the statute violates article I, section 14, the Fourth District stated that the trial judge's decision to deny pretrial release under section 903.0471 is "circumscribed by the Florida Constitution." Id....

...Regarding Parker's procedural due process claim that he *881 did not receive adequate procedural safeguards, the Fourth District found that "[h]aving received those safeguards [in article I, section 14], his due process rights were not violated." Id. Thus, the Fourth District expressly declared section 903.0471 valid, and we exercised our discretion to review this decision under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. The majority now approves the decision of the Fourth District, but, departing from the Fourth District's rationale, suggests that in order to deny pretrial release under section 903.0471, the trial court need not make findings consistent with the requirements of article I, section 14....

...detention is necessary to assure the integrity of the judicial system, satisfying article I, section 14. The conclusion that an article I, section 14 finding is not required is, in my view, not necessary to our assessment of the constitutionality of section 903.0471 in a case in which the trial court did in fact articulate an article I, section 14 finding....

...ease can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained." The initial constitutional question posed by section 903.0471, as construed by the majority, is whether a finding of probable cause that the defendant has committed a new crime while on pretrial release, without any additional findings, satisfies the language in article I, section 14 authorizing pretrial detention of an accused if no conditions of release can assure the integrity of the judicial process. This question should be answered in the negative, because section 903.0471 creates an irrebuttable presumption....

...assure the integrity of the judicial process." Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, commission of a new crime does not necessarily impugn the integrity of the judicial process and thereby obviate the need for an explicit finding to that effect in order to comport with article I, section 14. Under section 903.0471, the crime for which the defendant might be arrested could range from driving with a suspended license to possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanors that do not inherently undermine the integrity of the judicial process when allegedly committed by a person on pretrial release....

...o a greater degree than one arrested for a drug or traffic misdemeanor unrelated to the original charges. These violations may also put the community or persons at risk of physical harm or place the defendant's appearance at trial in doubt. However, section 903.0471, as construed by the majority, does not require a finding of any of the three constitutional criteria for pretrial detention....

...Although the defendant in Paul was arrested for drug and firearm offenses, the State subsequently filed an information only on a misdemeanor cannabis charge and a "no information" on the remaining charges. Id. at 1043 n. 2. Therefore, I believe that section 903.0471 as construed by the majority is on precarious constitutional footing under article I, section 14....

...lease can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process. [15] Without a requirement of this latter finding, I cannot conclude that section 903.0471 comports with article I, section 14 under all conceivable circumstances....

...SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS In the absence of a required finding of one of the article I, section 14 criteria, I am further concerned with the standard for determining whether a new crime has been committed. The majority observes that the "probable cause" standard in section 903.0471 is no higher than the traditional "in the conscience of the court" standard to establish a violation of probation, [16] *883 and that it is an appropriately less forgiving standard than "substantial probability," used for an initial order of pretrial detention under section 907.041(4)(c), Florida Statutes....

...at 498 (quoting In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir.1970)). Next, in stating that it is logical to apply a less forgiving standard than the "substantial probability" standard contained in section 907.041(4)(c), the majority does not identify several important distinctions between that statute and section 903.0471....

...ts for appearance at trial, threat of harm to the community or obstruction of the judicial process. [17] *884 In comparison to the "comprehensive and specific framework" of section 907.041, see Paul, 783 So.2d at 1052, the probable cause standard of section 903.0471 is tied only to the commission of an offense while on pretrial release. Section 903.0471 thus makes a novel use of the venerable concept of probable cause....

...at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854. Article I, section 14 brings additional considerations to bear on the complete denial of bail, triggering the need for an adversarial hearing. The absence of an adversarial hearing makes the probable cause determination under section 903.0471 an irrebuttable presumption that the article I, section 14 criteria for pretrial detention are satisfied, resulting in an indefinite deprivation of liberty and offending due process. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (conclusive presumption would conflict with overriding presumption of innocence). CONCLUSION Although I have deep reservations as to whether section 903.0471 as construed by the majority comports with article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution or affords procedural or substantive due process, I conclude that the provision was not unconstitutionally applied to Parker. In this case, the lower courts applied section 903.0471 as if the article I, section 14 findings were required....

...trial release at a first appearance hearing." Ch.2000-178, § 2, at 1468, Laws of Fla. Except for relettering to subsection (c), the legislature did not change subsection 907.041(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1999). Significantly, the legislature created section 903.0471, which provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.—Notwithstanding s....

