CopyCited 124 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 1528, 1996 WL 71487
...denied,
115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). Law enforcement officers are provided a complete defense to an excessive use of force claim where an officer "reasonably believes [the force] to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest." §
776.05(1), Fla.Stat....
...or "negligent" use of excessive force because there is no such thing as the "negligent" commission of an "intentional" tort. A contrary determination places a chilling effect on law enforcement efforts, and would render meaningless the defense under Section 776.05(1)....
CopyCited 112 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 34342
...ar, the court's attention to the final paragraph of the new instruction is requested. 2. Pages 45c and 45d of the manual provide the current instruction on justifiable use of force by law enforcement officers. Chapter 87-147, Laws of Florida, amends Section 776.05, Florida Statutes, to redefine justifiable use of force by an officer....
...conduct occurred as the result of entrapment. EXHIBIT 2 3.04(f) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making an arrest A law enforcement officer, or any person he has of a felon summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat F.S. 776.05 from or stop efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...in arresting a felon person who has been convicted of a felony and who is fleeing from justice. Force in making Use of any force by a law enforcement officer or unlawful arrest any person summoned or directed to assist the law prohibited enforcement officer is not justified if: F.S. 776.051(2) Give if 1....
CopyCited 72 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 557, 1985 Fla. LEXIS 3922
...g an arrest of a suspected felon pursuant to the recent decision of Tennessee v. Garner, [___ U.S. ___,
105 S.Ct. 1694,
85 L.Ed.2d 1] (1985). The second substantive change is a new instruction under justifiable use of force in resisting arrest under section
776.051(1)....
...cause death or great bodily harm, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force. Force in resisting A person is not justified in using force arrest to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears to be F.S. 776.051(1) and a law enforcement officer....
...e death or great bodily harm, but (assailant continued or resumed the use of force. Force in resisting A person is not justified in using force to arrest resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears to be a law F.S. 776.051(1) and enforcement officer....
...een proved. *1006 3.04(f) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making A law enforcement officer, or any person he an arrest has summoned or directed to assist him, need not of a felon retreat from or stop efforts to make a lawful F.S. 776.05 arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...in arresting a person who has been convicted of a felony and who is fleeing from justice. Force in Use of any force by a law enforcement officer making unlawful or any person summoned or directed to assist the arrest law enforcement officer is not justified if: prohibited F.S. 1. The arrest is unlawful. 776.051(2) 2....
CopyCited 68 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9615, 1988 WL 63970
...ieves to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest or when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice." Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976)....
...1694 , 1703 n. 14,
85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (listing Florida's statute as a codification of the "common-law rule"); see also City of St. Petersburg v. Reed,
330 So.2d 256, 257 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (common-law rule in Florida "has ... been codified in Fla.Stat. sec.
776.05"), cert. denied,
341 So.2d 292 (Fla.1976). Only recently has Florida amended section
776.05....
...oting in 1979. Under the Florida statute, a police officer could use "any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another ... or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice." Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976) (emphasis added)....
...To try to support this theory, Brown has extracted selective statements from the depositions of Chief Miller, Officer Perez, and several expert witnesses, all of whom testified about the City's police manual and the state statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. sec. 776.05 (West 1976)....
...gligence and assault and battery theories. 31 In granting summary judgment against Brown's state law claims, the district court stated that "[t]he standard of care owed by the City to the plaintiff must be determined with reference to Fla.Stat. sec. 776.05 (1979), which governed the use of deadly force by police officers." Brown, 644 F.Supp....
...the officer is entitled to use force which is reasonably necessary to capture him, even to the extent of killing or wounding him."), cert. denied,
341 So.2d 292 (Fla.1976); id. at 257 (noting that "[t]his rule has ... been codified in Fla.Stat. sec.
776.05."); see also City of Miami v....
...denied,
194 So.2d 621 (Fla.1966); Gordon v. Alexander,
198 So.2d 325, 327 (Fla.1967) (endorsing Nelson: "We are constrained to hold the officer was justified in his action and did not use unnecessary or excessive force."). Recently, the Florida legislature amended section
776.05 to restrict more narrowly the justifiable use of deadly force, 14 but the amendment applies prospectively 15 and does not affect the instant action....
...17 Although Garner is important in recognizing a federal constitutional tort, nothing in Garner made conduct not previously tortious under state law, tortious under state law. See Mazzilli v. Doud,
485 So.2d 477 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (citing Fla.Stat.Ann. sec.
776.05 (1979), without mentioning the Garner decision), review denied,
492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986)....
...h allowed the use of whatever force necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon. Garner,
471 U.S. at 25-26 ,
105 S.Ct. at 1708-09 ,
85 L.Ed.2d at 18-19 . Among those statutes identified by the Court as an embodiment of the common law rule was section
776.05, Florida Statutes, which authorized a police officer to use "any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another ... or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice." Fla.Stat. Sec.
776.05 (emphasis added). 2 49 In contrast to section
776.05, the city of Clewiston's police manual was much more restrictive, providing that deadly force could be used by a police officer only: 50 (1) to defend himself from serious injury; (2) to defend others from death or serious injury when...
...Officer Perez also testified that he could not catch Brown, id., and that Brown often would flee the jurisdiction after committing a crime. Id. at 7, 31. Brown presented no evidence to contradict or question Officer Perez's testimony on these points 3 As amended, section 776.05 provides justification for the use of "any force" (3) When necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice and: (a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a threat of death or serious physical harm...
