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Florida Statute 766.102 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 766.102 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLV
TORTS
Chapter 766
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND RELATED MATTERS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 766.102
766.102 Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness.
(1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider as defined in s. 766.202(4), the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.
(2)(a) If the injury is claimed to have resulted from the negligent affirmative medical intervention of the health care provider, the claimant must, in order to prove a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care, show that the injury was not within the necessary or reasonably foreseeable results of the surgical, medicinal, or diagnostic procedure constituting the medical intervention, if the intervention from which the injury is alleged to have resulted was carried out in accordance with the prevailing professional standard of care by a reasonably prudent similar health care provider.
(b) The provisions of this subsection shall apply only when the medical intervention was undertaken with the informed consent of the patient in compliance with the provisions of s. 766.103.
(3)(a) As used in this subsection, the term:
1. “Insurer” means any public or private insurer, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
2. “Reimbursement determination” means an insurer’s determination of the amount that the insurer will reimburse a health care provider for health care services.
3. “Reimbursement policies” means an insurer’s policies and procedures governing its decisions regarding health insurance coverage and method of payment and the data upon which such policies and procedures are based, including, but not limited to, data from national research groups and other patient safety data as defined in s. 766.1016.
(b) The existence of a medical injury does not create any inference or presumption of negligence against a health care provider, and the claimant must maintain the burden of proving that an injury was proximately caused by a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care by the health care provider. Any records, policies, or testimony of an insurer’s reimbursement policies or reimbursement determination regarding the care provided to the plaintiff is not admissible as evidence in any medical negligence action. However, the discovery of the presence of a foreign body, such as a sponge, clamp, forceps, surgical needle, or other paraphernalia commonly used in surgical, examination, or diagnostic procedures, shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the health care provider.
(4) The Legislature is cognizant of the changing trends and techniques for the delivery of health care in this state and the discretion that is inherent in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of patients by different health care providers. The failure of a health care provider to order, perform, or administer supplemental diagnostic tests shall not be actionable if the health care provider acted in good faith and with due regard for the prevailing professional standard of care.
(5) A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional standard of care unless the person is a health care provider who holds an active and valid license and conducts a complete review of the pertinent medical records and meets the following criteria:
(a) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist, the expert witness must:
1. Specialize in the same specialty as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered; and
2. Have devoted professional time during the 3 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
a. The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same specialty;
b. Instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty; or
c. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty.
(b) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a general practitioner, the expert witness must have devoted professional time during the 5 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
1. The active clinical practice or consultation as a general practitioner;
2. The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency program in the general practice of medicine; or
3. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited medical school or teaching hospital and that is in the general practice of medicine.
(c) If the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a health care provider other than a specialist or a general practitioner, the expert witness must have devoted professional time during the 3 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the action to:
1. The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same or similar health profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered;
2. The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency program in the same or similar health profession in which the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered; or
3. A clinical research program that is affiliated with an accredited medical school or teaching hospital and that is in the same or similar health profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.
(6) A physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who qualifies as an expert witness under subsection (5) and who, by reason of active clinical practice or instruction of students, has knowledge of the applicable standard of care for nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified registered nurse midwives, physician assistants, or other medical support staff may give expert testimony in a medical negligence action with respect to the standard of care of such medical support staff.
(7) Notwithstanding subsection (5), in a medical negligence action against a hospital, a health care facility, or medical facility, a person may give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of care as to administrative and other nonclinical issues if the person has substantial knowledge, by virtue of his or her training and experience, concerning the standard of care among hospitals, health care facilities, or medical facilities of the same type as the hospital, health care facility, or medical facility whose acts or omissions are the subject of the testimony and which are located in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.
(8) If a health care provider described in subsection (5), subsection (6), or subsection (7) is providing evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for a condition that is not within his or her specialty, a specialist trained in the evaluation, treatment, or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a similar health care provider.
(9)(a) In any action for damages involving a claim of negligence against a physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, podiatric physician licensed under chapter 461, or chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460 providing emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department, the court shall admit expert medical testimony only from physicians, osteopathic physicians, podiatric physicians, and chiropractic physicians who have had substantial professional experience within the preceding 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department.
(b) For the purposes of this subsection:
1. The term “emergency medical services” means those medical services required for the immediate diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions which, if not immediately diagnosed and treated, could lead to serious physical or mental disability or death.
2. “Substantial professional experience” shall be determined by the custom and practice of the manner in which emergency medical coverage is provided in hospital emergency departments in the same or similar localities where the alleged negligence occurred.
(10) In any action alleging medical negligence, an expert witness may not testify on a contingency fee basis.
(11) Any attorney who proffers a person as an expert witness pursuant to this section must certify that such person has not been found guilty of fraud or perjury in any jurisdiction.
(12) If a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or a dentist licensed under chapter 466 is the party against whom, or on whose behalf, expert testimony about the prevailing professional standard of care is offered, the expert witness must be licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, or chapter 466 or possess a valid expert witness certificate issued under s. 458.3175, s. 459.0066, or s. 466.005.
(13) A health care provider’s failure to comply with or breach of any federal requirement is not admissible as evidence in any medical negligence case in this state.
History.s. 12, ch. 76-260; s. 8, ch. 77-64; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 10, ch. 85-175; s. 78, ch. 88-1; s. 30, ch. 91-110; s. 1149, ch. 97-102; ss. 229, 296, ch. 98-166; s. 48, ch. 2003-416; s. 153, ch. 2004-5; s. 10, ch. 2011-233; s. 2, ch. 2013-108.
Note.Former s. 768.45.

