Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...the jurisdictional amount in controversy. B. ATTORNEY FEES On behalf of the class, Cohen brought claims under Florida statutes that prohibit deceptive business practices, see Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., and misleading advertising, see Fla. Stat. § 817.41 . Both statutory causes of action authorize a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105 ; Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ....

...esentative. The claim for attorney fees in this case is based on two Florida statutes: Fla. Stat. § 501.2105 (1), authorizing an award of attorney fees to “the prevailing party” in an action based on deceptive business practices; and Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (6), mandating an award of attorney fees to “[a]ny person prevailing” in an action based on misleading advertising....

...As for the first factor, the class members in this case could recover their individual attorney fees incurred in separate, individual suits under Florida’s consumer protection statutes. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105 (1) (authorizing fee award for “prevailing party”); Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (6) (mandating fee award for “[a]ny person prevailing” under the statute)....

...who are members of the `Orkin Termite Class' defined above, and were induced to and entered into a Standard Termite Contract based on Orkin's misleading advertisements and representations that violate Florida Statutes, sections 772.104, 817.06, and 817.41." [2] The circuit court certified both the Orkin Termite Class and the Orkin RICO Subclass under rule 1.220(b)(2) and (b)(3)....

...The Appellees' Claims for Misleading Advertising and Florida RICO-Racketeering In count II of the complaint, the Appellees alleged that the Appellants had disseminated misleading advertising before the general public of the State of Florida in violation of section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes....

...For the redress of this alleged violation of the statute, the Appellees are pursuing a civil remedy. A person prevailing in a civil action for a violation of the statute may recover costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and punitive damages in addition to the actual damages proven. § 817.41(6), Fla. Stat. In count III of the complaint, the Appellees pleaded a racketeering claim based on the Appellants' alleged misleading advertisements in violation of section 817.41(1)....

...See §§ 772.104, 817.06. The circuit court certified the class on both of these claims. b. The Requirement to Prove Fraud Misleading advertising is a particularized form of fraud. In order to establish their claim for misleading advertising under section 817.41(1) and the related racketeering claim, the Appellees will be required to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement, including reliance and detriment....

...Second, adequate incentives exist for consumers who have sustained an actual loss to obtain redress. We note that customers who succeed in establishing one of the statutory claims pleaded in the complaint would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. See § 501.2105, Fla. Stat. (FDUTPA); § 817.41(6), Fla....

...cts in violation of this statute. [8] *883 The complaint also alleges that the Appellants engaged in the following unfair or deceptive acts or practices: making or disseminating false and misleading advertisements in violation of sections 817.06 and 817.41, Florida Statutes (2001), forging consumers' signatures on inspection documents in violation of section 831.01, Florida Statutes (2001), defrauding and cheating consumers in violation of section 817.29, Florida Statutes (2001), and improperly...

...In the litigation that resulted in the FSA, the State, in support of its claim for punitive damages, alleged knowing and intentional dissemination of false, fraudulent and misleading statements to the general public by the FSA Defendants in violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...court clearly erred in finding that there was no likelihood that consumers would confuse the two marks. 2 These state-law claims were for deceptive and unfair trade practices under Fla. Stat. ch. 501, false advertising under Fla. Stat. § 817.41, unfair competition under Florida common law, dilution under Fla....

...The 131-count, 246-page, 937-paragraph state- court complaint accused Terminix of numerous violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.; criminal racketeering (i.e., Florida RICO), Fla. Stat. § 772.104; criminal false advertising, Fla. Stat. § 817.41; various forms of fraud and negligence, forty different breaches of the “duty of good faith and fair dealing” (counts 47-86), and forty different breaches of contract (counts 90-129)....

...be amended to state a cause of action. See Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). First we address count II, the Plaintiffs' claims for misleading and false advertising. A cause of action for misleading advertising is defined under section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 817.41 provides as follows: (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...(6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any other remedies prescribed by law. § 817.41(1), (6), Fla....

...17.40(5) must be related to the misleading statement made to the Plaintiffs. For this reason, given the basic facts of this case, it does not appear that the Plaintiffs could ever state a claim for misleading advertising under sections 817.40(5) and 817.41(1)....

...Baby Buddies filed a three-count complaint against Toys R Us7 on July 2, 2003, in federal court: Count I alleged that Toys R Us’s pacifier holder infringed Baby Buddies’s copyright in its pacifier holder; Count II alleged that Toys R Us violated Fla. Stat. § 817.41, which prohibits misleading advertising, by claiming to be the original author and copyright holder of the bear-themed pacifier holder; and Count III sought relief against Toys R Us under the theory of common law unfair 6...

...disposition of this appeal. 25 the marketplace will reward it accordingly. IV. Finally, we turn to Baby Buddies’s claim that Toys R Us violated Fla. Stat. § 817.41, which prohibits misleading advertising,19 by including the © symbol on its pacifier holder’s packaging to indicate that Toys R Us was the author of the design20 when, according to Baby Buddies, Toys R Us knew that it had appropriated the design from Baby Buddies....

...misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of misleading advertising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, designed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses. Fla. Stat. § 817.41(1)....

...Therefore, the Magistrate Judge's October 13 Report and Recommendation is AFFIRMED as to Count *1431 I of the Complaint, and Burger King's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Count I. B. Count II: Violation of the Florida Franchise Act In Count II of the Complaint, Barnes alleges Burger King violated Fla.Stat. § 817.416(2)(a) "by purposefully misrepresenting material facts with the intent to induce BARNES to enter into a Franchise Agreement with BKC." Complaint at ¶ 48. § 817.416(2)(a)(3) provides: (a) It is unlawful, when selling or establishing a franchise or distributorship, for any person: 3....

...Barnes further alleges that Burger King reinforced its misrepresentations by sending the July 21 letter discussed above to Barnes and by causing the October 7 "clarifying" letter not to be sent to Barnes. Complaint ¶¶ 49-50. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Burger King argues that Barnes' claims under § 817.416 must fail because, to recover under the Act, "a franchisee must demonstrate `proof of intentional words or conduct by the franchisor ......