...14 As amended, the statute determines the relevant standard for the "justifiable" use of deadly force in criminal and civil actions against police officers. The amendment took effect on October 1, 1987. See supra note 3. No party to this appeal has relied upon the amendment to section 776.05 15 On its face, the amendment to section 776.05 does not specify whether it applies prospectively or retrospectively....
...pending causes of action" found to be constitutional: the new statute did "not increase the liability of any of the participants in the offense.... The statute simply changes the form of the remedy without impairing substantial rights.") By amending section 776.05, the Florida legislature effectively abrogated the common-law rule on the use of deadly force....
...applicable judicial interpretation of the legislation controlling at the time the cause of action arose. We are not permitted to give the 1977 amendment ... retroactive application...."), review denied,
388 So.2d 1115 (Fla.1980). 16 The amendment to section
776.05 became effective on October 1, 1987....
...Officer Perez testified that as he was pursuing the unarmed Brown, "I was pacing up to him, trying to catch up to him, but at my age, Todd Brown was only about sixteen years old then and I have seen him run. He can run." See Deposition of Officer Luis Perez at 20 2 The full text of section 776.05 provides as follows: Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest.--A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...rm while making the arrest or when necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. As indicated in the majority's opinion, the Florida Legislature has recently amended section 776.05 to more narrowly circumscribe the conditions under which a law enforcement officer may use deadly force to arrest fleeing felons....
...es brought for the wrongful use of deadly force unless the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by such light, and when feasible, some warning had been given. Both parties apparently agree that the amendment to section 776.05 has no bearing on the disposition of this appeal.
CopyCited 62 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20922, 2006 WL 2355585
...t
court held that the agents’ actions did not constitute a tort because the agents’ use
of force was objectively reasonable, and thus privileged under Florida law.
Specifically, in his report and recommendation the magistrate judge relied on
section 776.05 of the Florida statute, which provides, in part,
A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned
or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to
make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the
arrest....
...The officer is justified in the use of any force:
16
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself
or herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest . . . .
Fla. Stat. § 776.05 (2000)....
CopyCited 57 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17492
...Jury Instruction on Fleeing Felon Statute
Appellants next contend that their convictions must be overturned because
the district court failed to give a jury instruction concerning Florida’s fleeing felon
30
statute. See Fla. Stat. § 776.05. In relevant part, § 776.05 provides that a police
officer is justified in using force against a fleeing felon in various circumstances, as
follows:
A law enforcement officer ....
...officer or others; or (b) The officer reasonably believes that the
fleeing felon has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person.
Id. Appellants contend that § 776.05 authorizes all of the police shootings in this
case, and that the lawfulness of the shootings themselves constitutes a complete
defense to the obstruction-of-justice charges.
The district court denied Appellants’ request for a jury instruction on this
fleeing felon statute....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 255327, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1689
....
Moreover, the law does not create a duty for a law enforcement officer to
retreat or abandon his efforts to effect an arrest simply because a fleeing felon is
noncompliant, a principle that has been statutorily codified in Florida’s penal
code. See id. § 776.05 (“A law enforcement officer ....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16301, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 441
...t waived sovereign immunity; and (4) whether the district court erred in granting a motion in limine restricting testimony of threats Fitzgerald allegedly made against Morris. DISCUSSION A. Whether Morris’s conduct was reasonable. Florida Statutes § 776.05 provides: A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...ly committed in retaking felons who have escaped or when necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice. McDaniel and Morris contend that Morris’s conduct was reasonable because Morris was acting under the specific authorization of section 776.05....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 732
...There was ample evidence to support these findings and, despite the defendants' contention to the contrary, ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Doud did not reasonably believe his use of force to be necessary either to defend himself or to effect the arrest of felons. See § 776.05, Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 110859
...1976); Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando,
327 So.2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). [10] 3. Jury Instructions Lozano contends that the trial court erred in failing to specially instruct the jury on the justifiable use of force by a police officer. See §
776.05, Fla....
...us to the jury instruction requested in Hedges v. State,
172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965). [12] Whether Lozano was in fact effecting an arrest is an issue of fact for the jury. If Lozano was attempting a lawful arrest, he had no duty to retreat. See, e.g., §
776.05, *25 Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...which is reasonably necessary to capture him, even to the extent of killing or wounding him. City of Miami v. Nelson, Fla. App.3d 1966,
186 So.2d 535; Gordon v. Alexander, Fla. 1967,
198 So.2d 325. This rule has recently been codified in Fla. Stat. §
776.05, as amended by Ch....