F.S. 766.102 on Google Scholar

F.S. 766.102 on Casetext

Amendments to 766.102


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 766.102
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 766.102.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

D. RIGGENBACH, M. D. v. A. RHODES,, 267 So. 3d 551 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Because Rhodes failed to comply with the requirement of sections 766.203, 776.202(6), and 766.102(5)( . . . The 2012 version of section 766.102 also allowed the trial court to determine whether the expert was . . . Id. § 766.102(14). In Oliveros v. . . . The active clinical practice of, or consulting with respect to, the same specialty ; § 766.102(5), Fla . . . The bill repeals s. 766.102(14), F.S. This appears to have the effect of overturning Oliveros v. . . .

DAVIS v. A. KARR, M. D. M. D. P. A. D B A M. D., 264 So. 3d 279 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . In 2013, the Legislature specifically amended section 766.102(5), regarding the requirements for qualification . . . for the first time on appeal the constitutionality of the "same specialty" requirements of section 766.102 . . . The Florida Supreme Court has recently declined to adopt the "same specialty" amendment to section 766.102 . . . Because the constitutionality of section 766.102(5)(a) is not properly before us, the statute remains . . .

DELISLE, v. CRANE CO., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018)

. . . privilege," and declining to adopt chapter 2011-233, section 10, Laws of Florida, creating section 766.102 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES REPORT NO., 253 So. 3d 531 (Fla. 2018)

. . . removing the second paragraph of instruction 402.4a (Medical Negligence), which is derived from section 766.102 . . . SeeF.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived fromF.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived fromF.S. 766.102(3). . . .

L. MORRIS, v. S. MUNIZ, M. D., 252 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 2018)

. . . Section 766.102 sets forth requirements for testifying experts in medical malpractice actions. . . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . ." § 766.102(5)(a) 1., Fla. Stat. . . . When reviewing the distinct requirements of sections 766.202(6) and 766.102 together, it is clear that . . . Dingler erroneously conflated sections 766.102 and 766.202 by concluding that the present-tense "duly . . . Id. § 766.102(5)(a). Section 766.102(5)(a) 2. does not define "professional time." . . . See §§ 766.102(1) ; 766.203(2). . . . See § 766.102(6). . . . Id. § 766.102(6). . . . Thompson was not a qualified expert under section 766.102(5)(a) 2. or section 766.102(6). . . .

SIMMONS, v. JACKSON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,, 253 So. 3d 59 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . in order to prevail, must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . Townes, 242 So.3d at 311-312 (quoting § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) ). . . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . . § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013) ; see Townes, 242 So.3d at 309. . . .

RODRIGUEZ v. NICOLITZ, M. D. M. D., 246 So. 3d 550 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Champion argued that the notice of intent to initiate litigation did not comply with section 766.102( . . . that an ophthalmologist and an infectious disease specialist were too dissimilar to satisfy section 766.102 . . . An expert witness as defined in section 766.102 is, in turn, a "health care provider who holds a valid . . . The parties disagree whether the trial court applied the 2012 or 2013 version of section 766.102(5)(a . . . On appeal, the parties agree that the 2012 version of section 766.102 applies. . . .

NATIONAL DEAF ACADEMY, LLC, v. TOWNES,, 242 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 766.102. . . . Id. § 766.102(1); see id. § 766.102(5). In Silva v. . . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . See id. § 766.102(1), (5). . . . vicariously liable under the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .

CLARE, M. D. v. LYNCH,, 220 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Because the expert affidavit submitted by Lynch did not satisfy the requirements of section 766.102(5 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . In turn, section 766.102 sets forth the requirements for an expert witness as follows: (5) A person may . . . Overley could not meet the requirements of the plain language of section 766.102(5), and the noncomplying . . . Here, Lynch did not raise the constitutionality of sec-tion 766.102(5)(a)(1) in either the trial court . . .

IN RE AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017)

. . . Evidence Committee (Committee), concerning legislative changes to the Florida Evidence Code and to section 766.102 . . . Committee’s recommendation to adopt, to the extent it may be procedural, legislation creating section 766.102 . . . Same Specialty Amendment The Same Specialty Amendment amended section 766.102(5)(a), Florida Statutes . . . Before its repeal, section 766.102(14), Florida Statutes, provided that section 766.102 did “not limit . . . See, e.g., § 766.102(5)(b), Fla. . . .

DOCKSWELL, v. BETHESDA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., 210 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2017)

. . . See id. § 766.102(3)(b) (2016). . . . Id. § 766.102(1); accord id. § 766.102 (3)(b). . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . . (citing § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2016) (defining "expert”)). . . . See § 766.102(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

MARK E. POMPER, M. D. P. A. a d b a v. FERRARO, 206 So.3d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Thus, we deny the petition without prejudice to raise the issue of noncompliance with section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: [T]he claimant shall have the burden of proving . . .