...Burger King further argues that "`[t]he law is clear that reliance by a party claiming fraud must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances.'" Burger King Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, citing Smith v. Mellon Bank, 957 F.2d 856, 858 (11th Cir.1992) (applying § 817.41 of the Florida Fraudulent Practices Act, a related statute)....

...Barnes responds that there are material issues of fact regarding the application of the Act and the Shin negotiations. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude judgment as a matter of law for the following reasons. *1432 1. Burger King's Duty to Disclose Under § 817.416(2)(a)3....

...n law. The Florida Act imposes a duty on the franchisor to disclose "efforts to sell or establish more franchises or distributorships than is reasonable to expect the market or market area for the particular franchise or distributorship to sustain." § 817.416(2)(a)3....

...B. ATTORNEY FEES On behalf of the class, Cohen brought claims under Florida statutes that prohibit deceptive business practices, see Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., and misleading advertising, see Fla. Stat. § 817.41. Both statutory causes of action authorize a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105; Fla. Stat. § 817.41....

...or as the class representative. The claim for attorney fees in this case is based on two Florida statutes: Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1), authorizing an award of attorney fees to "the prevailing party" in an action based on deceptive business practices; and Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6), mandating an award of attorney fees to "[a]ny person prevailing" in an action based on misleading advertising....

...e class members in this case could recover their individual attorney fees incurred in separate, individual suits under Florida's consumer protection statutes. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1) (authorizing fee award for "prevailing party"); Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6) (mandating fee award for "[a]ny person prevailing" under the statute)....

...This is sufficient to state a claim under Florida law for both fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. Next, Mr. Godelia’s fraudulent marketing and promotion claim is based on Florida Statutes Sections 817.40(5) and 817.41(1). Among other things, these laws make it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated . . . any misleading advertisement.” Fla. Stat. § 817.41(1)....

...However, I am compelled to point out that the cases relied upon by the Court in Marrero v. Cavero, supra , involve claims for attorneys fees under a statute. Miami Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Kramer, 399 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) upheld appellant's entitlement to attorneys fees in an action brought under Section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes (1979) and Ocala Music and Marine Center v....

...or to trial, citations to the appropriate sections of the statutes pursuant to which the suit was brought. In responding, plaintiff cited not only to Chapter 498, Florida Statutes, which had been specifically pleaded, but also to Sections 817.40 and 817.41, [2] Florida Statutes, which had not been pleaded. At the commencement of the trial, the court ruled that plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action under Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, [3] because (1) plaintiffs had not specifically pleaded the statute in the complaint, (2) had it been pleaded, plaintiffs would still have had to prove all of the elements of common law fraud in inducement, including reliance, and (3) in any event, Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, (as applied to sales advertisement of land registered pursuant to Chapter 498, Florida Statutes) had been preempted by the provisions of Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. This ruling, as well as two of the three reasons for it, was in error. First, while it would be better pleading practice, plaintiffs were not required to specifically designate or refer to Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes in order to maintain an action under it, so long as they pleaded sufficient facts to bring the allegations of the complaint within the statute. See, City of Lakeland v. Select Tenures, Inc., 129 Fla. 338, 176 So. 274 (1937). Second, plaintiffs were not precluded from maintaining this action under Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes due to any preemption by Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. The statutes are not inconsistent or repugnant to one another. We find no express legislative intent that Chapter 498, Florida Statutes, repeals Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, and repeal by implication is not favored. Mann v. *1370 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 300 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1974). However, the trial court quite properly determined that one seeking to maintain a civil action for violation of Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, must, in order to recover damages, prove each of the elements of the common law tort of fraud in inducement (discussed infra), which would include not only reliance, but also detriment. This is so despite the fact that the state, in charging a crime under Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, need not prove either reliance or detriment in order to obtain a conviction....

...Here, because the court granted the defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal, there was no necessity to consider damages. Nonetheless, on the retrial of this matter, that issue may again arise. By statute, punitive damages (in addition to actual damages proven) are allowable for a violation of Section 817.41, Florida Statutes....

...REVERSED AND REMANDED. BERANEK, J., and GREEN, OLIVER L., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Amended at trial to "a spacious hunting lodge to look like the artist's conception in the Sales Brochure." [2] The relevant portions are Section 817.40(5) and Sections 817.41(1) and (6) as follows: Section 817.40(5) — The phrase "misleading advertising" includes any statements made, or disseminated, in oral, written or printed form or otherwise, to or before the public, or any portion thereof, which are known, or...

...or purpose, either directly or indirectly, of selling or disposing of real or personal property, services of any nature whatever, professional or otherwise, or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating to such property or services. Section 817.41(1) — It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of misleading advertising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, designed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses. Section 817.41(6) — Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any other remedies prescribed by law. [3] Although Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes, is penal in character, it is the type of penal statute the violation of which affords civil relief. See Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So.2d 678 (Fla.3d DCA 1964). Section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes, confirms this conclusion....

...Suffice it to say that all of Himes's claims suffer from the same major defect. The trial court could justifiably find that Himes did not suffer any actual damages proximately caused by Brown's alleged violations of Florida's False Advertising Statute, section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1985), see § 817.41(6), Fla....

...[2] Accordingly, because the trial court's final judgment is supported by substantial competent evidence, we affirm the final judgment under review. NOTES [1] In arriving at our decision, we in no way condone Brown's obviously false advertising. We point out that the legislature enacted criminal penalties for violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1985), see § 817.45, and has also established enforcement procedures whereby the state attorney's office or the Department of Legal Affairs may seek injunctions, declaratory judgments, actual damage awards, or civil...

...Punitive Damages Instruction The district court charged the jury on punitive damages as follows: R21:184 (emphasis added). Exide claims that this charge is erroneous because it states that the jury could award punitive damages against Exide for violation of Section 817.41 without making a finding of “malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, or reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Electro argues that we should decline to consider this alleged error because Exide failed to object to the challenged instruction. If you find for Electro Services and find also that Exide Corporation acted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, or reckless indifference to the rights of others or if you find that Exide Corporation violated Section 817.41 Florida Statutes by disseminating to Electro Services and the general public misleading advertisements you may in your discretion assess punitive damages against Exide Corporation as punishment and as a deterrent to others....