...*259 BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING Appellees contend that we overlooked the fact that any error in admitting the order on use of firearms into evidence was rendered harmless by a later jury instruction which was substantially identical to Fla. Stat. § 776.05....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 23504
...We find we must reverse and remand for a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against appellant on the issue of comparative negligence and by failing to give appellant's requested jury instruction regarding the justifiable use of force standard found in section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it directed a verdict on the issue of comparative negligence and that it compounded that error when it refused to give appellant's requested jury instruction on the justifiable use of force as defined in section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...The trial judge nevertheless accepted appellee's application of Mazzilli and granted the motion. The trial judge also determined that it was not proper in a civil case to give the *136 defense requested jury instruction on the justifiable use of force standard established in section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...move from the jury the issue of Allen's comparative negligence. As a necessary follow-up to that conclusion, we must also conclude that the jury should have been instructed on the standard for determining the justifiable use of force as set forth in section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1985). This court recognized the propriety of the use in a civil case of the standard established in section 776.05 in City of St....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1991 WL 19930
...Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding the Verdict The officers contend that Ansley did not prove the duty prong of his negligence *1343 claim. They argue that under Florida law an officer does not owe a suspect a duty to refrain from discharging a weapon during an attempted arrest. The officers rely on Fla.Stat. § 776.05 which states in pertinent part: A law enforcement officer or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...he heard a loud double snap from weapons and felt a sharp pain in his right side and then his right leg. Ansley testified that he did not raise his right hand as he turned nor did he act in a threatening manner toward the officers. Florida Statutes § 776.05 allows an officer to use any force reasonably necessary to defend himself or others from bodily harm while making an arrest....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 2, 2010 WL 26546
...Instruction 3.3(g) is intended to ensure that a jury makes the findings required by Harbaugh. We amend instruction 3.6(f), Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, and instruction 3.6(g), Justifiable Use of Non-deadly Force, to conform with statutory changes brought about by the Legislature's amendment to section 776.051, Florida Statutes (2008)....
...In Tillman, the Court held that the offense of using force to resist an arrest was limited to situations where the law enforcement officer was effecting an arrest, and not to other types of police-citizen encounters. Id. at 1266. The plain language of section
776.051 dictated such limited results, particularly since sections
784.07 and
843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), which defined the offenses of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, respectively, included t...
...r was "engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties" or "in the lawful execution of any legal duty." Tillman,
934 So.2d at 1266 (quoting §§
784.07(2),
843.01). Without such alternative language that appears in sections
784.07 and
843.01, section
776.051 could not be extended to those situations where a law enforcement officer was not in the process of making an actual arrest. In chapter 2008-67, section 1, the Legislature *641 expanded section
776.051(1) to include as the nonjustifiable use of force resisting a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty where the officer was acting in good faith. The amendments to instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) include that new language reflecting amended section
776.051(1)....
...Instruction 3.6(h), Justifiable Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer, is amended to reflect that force by a law enforcement officer or person assisting him or her is prohibited both in the case of making an unlawful arrest and in the unlawful execution of a legal duty. See § 776.051(2), Fla....
...In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with (assailant) and clearly indicated to (assailant) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of deadly force, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force. Force in resisting a law enforcement officer arrest . § 776.051(1), Fla....
...In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with (assailant) and indicated clearly to (assailant) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of non-deadly force, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force. Force in resisting a law enforcement officer arrest . § 776.051(1), Fla....
...Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [
477 So.2d 985], 1992 [
603 So.2d 1175], 2005 [
911 So.2d 766], 2006 [
930 So.2d 612], and 2010. 3.6(h) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making an arrest of a felon. §
776.05, Fla....
...making the arrest. That force is also justifiable when necessarily used: 1. in retaking a felon who has escaped or 2. in arresting a felon who is fleeing from justice. Force in making unlawful arrest or unlawful execution of a legal duty prohibited. § 776.051(2), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20060
...scape from arrest. 2. Clearly Established Law In 1979, the Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part, that a law enforcement officer was justified in the use of any force "necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice." Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979)....
...d not to PEREZ. To the extent that our assumption is incorrect, we state the following: (1) That defendant PEREZ owed no duty to the plaintiff to refrain from discharging his weapon during the attempted arrest of the plaintiff, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979); under that statute, PEREZ was permitted to use deadly force to apprehend the plaintiff, who was a fleeing felon; (2) Police department regulations limiting the use of deadly force to situations where the felon is a danger to the arr...
...Plaintiff's claim for assault and battery (Count III) The plaintiff alleges that Officer PEREZ used a greater degree of force than was necessary under the circumstances. As we have previously stated in our discussion regarding plaintiff's civil rights claim, the force used by Officer PEREZ was authorized by Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979) and was therefore justified or priviledged....
...In this count, as with the others, the plaintiff attempts to extrapolate a higher duty of care from the police department regulations allegedly in effect at the time the shooting incident occurred. It is stated that these regulations were much narrower than the standard set forth in Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1104538
...nce pertaining to Officer Penix. Because Mr. Light had committed only misdemeanors in the presence of these officers prior to the collision, they had no authority to use deadly force except in self-defense or if Mr. Light committed a new felony. See § 776.05(1), (3), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 498397
...ased on his reasonable belief. Specifically §
776.012 Fla. Stat. provides that a person is justified in the use of force when he "reasonably believes" such conduct is necessary to defend himself or to prevent death or great bodily injury. Likewise, §
776.05 permits a law enforcement officer to use force when he "reasonably believes" it is necessary to defend himself....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida
...Law enforcement officers are provided a complete defense to an excessive use of force claim where an officer ‘reasonably believes [the force] to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.’” Sanders,
672 So.2d at 47 (quoting §
776.05(1), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 11857
...violated clearly established law on preGarner precedent. See Hamm v. Powell,
874 F.2d 766 *374 (11th Cir.1989), modified on other grounds on reh'g in part,
893 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 938,
110 S.Ct. 3218,
110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). Section
776.05, Florida Statutes (1983), provided: [A law enforcement officer] is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest or when necessarily...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida
...Don't take your gun out unless you *1411 need it; don't fire it unless it's absolutely necessary." (D.E. 100, pp. 23, 36-37, 39-40). It was Chief Miller's opinion that the department policy was more restrictive than the state statute (D.E. 100, p. 39) (referring to Florida's "Fleeing Felon" Statute, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979)), although, upon further questioning, he did say that the regulations and the statute closely paralleled one another (D.E....
