CopyCited 73 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1782, 2008 WL 215210
...§§
2671-80, arising from emergency medical treatment provided at a military hospital
in the state of Florida. The district court held that liability should be decided under
an ordinary negligence standard of care, and not the “reckless disregard” standard
codified in the Florida “Good Samaritan Act,” Fla. Stat. § 768.13 (“GSA”)....
...the damages claimed.” Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc.,
445 So. 2d 1015, 1018
(Fla. 1984). If a defendant may rely on the GSA, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant acted with “reckless disregard for the consequences” of his or her
actions. Fla. Stat. §
768.13(2)(b)1....
...from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or
treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless
disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or
health of another.
Fla. Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)1 (2000)....
...In 2003, the GSA was amended to apply to
“[a]ny health care provider, including a hospital licensed under chapter 395,
providing emergency services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd, §
395.1041, §
395.401, or §
401.45 . . . .” Fla. Stat. §
768.13(2)(b)1
(2005).7 “Reckless disregard” was defined in the 2001 version of the GSA as:
such conduct which a health care provider knew or
should have known ....
...Because
we hold that the government was entitled to the protection of either version of the GSA, we do
not decide whether the 2001 or 2003 version applies in this case.
19
emergencies.
Fla. Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)3 (2000)....
...nown, at the time such services
were rendered, created an unreasonable risk of injury so as to affect the life or
health of another, and such risk was substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make the conduct negligent.” Fla. Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)3 (2005).
According to the district court, NHJ cannot rely on the 2001 version of the
GSA because it is not a hospital licensed under Florida law, and because NHJ is
analogous to a specialty hospital, which provides treatment only to a select group
of persons, not to all persons....
...On appeal, the Turners argue that neither the 2001
nor the 2003 version of GSA applies to NHJ because NHJ does not comply with
the Florida anti-patient dumping statute, Fla. Stat. §
395.1041, and “does not treat
all patients as required by” Fla. Stat. §
768.13(2)(b)4....
...subsection (2)(b)4 of the GSA, which requires “[e]very emergency care facility
granted immunity under this paragraph [to] accept and treat all emergency care
patients within the operational capacity of such facility without regard to ability to
pay . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)4....
CopyCited 62 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1805778
...Fitness's duty of reasonable care required it to have an automatic external defibrillator (AED) on its premises and to use it on the deceased. There is no common law or statutory duty that a business have an AED on its premises. On the contrary, the Florida legislature has adopted the "Cardiac Arrest Survival Act" § 768.1325, Fla....
...s establishments have no common law duty to have an AED on the premises. See Rotolo, 59 Cal. Rptr.3d at 770, Salte, 286 Ill.Dec. 622, 814 N.E.2d at 614-15; Atcovitz; 812 A.2d at 1218; Rutnik, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 451. We find these cases, as well as F.S. § 768.1325, persuasive as we hold that L.A....
...in his actions (or inaction). I would affirm the jury's verdict and judgment entered. NOTES [1] Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 165 W.Va. 689, 271 S.E.2d 335 (1980). [2] Given the current state of Florida's Good Samaritan Act, F.S. 768.13, we have some public policy concerns regarding the potential impact of our ruling in this case....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 182, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 625, 2015 WL 1472236
...The Second
District also determined that neither the undertaker’s doctrine3 nor section
1006.165, Florida Statutes, imposed a duty to use an AED on Abel. Id. at 906-07.
Finally, after it concluded that Respondent was immune from civil liability under
section
768.1325(3), Florida Statutes (2008), the Second District affirmed the
decision of the trial court....
...Immunity
- 14 -
Because we conclude that Respondent owed a common law duty to Abel, we
must now consider whether Respondent is immune from suit under sections
1006.165 and
768.1325, Florida Statutes....
...chool property
and to train “all employees or volunteers who are reasonably expected to use the
device” in its application. §
1006.165(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Further, “[t]he use of
[AEDs] by employees and volunteers is covered under [sections]
768.13 and
768.1325,” which generally regulate immunity under Florida’s Good Samaritan
Act and the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act. §
1006.165(4).7 Subsection (3) of the
Cardiac Arrest Survival Act states:
7. Although section
1006.165 references both the Good Samaritan Act,
section
768.13, and the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act, section
768.1325, Respondent
seeks immunity only under the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act....
...In addition, notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary, and except as provided in subsection
(4), any person who acquired the device and makes it available for
use, including, but not limited to, a community organization . . . is
immune from such liability . . . .
§ 768.1325(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). There is no immunity for criminal
misuse, gross negligence, or similarly egregious misuse of an AED. §
768.1325(4)(a).