...es are inconsistent with this act." Ch.2000-178, § 5, at 1470, Laws of Fla. Had these statutory changes been in effect when Paul was decided, this court would have upheld the trial court's decision to remand the defendant into custody without bond. Section 903.0471 obviously allows this result when a defendant has committed new crimes while on pretrial release....

...The court has the right and the duty, in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute, to consider subsequent legislation. Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida, 59 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla.1952) (quoting General Petroleum Corp. of Cal. v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 239, 157 P.2d 356, 360 (1945)). In creating sections 903.0471 and 907.041(4)(b)7, the legislature used the term "pretrial detention" in a way that signifies that the term applies to a revocation of an existing bond....

...etention according to rules 3.131 and 3.132. WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This case does not involve the lower court's revocation of pretrial release on these pre-existing misdemeanors as a result of the commission of the burglary. See § 903.0471, Fla....

...None of the cases cited by the majority support this urinalysis condition. The imposition of house arrest in Alvarez v. Felton, 639 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) was arguably for the protection of the public. See also Williams v. Spears, 814 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, constitutional and stating that the trial court may revoke pretrial release where the defendant commits a new crime)....

...detention. This opinion shall take effect immediately notwithstanding the filing or disposition of any motion for rehearing. . This assumes, of course, that the bond condition which was violated did not constitute a criminal offense. See Fla. Stat. § 903.0471 (authorizing court, on its own motion, to "revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.”).

...(2008) (requiring a court ordering pretrial detention based on a violation of a pretrial release condition to find that "no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at trial"). Cf. § 903.0471, Fla. Stat. (2008) (permitting court to order pretrial detention when it finds probable cause to believe defendant committed a new offense while on pretrial release); Parker v. State, 843 So.2d 871, 878 (Fla.2003) (finding section 903.0471 constitutional and suggesting that an Article I, section 14 finding is not required when probable cause is found that defendant committed a new offense while on pretrial release)....

...is for making a probable cause determination that he committed a new crime while on pretrial release. He also argues he was denied his "constitutional" right to cross-examine the state witness who prepared the affidavit, or to confront the evidence. Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, provides for revocation of bail under the circumstances presented in this case....

...e defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. The constitutionality of this statute has been addressed and upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, in Parker v. State, 2003 WL 1563567, 843 So.2d 871 (Fla.2003). The supreme court held that section 903.0471 is consistent with the pretrial release and detention provision of Article 1, section 14, Florida Constitution, because it assures the integrity of the judicial process. The supreme court also found that section 903.0471 does not violate substantive due process or procedural due process. This proceeding presents the question of what quality of evidence is required in a proceeding brought under section 903.0471, upon which to base a probable cause finding....

...argues that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132(c)(1) requires that an order of pretrial detention not be based exclusively on hearsay evidence. It is the procedural counterpart to section 907.041, the pretrial detention statute. However, *303 section 903.0471 is independent of section 907.041, and the procedures and requirements of the two are different. The supreme court in Parker indicated that the probable cause determination required under section 903.0471 is similar to the probable cause determination which supports an arrest warrant or the probable cause determination made at first appearance....

...The probable cause finding at first appearances may be based on sworn complaints, affidavits, depositions under oath, or if necessary, on testimony under oath properly recorded. Following Parker, we conclude that with regard to bail revocations pursuant to section 903.0471, if a defendant has already been arrested in a second case as occurred here, the court may revoke bail in the first case based solely on a probable cause affidavit prepared in the second case for an arrest warrant or a probable cause determination at first appearance. There is no indication in the language of section 903.0471, in contrast to section 907.041, that the Legislature intended there be an adversary hearing or that there be proffered anything other than the kind of evidence required to support an arrest warrant or probable cause determination at first appearances....

...F06-001943-XX, we granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus as to that case. In Parker, the trial court revoked the bond of a defendant who, while out on bond for pending charges, was arrested on new charges. The Florida Supreme Court held that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, *849 which allows a trial court to sua sponte revoke pretrial release when there is probable cause to believe a defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release, is neither a violation of due process considerations nor of article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution. Section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically requires that a defendant who is on any form of pretrial release "refrain from criminal activity of any kind." Section 903.047 is immediately followed by section 903.0471, which is the subject of Parker and states that "[n]otwithstanding s....

...These new charges were clearly a violation of Alexander's conditions of pretrial release in case number CF06-000735-XX. Accordingly, when the trial court relied on Parker to sua sponte revoke the pretrial release in case number CF06-000735-XX, it was properly proceeding under section 903.0471....