...It is alleged that PEREZ was acting within the scope and course of his employment at the time the shooting occurred. In several memoranda filed herein, the plaintiff alludes to the CITY's liability based on PEREZ's acts committed pursuant to the Florida Fleeing Statute, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979) (as opposed to any ordinance or custom of the CITY)....
...It is axiomatic that, in order to show negligence, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff. The standard of care owed by the CITY to the plaintiff must be determined with reference to Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979), which governed the use of deadly force by police officers....
...The Clewiston Police Department Rules and Regulations do not determine the standard of care insofar as this state claim is concerned. Those rules are only relevant to determine whether PEREZ received proper instruction in the use of deadly force within the allowable parameters of Fla.Stat. § 776.05 (1979). *1416 In 1979, when officer PEREZ shot the plaintiff, Fla.Stat. § 776.05 permitted a law enforcement officer to use any force "necessarily committed in arresting felons fleeing from justice." ( See, Order Granting Perez' Motion for Summary Judgment, D.E....
...(b) Assault and Battery The same reasoning which applied to plaintiff's claim for negligence applies to this claim as well: The statewide standard for the use of deadly force is controlling. St. Petersburg v. Reed, supra. There is no evidence that either PEREZ or the CITY violated the state standard imposed by Fla. Stat. § 776.05 (1979) ( See, D.E....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5275428, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 18680
...ng unjustified and unnecessary force to [the individual], who was already engaged by three other officers.” Caamano was charged with attempted battery, a second-degree misdemeanor. Caamano moved to dismiss the charge, alleging immunity pursuant to section 776.05, Florida Statutes (2010), which provides qualified immunity for a law enforcement officer’s use of force in making an arrest....
...and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force .... As used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant. In contrast, section 776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest,” provides: A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
...e essential requirements of the law by applying the incorrect law. Specifically, the State argues that by ordering the county court to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing under section
776.032, the Stand Your Ground statute, rather than proceeding under section
776.05, the statute specific to law enforcement, the circuit court stripped section
776.05 of meaning....
...As the State would not be permitted to appeal should Caamano eventually be acquitted after a trial conducted under the more lenient immunity standard of section 776.082, the State has satisfied the injury and lack of appellate remedy prongs required for certiorari relief. Because sections
776.05 and 776.082 address the use of justifiable force in the context of a criminal prosecution, the doctrine of in pari materia requires that we read them together and attempt to harmonize them. Upon such a review, it is evident that if Caamano is entitled to any immunity under either statute in this case, then such protection must flow from section
776.05. We hold that the specific language of section
776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest,” must apply to the behavior of law enforcement officers during the course of an arrest, rather than the language of section
776.032, which applies generally to the public at large....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8485, 2000 WL 781042
...When a law enforcement officer believes that the use of force is "necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making [an] arrest," the law enforcement officer has a complete defense to claims of alleged use of excessive force. Fla. Stat. § 776.05(1)....
...orce because there is no such thing as the `negligent' commission of an `intentional' tort." See id. at 48. To hold otherwise would place a "chilling effect on law enforcement efforts, and would render meaningless the defense under [Florida Statute] Section 776.05(1)." Id....
...of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others; or (b) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to another person. Fla. Stat. § 776.05 The decision made by Officer Knight and/or Officer Minor to use deadly force against decedent TyRon Lewis is exactly the type of discretionary decision which is protected by governmental immunity....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 4610, 2014 WL 1255319
...he officer was attempting to arrest the victim. When the officer asserted a defense under *515 section
776.032, the court held that another, more specific, statute found in chapter 776 provided a defense for law enforcement officers. That statute is section
776.05, and it provides that the officer “is justified in the use of any force” under specified circumstances. §
776.05, Fla. Stat. (2011). Specifically, the court stated that “[bjecause sections
776.05 and
776.032 address the use of justifiable force in the context of a criminal prosecution, the doctrine of in pari materia requires that we read them together and harmonize them.” Caamano, .
105 So.3d at 22 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that section
776.05 is specifically applicable to cases involving the use of force by law enforcement officers in making an arrest and, therefore, section
776.05 supplied the justification defense applicable to the police officer rather than the more general statute found in section
776.032....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79761, 2016 WL 3221138
...ive.
672 So.2d at 47 . Under Florida law, an “officer is justified in the use of any force ... [w]hich he or she reasonably believes to-be necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm’ while making the arrest”. Fla. Stat. §
776.05 ....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, 1996 WL 380629
...1865, 1871,
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Court, referring to the excessive use of force to effect arrest, recognized that the "Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against th[at] sort of physically intrusive conduct ..." Furthermore, under §
776.05, Fla....
...e Law Battery Claim. Defendant Schramm seeks Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's state law battery claim. Defendant Schramm contends that, because he used the minimum amount of force necessary in this situation, his actions were justified pursuant to § 776.05, Fla.Stat....
...make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force: (1) Which he reasonably believes to *838 be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. § 776.05, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...HE OR SHE REASONABLY BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO
PREVENT IMMINENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM TO
HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR ANOTHER OR TO PREVENT THE
IMMINENT COMMISSION OF A FORCIBLE FELONY, IS
LIMITED TO INVOKING A DEFENSE UNDER SECTION
776.05(1), OR IS ALSO PERMITTED TO SEEK IMMUNITY
FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER SECTIONS
776.012(1) AND
776.032(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2013), MORE
COMMONLY KNOWN AS FLORIDA’S “STAND YOUR
GROUND” LAW.