Under a plain reading of the statute, this subsection creates two classes of
parties that may be immune from liability arising from the misuse of AEDs: users
(actual or attempted), and acquirers. Users are clearly “immune from civil liability
for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use” of an AED. § 768.1325(3),
Fla....
...an AED is actually used or attempted to be used. It is undisputed that no actual or
attempted use of an AED occurred in this case until emergency responders arrived.
- 16 -
Therefore, we hold that Respondent is not entitled to immunity under section
768.1325 and such section has absolutely no application here.
Despite the protests of Respondent and its amici, we do not believe that this
straightforward reading of the statute defeats the legislative intent....
... to his aid to prevent aggravation of his injury. It is a matter for the jury to
determine under the evidence whether Respondent’s actions breached that duty and
resulted in the damage that Abel suffered. We further hold Respondent is not
entitled to immunity from suit under section 768.1325, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 260, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 954, 1995 WL 337998
...OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which GRIMES, C.J. and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. McDONALD, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which GRIMES, C.J. and OVERTON, J., concur. GRIMES, Chief Justice, dissenting. By the passage of section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1991), the legislature expressed the public policy of allocating a portion of punitive damage awards to either the state or the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31875153
...We, therefore, reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of JH. We affirm JH's other argument on appeal without further discussion. Appellant Bay Anesthesia, Inc. ("Bay") raises three issues on appeal. [1] Bay first argues that the reckless disregard standard set forth in section 768.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes (1997), applies to its contract nurse anesthetist who provided care to a critically burned patient in JH's emergency room. In addition to this argument, Bay contends that unless section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...is construed to extend to contract health care providers who provide care in hospitals, such denial would violate the constitutional protection of equal protection. We affirm on this issue and hold that because Bay's contract nurse anesthetist is not a member of any of the classes clearly enumerated in section 768.13(2)(b)1., Bay was properly held to the lesser standard of negligence....
...Briggs testified that Roddenberry had a survivable injury. Following the close of appellees' evidence, JH moved for a directed verdict as to all issues, arguing that appellees' evidence was such that reasonable men would not differ, which the trial court denied. Bay argued that section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1997), and its reckless disregard standard should be applied to Cruce, which the trial court also denied....
...Jackson Hospital JH argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict, motion for new trial, and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence introduced by appellees at trial was insufficient to prove both reckless disregard, as set forth in section 768.13(2)(b)1., and causation....
...of such medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another. § 768.13(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. The term "reckless disregard" as it is used in section 768.13(2)(b)1., is defined as: conduct which a health care provider knew or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, would be likely to result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another, taking into account the following to the extent they may be present; a....
...The lack of time or ability to obtain appropriate consultation. c. The lack of a prior patient-physician relationship. d. The inability to obtain an appropriate medical history of the patient. e. The time constraints imposed by coexisting emergencies. § 768.13(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1997). The only individual whose conduct was in question regarding section 768.13(2)(b)1., was that of Dr....
...Therefore, we also hold that the trial court erred in denying JH's motions for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the causation issue. III. Bay Anesthesia Bay argues on appeal that the reckless disregard standard of liability set forth in section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...Huntington Nat'l Bank,
609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1992). We review the trial court's interpretation of a statute under the de novo standard. See Dixon v. City of Jacksonville,
774 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review dismissed,
831 So.2d 161 (Fla.2002). Section
768.13(2)(b)1....
...direction of Dr. Griffin and, therefore, was entitled to the protection of section 786.13(2)(b)1. However, the Legislature did not expressly include independent contractors or agents who are not licensed to practice medicine within the protection of section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...In contrast, in section
768.28(9)(a), which addresses the State's limited waiver of sovereign immunity for torts, the Legislature expressly included within the statute's immunity protection officers, employees, and agents. The Legislature's inclusion of the term "agent" in section
768.28(9)(a), a statute similar to section
768.13(2)(b)1., in that both serve to immunize those enumerated classes from civil liability, and its omission of the word "agent" from section
768.13(2)(b)1. demonstrate that if the Legislature had intended to include agents of hospitals or their independent contractors who are not licensed to practice medicine but who render care within their emergency rooms within the protection of section
768.13(2)(b)1., it would have done so....