...mber CF06-000735-XX, but also used Parker to impose a "no bond hold" as to Alexander's new charges in case number CF06-001943-XX. Because Alexander had never been on any form of pretrial release as to those charges, the trial court could not rely on section 903.0471 to revoke pretrial release that had not yet been imposed. Neither Parker nor section 903.0471 addresses the court's authority to hold a defendant with no bond on new charges that form the basis of a revocation of pretrial release as to old charges....

...2003), which upheld the power of trial courts to revoke pretrial release upon probable cause to believe that a released defendant has committed a new offense. In response the State argued that "regardless of chapter 916" the court had the authority under section 903.0471 to revoke an incompetent defendant's release upon the commission of a new offense....

...incompetent to proceed under chapter 916 doesn't mean that no matter what . . . crimes he commits thereafter, that somehow falls within the — some protective umbrella that precludes subsequent incarceration. The court finds that ... under [section] 903.0471 that he has violated these conditions of release and that he will be held without bond in both cases." It is from that order that defendant seeks our relief. We must disagree with the trial judge and the State. The finding of incompetency places this defendant into a different statutory category. For competent defendants, section 903.0471 does indeed authorize revocation of release and the imposition of pretrial detention upon the commission of a new offense while on pretrial release from a pending charge....

...im in pretrial detention. The trial court found, after an evidentiary hearing, that there was probable cause to believe Parker had committed a new crime while on pretrial release and ordered his detention pursuant to recently enacted Florida Statute § 903.0471 (2000), which provides: Violation of condition of pretrial release....

...If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained. Before the passage of section 903.0471, the law in this court conflicted with the law in two other district courts of appeal on the issue of whether a trial court must follow section 907.041, after pretrial release was revoked for violation of a condition....

...e Florida Constitution, applied when the defendant again sought pretrial release. The same issue was again presented to this court, not long after it was addressed in Paul, in Barns v. State, 768 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Although newly enacted section 903.0471 was not in effect when release was revoked in Barns, this court relied on the new legislation in order to determine whether the legislature had previously intended section 907.041 to apply after a trial court revoked pretrial release. Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla., 59 So.2d 788 (Fla.1952)(subsequent legislation can be considered in order to arrive at the correct meaning of a prior statute). We concluded that section 903.0471 clarified that the legislature had not intended that section 907.041 had to be followed after a defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. [1] *212 In the present case, after his pretrial release was revoked Parker was given a hearing at which he asked to again be released on bond and argued that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied a second pretrial release, finding that there was probable cause that Parker had committed a new crime while on pretrial release, and that he was a danger to the community. Parker argues that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional as violating Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution which allows pretrial detention if "no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the pr...

...al court's discretion under the state constitution, but to be coextensive with it. Barns, 768 So.2d at 532-33. Barns, as we said earlier, involved a violation of a condition which was not a new crime, and thus was analyzed under section 907.041, not section 903.0471. Our conclusion, however, that the trial judge's decision to deny pretrial release was still circumscribed by the Florida Constitution, would be equally applicable where the defendant committed a new crime and was being detained under section 903.0471....

...As we noted earlier, the trial court not only found probable cause that Parker had committed the new crime while on pretrial release, but also found, consistent with Article I, section 14, that detention was necessary to protect the community from the risk of physical harm. [2] Parker also argues that section 903.0471 violates substantive due process because it authorizes a court to deny a second pretrial release upon finding probable cause that a defendant committed a new crime, which is less than the burden on the state when pretrial detention is sought under section 907.041....

...Having received those safeguards, his due process rights were not violated. We deny the petition. WARNER, C.J., and DELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] In Barns, the defendant had not actually committed a new crime, but rather had violated a condition of his pretrial release. The same legislature which passed section 903.0471 also amended section 907.041 to authorize pretrial detention if the court finds that: The defendant has violated one or more conditions of pretrial release or bond for the offense currently before the court and the violation, in the...

...rotect the community from risk of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at trial. § 907.041(4)(b)7. [now numbered § 907.041(4)(c)7] The trial court in this case was not applying this amendment, but rather the more specific section 903.0471, which is applicable only when there is reasonable cause to believe the defendant has committed a crime while on pretrial release....

...This opinion explains the rationale for that decision. Simeus was charged in Collier County with grand theft and possession of an an-tishoplifting device, and his bond was set at $35,000. 1 The trial court subsequently revoked pretrial release and ordered pretrial detention pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2010), after finding that Simeus had committed a new offense while out on bond....