Peraza, 226 So....
...After being indicted for manslaughter with a firearm, Deputy Peraza moved
to dismiss the indictment, citing immunity from prosecution under sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1), Florida Statutes (2013), commonly known as Florida’s
“Stand Your Ground” law, and under section
776.05, Florida Statutes (2013).
After the evidentiary hearing, the judge made the findings set forth above and
granted Deputy Peraza’s motion to dismiss based upon Stand Your Ground
immunity.
The State appealed, arguing that law enforcement officers are not eligible to
assert immunity pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law because they are already
provided a defense pursuant to section
776.05, which involves the justifiable use of
force when making a lawful arrest. The State’s argument on appeal was consistent
-3-
with the holding in Caamano,
105 So. 3d at 22. Significantly, a defense pursuant
to section
776.05 (which does not use the term “immunity”) is not subject to pre-
trial determination when facts are in dispute, and may only be presented as a
defense at trial, before a jury.
The Fourth District disagreed with Caamano and...
...The Fourth District also found this case distinguishable from Caamano
based upon a secondary finding by the trial court that Deputy Peraza was not
making an arrest when he shot McBean. Peraza,
226 So. 3d at 946. This is legally
significant because section
776.05 immunity only applies when an officer is
making an arrest. §
776.05(1), Fla....
...3d at 947.
Although we generally agree with the Fourth District’s analysis, we also
recognize that the Second District was attempting to harmonize arguably related
statutes. As the Second District’s analysis recognizes, given the question presented
in this case and the arguments made, some consideration of section
776.05, Fla.
Stat., is necessary in order to determine whether it creates an ambiguity not
otherwise apparent on the face of sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1), Fla....
...l statutory
provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”
M.W. v. Davis,
756 So. 2d 90, 101 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key
Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
Section
776.05 was originally enacted in 1974, see chapter 74-383, Laws of
Florida, and in relevant part provides that “[a] law enforcement officer ....
... retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance . . . [and
is] justified in the use of any force . . . [w]hich he or she reasonably believes to be
necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making
the arrest.” §
776.05, Fla. Stat. At the heart of the State’s argument lies the
observation that the defense recognized in this law enforcement use of force
statute, section
776.05, may overlap in some cases with the defense created in
section
776.012 (“[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not
have a duty to retreat if ....
...necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or
another”). In other words, there may be cases in which a person justified in the use
of deadly force under section
776.012 is also a law enforcement officer justified in
the use of force under section
776.05....
...That immunity is addressed only in section
776.032(1), which
plainly says that the immunity is afforded to any “person who uses force as
permitted in s.
776.012.” §
776.032(1). The State has pointed to no language from
any statute, including section
776.05, that could reasonably be read as negating the
plain and unambiguous language of the only statute affording the pretrial immunity
determination that Deputy Peraza seeks.
We also recognize that the Second District’s analysis...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 3981633
...The bail bondsman is justified in the use of any force that he reasonably believes necessary [to] defend himself or another from bodily harm while making surrender. That force is justifiable when necessary in surrendering a bailee on his bond. This language closely tracks the language set forth in section 776.05 of the Florida Statutes. That statute reads: 776.05....
...The officer is justified in the use of any force: (1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or *213 herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest; (2) When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have escaped. § 776.05, Fla. Stat. (2005). However, section 776.05 did not apply to the facts presented in this case since the defendant was neither a law enforcement officer nor a person whom the officer had summoned or directed to provide assistance....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1910, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14940
...d felon’s escape from the citizen’s custody. We believe the words "or other person” used in that section refer to a person summoned by a law enforcement officer to assist the officer in making an arrest or preventing an escape, as mentioned in § 776.05....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 11124, 1991 WL 229790
...The trial court also granted a new trial because it “erroneously” gave a jury instruction on justifiable use of force. This court’s prior opinion suggested that an instruction should be given in this case on justifiable force in making an arrest under section 776.05, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Sep 27, 2024
...The
officer is justified in the use of any force . . . [w]hich he
or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend
himself or herself or another from bodily harm while
making the arrest.
FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1) (emphasis added)....
...acceleration posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to
him. For those same reasons, the district court correctly found that
Santiago-Miranda is entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiffs’ battery claims. See FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1); Kimbrel,
385 So....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...2d at 47.
Officers are only liable for damage where the force used is “clearly
excessive.” Id. “[O]rdinary incidents of [an] arrest . . . do not give
rise to an independent tort.” Lester v. City of Tavares,
603 So. 2d
18, 19–20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). §
776.05, Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 29 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 111, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 417, 2004 WL 524907
...ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. APPENDIX Proposal 3. Revised instruction on justifiable use of force by law enforcement 3.6(h) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER In making an arrest of a felon § 776.05, FlaStat....
...self] or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. That force is also justifiable when necessarily used 1. in retaking a felon who has escaped or 2. in arresting a felon who is fleeing from justice. Force in making unlawful arrest prohibited § 776.051(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1989 WL 51539
.... Prior to Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 ,
105 S.Ct. 1694 ,
85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), no Fourth Amendment basis existed to challenge the use of deadly force to make a lawful arrest. In fact, appellants’ conduct apparently was authorized by Fla.Stat. §
776.05 that provides: "A law enforcement officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20247, 1993 WL 733106
...ccordance with the jury's finding of a constitutional violation. B. The Battery Claim 1. Justifiable Use of Force Defense to Battery Deputy Curtis argues he was deprived of a jury charge on justifiable use of force as a defense to battery. Fla.Stat. 776.05 provides that a law enforcement officer is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...§
870.05, Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis supplied).