...a term in one section of a statute but has omitted *330 it in another section of the same statute, courts will not imply the term where it has been so excluded). Therefore, because Cruce does not come within any of the enumerated classes covered by section 768.13(2)(b)1., she is excluded from the statute's protection. Furthermore, although the stated legislative intent behind section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...(emphasis added), the Legislature did not employ this "medical emergency care providers" language within the actual statute. While Cruce would undoubtedly come within the purview of the broad term "medical emergency care providers," the Legislature chose not to incorporate this more encompassing phrase within section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...Therefore, because legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute, see State v. Rife,
789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001), and because Cruce, who was employed by Bay and who worked only as an independent contractor at JH, is not a member of any of the classes of persons enumerated in section
768.13(2)(b)1., Cruce was not entitled to the protection of the reckless disregard standard of care....
...ct, rather than the purpose or the intent indicated by legislative history). Bay further argues that the application of two different standards of care within the emergency room is illogical and contrary to legislative intent. Yet, "[t]he fact that [section 768.13(2)(b)1.] fails to protect individuals seemingly worthy of protection is not for this [C]ourt to remedy, but rather the [L]egislature." Knox v....
...5th DCA 2002); see also Overstreet v. State,
629 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla.1993) (holding that if the Legislature did not intend the results mandated by a statute's plain language, the appropriate remedy is for the Legislature to amend the statute). Because section
768.13(2)(b)1....
...clearly and unambiguously immunizes only hospitals licensed under chapter 395, employees of such hospitals working in a clinical area within the facility, and physicians, we are bound to follow the plain and obvious meaning of the statute. See M.W.,
756 So.2d at 101; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
609 So.2d at 1317. Section
768.13(2)(b)1....
...1993) (holding that it is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language). As such, we affirm the trial court as to this issue. In affirming, we conclude that section 768.13(2)(b)1....
...World Omni Leasing, Inc.,
583 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1991) (holding that the test for whether a statute violates equal protection *331 rights is whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative objective). Although we conclude that Cruce is not entitled to the protection of section
768.13(2)(b)1....
...We, therefore, certify the following question: WHETHER MEDICAL EMERGENCY CARE PROVIDERS WHO ARE NOT EMPLOYED BY HOSPITALS LICENSED UNDER CHAPTER 395 AND WHO ARE NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE MEDICINE BUT WHO RENDER CARE WITHIN THE EMERGENCY ROOMS OR TRAUMA CENTERS OF SUCH HOSPITALS ENJOY CIVIL IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO SECTION 768.13(2)(b)1., FLORIDA STATUTES, UNLESS SUCH CARE EVINCES A RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE LIFE OR HEALTH OF ANOTHER....
...I would reverse as to all issues. I concur completely in Judge Lewis' opinion as to Jackson Hospital (JH), as well as in certifying the question and consolidating the cases for purposes of this opinion. However, I would find that, under the facts of this case, section 768.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes, applied to Nurse Cruce and, therefore, to Bay Anesthesia (Bay)....
...While I agree with the majority that JH and Bay entered into an independent contractor relationship and that Nurse Cruce, generally speaking, was not an employee of JH, I believe that she was an employee of JH, in the sense that her activities were directed toward a particular activity or person and as that term was used in section 768.13, during the emergency treatment of William Roddenberry....
...It seems irrational to maintain that the Legislature intended to apply two different standards to people working as part of one trauma team, at the same time, in the same location, and on the same patient. It is even more unsound, in my view, to suggest that sec. 768.13(2)(b)1....
...ase. Reckless disregard as defined in the statute means "conduct which a health care provider knew or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, would be likely to result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another ...." § 768.13(2)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1997). The question of whether a health care provider acted with reckless disregard as defined by section 768.13(2)(b)3....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 25297
...Unlike other statutory provisions in which the legislature expressly limited the liability of a health care provider to those situations where damage results from a failure to provide medical care or omission in treatment, section
766.102(3) is silent on this point. See, e.g., §
768.13(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7969, 1994 WL 96755
...The Court, however, does not find the Good Samaritan Act to be applicable here. Though there is a dearth of case law interpreting the Florida statute [4] , it appears this act is designed to grant immunity for acts amounting to simple negligence. See Fla. Stat.Ann § 768.13(2)(a) and (b)....
...[4] The Court's research revealed only five Florida appellate decisions addressing the provisions of the Good Samaritan Act. Unfortunately, none of these cases lend any assistance to the Court in determining the issue raised by the Hospital in this case. [5] Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.13(2)(b)(1), which the Hospital cites as relevant here, states part: Any hospital licensed under chapter 395, any employee of such hospital working in a clinical area within the facility and providing patient care, and any person licensed to p...
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 149, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 302
...ce Arising Out of Civil Litigation 402.13 Burden of Proof on Main Claim 402.14 Defense Issues 402.15 Burden of Proof on Defense Issues
402.16 Emergency Medical Treatment Claims
402.16a Emergency Medical Treatment Jury Issue as to Application of F.S.