...t was probably responsible for an incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice.” Pate, supra, 819 F.2d at 1083 . We conclude that Exide has failed to establish either ground. First, the challenged instruction was a correct statement of law. Section 817.41(6) provides that “[a]ny person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section [prohibiting misleading advertisement] ......

...But the statute, itself, states that the jury is allowed to consider punitive damages if a violation of the statute is found. The Court: [Asks for comments of defendant’s counsel] *1529 [Defendant’s Counsel]: I am not sure which misleading advertising statute? There are two of them. [Plaintiffs Counsel]: In 817.41. The Court: He only refers to 817.41....

...Thus he concluded that he could not possibly save the money promised. He alleged that Kraft had deliberately misled him. He filed his action against Kraft in the circuit court in Broward County. In his initial complaint commencing the action, he included a claim seeking relief for misleading advertising under section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1991), [1] and a claim for relief under *108 section 501.204 of Florida's "Little FTC Act". [2] His demand for judgment under section 817.41 prayed: "WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court enter a Final Judgment awarding damages in the sum of $3.50, incidental and consequential damages, as well as punitive damages for misleading Plaintiff and the general public pursuant to § 817.41(5), Florida Statutes, together with costs and attorney's fees pursuant to § 817.41(6), Florida Statutes." Similarly, his demand for judgment under section 501.204 sought punitive damages, but he later conceded that that statute does not itself provide for punitive damages....

...It really does not mean that a pleader may not include such a claim in its initial pleading without prior leave of court; rather, he argues, the court may as here allow it to stand while the claimant searches for evidence to support it. Moreover, section 768.72 is in conflict with section 817.41(6), which expressly authorizes punitive damages for misleading advertising violations; and thus he contends that the requirements of section 768.72 were intended to give way to section 817.41(6)....

...Hence he suggests that Kraft has suffered no harm, and *109 certainly not the kind of irremediable harm that common law certiorari requires. To determine whether Kraft has made the kind of extraordinary showing demanded, we begin by analyzing the statutes. It is true that section 817.41 plainly authorizes awards of punitive damages for violations of its terms. It is equally true, however, that the subject of pleading punitive damages is covered only in section 768.72. In other words, while section 817.41 creates an entitlement to punitive damages, it says nothing about how that entitlement shall be pleaded. As to the subject of pleading the entitlement, section 817.41 thus impliedly defers to section 768.72, which allows the pleading only after a judge has determined that the claimant can offer sufficient evidence to allow the claim for punitive damages to be pleaded. Claimant argues that "the legislature intended punitive damages to be an integral and important part of the remedy of 817.41." He continues that section 817.41 is a "public protection statute for consumers transactions," many of which are likely to involve small sums of money....

...From this premise, he argues that the restrictions of Chapter 768, Part II, "will make redress for `private violations' * * * ineffective and prohibitive." Consequently, he urges, the legislature could not possibly have meant for section 768.72 to be a restriction on pleading punitive damages remedies for section 817.41 violations....

...Apart from the legislative directive that, where conflicting, other statutes take precedence over section 768.72, claimant can point to nothing in either of the statutes to support his conclusions. He does not explain, for example, how the fact that section 817.41 may be a consumer protection statute yields the conclusion that prior authorization of punitive damage claims will render it "ineffective and prohibitive." Nor does he explain how the mere fact that a claimant must first be given leave of court to plead for punitive damages creates any conflict at all with section 817.41....

...unitive-damage-claim-with-out-leave-of-court" requirement, it obviously knows how to say so in unmistakable language. It follows that the presence of the quoted text in section 760.11(5), coupled with the absence of such an expression in the text of section 817.41, must be taken as an intent that the pleading limitation requirement be enforced as to any other statute granting a right for punitive damages unless the granting statute says otherwise....

...ch a pleading until the court has first determined whether a factual basis exists to support a claim for punitive damages. CERTIORARI GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. POLEN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The pertinent parts of section 817.41 are as follows: "(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...[3] Because we have considered the petition to seek review by common law certiorari and granted that relief, we expressly disavow any holding on the alternative remedy of mandamus. [4] We, of course, express no conclusion on what factual showing would be necessary to allow a claimant to plead a punitive damages claim under section 817.41....

...Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that American General promoted and marketed the Programs despite its knowledge of the Programs' noncompliance. Plaintiffs bring claims for (1) common law unfair competition (Count II); (2) misleading advertising under Florida Statute § 817.41 (Count III); (3) fraud by concealment (Count IV); (4) common law fraud (Count V); (5) violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla....

...The First Amended Complaint alleged several causes of action: Count I alleged a claim under Florida's RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 895.01 - 895.06. Count II alleged a claim for common law unfair competition. Count III asserted a misleading advertising claim under Florida Statute § 817.41....

...genuine factual disputes which preclude judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Summary judgment as to Count II will therefore be granted. 2. Count III In Count III, Plaintiffs bring a claim under Florida's Misleading Advertising Law, Fla. Stat. § 817.41 , contending that American General "publicly disseminated advertising regarding its Programs and Policies that contained statements that were fraudulent, untrue and/or misleading." (Doc. 54, ¶ 118). Florida's Misleading Advertising Law makes it unlawful "to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement." Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ....

...*1322 Analysis SignatureLink and Liscum moves to dismiss Counts II through VI of ThirdParty's Amended Complaint for Count II — false marking in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292, Count III — false advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Count IV — misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41, Count V — Florida common law of unfair competition and Count VI — deceptive and unfair trade practices in violation of Fla....

...induce the public to enter into any obligation relating to such property or services. Samuels v. King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So.2d 489, 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The statutory term "misleading advertising" as defined in Florida Statute § 817.41(5) [4] includes any statements made or disseminated to the public in oral, written or other form which are known or through the exercise of reasonable care, could have been ascertained, to be untrue or misleading and which were made or diss...