Section
870.05 uses language consistent with a defense at trial (“shall
be held guiltless and fully justified in law”), not immunity. “Justification”
and “guilt” are trial concepts. For example, section
776.05, Florida
Statutes (2018), describes situations where a law enforcement officer “is
justified in the use of any force.” The Florida Supreme Court has
recognized that such language is consistent with a defense at trial, as
opposed to a statute, such as section
776.032, that plainly affords pretrial
immunity....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...After being indicted for manslaughter with a firearm, Deputy Peraza moved
to dismiss the indictment, citing immunity from prosecution under sections
776.012(1) and 776.()32(1), Florida Statutes (2013), commonly known as Florida’s
“Stand Your Ground” law, and under section
776.05, Florida Statutes (2013).
After the evidentiary hearing, the judge made the findings set forth above and
granted Deputy Peraza’s motion to dismiss based upon Stand Your Ground
immunity.
The State appealed, arguing that law enforcement officers are not eligible to
assert immunity pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law because they are already
provided a defense pursuant to section
776.05, which involves the justifiable use of
force when making a lawful arrest. The State’s argument on appeal was consistent
with the holding in Caamano,
105 So. 3d at 22. Significantly, a defense pursuant
to section
776.05 (which does not use the term “immunity”) is not subject to pre-
trial determination when facts are in dispute, and may only be presented as a
defense at trial, before a jury.
The Fourth District disagreed with Caamano and held tha...
...The Fourth District also found this case distinguishable from Caamano
based upon a secondary finding by the trial court that Deputy Peraza was not
making an arrest when he shot McBean. Peraza,
226 So. 3d at 946. This is legally
significant because section
776.05 immunity only applies when an officer is
making an arrest. §
776.05(1), Fla....
...3d at 947.
Although we generally agree with the Fourth District’s analysis, we also
recognize that the Second District was attempting to harmonize arguably related
statutes. As the Second District’s analysis recognizes, given the question presented
in this case and the arguments made, some consideration of section
776.05, Fla.
Stat., is necessary in order to determine whether it creates an ambiguity not
otherwise apparent on the face of sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1), Fla....
...Stat.
This is true because “[w]here possible, courts must give effect to all statutory
provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”
M.W. v. Davis,
756 So. 2d 90, 101 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key
Beach Erosion Control Dist.,
604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
Section
776.05 was originally enacted in 1974, see chapter 74-383, Laws of
Florida, and in relevant part provides that “[a] law enforcement officer ....
...need not
_7_
retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance . . . [and
is] justified in the use of any force . . . [w]hich he or she reasonably believes to be
necessary to defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making
the arrest.” §
776.05, Fla. Stat. At the heart of the State’s argument lies the
observation that the defense recognized in this law enforcement use of force
statute, section
776.05, may overlap in some cases with the defense created in
section
776.012 (“[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not
have a duty to retreat if ....
...necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or
another”). ln other words, there may be cases in which a person justified in the use
of deadly force under section
776.012 is also a law enforcement officer justified in
the use of force under section
776.05....
...determination. That immunity is addressed only in section
776.032(1), which
plainly says that the immunity is afforded to any “person who uses force as
permitted in s.
776.012.” §
776.032(1). The State has pointed to no language from
any statute, including section
776.05, that could reasonably be read as negating the
plain and unambiguous language of the only statute affording the pretrial immunity
determination that Deputy Peraza seeks.
We also recognize that the Second District’s analysis reflects...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12472, 2017 WL 3730352
...The state argues that, as held in State v. Caamano,
105 So. 3d 18 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012), law enforcement officers are not entitled to seek immunity
under the Stand Your Ground law. The state reasons that law enforcement
officers already are provided a defense under section
776.05(1), Florida
Statutes (2013), describing the justifiable use of force in making an arrest.
We disagree with the state’s argument and with Caamano....
...er
to shoot at the man, resulting in the man’s death.
b. The Circuit Court’s Conclusions of Law
In the circuit court’s conclusions of law, the court began by reciting the
statutes at issue, that is, sections
776.012(1),
776.032(1), and
776.05(1),
Florida Statutes (2013).
In 2013, section
776.012(1) provided:
[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does
not have a duty to retreat if:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is...
...As
used in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution”
includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or
prosecuting the defendant.
§
776.032(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).
3
Section
776.05(1) provided, in pertinent part:
A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer
has summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not
retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because
of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer
is justified in the use of any force:
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to
defend himself or herself or another from bodily harm while
making the arrest[.]
§
776.05(1), Fla....
...(2013).
Having reviewed the foregoing statutes, the circuit court then
addressed the state’s argument that the officer could not avail himself of
Stand Your Ground immunity under sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1)
because, as a law enforcement officer, his use of force was governed solely
by section
776.05(1). The state’s argument rested on Caamano, which
held, in pertinent part:
[I]f [the officer] is entitled to any immunity under either
statute in this case, then such protection must flow from
section
776.05. We hold that the specific language of section
776.05, titled “Law enforcement officers; use of force in
making an arrest,” must apply to the behavior of law
enforcement officers during the course of an arrest, rather
than the language of section
776.032, which applies generally
to the public at large.
Caamano, 105 So....