768.13(2)(b) 402.16a Emergency Medical Treatment NOTES ON USE 1....
...Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on issues raised by any replies to affirmative defenses, and instruction 402.15 should be modified as appropriate for those issues.
402.16 EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT CLAIMS INTRODUCTORY COMMENT Instruction
402.16 addresses the provisions of F.S.
768.13(2)(b)....
...on
402.16. If there are any preliminary vicarious liability issues, instructions 402.9 and 402.10 should also be given. No reported decision construes the legislative intent behind this section. Based upon the definition of "reckless disregard" in F.S.
768.13(2)(b)3, the committee has concluded that the intent was to limit liability in civil actions for damages arising out of fact situations to which the statute applies to cases where something more than "simple" negligence is established. Therefore, the standard instructions dealing with "simple" negligence are not appropriate for civil damage actions to which the statute applies.
402.16a EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT Jury Issue as to Application of F.S.
768.13(2)(b) (1)....
...is a defense when the reckless disregard standard is in effect. If the court decides that comparative negligence is a defense, then an instruction on simple negligence should be given. 5. "Reckless disregard," as defined and used in the context of F.S. 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to have the same meaning as reckless disregard when used in the context of standards for punitive damages....
............. 854 4. Model form of verdict for statute of limitations defense in a medical negligence case........................................... 855 5(a). Model form of verdict for emergency medical treatment; no issue as to the applicability of F.S. 768.13(2)(b)............. 856 5(b). Model form of verdict for emergency medical treatment; issue as to the applicability of F.S. 768.13(2)(b); no issue as to comparative negligence......................... 856 5(c). Model form of verdict for emergency medical treatment; issues as to both applicability of F.S. 768.13(2)(b) and comparative negligence........................................
...awarded. Select the appropriate damage questions from Forms 2(a) and (b). SO SAY WE ALL, this ____ day of ________, 2___ ____________ FOREPERSON FORM 5(a). MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT; NO ISSUE AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF F.S. 768.13(2)(b) VERDICT We, the jury, return the following verdict: 1....
...However, if the court decides that comparative negligence is a defense, and that there is sufficient evidence to support such a defense, this verdict form should be modified accordingly. FORM 5(b). MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT; ISSUE AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF F.S. 768.13(2)(b); NO ISSUE AS TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE VERDICT We, the jury, return the following verdict: 1....
...ent) $____ Refer to Forms 2(a) and (b) for itemized damage interrogatories. SO SAY WE ALL, this ____ day of ________, 2___ ____________ FOREPERSON FORM 5(c). MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT; ISSUES AS TO BOTH APPLICABILITY OF F.S. 768.13(2)(b) AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE VERDICT We, the jury, return the following verdict: 1....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2363
...Pomeroy answered denying Edwards' negligence or that Edwards was his agent or *1277 employee, or any causal connection between Edwards' action and Botte's injury, and raising the affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and immunity under the Florida Good Samaritan Act, Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...llow water dive. See, Lister v. Campbell,
371 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), Hughes v. Roarin 20's, Inc.,
455 So.2d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). [2] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is AFFIRMED. MILLS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Cf., Section
768.13, Florida Statutes (1981), the "Good Samaritan Act," with commercial transactions ( Kaufman II, the "tour guide" situation) and dependency relationships ( Rupp; schools in an in loco parentis relationship with students)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 397349
...(2007) (employing the phrase, "shall not be held liable for any civil damages"); §
768.12, Fla. Stat. (2007) (using the terminology, "shall have no cause of action"); §
768.125, Fla. Stat. (2007) (using the phrase, "shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage"); §
768.13, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21013105
...Davis of Silber & Valente, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Deirdre E. Brett of Cameron, Davis & Gonzalez, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee. JENNIFER D. BAILEY, Associate Judge. In this automobile negligence case, the trial court granted summary judgment pursuant to section 768.1355(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....
...tional "eyes and ears" for the department. While the negligence case was pending, Berger passed away and his estate was substituted as defendant. The trial court granted the estate's summary judgment pursuant to the Florida Volunteer Protection Act, section 768.1355(1), which provides: Any person who volunteers to perform any service for any nonprofit organization......
...There is no ambiguity in this statute. The statute clearly and articulately provides that volunteers are protected if they are carrying out volunteer duties in good faith and as reasonably prudent persons. The same language in the Good Samaritan Act, § 768.13(2)(a), has been recognized as offering no protection to a negligent party....