...Jean, Miami Beach, for appellant. Richard E. Gerstein, State Atty., and N. Joseph Durant, Jr., Asst. State Atty., for appellee. CALDWELL, Judge. This cause is here on appeal to review the decision of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County upholding the validity of F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A., the basis of the information charging Henry Major, defendant, appellant herein, as follows: "* * * Henry Major on the 1st day of January, 1963, in the county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully cause to be made or di...

...show room condition, paid over $4,000 new, fantastic opportunity, must be sole today Jan. 1st, regardless of price, on a 1st come basis. Dealers invited. (Deposit will hold) Private TU 8-1802.' said advertisement stating `Estate Settlement' which statement was false and misleading, in violation of F.S. § 817.41 * * *." Defendant's motion to quash the information on the grounds it was vague, indefinite and unconstitutional, was denied. On appeal the defendant raises the following points: 1. "Whether the information for violating F.S. § 817.41 was unconstitutional in that it is vague, indefinite, uncertain and fails to set forth a standard sufficient to apprise the defendant of the acts which he did to violate said statute." 2. "Whether the F.S. § 817.41 makes the elements of the crime of `taking money or property under false pretenses' an essential requirement to prove a violation under said statute." As a general rule the Florida courts have held that indictments and informations which charge in terms of a statute are sufficient....

...1955); 17 Fla.Jur., Indictment and Information §§ 55-57. But appellant contends that because the statute itself *337 is vague and indefinite, in that it describes no ascertainable standard of guilt, the information against him violates constitutional guaranties. Florida Statute § 817.41, F.S.A., prohibiting misleading advertising, originated as § 2 of Chapter 59-301, Acts of 1959....

...or otherwise, or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating to such property or services." Appellant contends that he cannot be found guilty of violating § 817.40 (the definition section) under an information charging a violation of § 817.41 (the prohibition and penalty section)....

...y intended to be read together. Ervin v. Capital Weekly Post, 97 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1957); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla.App. 1st 1960). Florida Statute § 817.40, F.S.A. requires that the definition prescribed be read into F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A. It is noted that, absent such requirement, the general rule of statutory construction would exact the same result. [1] Appellant insists, under his second point on appeal, that, to obtain conviction under F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A., the information must charge and the state must prove all the elements of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses and, as authority for this contention, cites the following portion of F.S. § 817.41, F.S.A.: "Such making or dissemination of misleading advertising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, designed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses." Appellant argues it was ne...

...t confusingly similar to Inmuno's. Count VI arises under Section 501.201 of the Florida Statutes and states a claim for deceptive and unfair trade practices relating to the acts of Nutrivida in infringing Inmuno's seal design. Count VII arises under Section 817.41 of the Florida Statutes and states a claim for false advertising relating to Nutrivida's use of a false or misleading seal design....

...The Bank refused and Mr. Joseph brought suit. When all the pleading smoke cleared, what remained were three counts against the Bank, one for negligent misrepresentation, one for fraudulent misrepresentation, and one for misleading advertising under section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...or purpose, either directly or indirectly, of selling or disposing of real or personal property, services of any nature whatever, professional or otherwise, or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating to such property or services. Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which prohibits misleading advertising, states that: It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...ssociated with it. Subsection (6) contemplates a civil action under this section, and awards costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to actual damages and punitive damages. Section 817.45, Florida Statutes (1999), makes violation of section 817.41 a first degree misdemeanor. Although the statute does not say it, the case law that has developed since the adoption of section 817.41(1) requires one seeking to maintain a civil action for violation of the statute to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement, including reliance and detriment, in order to recover damages....

...d act on it; and (d) the plaintiff suffered injury in justifiable reliance on the representation (Emphasis added). See also Hillcrest Pacific Corp. v. Yamamura, 727 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The definition of misleading advertising supplied in section 817.41(1) includes the requirement that the representor make or disseminate oral, written or printed statements "which are known, or through the exercise of reasonable care or investigation could or might have been ascertained, to be untrue o...

...There is no indication that the legislature intended the insurance fraud statute and the nonjoinder statute to be read together. Compare Major v. State, 180 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1965) (one statute (section 817.40) defined *1191 certain terms and the other statute (section 817.41) prohibited certain activities and proscribed punishment)....

...t intend to keep, that the complaint properly alleged claims for violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201-501.213, Florida Statutes (1987), [9] and the statutory prohibition against misleading advertising, section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...ion of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act), pet. for review denied, 461 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1985); Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. v. Burkert, 521 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (jury verdict for plaintiff under breach of contract, violations of § 817.41 Fla....

...ew vehicles), review denied, 531 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1988); Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, Ltd., 403 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (elements of common-law fraud sufficient when pled to state cause of action for misleading advertising under § 817.41, Fla....

...Rule X2(b)3 of the personnel rules of the City of Miami Beach. "Specification: You have been found guilty in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, of the charge of misleading advertising (an offense set forth and denounced by section 817.41(1) Florida Statutes, 1961 [F.S.A.]) as set forth and evidenced by an order entered by that court in said cause (case number 63-4906) on Oct....

...f by reference. "As a Second and Separate Ground for Removal You Are Hereby Charged as Follows: You have violated Rule X, section 2(b) 1 in that you have been guilty of a criminal act, to wit, misleading advertising, as set forth in and denounced by section 817.41(1) of Florida Statutes, 1961 [F.S.A.], as evidenced by a true and correct copy of the proceedings had in case number 63-4906 in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, to wit, the information; transcript of testim...

...Therefore, the mere fact that appellant did not prevail on two of several theories of recovery does not, without more, activate the attorney's fees entitlement of those statutes. The appellees also claim that they are entitled to their attorney's fees pursuant to section 817.41(6) for time spent in litigating count II of the appellant's amended complaint. However, the appellees did not seek attorney's fees under section 817.41(6) in any of their motions for attorney's fees, nor did the trial court indicate in its final judgment that it was basing its fee award on this statutory provision....

...ney's fees in its motion attacking the sufficiency of the appellant's claims and its later motion for fees failed to cite any statutory basis for them. Id. Appellees therefore cannot justify the trial court's award of attorney's fees on the basis of section 817.41(6)....

false and misleading advertising, Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count II), unjust enrichment (Count III), breach

...insurance" and covered accidental bodily injury caused in connection with a common carrier, but excluded accidents involving a rental car. 10 The cause of action here is based exclusively on the assertion that the advertisement was misleading under Section 817.41, Florida Statutes....