...2d DCA 2006). In the petition, Simeus contends, and we agree, that the unsworn supplemental police report was legally insufficient to support a probable cause determination that he com *4 mitted a new offense while on pretrial release. Pursuant to section 903.0471, the trial court may on its own motion revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if it finds probable cause to believe the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. An adversarial hearing is not required. Parker v. State, 843 So.2d 871, 879-80 (Fla.2003). The probable cause determination required under section 903.0471 is similar to the probable cause determination necessary to support an arrest warrant or to the probable cause determination made at first appearance....

...In the present case, although the supplemental police report indicated that the authoring officer himself observed Simeus committing the new offense, the report was not in the form of an affidavit, and it therefore did not provide a sufficient basis for the required probable cause determination under section 903.0471....

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Santiago seeks habeas corpus relief from an order revoking his pretrial release and detaining him without bond entered pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000): Notwithstanding s....

...Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 414 (Fla.2004); Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla.2006). In essence, the issue is one of statutory interpretation which, of course, is based entirely upon a correct reading of legislative intent. The very purpose of enacting section 903.0471 was to reinstate the common and well justified practice of, in effect, granting a defendant only one shot at pretrial release and, as it were, automatically revoking it when he has violated its most basic term by committing another offense thereafter....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher Zibura, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Robert Baehren petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking reinstatement of his pretrial bond. His bond was revoked pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, after the trial court found probable cause to believe he committed a new offense while on pretrial release....

...that the State will file a motion for pretrial detention, and the language of section 907.041(4)(g), which states the "state attorney has the burden of showing the need for pretrial detention." The FPDA contrasts the language of section 907.041 with section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2008), violation of condition of pretrial release, which expressly allows the court to revoke bond "on its own motion" if it finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on bond....

...ion whether the defendant should be released or detained not only changes the procedure to be followed, but could place the judicial officer in an impermissible adversarial role. See Parker v. State, 843 So.2d 871, 880 (Fla.2003) (stating that while section 903.0471 only requires that the judge make a finding of probable cause for revocation of a pretrial release, a Florida defendant is accorded a full adversarial hearing under section 907.041 upon his or her initial application for pretrial release)....

...The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. See Alexander v. Judd, 930 So.2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The trial court could not rely on the violation of conditions of pretrial release in a prior case to categorically deny pretrial release in this case. Id.; see § 903.0471, Fla....

...nd. The provision does not authorize a trial judge to become a prosecutor, issuing orders without any cause whatsoever, not to mention probable cause. In a perversion of logic, the State also seeks to justify the trial court's action by reference to § 903.0471, Fla....

...y be detained. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.131. There is no doubt the court has the authority to revoke a defendant’s pretrial release “if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” See § 903.0471, Fla....

...We deny the petitions because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioners’ motions for bond. This Court reviews conditions of a pretrial release under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hernandez v. Roth, 890 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Sections 903.047(1)(a), 903.0471, and 907.041(4)(c)7, Florida Statutes (2014), provide for revocation of the defendants’ pretrial release under the circumstances presented in these cases. Under section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), as a condition of pretrial release, a defendant shall “[r]efrain from criminal activity of any kind.” Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2014), provides that “a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretria...

...2003), the Florida Supreme Court determined that a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s pretrial release after the defendant committed another crime while on bond for pending charges was not a due process violation. The Florida Supreme Court found that an adversarial hearing was not required and that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000) is consistent with article 1, section 14 of the Florida Constitution. Id. The Florida Supreme Court has, in fact, construed section 903.0471 broadly to authorize trial courts to revoke a defendant’s pretrial release when a second crime is committed from jail even when a defendant has not been physically released from custody....

commission of a new offense;1 and the State 1 See § 903.0471, Fla. Stat. (2021) (providing that a trial court

...eant the defendant was required to be “released from custody,” without the condition set forth in section 903.047(l)(a). 2 This type of release should not be equated with “pretrial release” as that term of art is used in sections 903.047 and 903.0471....

...ndpoint) he was in prior to his arrest. Because the defendant’s release cannot be considered a “pretrial release” it could not be conditioned upon his compliance with section 903.047(iXa). Therefore his release could not be revoked pursuant to section 903.0471 as a result of his subsequent arrest for a new crime....