...e us, he would not be protected from his own ordinary negligence under the straightforward language of the statute. Careful reading reveals the requirements of the Florida Volunteer Protection Act are written in the conjunctive, not disjunctive. See § 768.1355(1)(a)-(b)....
...ndard. If Berger was not acting as a reasonably prudent person, no protection is available to the estate under the statute. The statute provides a mechanism by which the risk is shifted to the non-profit organization if the volunteer is protected by section 768.1355(1)....
...The legislature's clear intent is not to immunize volunteers from liability, but rather to shift liability from the volunteer to the non-profit organization only where the volunteer is exercising reasonable care and meets the other statutory criteria. See § 768.1355(2)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Ignoring this entreaty, the good samaritan allegedly moved the stricken party and removed his pants, rendering the latter a quadriplegic. We are all familiar with the Good Samaritan statute which supposedly insulates from liability those who assist injured parties at the scene of an emergency. See Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 617187
...le assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department." We express no opinion whether the expert rendering the opinion at trial must be qualified under section
766.102(6). [8] EMSA contends that the Good Samaritan Act, §
768.13, Fla....
...At this early point in the litigation, there is insufficient record basis demonstrating that the Act pertains to this case. Maldonado's treatment in an emergency room does not render the Act automatically applicable. The statute contains exceptions to its application. See § 768.13(2)(b)1; .13(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 1040322
...Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Appellees contended that Knox had failed to state a cause of action based on Florida's Good Samaritan Act. In pertinent part, the motion to dismiss alleged that: pursuant to Section 768.13, Florida Statutes, JAMIE BRANAM and EDITH HURST, as emergency paramedics, may only be held liable for civil damages allegedly resulting from emergency care provided when it is alleged, and ultimately proven, that such care was provided...
...of such medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another. § 768.13(2)(b)1, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 357, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1566, 2011 WL 2637421
...ime of onset of the stroke. Mr. Cox and his wife filed a medical malpractice action against St. Joseph’s Hospital, the emergency room doctor, and the doctor’s medical practice. Because the claim was against the emergency room doctor, pursuant to section 768.13(2)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (2000), the plaintiffs were required to show that the defendants acted with “reckless disregard” of Mr....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 7772, 2009 WL 1675923
...o-and-a-half years before his stroke. Given the increased risk for hemorrhaging associated with tPA, the drug is contraindicated for, among others, any patient who previously has suffered a subdural hematoma. The case was submitted to the jury under section 768.13(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides for immunity from civil liability when a patient entered a hospital through the emergency room unless damages resulted "from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 439988, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 1821
...ernal defibrillator. (3) The location of each automated external defibrillator must be registered with a local emergency medical services medical director. (4) The use of automated external defibrillators by employees and volunteers is covered under s. 768.13 and 768.1325....
...requirements. The body of section
1006.165 does not set forth requirements regarding the school’s use of the AED it is required to maintain. Instead, subsection (4) provides that the “use” of AEDs in FHSAA high schools is governed by sections
768.13 and
768.1325. We therefore look to these sections to determine whether the School Board had a duty to make available, diagnose the need for, or use an AED in the circumstances of this case. III. Duty Under Sections
768.13 and
768.1325 Section
768.13, Florida Statutes (2008), is known as the “Good Samaritan Act.” §
768.13(1). This statute provides immunity from civil liability to any person “who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment” under certain circumstances in emergency situations outside a hospital or doctor’s office. See §
768.13(2)(a)....
...To qualify for such immunity,, the person rendering aid must have done so without objection by the patient and must have “act[ed] as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.” Id. This immunity extends to both acts and omissions and includes diagnosis. §
768.13(2)(b)2. While this provision requires a person who undertakes a duty to render aid to do so reasonably, this provision does not set forth a duty to render aid. See L.A. Fitness,
980 So.2d at 561 n. 2. Section
768.1325, Florida Statutes (2008), is known as the “Cardiac Arrest Survival Act.” §
768.1325(1). This statute provides immunity from civil liability for those who use or attempt to use an AED and for “any person who acquired the device and makes it available for use.” See §
768.1325(3)....
...the person’s (1) failure to maintain and test the AED or (2) failure to provide any appropriate training in the use of the AED. Id. And there are certain other exceptions to immunity that *908 are not at issue given the facts alleged in this case. § 768.1325(4). As with the immunity provision in section 768.13, section 768.1325 does not create a legal duty to render aid through the use of an AED....