...At the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the misleading advertising statute claim, and the trial court granted the motion. The Florida Statute provides as follows: 11 Misleading advertising prohibited.-- 12 817.41 (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...14 (6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any other remedies prescribed by law. 15 In order to prove a violation of Section 817.41, Florida law requires the plaintiff to prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement....

misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41; and punitive damages. II. Jurisdiction and Applicable

...Before HUBBART, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. The final order denying attorney's fees which is under review by this appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to award the defendant Miami Lincoln Mercury, Inc. reasonable attorney's fees under Section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes (1979), upon a holding that: (a) the defendant herein was the prevailing person in a civil action brought against it inter alia for misleading or deceptive advertising under Section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes (1979), and accordingly, was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees under Section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes (1979), see e.g., Johnny Crews Ford, Inc....

...wer. See e.g., Ocala Music & Marine Center v. Caldwell, 389 So.2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and cases collected. Reversed and remanded. FERGUSON, Judge (dissenting). Kramer filed this suit against Miami Lincoln Mercury pursuant to Sections 817.40 and 817.41, Florida Statutes (1977), for damages arising from an alleged misleading advertisement that the auto he purchased had been driven less than 7,000 miles....

...asonably should have known that the odometer had been tampered with. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned for Miami Lincoln Mercury. Miami Lincoln Mercury then sought attorney's fees from Kramer as the prevailing party pursuant to the statute. § 817.41(6). The parties are unable to provide the court with a case construing the statutory provision in question. Section 817.41(6) provides for attorney's fees to be awarded "to any person prevailing in an action for violation of this action." Similar statutes relied upon by appellant provide for an award of fees to the prevailing party and have been construed to apply as well to a prevailing defendant....

...against fraudulent commercial practices than already existing legal remedies. [2] There are sixty-five sections under Chapter 817 identifying and prohibiting certain frauds. Nearly all of the frauds are made criminal acts and are punishable as such. Section 817.416, supra, prohibits misrepresentations in the sale of franchises and distributorships. A violation of the section is a crime. § 817.416(2)(b)....

...Activities in violation of the section may be enjoined by the Department of Legal Affairs or the Department of Agriculture and Consumers Services in behalf of the people of the state. Most persuasive to an interpretation of the provision in question is the language found in subsection (3) of Section 817.416 which provides for a civil remedy in addition to criminal penalties and injunctive relief: Any person, who shows in a civil court of law a violation of this section may receive a judgment for all moneys invested in such a franchise or distributorship....

...Upon such a showing, the court may award any person bringing said action reasonable attorney's fees... . It is perfectly clear that this section does not intend to award fees to a prevailing defendant even though the very nature of the subject contemplates a more sophisticated type of litigation than does Section 817.41. I am aware of no criminal statute which awards attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant. Section 817.41 prohibits misleading advertising but is the only fraudulent practice in this Chapter for which no criminal penalty is prescribed, nor is expressly subject to injunctive action by a department of state government. The single statutory remedy for violation of the section is a civil action by a member of the public who has been misled. I believe that the purpose of Section 817.41(6) is to place aggrieved consumers on equal footing with retailers in terms of access to the court for the purpose of vindicating a public as well as private wrong....

...ble for attorney's fees. It is doubtful that the Legislature intended this inconsistency. I would affirm the trial court. NOTES [1] § 501.2105(1) Florida Statutes (1979); § 713.29 Florida Statutes (1979); § 718.303(1) Florida Statutes (1979). [2] § 817.415 Florida Free Gift Advertising Law (1) LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2) The Legislature of the State of Florida recognizes that the deceptive misuse of the term "free" and words of similar meaning and intent in advertising by the unscrupulous had res...

...§ 1125(a) (Count II); (3) false advertising in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count III); (4) trademark infringement in violation of Fla. Stat. § 495.151, et seq., (Count IV); (5) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count V); (6) common law unfair competition (Count VI); and (7) deceptive and unfair trade practices in violation of Fla....

...Determining that Black Diamond is entitled to recover certain attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing party, we reverse. A group of plaintiffs, including William Bristol, filed a complaint against Black Diamond asserting three claims: (1) misleading advertising under section 817.41 of the Florida Statutes, (2) deceptive and unfair trade practices under sections 501.201 through 501.204 of the Florida Statutes, and (3) conversion....

...Furthermore, under the circumstances the Defendants have not prevailed under the "significant issues" test. Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So.2d 807 (Fla.1992). Accordingly, the Defendant are not entitled to prevailing party attorney's fees and cost with respect to Plaintiff Bristol. This appeal timely followed. Section 817.41(6) of the Florida Statutes (2003) authorizes the award of prevailing party attorney's fees as follows: 817.41 Misleading advertising published....

...* * * (6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any other remedies prescribed by law. *821 § 817.41(6), Fla....

...Adams, 509 So.2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Additionally, a prevailing party is entitled to recover an award of costs pursuant to rule 1.420(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure following a voluntary dismissal. Black Diamond sought fees and costs pursuant to sections 817.41(6) and 501.2105(1) of the Florida Statutes....

...In this case, attorney's fees cannot be granted to Black Diamond under section 501.2105(1) because judgment is not entered following a voluntary dismissal. Nolan v. Altman, 449 So.2d 898, 900-901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Accordingly, Black Diamond is entitled to recover its attorney's fees under section 817.41(6) only....

...wing Bristol's voluntary dismissal. Accordingly, Black Diamond is entitled to recover costs under rule 1.420(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and this court's holding in Long. Black Diamond is also entitled to recover attorney's fees under section 817.41(6) of the Florida Statutes and this court's holdings in Vidibor and Long....

...§ 1125(a) ("Count II"), (3) false advertising in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ("Count III"); (4) trademark infringement in violation of Fla. Stat. § 495.151, et seq. ("Count IV"); (5) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ("Count V"); (6) common law unfair competition ("Count VI"); and (7) deceptive and unfair trade practices in violation of Fla....