...Your Ground immunity under sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1). The
court articulated two reasons for its conclusion.
First, the circuit court reasoned that Caamano was distinguishable on
its facts:
The decision in Caamano and Florida Statute
776.05
specifically applied to an officer’s use of force while making an
arrest....
...4
during the course of an arrest.” Caamano at 20. The [officer]
in this case was responding to an emergency and was
investigating a disturbance. . . . Therefore, the limitation on
law enforcement officers to proceed under section
776.05 to
the exclusion of section
776.032 is distinguishable from the
present case as such limitation only applies, if at all, to cases
where the officer is in the process of making an arrest.
Therefore this Court fin...
...Second, the circuit court “urge[d] the 4th DCA to reexamine the legal
holding in Caamano.” The circuit court observed that Caamano applied
the rule of statutory construction known as in pari materia to reconcile the
differences between sections
776.05 and
776.032. See Caamano,
105 So.
3d at 22 (“Because sections
776.05 and
776.032 address the use of
justifiable force in the context of a criminal prosecution, the doctrine of in
pari materia requires that we read them together and attempt to
harmonize them.”)....
...not permitted to claim immunity pursuant to sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1), which applies generally to all persons using force.
Instead, the state argues, because the officer was attempting an arrest,
he was required to proceed pursuant to the more specific section
776.05(1), which applies to law enforcement officers using force in
attempting an arrest.
According to the state, section
776.05(1) allowed the officer to assert a
claim of qualified immunity, for which the officer would not be entitled to
7
a pre-trial evidentiary hearing and dismissal as permitted under section
776.032(1)...
...[T]his Court should follow the reasoning of Caamano and
reverse the [circuit] court order because where the actions of
a law enforcement officer using force in the line of duty are
concerned, the specific language of [section]
776.05[(1)]
should apply, not the general language of [section]
776.032[(1)]. Additionally, because the question of whether
qualified immunity pursuant to [section]
776.05[(1)] applies[]
is for the jury not the judge, the order granting immunity must
be reversed and this case remanded for a jury trial.
b....
...Specifically, the officer argues that based on the circuit court’s findings of
fact that he was responding to an emergency and not making an arrest,
he was entitled to absolute immunity under section
776.032(1), and not
merely an affirmative defense at trial under section
776.05(1)....
...According
to the officer, a court may not deny a motion seeking absolute immunity
under section
776.032(1) simply because factual disputes exist.
The officer also argues, to the extent Caamano found that allowing a
law enforcement officer to seek absolute immunity under section
776.032(1) would abrogate section
776.05(1), Caamano was wrongly
decided. According to the officer, even though section
776.05(1) allows law
enforcement officers, charged with the use of excessive force during an
arrest, to claim the right of self-defense at trial, law enforcement officers
still may seek absolute immunity under section
776.032(1) before a trial.
To support this argument, the officer seeks to harmonize sections
776.032(1) and
776.05(1) by proposing the following example:
A police officer goes to arrest a suspect....
...The [officer] then proceeds to trial and maintains a
self-defense claim. At trial, the [officer], although he is a police
officer, is still entitled to rely upon Florida Standard Jury
Instruction 3.6(f) but is also entitled to the additional
protection of [section] 776.05[(1)] which expands a police
officer’s right to employ force to defend him[self] or herself or
others.
The officer finally argues “it would be difficult to imagine that the
Florida Legislature would intend to extend immunity...
... bring unjustified and unnecessary force to [the individual], who was
already engaged by three other officers.” Id.
The state charged Caamano with attempted battery, a second-degree
misdemeanor.
Caamano moved to dismiss the charge, initially alleging immunity
pursuant to section 776.05(1), Florida Statutes (2010), which the Second
District stated “provides qualified immunity for a law enforcement officer’s
use of force in making an arrest.” (emphasis added)....
...sential requirements
of the law by applying the incorrect law. Specifically, the State
argues that by ordering the county court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing under section
776.032[(1)], the Stand
Your Ground statute, rather than proceeding under section
776.05[(1)], the statute specific to law enforcement, the circuit
court stripped section
776.05[(1)] of meaning. We agree.
....
[T]he circuit court departed from the essential
requirements of the law by applying the incorrect law. . . .
Because sections
776.05[(1)] and
776.032[(1)] address the use
of justifiable force in the context of a criminal prosecution, the
doctrine of in pari materia requires that we read them together
and attempt to harmonize them.
11
Upon such a review, it is evident that if Caamano is entitled
to any immunity under either statute in this case, then such
protection must flow from section
776.05[(1)]. We hold that
the specific language of section
776.05[(1)], titled “Law
enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest,” must
apply to the behavior of law enforcement officers during the
course of an arrest, rather than the language of section
776.032[(...
...ntitled
to deference and must be supported by competent substantial evidence.
. . . The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.”). To the
extent we review the circuit court’s interpretation of sections
776.012(1),
776.032(1), and
776.05(1), our review also is de novo....
...The circuit court’s most significant finding of fact is that the officer was
responding to an emergency and investigating a disturbance, but was not
12
making an arrest. That finding of fact is significant because, if true, it
eliminates section 776.05’s application to this case and distinguishes this
case from Caamano, where three officers already had detained the suspect
before Officer Caamano used unnecessary force against the suspect.
While we conclude the finding of fact...
...we are squarely
faced with the legal question which the circuit court called to our attention.