...Athletic Ass’n,
998 So.2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that statute which requires FHSAA to adopt bylaws that require students to pass a medical evaluation prior to participating in high school sports does not create a private cause of action). In fact, section
768.1325(5) expressly declares that it “does not establish any cause of action.” IV. Immunity Under the Cardiac Arrest Survival Act As discussed previously, this statute provides immunity from civil liability for “any person who acquired the device and makes it available for use.” §
768.1325(3)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 9688, 2009 WL 2049173
...Appellant, Lana Harris, raises a number of issues concerning the propriety of the trial court's order granting appellees' motion for directed verdict. We find no merit in the appeal. However, two issues raised by appellant warrant discussion. Ms. Harris argues that the trial court erred in finding that section 768.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2004), was applicable because (1) Dr....
...Soha responded to the emergency room physician's request for assistance. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Harris died from complications. Ms. Harris subsequently filed suit, alleging that Dr. Soha failed to take actions which may have prevented her husband's death. *769 The trial court found that the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (2004), was applicable, which provides that: Any health care practitioner as defined in s....
...Harris' case, the trial court found that there was insufficient evidence and granted appellees' motion for directed verdict. We review the trial court's directed verdict de novo. See Rosa v. Dep't of Children & Families,
915 So.2d 210, 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). First, Ms. Harris argues that section
768.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, was inapplicable because Dr....
...s in general if they are at the hospital attending to a patient. However, she acknowledges that the Good Samaritan Act would be applicable if an anesthesiologist or any other type of physician were in the hospital "for business or personal reasons." § 768.13(2)(c)(1), Fla....
...ital for business or personal reasons. This result contravenes the legislature's intent that the immunity offered under this section "encourage health care practitioners to provide necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation." § 768.13(2)(c)(3), Fla....
...rates simply to distinguish the next requirement under this section, which is that the doctor then provide assistance to a patient "with whom at that time the practitioner does not have a then-existing health care patient-practitioner relationship." § 768.13(2)(c)(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court did not err in finding section 768.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable here because Dr. Soha was attending to a patient of his practice when he responded to the emergency room. Second, Ms. Harris argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable here because the jury could have concluded that Dr....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 8651, 1992 WL 191297
OWEN, WILLIAM G, Jr., Senior Judge. The Village of Palm Springs, one of the defendants in this tort action, received a favorable summary judgment on the holding that it had civil liability immunity under the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...gence of the City’s paramedic and the Village’s police officer. The Village asserted among its affirmative defenses that its employee acted as a “Good Samaritan,” entitling the Village to immunity from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13(2)(a)....
...The trial court concluded that since Lieutenant Smith was outside the jurisdiction of the Village of Palm Springs at the time of the incident, he had no duty to render assistance under the circumstances. Accordingly, the trial court found that the police officer qualified under section 768.13(2)(a) as one who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency....” 2 The court then went on to conclude that if the police officer was not liable, the Village of Palm Springs could not be liable....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ited by this Court’s
decision in Saunders. We agree and quash the Fourth District’s decision.2
2. We also agree with the Cantores that the trial court erred in entering a
directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13,
Florida Statutes (2008), the Good Samaritan Act, which grants immunity from civil
damages to any healthcare provider that provides “emergency services,” unless the
damages are the result of “reckless disregard.” The threshold...
...he patient. But here there was
conflicting evidence regarding whether Alexis was “stabilized and [was] capable
of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient” at the times relevant to
the Cantores’ allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 15287, 2011 WL 4467382
...The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County petitions for certiorari relief from a trial court order denying its motion for summary judgment on its defense of sovereign immunity and motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting it was immune from liability under Florida’s Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 of the Florida Statutes (2004)....
...re. See State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Garcia, — So.3d -, -,
2011 WL 3300540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (citing Gerard v. Dep’t of Transp.,
472 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1985)). The Trust next asserts it is immune from suit under Florida’s Good Samaritan Act, section
768.13, Florida Statutes (2004)....
...ency] medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another.” § 768.13(2)(b)l., Fla....
...in the act of governing and are [therefore] immune from suit.” See Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah,
468 So.2d 912, 918 (Fla.1985) (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty.,
371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979)). Petition denied. . Section
768.13(2)(c)3 states that the legislative intent of the immunity provision of the Act "is to encourage health care practitioners to provide necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation.” We find this sub-sub paragraph...
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1989).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
of child abuse pursuant to Ch. 39, F.S.). 2 Section
768.13(2)(a), F.S. (1988 Supp.). 3 See, 65 C.J.S.
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 12878, 2001 WL 1040422
...However, neither Parkway nor the claimant, offered to arbitrate. Instead, Parkway answered the complaint denying liability and asserting several affirmative defenses. Among other defenses, Parkway alleged that it was immune from liability pursuant to the Good Samaritan Statute. § 768.13(2)(b), Fla....