...The defendant ultimately posted bond in both cases and was released from jail. Id. at 849–50. When the defendant appeared before the trial court for his arraignment on the first case, the court sua sponte revoked his bond on that first case pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes. Id. at 850. That statute permits the sua sponte revocation of a defendant’s pretrial release based upon a finding of “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” Id. at 849 (quoting § 903.0471, Fla. Stat.). On habeas corpus review of the order revoking the defendant’s pretrial release, the Third District framed the legal issue presented as whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, “applies when the defendant commits new felonies from jail during the period between the setting of bond for previous offenses and his release.” Id....

...defendant must: (a) Refrain from criminal activity of any kind.” § 903.047(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court can order pretrial detention when it finds probable cause that the defendant violated this condition by committing a new offense. Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, “Violation of condition of pretrial release,” provides: “Notwithstanding s....

...ation of bail by the judge presiding over the defendant’s first appearance hearing.” Thus, the rules allow the trial judge to cede its authority to the first appearance judge. That did not occur here. 4 903.0471, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Santiago v. Ryan, 109 So. 3d 848, 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (denying habeas corpus petition where the trial court revoked bond under section 903.0471 even though defendant had been released on bond at first appearance for a new offense). Defendant relies on Gadson v....

...ease conditions for those offenses. The first appearance judge had no authority to make a final determination over the pretrial release conditions in the pending 2018 cases. The trial court properly exercised its authority to revoke bond pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Petition denied. GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposit...

...und probable cause for the two misdemeanors and set a bond amount for each. However, he ordered Thomas to be held without bond on the unrelated felony case until the trial judge on that case could consider whether to revoke his pretrial release. See § 903.0471, Fla....

...Defendant was released on bond pending his trial. While out on bond in the First Case, Defendant was arrested for the offense of domestic battery, which initiated a second case (the “Second Case”) against Defendant. In the First Case, the trial court revoked Defendant’s bond pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, after finding probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed the new offense of domestic battery while on pretrial release. After Defendant’s bond was revoked in the First Case, the State filed a...

...d with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime…shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions.”1 However, section 903.0471, 1 While some of the charges against Defendant are punishable by life imprisonment, the trial court never denied Defendant bond on the ground that the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption was great....

...ndant committed the new crime of domestic battery. Rather, Defendant argues that the State declining to prosecute the new crime that served as the basis to revoke his bond required the trial court to reinstate his bond. Defendant is wrong. Section 903.0471 allows a trial court to revoke a defendant’s pretrial release “if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” The statute contains no requirement that the State prosecute the new crime....

...ndant.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(d)(2). Although a trial court may sua sponte “revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release,” § 903.0471, Fla....

...The affidavit did not state any facts establishing probable cause for the new charge. Because the affidavit did not state any facts establishing probable cause for the new charge, the affidavit was insufficient to revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention. See § 903.0471, Fla....

...pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.”) (emphasis added); Simeus v. Rambosk, 100 So. 3d 2, 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (the probable cause determination required under section 903.0471 is similar to the probable cause determination necessary to support an arrest warrant or to the probable cause determination made at first appearance; it must be based on an affidavit of a police officer, a sworn complaint, sworn dep...

...The affidavit did not state any facts establishing probable cause for the new charge. Because the affidavit did not state any facts establishing probable cause for the new charge, the affidavit was insufficient to revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention. See § 903.0471, Fla....

...pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.”) (emphasis added); Simeus v. Rambosk, 100 So. 3d 2, 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (the probable cause determination required under section 903.0471 is similar to the probable cause determination necessary to support an arrest warrant or to the probable cause determination made at first appearance; it must be based on an affidavit of a police officer, a sworn complaint, sworn dep...

...ly amended the motion to request Petitioner’s immediate release on his own recognizance. The court denied Petitioner’s request, finding that section 916.17, Florida Statutes (2012), did not apply and that Petitioner could be detained pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2012), as there was probable cause that he committed a new offense while on pretrial release....

...4 The court further indicated that Petitioner would remain in custody and be unable to file additional motions for release unless there was a change in circumstances. 5 This petition followed. Petitioner claims he is entitled to immediate release in Osceola County Case No. 12-793 because section 903.0471 does not apply to defendants who have been released because of a finding of incompetence. We agree. Section 903.0471 provides: Violation of condition of pretrial release — Notwithstanding section 907.041 [the pretrial detention and release statute], a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. Although section 903.0471 authorizes revocation of a competent defendant’s release and the imposition of pretrial detention upon the commission of a new offense, section 916.17(2) appears to leave the judge only two options when an incompetent defendant vio...

