The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . The County also points to Florida Statute Section 901.18 for the proposition that it is immune from . . . Stat. § 901.18. . . . If an ICE official (or any other federal officer) is a "peace officer" under Section 901.18, then ICE . . . Stat. § 901.18. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 901.18 is not relevant to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs . . .
. . . The County also points to Florida Statute Section 901.18 for the proposition that it is immune from . . . Stat. § 901.18. Mr. . . . If an ICE official (or any other federal officer) is a "peace officer" under Section 901.18, then ICE . . . Stat. § 901.18. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that Section 901.18 is not relevant to the Court's analysis of Mr. . . .
. . . . § 901.18); Migut v. . . .
. . . . § 901.18(a)(1); see Compl., Ex. 3 at 27 (“The issue in the grievance is whether these differences resulted . . .
. . . . § 901.18; see, e.g., Voorhees v. . . .
. . . . § 901.18(a)(1), (5) (2007); 3 FAM § 4431-34. . . .
. . . . § 901.18, allows an officer to rely on the probable cause determination of another. . . .
. . . . § 901.18(c)(6) (clarifying that while the judgment of a PSB is not a valid grievance, “alleged procedural . . . agency policy which is not contrary to law, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement.” 22 C.F.R. § 901.18 . . .
. . . As a result, the rule is related to the provision in section 901.18, Florida Statutes (2003), which permits . . .
. . . WHETHER AN OFF-DUTY POLICE OFFICER IS AN OFFICER FOR PURPOSES OF FLORIDA STATUTES 901.18, 901.25(2) AND . . . that Officer Christoffers’ status as an off-duty officer did not preclude him from relying on section 901.18 . . . Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes a “peace officer” making a lawful arrest to command . . . the requisite authority to command the assistance of another person in making an arrest under section 901.18 . . . We note, however, that section 901.18, Florida Statutes, which pertains to the authority of an officer . . .
. . . Section 901.18 authorizes an officer to elicit assistance from another officer; and the second officer . . .
. . . Because the circuit court’s order erroneously interprets section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1993), thus . . . once in a citizen’s arrest by Auxiliary Trooper Rayburn, and secondly by the sergeant under section 901.18 . . . This concession on the part of respondent, when we are faced with the clear language of section 901.18 . . . This erroneous application of section 901.18 to the facts of this case represents a departure from the . . . The county court found that section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1993), did not apply to the facts; that . . .
. . . . § 901.18, Fla.Stat. (1989); State v. Eldridge, 565 So.2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and cases cited. . . .
. . . powers to enact an arrest under Chapter 315 to Officer House through the authority of Florida Statute 901.18 . . .
. . . Section 901.18 provides that a police officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he . . .
. . . The state, however, argues that section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized Deputy Burton to . . .
. . . arresting officer did not see the Appellee driving, the other two officers on the scene did, and Section 901.18 . . .
. . . Plaintiffs maintain it is impossible to assess how and why, for example, $14,-901.18 (99.83%) of the . . .
. . . The second, § 901.18, gives the City Council unlimited discretion to grant or deny applications for all . . . Someone who wishes to apply for permission under §901.18 to erect a soft-drink vending machine on city . . . Yet surely § 901.18 is not invalid on its face merely because it creates the possibility that the discretion . . . this decision, repeals local ordinance §901.181 (the detailed newsrack permit law) and simply left §901.18 . . . Compare § 901.181(c)(5) with § 901.18. . . . . § 901.18, Codified Ordinances, City of Lakewood (1984). . . .
. . . The Defendant asserts that the arrest was unlawful, under Florida Statute 901.15(5) and 901.18 as the . . .
. . . section 901.15(5) as they held that thé second officer was authorized to make the arrest under Section 901.18 . . . Section 901.18 provides: A peace officer making a lawful arrest may commit the aid of persons he deems . . . This Court finds that Section 901.18 authorizes a back-up police officer that is coming to assist another . . .
. . . This Court finds that F.S. 901.18, supported by the appellate court cases cited thereunder, authorize . . . F.S. § 901.18 provides: “A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems . . .
. . . However, see Florida Statute § 901.18 which provides that: “A peace officer making a lawful arrest may . . .
. . . Florida Statute 901.18 provides: A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons . . .
. . . 5), the First District held that the second officer was authorized to make the arrest under Section 901.18 . . .
. . . The City Law Director denied the request citing Section 901.18 of the Lakewood Codified Ordinances which . . . provided at that time: 901.18 ERECTING BUILDINGS OR STRUCTURES ON PUBLIC GROUND. . . . Dealer filed suit eight months later on January 5, 1983, attacking the constitutionality of Section 901.18 . . . On October 17, 1983, the City amended Section 901.18 to permit erection of a structure on public property . . . We reverse the district court decision in part because Sections 901.18 and 901.181 unconstitutionally . . .
. . . have concluded that the denial of the motion to suppress should be upheld on the authority of Section 901.18 . . .
. . . See, Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979) (“A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the . . .
. . . Another important exception is embodied in § 901.18, Fla.Stat. (1979). . . .
. . . The police officers were not directly commanded to assist in an arrest, and therefore, section 901.18 . . .
. . . . § 901.18, Fla.Stat. (1979); Goodman v. State, 399 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). See State v. . . .
. . . By virtue of Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979), Ortenzo had, under these circumstances, the same . . .
. . . See, Section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1979) (“A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the . . . S. 1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., had the right to do whatever the summoning officer himself might lawfully . . .
. . . His right to arrest Kirby would have to be derived from F.S.1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., as an officer . . . Gulbrand, having been summoned under F.S.1967, Section 901.18, F.S.A., had the right to do whatever the . . .
. . . supervisory force of employees at the site after September 8, 1936 (the completion date), and (3) $901.18 . . . that building No. 9 should have been accepted December 31, 1935), and the entire tax deduction of $901.18 . . . All of plaintiff’s claims, except that relating to the tax deduction of $901.18, were considered and . . . Co., the defaulting prime contractor, was indebted to the Government to the extent of $901.18 for income . . . Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff for nine hundred and one dollars, and eighteen cents ($901.18 . . .
. . . supervisory force of employees at the site after September 8, 1936 (the completion date), and (3) $901.18 . . . ground that building No. 9 should have been accepted December 31,1935), and the entire tax deduction of $901.18 . . . All of plaintiff’s claims, except that relating to the tax deduction of $901.18, were considered and . . . Co., the defaulting prime contractor, was indebted to the Government to the extent of $901.18 for income . . . Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff for nine hundred and one dollars, and eighteen cents ($901.18 . . .