...Prezeau raised one issue on cross-appeal regarding the $250,000 set-off. At oral argument, Prezeau's counsel indicated that should she prevail on the appeal, she wished to abandon the cross-appeal. As such, we do not reach the merits of the cross-appeal. . § 768.13, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 3390891
...Cooper was that he failed to recognize the severity of Mr. Christensen's internal injuries and emergent need for surgery and failed to call for surgical evaluation in a timely manner. By way of amendment to their answer, Appellees filed affirmative defenses to raise the immunity provisions of the Act, section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1998)....
...Christensen was "stable" precluded summary judgment. However, we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's expert's testimony was insufficient *210 to present a jury question under the Act. The 1998 version of the Act, applicable here, [1] provides in pertinent part: 768.13....
...der rendering emergency medical services shall be such conduct which a health care provider knew or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, would be likely to result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another,. . . . § 768.13(1)-(2)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 2345115, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 10000
...rdict, UFBOT timely appealed the judgment to this court. UFBOT raises three issues in this appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion for directed verdict as to the inapplicability of the heightened standard of proof in section 768.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), commonly known as the Good Samaritan Act (hereafter “the GSA” or “the Act”); 2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the medical examiner’s opinion as to the cause of Mr....
...tside of a medical facility and without objection of the injured victim could not be held liable for any resulting damages as long as the person was acting as an “ordinary and reasonably prudent man” would have acted under similar circumstances. § 768.13, Fla....
...The 1988 amendments provided immunity to hospitals and their employees when rendering medical care or treatment “necessitated by a sudden, unexpected situation or occurrence resulting in a serious medical condition demanding immediate medical attention.” Id. at § 46, Laws of Fla. (creating section 768.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes)....
...This immunity only applied when the patient entered the hospital through the emergency room or trauma center, and it did not *268 apply after the patient is stabilized and capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient. Id. (creating section 768.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes)....
...2003-416, § 65 Laws of Fla. The 2003 amendments eliminated the requirement that the patient enter the hospital through the emergency room for the Act to apply and also expanded the medical care subject to the Act to specifically include diagnosis. Id. (amending section 768.13(2)(b)1. and 2., Florida Statutes). The 2003 amendments retained and revised the “reckless disregard” standard that must be shown to overcome the immunity provided by the Act, id. (amending section 768.13(2)(b)3., Florida Statutes), and also retained the language stating that the immunity did not apply after the patient is stabilized and capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient. Id. (making only minor grammatical changes to section 768.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes)....
...or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, created an unreasonable risk of injury so as to affect the life or health of another, and such risk was substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent. § 768.13(2)(b), Fla....
...Likewise, although the objective standard advocated by UFBOT properly focuses on the patient’s medical condition, it does not take into account when the care was provided. The plain language of the GSA defines its scope and, therefore, it is unnecessary to look outside the Act for clarification of its terms. Section 768.13(2)(b)2.a....
...pro *270 vides that immunity under the Act applies to medical care occurring “prior to the time the patient is stabilized and is capable of receiving medical treatment as a non-emergency patient.” This language describes the scope of the immunity provided by section 768.13(2)(b)l., and in doing so, it provides a temporal limitation on the “emergency services” that are subject to immunity....
...ROBERTS and ROWE, JJ., concur. . The 2004 version of the GSA applies in this case. The Act was amended in 2004, but that amendment did not impact any of the changes made in 2003 to the provisions of the Act at issue in this case. See Ch. 2004-45, § 1, Laws of Fla. (amending section 768.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, only)....
...The GSA also provides immunity for “any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment which occurs prior to the stabilization of the patient following surgery” that is required as a result of the emergency and that occurs within a reasonable time after the patient is initially stabilized. § 768.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2866414, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9233
...Exposito’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations; that she failed to comply with section
768.26(6) by not filing her notices of claim “within three years of the incident;” that the doctors could not be personally liable under section
768.26(9); that the lawsuit was barred by section
768.13 (Florida’s “Good Samaritan Act”), because Stephanie’s alleged injuries occurred during a medical emergency; and that she failed to comply with the medical malpractice pre-suit requirements imposed by Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 10952, 2015 WL 4429170
...Examples of this abound in chapter 768, Florida Statutes, which covers torts that arise from negligence and shows how torts are categorized under the law. Such distinctions include section
768.0755, Florida Statutes, which governs "Premises liability for transitory foreign substances in a business establishment;” section
768.13, Florida Statutes, governing the Good Samaritan Act; and section
768.136, Florida Statutes, "Liability for canned or perishable food distributed free of charge.” ....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...may apportion fault. This will permit the trial court to allocate damages, determine
setoffs, if appropriate, and facilitate appellate review.