...f surviving alone or with the help of friends, or that he was likely to inflict serious bodily harm to himself or others. § 916.17(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 916.13(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). Therefore, the trial court detained Petitioner pursuant to section 903.0471, finding that there was probable cause that Petitioner committed a new offense while on pretrial release....

...For these reasons, I reject Defendant’s argument that Section 907.041(5)(d) violates Article I, Section 14 by allowing a basis for pretrial detention to be established by a “substantial probability.” 10 The Florida Supreme Court found that Section 903.0471, which allows a trial court, on its own motion, to “revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release,” properly i...

...The Court hereby amends Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131 as proposed by the Committee in Track B with slight modification. The amendments clarify that a first appearance judge can revoke pretrial release on a case not assigned to that judge in accordance with section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2023)....

...(2) – (3) [No change] (e) [No change] (f) Revocation of BailPretrial Release. (1) Any judge presiding at a first appearance hearing may revoke a defendant’s pretrial release status pursuant to s. -4- 903.0471 on a case not assigned to the first appearance judge but that is pending in the same judicial circuit as the first appearance hearing. (2) The court in its discretion for good cause, any time after a defendant who is at large on...

...The defendant, however, was never arrested on that charge, was not booked on that charge, and the trial court did not set any conditions for pretrial release. Therefore, the defendant was not placed on pretrial release pursuant to sections 903.047-903.0471, Florida Statutes (2005). Subsequently, the defendant was arrested on an unrelated misdemeanor charge and the trial court ordered him held without bond pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, for violating the conditions of his pretrial release....

COPE, J. The question presented is whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2001) is constitutional....

...Bond was set for $7,500 in the second case. 1 In the first case, the defendant’s pretrial release was revoked because the defendant had committed a new crime and thus breached a condition of the pretrial release. The defendant filed a motion to reinstate bond. He argued that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2001), violated the pre *1169 trial release provision of the Florida Constitution and the due process clauses of the Florida and Federal Constitutions. The trial court ruled that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, is constitutional and declined to reinstate bail for the defendant....

...We concur with Judge Lopez that the statute is constitutional, and deny the defendant’s petition. II. It is a statutory condition of pretrial release that “[t]he defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind....” Id. 903.047(l)(a). In 2000, the Florida legislature enacted section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, which provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release....

...The defense declined the invitation, opting instead to argue solely the issue of unconstitutionality. Thus, for present purposes it is accepted that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant on the second crime. That being so, the defendant fell within the terms of section 903.0471. The trial court acted within its statutory authority in refusing to allow any further pretrial release. III. The defendant’s primary argument is that section 903.0471 violates article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution....

...n that. The integrity of the judicial process is undercut if the courts do not have effective tools to use where a defendant free on bail commits a further crime. IV. At the hearing below, the defense argued that if the trial court wanted to rely on section 903.0471 in denying any further bail, it was necessary not only to make the statutory finding that there was “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release,” id., but the court must also make...

...” The trial court in an abundance of caution made a finding that the defendant “is a danger and/or a risk of physical harm to the community or persons within the community. ...” This additional finding by the trial court was unnecessary. Where section 903.0471 is involved, the only finding which need be made is the statutory finding that there is “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” § 903.0471, Fla....

...The reason for revoking the defendant’s pretrial release in this case — and refusing further release — is because the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. No showing that the defendant poses a risk of physical harm is required. 2 V. Section 903.0471 is consistent with the approach followed in other jurisdictions....

...trial courts a similar authority, in the proper circumstances, to revoke a defendant’s bail for serious noncompliance with the conditions of his release. State v. Ayala, 610 A.2d at 1171-74 (some citations omitted). VI. The defendant contends that section 903.0471 violates the due process clauses of the Florida and Federal Constitutions. We reject that argument on authority of Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210, 212-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review granted, 800 So.2d 615 (Fla.2001). VII. For the reasons stated, we hold that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, is constitutional....

...Judge Zuroweste stated for the record: [A]t the direction of Judge Siracusa whose case this is, date of offense August 8, 2023 with a new charge on January 29th in which probable cause is found, at his request as the trial Judge under 903.0471 and 3.131(d) in the Criminal Rules of Procedure, I'm revoking Mr....

...3d 123, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ("When a defendant violates pretrial release conditions, the statutes and rules of criminal procedure vest the judge having trial jurisdiction with the ultimate authority to revoke an existing bond and order commitment."); see also § 903.0471, Fla....