...at 18) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 817.06). As a threshold matter, Transamerica's claim for false and misleading advertising is brought under section 817.06, as well as sections 817.40-817.47. Sections 817.40-817.47 are not as limited as section 817.06. Section 817.41, titled "Misleading advertising prohibited.", provides, in relevant part, that It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...ar statutes require that the rep-resentor knew or should have known the statement was false or misleading at the time it was made. See, e.g., Rollins, Inc. v. But-land, 951 So.2d 860, 877 (Fla.App.2d Dist.2006) (finding misleading advertising [under § 817.41] is a particularized form of fraud requiring plaintiffs to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement); Joseph v. Liberty Nat. Bank, 873 So.2d 384, 388 (Fla.App. 5th Dist.2004) (finding § 817.41 requires plaintiff to prove repre-sentor knew or should have known falsity of statement, as when proving fraud in the inducement)....

...l insurance” and covered accidental bodily injury caused in connection with a common carrier, but excluded accidents involving a rental car. The cause of action here is based exclusively on the assertion that the advertisement was misleading under Section 817.41, Florida Statutes....

...At the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the misleading advertising statute claim, and the trial court granted the motion. The Florida Statute provides as follows: Misleading advertising prohibited.— 817.41 (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement....

...(6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any other remedies prescribed by law. In order to prove a violation of Section 817.41, Florida law requires the plaintiff to prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement....

...contract that could only be exercised at the discretion of Olsen, who was the owner of the legal entity that owned the golf courses and facilities. Plaintiffs alleged that the actions of Defendants constituted false and misleading advertising under section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The complaint was subsequently amended to include Kathy Haines and the Masuts. As to all Plaintiffs except the Haineses, it is uncontroverted that the suit was not filed within the four-year limitations period under the statute. Because Defendants concede that the Haineses timely filed their claim under section 817.41, any further discussion regarding the statute of limitations defense will relate to the claims of the other four plaintiffs....

...In the instant case, the damage-causing act was completed at the time Plaintiffs purchased the memberships in reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations. Accordingly, the continuing tort doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. We conclude that the section 817.41 claims of Angelo and Brenda Masut, Tom Howell, and Richard Conboy are barred by the statute of limitations. As to the Haineses, Defendants claim that the jury instruction regarding their section 817.41 claim is erroneous and requires reversal....

...r should have known the advertisements were false or misleading. In Joseph v. Liberty National Bank, 873 So.2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), this court explained: Although the statute does not say it, the case law that has developed since the adoption of section 817.41(1) requires one seeking to maintain a civil *1095 action for violation of the statute to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement, including reliance and detriment, in order to recover damages....

...t on it; and (d) the plaintiff suffered injury in justifiable reliance on the representation. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, the jury instructions given by the trial court subjected Defendants to strict liability on the section 817.41 claims in contravention of Joseph. Defendants are entitled to a new trial regarding the section 817.41 claim of the Haineses. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the final judgment awarding damages to Charles and Kathy Haines, Angelo and Brenda Masut, Tom Howell, and Richard Conboy pursuant to section 817.41. We remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on the Haineses' section 817.41 claim....

...FDUTPA Plaintiff brings two claims under FDUT-PA. The first is based on Defendant’s alleged deceptive and unfair practice of advertising a certain price and then charging customers a higher price (Count IV). The second is based on Defendant’s alleged violations of sections 560.204 and 817.41, Florida Statutes, (Count V)....

...mages. As set forth above, this argument requires the Court to engage in factual determinations, which is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss. As to Plaintiff’s second FDUTPA claim, Defendant argues that a violation of neither section 560.204 nor section 817.41 could possibly constitute a per se violation of FDUTPA because those sections do not proscribe unfair or deceptive trade practices. In relevant part, section 817.41 makes it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof, any misleading advertisement.” Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (1). Although Defendant includes section 817.41 in its argument that Plaintiff has not alleged a per se violation of FDUT-PA, its only support for that argument is that it was unable to find a. case \yhere that section was used as a predicate for a FDUTPA claim. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. The type of activity proscribed by section 817.41—misleading advertising—is precisely the type of unfair and deceptive trade practice that is prohibited by FDUTPA. See, e.g., Third Party Verification, Inc. v. Signaturelink, Inc., 492 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1323, 1327-28 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (determining that allegations regarding a misleading advertisement stated a claim under both the private'right of action in § 817.41 and FDUTPA); Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc., 550 So.2d 1135, 1140-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (same). Thus, Count V states a claim insofar as it alleges a violation of section 817.41....

...¶¶ 17-19, 23. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts five counts: (i) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”); (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat.' § 817.41; (4) breach of express warranty; and (5) unjust enrichment....

...the representation induces another to act on it; and (4) injury to the Plaintiff as a result of acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.”); Smith v. Mellon Bank, 957 F.2d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 1992) ("In order to prove a violation of Section 817.41, Florida, law requires the plaintiff to prove reliance on the alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements of the common law tort of fraud in the inducement.”); Moss v....

...who are members of the `Orkin Termite Class' defined above, and were induced to and entered into a Standard Termite Contract based on Orkin's misleading advertisements and representations that violate Florida Statutes, sections 772.104, 817.06, and 817.41." [2] The circuit court certified both the Orkin Termite Class and the Orkin RICO Subclass under rule 1.220(b)(2) and (b)(3)....

...The Appellees' Claims for Misleading Advertising and Florida RICO-Racketeering In count II of the complaint, the Appellees alleged that the Appellants had disseminated misleading advertising before the general public of the State of Florida in violation of section 817.41(1), Florida Statutes....

...For the redress of this alleged violation of the statute, the Appellees are pursuing a civil remedy. A person prevailing in a civil action for a violation of the statute may recover costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and punitive damages in addition to the actual damages proven. § 817.41(6), Fla. Stat. In count III of the complaint, the Appellees pleaded a racketeering claim based on the Appellants' alleged misleading advertisements in violation of section 817.41(1)....