FORM 5(c). MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TREATMENT; ISSUES AS TO BOTH APPLICABILITY OF F.S.
768.13(2)(b) AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
VERDICT
We, the jury, return the following verdict:
1....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...ited by this Court’s
decision in Saunders. We agree and quash the Fourth District’s decision.2
2. We also agree with the Cantores that the trial court erred in entering a
directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13,
Florida Statutes (2008), the Good Samaritan Act, which grants immunity from civil
damages to any healthcare provider that provides “emergency services,” unless the
damages are the result of “reckless disregard.” The threshold...
...he patient. But here there was
conflicting evidence regarding whether Alexis was “stabilized and [was] capable
of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient” at the times relevant to
the Cantores’ allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13(2)(b)2.a., Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LAWSON, J., concurs. LEWIS, J., recused. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We also agree with the Cantores that the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13, Florida Statutes (2008), the Good Samaritan Act, which grants immunity from civil damages to any healthcare provider that provides "emergency services," unless the damages are the result of "reckless disregard." The threshold question...
..." to the patient. But here there was conflicting evidence regarding whether Alexis was "stabilized and [was] capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient" at the times relevant to the Cantores' allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13(2)(b) 2.a., Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 WL 1592735
...e
civil jury instruction book by the Committee’s proposal, with a “placeholder”
instruction. The “placeholder” instruction explains that the Committee will
propose a new instruction
402.16 that is consistent with the current version of
section
768.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), when “guidance is provided from
decisions of the Florida appellate courts.”
Prior to filing its report with the Court, the Committee published its
proposals for comment....
...-3-
Appendix
402.16 EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT
Instruction
402.16 addresses the provisions of F.S.
768.13(2)(b)....
...If there are any preliminary vicarious liability
issues, instructions 402.9 and 402.10 should also be given.
No reported decision construes the legislative intent behind this section. Based
upon the definition of “reckless disregard” in F.S.768.13(2)(b)3, the committee has
concluded that the intent was to limit liability in civil actions for damages arising out
of fact situations to which the statute applies to cases where something more than
“simple” negligence is established....
...Therefore, the standard instructions dealing with
“simple” negligence are not appropriate for civil damage actions to which the statute
applies.
402.16a EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT —
Jury Issue as to Application of F.S.
768.13(2)(b)
(1)....
...n the reckless disregard
standard is in effect. If the court decides that comparative negligence is a defense,
then an instruction on simple negligence should be given.
5. “Reckless disregard,” as defined and used in the context
of F.S. 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to have the same meaning as reckless
disregard when used in the context of standards for punitive damages....
...LAIMS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING PRIOR TO
SEPTEMBER 15, 2003
INTRODUCTORY COMMENT
-8-
Instruction
402.16 addresses the provisions of F.S.
768.13(2)(b)....
...If there are any preliminary vicarious liability
issues, instructions 402.9 and 402.10 should also be given.
No reported decision construes the legislative intent behind this section.
Based upon the definition of “reckless disregard” in F.S. 768.13(2)(b)3., the
committee has concluded that the intent was to limit liability in civil actions for
damages arising out of fact situations to which the statute applies to cases where
something more than “simple” negligence is established....
...Therefore, the standard
instructions dealing with “simple” negligence are not appropriate for civil damage
actions to which the statute applies.
402.16a EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT—Jury Issue as to
Application of F.S.
768.13(2)(b)
(1)....
...n the reckless disregard
standard is in effect. If the court decides that comparative negligence is a defense,
then an instruction on simple negligence should be given.
5. “Reckless disregard,” as defined and used in the context
of F.S. 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to have the same meaning as reckless
disregard when used in the context of standards for punitive damages....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 3164, 1998 WL 144979
...tanding the verdict in favor of Kendall Regional in accordance its motion for directed verdict. In its motion, Kendall Regional argued that its actions were neither the cause-in-faet of Mr. Garcia’s death nor reckless under the Good Samaritan Act. § 768.13, Fla....
...Applying that principle, we hold that the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of Kendall Regional: the record contains evidence from which the jury could find that Kendall Regional acted with reckless disregard for the consequences of its actions in treating Mr. Garcia as defined in section 768.13(b)(3)....
...sly disregarded the consequences of its actions: it knew or should have known when it rendered emergency services to Mr. Garcia that the delay in transfer would be likely to result in Mr. Garcia’s death taking into account the factors set forth in section 768.13(3)....
