Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...e aircraft and officers on the ground and, (2) if the police officers used a marked police car and asserted their official position in stopping the arrestees? DOWNEY, HURLEY and DELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Another important exception is embodied in § 901.18, Fla....

...Neither the operation of the motor vehicle by the unauthorized driver nor Kirby's admission of ownership and authorization to operate it occurred in the presence of Deputy Gulbrand. His right to arrest Kirby would have to be derived from F.S. 1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., as an officer summoned to aid Deputy Bowling in making the arrest....

...g an unauthorized person to drive his car, but was to assist another deputy in arresting Kirby; hence, there was a fatal variance between the evidence and the information. We must reject this argument. Gulbrand, having been summoned under F.S. 1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., had the right to do whatever the summoning officer himself might lawfully do....

...In the order denying appellant's motion to suppress, the county court judge certified the following issues to this court as issues of great public importance, pursuant *42 to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(A) and 9.160: I. WHETHER AN OFF-DUTY POLICE OFFICER IS AN OFFICER FOR PURPOSES OF FLORIDA STATUTES 901.18, 901.25(2) AND THE "FELLOW OFFICER" DOCTRINE....

...State, 512 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), the trial judge ruled that the officer's characterization of his actions was not binding on the court. The court next decided that Officer Christoffers' status as an off-duty officer did not preclude him from relying on section 901.18 and the "fellow officer" doctrine to communicate his probable cause information to the DUI unit officer who ultimately effected the arrest. We agree with the trial court's well-reasoned order and conclude that the stop was proper under the "fellow officer" rule and "fresh pursuit" theory. We answer the certified questions in the affirmative. Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes a "peace officer" making a lawful arrest to command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest, and confers on persons so commanded the same arresting authority as is held by the peace officer....

...ent functions. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Officer Christoffers qualified as a "peace officer" [2] or "law enforcement officer" and had the requisite authority to command the assistance of another person in making an arrest under section 901.18 and to make an arrest, outside his jurisdiction, while in fresh pursuit pursuant to section 901.25(2), Florida Statutes (1997). We note, however, that section 901.18, Florida Statutes, which pertains to the authority of an officer in "making a lawful arrest" to enlist the aid of others, does not apply to the facts in this case, because Officer Christoffers did not arrest appellant or directly participate with Officer Thomas in making her arrest....

...ver officers into his home extends not only to their own contemplated reentry but also to the causally and temporally closely-related actions of other officers who act at their direction and must therefore be deemed to stand in their shoes. [7] See, Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979) ("A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest... . *479 A person commanded to aid a peace officer shall have the same authority to arrest as that peace officer..."); Kirby v. State, 217 So.2d 619, 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) ("Gulbrand, having been summoned under F.S. 1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., had the right to do whatever the summoning officer himself might lawfully do....

...The trial court held that the officer did have such authority and we agree. Ortenzo had been requested to aid the sheriff's department in effecting an arrest and in securing premises related causually, if not geographically, to that arrest. By virtue of Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979), Ortenzo had, under these circumstances, the same authority as that of the deputy sheriffs....

...equirement specifically relates to violations of chapter 316, traffic offenses). The defendant contends that since Martinez did not see him in actual physical control of the truck, his arrest by Martinez was unlawful. The state, however, argues that section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized Deputy Burton to delegate her authority to arrest to Deputy Martinez....

...218, 420 S.E.2d 713 (1992). The fellow officer rule is typically, although not always, a rule permitting an officer who has lawful power to arrest a person the option of delegating that function to another officer. As a result, the rule is related to the provision in section 901.18, Florida Statutes (2003), which permits an officer making an arrest to "command the aid of persons she or he deems necessary to make the arrest." Under that statute, we have expressly allowed an officer observing a misdemeanor in his p...

...CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED; dismissal and suppression orders QUASHED; REMANDED. HARRIS, J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., concurs in conclusion only without opinion. NOTES [1] § 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 316.1925, Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] Section 901.18 provides that a police officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest and that a person so commanded shall have the same authority to arrest as that police officer....