...See §§ 772.104, 817.06. The circuit court certified the class on both of these claims. b. The Requirement to Prove Fraud Misleading advertising is a particularized form of fraud. In order to establish their claim for misleading advertising under section 817.41(1) and the related racketeering claim, the Appellees will be required to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement, including reliance and detriment....

...Second, adequate incentives exist for consumers who have sustained an actual loss to obtain redress. We note that customers who succeed in establishing one of the statutory claims pleaded in the complaint would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. See § 501.2105, Fla. Stat. (FDUTPA); § 817.41(6), Fla....

...ral acts in violation of this statute. [7] The complaint also alleges that the Appellants engaged in the following unfair or deceptive acts or practices: making or disseminating false and misleading advertisements in violation of sections 817.06 and 817.41, Florida Statutes (2001), forging consumers' signatures on inspection documents in violation of section 831.01, Florida Statutes (2001), defrauding and cheating consumers in violation of section 817.29, Florida Statutes (2001), and improperly...

...d in or omitted from statements given to the buyer, and that the buyer would be accorded access to the company's books and records during normal business hours. Appellants alleged that Neff had failed "to disclose material evidence," in violation of Section 817.41, Florida Statutes; had made certain entries in the Foxfire Inn's books and records in violation of section 817.15; and had made false statements of fact concerning the Foxfire Inn's net worth, its actual profit margin during the time N...

to attorneys fees in an action brought under Section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes (1979) and Ocala Music

...similar statutes require that the representor knew or should have known the statement was false or misleading at the time it was made. See, e.g., Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 877 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2006) (finding misleading advertising [under § 817.41] is a particularized form of fraud requiring plaintiffs to prove each of the elements of common law fraud in the inducement); Joseph v. Liberty Nat. Bank, 873 So.2d 384, 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding § 817.41 requires plaintiff to prove representor knew or should have known falsity of statement, as when proving fraud in the inducement)....

unregistered dealer, violation of Florida Statute § 817.41 (1989) for misleading advertising, and breach

...§ 1125(a) (Count II); (3) false advertising in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count III); (4) trademark infringement in violation of Fla. Stat. § 495.151, et seq., (Count IV); (5) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count V); (6) common law unfair competition (Count VI); and (7) deceptive and unfair trade practices in violation of Fla....

...nary Injunction. Star-Brite asserts claims for false advertising under the federal Lanham Act (Count I), for violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count II), for violation of Florida's false advertising statute, Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count III), and a claim for common law unfair competition....

...("Plaintiff) filed an Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Kop-Coat, Inc. Star-Brite asserts claims for false advertising under the federal Lanham Act (Count I), for violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count II), for violation of Florida's false advertising statute, Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count III), and a claim for common law unfair competition....

...The Court will not issue sanctions as requested by Defendant. C. Motion Regarding Pleadings Defendant has moved to dismiss Count III of the Second Amended Complaint because it seeks injunctive relief which Defendant asserts is not authorized by Florida Statutes § 817.41 (governing false advertising)....

...clearly erred in finding that there was no likelihood that consumers would confuse the two marks. 2 These state-law claims were for deceptive and unfair trade practices under Fla. Stat. ch. 501, false advertising under Fla. Stat. § 817.41, unfair competition under Florida common law, dilution under Fla....

...Accordingly, on October 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint. Id. ¶ 39. The Complaint alleged three counts: 1) a violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, section 501.201, et seq., Florida Statutes (“FDUTPA” or “the Act”); 2) False and Misleading Advertising in violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes; and 3) Unjust Enrichment....

...pose Rule 11 sanctions in this case. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions in appeal No. 87-5381. AFFIRMED. . These included the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla.Stat. § 501.201-.213 (1987); id. § 817.41 (Misleading Advertising); id. § 817.44 (Intentional False Advertising); id. § 817.411 (False Information); the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, id....

...d by Appellant. These claims are not common law tort claims subject to the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes; they are statutory claims arising under part II of chapter 501 (unfair and deceptive trade practices) and section 817.41 (misleading advertising), respectively....

...Appellants, Black Diamond Properties, Inc., Black Diamond Realty, Inc., and Stanley C. Olsen appeal an order awarding statutory prevailing-party attorney’s fees and costs to appellees, Charles and Kathy Haines, Angelo and Brenda Masut, Tom Howell, and Richard Conboy. See § 817.41(6), Fla. Stat. (1997). The award was based on the previously entered final judgment finding that the appellees had sustained damages as a result of the appellants’ misleading advertising, as prohibited by section 817.41(2)....

particular violation under Section 817.06 and Section 817.-41(1), Florida Statutes (1979).

...# 1). Plaintiffs thereafter filed an amended complaint against both OmniActive USA and OmniActive India alleging patent infringement of the 714 patent (count one), false marking (count two), false advertising (count three), violation of Florida Statute Section 817.41, which criminalizes false advertising (count four), violation of Florida Statute Section 501.201, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (count five), violation of Florida Common Law of Unfair Competition (count six), and product disparagement (count seven)....

...Baby Buddies filed a three-count complaint against Toys R Us7 on July 2, 2003, in federal court: Count I alleged that Toys R Us’s pacifier holder infringed Baby Buddies’s copyright in its pacifier holder; Count II alleged that Toys R Us violated Fla. Stat. § 817.41, which prohibits misleading advertising, by claiming to be the original author and copyright holder of the bear-themed pacifier holder; and Count III sought relief against Toys R Us under the theory of common law unfair 6...

...disposition of this appeal. 25 the marketplace will reward it accordingly. IV. Finally, we turn to Baby Buddies’s claim that Toys R Us violated Fla. Stat. § 817.41, which prohibits misleading advertising,19 by including the © symbol on its pacifier holder’s packaging to indicate that Toys R Us was the author of the design20 when, according to Baby Buddies, Toys R Us knew that it had appropriated the design from Baby Buddies....

...misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of misleading advertising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, designed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses. Fla. Stat. § 817.41(1)....

SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. Appellee, defendant in the trial court, prevailed in a civil action instituted by appellants, plaintiffs below. Plaintiffs brought suit under section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1985), charging defendant with misleading advertising. The trial court awarded the prevailing defendant attorney’s fees pursuant to section 817.41(6) which provides: Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and may be awarded punitive damages in addition to actual damages proven....

...We reject this contention. The legislative intent is evident from the plain language of the statute. See St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1982). As the prevailing party in this action, defendant was entitled to an award of fees under section 817.41(6)....

...misleading advertising claims asserted by Appellant. These claims are not common law tort claims subject to the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 768.28, Florida Statutes ; they are statutory claims arising under part II of chapter 501 ... and section 817.41 ......

...1 While the Court would allow the Frehling employee to testify regarding the conversation she had with the Sprint Operator, the Court will not place any weight on Frehling’s testimony regarding an alleged third party conversation between a Sprint Operator and a Frehling employee. B. Count IV: Fla. Stat. § 817.41 Misleading Or False Advertising In order to prove that ISG violated Florida’s misleading advertising statute, Plaintiff must prove reliance on alleged misleading advertising, as well as each of the other elements of common-law tort of fraud in the inducement....

...Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, Ltd., 403 So.2d 1367 (Fla.App. 4Dist.1981). Plaintiff has failed to prove that ISG has engaged in false or misleading advertising. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant has not violated Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ....

...§§ 1114 (1) and 1125(a), and the Anticy-bersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d), the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“DUT-PA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 , and the Florida Communications Fraud Act for misleading advertising, Fla. Stat. § 817.41 ; and asserting a common law claim for unjust enrichment....

...Other claims Plaintiff also apparently seeks (in the Conclusion section of the Motion for Default Judgment) unspecified relief pursuant to: the Lanham Act for trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and unfair competition (Count II, III); the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count IV); Fla. Stat. § 817.41 for misleading advertising, (Count V); and Florida common law for unjust enrichment (Count VI)....

...We affirm the district court’s disposition of the misleading advertising claim. . As noted above, the appellant also asserted a claim for personal injuries flowing from the appellees' alleged misleading advertising in connection with the CJ-7 model vehicle. See Fla. Stat.Ann. § 817.41 (West 1977)....

...He alleged claims arising under general maritime law for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as a claim for misleading advertising under Fla. Stat. § 817.41. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that the forum selection clause required Turner to litigate his claims in Italy. The district court agreed, finding that Turner’s claims fell with...

...§ 1125(a) (Count II), (3) false advertising in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count III); (4) trademark infringement in violation of Fla. Stat. § 495.151 et seq. (Count IV); (5) misleading advertising in violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.41 (Count V); (6) common law unfair competition (Count VI); and (7) deceptive and unfair trade practices in violation of Fla....

...B. ATTORNEY FEES On behalf of the class, Cohen brought claims under Florida statutes that prohibit deceptive business practices, see Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., and misleading advertising, see Fla. Stat. § 817.41. Both statutory causes of action authorize a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105; Fla. Stat. § 817.41....

...entative. The claim for attorney fees in this case is based on two Florida statutes: Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1), authorizing an award of attorney fees to “the prevailing party” in an action based on deceptive business practices; and Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6), mandating an award of attorney fees to “[a]ny person prevailing” in an action based on misleading advertising....

...members in this case could recover their individual attorney fees incurred in separate, individual suits under Florida’s consumer protection statutes. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1) (authorizing fee award for “prevailing party”); Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6) (mandating fee award for “[a]ny person prevailing” under the statute)....

...against the same defendants. The cases were tried together, and orally argued together, but remain independent. See Taglieri v. SB Hotel Assocs. LLC, No. 4D14-1983 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 14, 2016). and costs based on separate proposals for settlement and section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, alleging counts for violation of the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (“ILSA”), fraud, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and misleading advertising in violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes....

...Donald Trump’s presence as the developer. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on all counts. The defendants moved for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes; rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; section 817.41(6), Florida Statutes; and ILSA. The trial court “granted [the motions] as to entitlement pursuant to and from the date of their August 16, 2013 separate Proposals for Settlement” and “as to entitlement from December 13, 2013 pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6).”2 On appeal, the plaintiff argues the proposals for settlement do not comply with rule 1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes, because they fail to state whether attorney’s fees are part of the claim for relief, do not spec...

...Because we hold the proposals invalid and unenforceable due to their noncompliance with the rule concerning attorney’s fees, we do not address the plaintiff’s additional arguments of the proposals’ invalidity based on their handling of punitive damages and reference to section 817.41(6). Next, the plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding the defendants 4 are entitled to all of their attorney’s fees under section 817.41(6) because that section is limited to fees incurred in a misleading advertising claim and fees related to the other claims should be excluded. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that because the court found the defendants are entitled to fees under section 817.41(6) from December 13, 2013, this Court should reverse any fee award granted under the proposals for settlement before then. “[E]ntitlement to recover fees and costs [is] generally ....

...limited to those fees and costs directly and exclusively related to each claim . . . on which recovery is allowed . . . .” Black Diamond Props., Inc. v. Haines, 36 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). However, the defendants argue the attorney’s fees under the section 817.41(6) claim are inextricably intertwined with the other claims because they were based on the same facts and alleged wrongs. “[W]here the claims involve a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories, a full fee may...

...tly comply with rule 1.442(c)(2)(F) because they failed to state whether the attorney’s fees were part of the legal claim. They therefore cannot form a basis for the attorney’s fees award. While the trial court did not err in awarding fees under section 817.41(6), those fees are limited to the misleading advertising claim unless the court determines the claims were intertwined and to date from December 13, 2013....

...et Harbour North and therefore she was not personally liable. The Association argues that the law creates a rebuttable presumption that a person receiving the benefit of any misleading advertisement is responsible for it. The Association relies upon section 817.41(4), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides as follows: (4) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person named in or obtaining the benefits of any misleading advertisement or any such sale is responsible for such misleading advertisement or unlawful sale....

...To be liable, Sara Bedzow must be found to have engaged in at least two incidents of criminal activity. See § 772.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). The criminal activity alleged in this case is the dissemination of misleading advertisements in violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1997)....