That is, whether Caamano correctly held that if an officer is entitled to any
immunity during the course of an arrest, then such protection must flow
from section
776.05, which applies specifically to law enforcement officers,
rather than section
776.032, which applies generally to the public at large.
We disagree with Caamano....
...We hold that a law enforcement officer,
who while making a lawful arrest, uses deadly force which he or she
reasonably believes is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony, is not limited to invoking a defense under
section
776.05(1), but is also permitted to seek immunity from criminal
prosecution under sections
776.012(1) and
776.032(1).
In reaching our holding, we agree with the circuit court that sections
776.012(1)’s and
776.032(1)’s plain language dictates this conclusion....
...HE OR SHE REASONABLY BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO
PREVENT IMMINENT DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM TO
HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR ANOTHER OR TO PREVENT THE
IMMINENT COMMISSION OF A FORCIBLE FELONY, IS
LIMITED TO INVOKING A DEFENSE UNDER SECTION
776.05(1), OR IS ALSO PERMITTED TO SEEK IMMUNITY
FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER SECTIONS
776.012(1) AND
776.032(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2013),
MORE COMMONLY KNOWN AS FLORIDA’S “STAND YOUR
GROUND” LAW.
Af...
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1976).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
QUESTIONS: 1. Does the term "felon" as used in s. 776.05 , F....
...Is the phrase "fleeing from justice" applicable to a setting where a police officer, after having identified himself as such and ordered an individual reasonably believed to have committed a felony to halt, uses necessary force, including deadly force, in arresting such person? 4. Does s. 776.05 , F. S., make any distinction as to whether an individual whom the officer reasonably believes is a felon is armed or unarmed? 5. Does s. 776.05 , F. S., make any distinction between a felony crime against property rather than against a person or persons? SUMMARY: The term "felon" as used in s. 776.05 , F....
...ing arrest, the officer is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest. Section 776.05 , F. S., makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons. Section 776.05 , F....
...itted or attempted a felony or is attempting to escape by use of a weapon or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life, or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay. In 1975, the Legislature significantly amended Ch. 74-383, s. 776.05 , F. S., to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the 1974 revisions regarding endangering human life or infliction of great bodily harm. In legal effect, the 1975 amendments to s. 776.05 , F....
...S., have codified the traditional common law rule and returned Florida to the law as it existed at the time AGO 071-41 was issued. See City of St. Petersburg v. Reed,
330 So.2d 256 , 257 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1976). Thus, the answers to your specific questions involve an analysis of s.
776.05 , read in light of the common law principles it codified, regarding use of deadly force by a police officer. AS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2: Section
776.05 , F. S., provides:
776.05 Law enforcement officers; use of force in making an arrest....
...n to be arrested even if there is no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and the firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding. In examining these statutes, I am of the view that the term "felon" as used in s. 776.05 , F....
...5; Comment, 31 La.L.Rev. 131, 134. Moreover, "felon" has been defined as a person who commits, or one who has committed, a felony. See 36A C.J.S. Felon, at p. 253; Black's Law Dictionary, at p. 743. The title of Ch. 75-64, Laws of Florida, which amends s. 776.05 , F....
...officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been or is being committed, that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it, and that the person to be arrested is fleeing from or escaping arrest, the officer, pursuant to s. 776.05 , is justified in using any force necessarily committed in retaking or arresting such person, provided that no more force is used than is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person to be arrested or to effectuate such arrest....
...your inquiry. See Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando,
327 So.2d 230 , 232 (4 D.C.A. Fla., 1975). Also see City of St. Petersburg v. Reed, supra, in which the court stated that the decisional rule of Nelson and Alexander had been codified in s.
776.05 , F....
...Additionally, in the event an arrest warrant has been issued, the officer must advise the person to be arrested of that fact unless the person is fleeing or the recital of this information would imperil the arrest. Section
901.16 , F. S. Thus, when ss.
901.17 and
776.05 , F....
...of the state with a purpose to avoid detection. State v. Berryhill,
177 So. 663 , 665 (La. 1937). AS TO QUESTION 4: The statute makes no distinction between armed and unarmed felons. The only differentiation recognized by the Legislature in enacting s.
776.05 , F....
...It might be noted that the facts recited in Reed, and in Nelson and Alexander, supra, indicate that the involved felons were unarmed. AS TO QUESTION 5: I must again reiterate what was stated in response to question 4 — since the Legislature made no such distinction when enacting s. 776.05 , F....
...It should be noted, however, that the constitutional due process issue posed by this question is presently the subject of litigation in several federal courts under the federal civil rights acts. Recently, many state legislatures have enacted statutes similar to s. 776.05 , F....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1976).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
firearms and other weapons for lawful purposes. Section
776.05, F. S., inter alia, authorizes a "law enforcement
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...(prohibiting a person with a firearm from
exhibiting it in a “threatening manner” while others are present).
Reinforcing the distinction between use of force in connection with
arrest by a law enforcement officer and that of a private person is
section 776.05, Florida Statutes. Under that provision, a “law
enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or desist from efforts to
make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened
resistance.” § 776.05(1), Fla....
...Recall there are very limited circumstances where a private
person—like the petitioner—has express statutory authority to
make a warrantless arrest: when faced with an out-of-state
fugitive and when under the direction of a peace officer. See
§§
901.18,
941.14, Fla. Stat. Section
776.05(1) reflects this
statutory carve-out for authorized, warrantless arrests by private
persons, allowing for the use of force only when the person has
been “summoned or directed” by a law enforcement officer “to
assist him” with the arrest....