...ercover officers into his home extends not only to their own contemplated reentry but also to the causally and temporally closely-related actions of other officers who act at their direction and must therefore be deemed to stand in their shoes. See, Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979) ("A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest......

circuit court’s order erroneously interprets section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1993), thus improperly sustaining

...performance of his duties. In the instant case, it is true that the officers did not have the power to arrest the appellant in their capacity as police officers. The police officers were not directly commanded to assist in an arrest, and therefore, section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1981), is not applicable....

...based on a detainer, and this archaic Florida statute adds nothing to the County's arrest authority. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 950.03 does not support the County's arrest of C.F.C. and S.C.C. pursuant to a detainer based on alleged civil immigration violations. b) Florida Statute Section 901.18 The County also points to Florida Statute Section 901.18 for the proposition that it is immune from civil liability under Florida law because the County's arrest of C.F.C. and S.C.C. amounted to "aid[ing] a peace officer." (DE 23 at 18). Section 901.18 provides that "[a] person commanded to aid a peace officer shall have the same authority to arrest as that peace officer and shall not be civilly liable for any reasonable conduct in rendering assistance to that officer." Fla. Stat. § 901.18 ....

...is asked to make an arrest to make that arrest" and, thus, there would be no limit to the arrests that federal agencies could demand of local officers. (DE 32 at 19). The Court again agrees with Plaintiffs' reading of the statute. It cannot be that Section 901.18 applies in the context of federal officials coordinating with the County to arrest individuals for civil immigration purposes. If an ICE official (or any other federal officer) is a "peace officer" under Section 901.18, then ICE officials could "command" the County and its officers to arrest individuals-pursuant to detainers or, presumably, for any other reason-and the County would be required to comply by "render[ing] assistance as directed *1263 by the officer." Fla. Stat. § 901.18 ....

...2365 , 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) (holding invalid a federal law that "purport[ed] to direct state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme"). Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 901.18 is not relevant to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs' claims and, at the very least, cannot serve the County's proffered purpose of immunizing it from liability for a Fourth Amendment violation....

Mahoy, 575 So.2d 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Section 901.18 authorizes an officer to elicit assistance

...Creedle based on a detainer, and this archaic Florida statute adds nothing to the County's arrest authority. Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 950.03 does not support the County's arrest of Mr. Creedle pursuant to a detainer based on a purported civil immigration violation. b) Florida Statute Section 901.18 The County also points to Florida Statute Section 901.18 for the proposition that it is immune from civil liability under Florida law because the County's arrest of Mr. Creedle amounted to "aid[ing] a peace officer." (DE 70 at 19). Section 901.18 provides that "[a] person commanded to aid a peace officer shall have the same authority to arrest as that peace officer and shall not be civilly liable for any reasonable conduct in rendering assistance to that officer." Fla. Stat. § 901.18 ....

...ed to make an arrest to make that arrest" and, thus, "[t]here would be no limit to the arrests that federal agencies could demand of local officers." (DE 89 at 8-9). The Court again agrees with Mr. Creedle's reading of the statute. It cannot be that Section 901.18 applies in the context of federal officials coordinating with the County to arrest individuals for civil immigration purposes. If an ICE official (or any other federal officer) is a "peace officer" under Section 901.18, then ICE officials could "command" the County and its officers to arrest individuals-pursuant *1308 to detainers or, presumably, for any other reason-and the County would be required to comply by "render[ing] assistance as directed by the officer." Fla. Stat. § 901.18 ....

...2365 , 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) (holding invalid a federal law that "purport[ed] to direct state law enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme"). Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 901.18 is not relevant to the Court's analysis of Mr....

suppress should be upheld on the authority of Section 901.18, which provides: A peace officer making a lawful

...3d DCA 1984); Campbell v. County of Dade, 113 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 1.9 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.1991); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 340 (1981); and (b) the arrest in question was in fact validly effected. § 901.18, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Torres’ convictions for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft are affirmed. § 901.18, Fla.Stat....

not located at the scene. AS TO QUESTION 1: Section 901.18, F.S., provides: 901.18 Officer may summon