S. CHIRILLO, Jr. M. D. v. GRANICZ,, 199 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Relying on Florida case law and section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2008), the Second District reversed . . . (quoting Sweet, 932 So.2d at 368); see also § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . Petitioners assert that the Second District’s application of section 766.102(l)’s standard of care was . . . incorrect because there is a difference between an action in general medical malpractice (to which section 766.102 . . . inpatient duty to prevent suicide does not apply here, there still existed a statutory duty under section 766.102 . . .

BERY, v. FAHEL, D. O., 194 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness' 'as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102, in turn, sets forth the qualifications required of an expert ■ witness providing the . . . , not only because of Appellant’s failure to satisfy the statutory requirements set out in Section' 766.102 . . .

L. MORRIS, S. v. S. MUNIZ, M. D. OB GYN d b a G. M. D., 189 So. 3d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . failure, the record did not support a finding that her medical expert was qualified under sections 766.102 . . . The expert must meet the qualifications set forth in sections 766.202(6) and 766.102(5). . . . Subsection (5) of section 766.102 addresses the qualifications for an expert concerning the professional . . . from a university or college and who. meet§ the requirements of an expert witness as set- forth in s. 766.102 . . . Specifically, section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: (5) A person may not give expert testimony . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. LONG,, 189 So. 3d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Furthermore, we have previously recognized that “section 766.102(5) provides a less stringent standard . . . Section 766.102(5)(c)l., Florida Statutes (2011) provides: (c) If the health care provider against whom . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO., 192 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .

DOCKSWELL v. BETHESDA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. a, 177 So. 3d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Instead, the issue to be resolved by us on appeal is how the first and last sentences of section 766.102 . . . In determining the application of the first and last sentences of section 766.102(3)(b), it is important . . . In understanding the application of the first and last sentences of section 766.102(3)(b), it is also . . . The last sentence of section 766.102(3)(b) provides an exception to the general rule established by the . . . I agree with the Dockswells that the last sentence of section 766.102(3)(b) codifies and expands “the . . . The instruction is derived from section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes, which provides that a plaintiff . . . See id. at n. 1; § 766.102(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . ability to present direct evidence of the nurse’s negligence, whereas the word “discovery” in section 766.102 . . . The foreign body instruction is derived from section 766.102(3), which provides in pertinent part: (b . . . (4), then as 766.102(3). . . .

SHANDS TEACHING HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, INC. d b a v. ESTATE OF ASHLEY LAWSON, LAWSON,, 175 So. 3d 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. Our court said in Broadway v. . . . directly or vicariously hable under the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . clearly ar[o]se from the rendering of, or failure to render, medical services,” determined by section 766.102 . . . directly or vicariously lia-' ble under the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . The statutory standard for medical care is in section 766.102(1), which states that the “prevailing professional . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” § 766.102 . . .

PLANTZ, M. D. v. JOHN, M. Ad a k a C., 170 So. 3d 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . constitute substantial professional experience in providing emergency medical services under section 766.102 . . .

HOLMES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. DUMIGAN, 151 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . the Dumigans would be required to address the medical negligence standard of care found in section 766.102 . . . The medical malpractice standard of care is set forth in section 766.102(1), which provides: In any action . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers. § 766.102 . . .

NIEVES, M. D. v. VIERA,, 150 So. 3d 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . the subject of the claim and have prior experience treating similar patients,” as required by section 766.102 . . . The legislature deleted the “similar specialty” alternative from section 766.102(5)(a)l effective July . . .

FRANZA, F. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. a, 772 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 766.102 (2013) (defining standard of care in medical malpractice action “in light of all relevant . . .

SAUNDERS, v. DICKENS, M. D., 151 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE, 144 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 2014)

. . . .; and to section 766.102(12) of the Florida Statutes, see ch.2011-233, § 10, Laws of Fla. . . . Finally, in chapter 2011-233, section 10, Laws of Florida, the Legislature created section 766.102(12 . . . ), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: 766.102 Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert . . . possess a valid expert witness certificate issued under s. 458.3175, s. 459.0066, or s. 466.005. § 766.102 . . .

GRANICZ, v. S. CHIRILLO, Jr. M. D. S. M. D. P. A. LLC,, 147 So. 3d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.’ ” Sweet, 932 So.2d at 368 (quoting § 766.102 . . .

ADVISORY OPINION TO ATTORNEY GENERAL RE USE OF MARIJUANA FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL CONDITIONS., 132 So. 3d 786 (Fla. 2014)

. . . .” § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

LUCANTE, v. S. KYKER, M. D. J. M. D., 122 So. 3d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . its experts’ affidavits fulfilled the “similar specialty” presuit compliance requirement of section 766.102 . . . dispositive, this Court declines to address the meaning of the phrase “similar specialty” found in section 766.102 . . .

EDWARDS, v. SUNRISE OPHTHALMOLOGY ASC, LLC, d b a A. M. D., 134 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . his employer because she failed to obtain a written opinion from an expert — as defined by section 766.102 . . . The ophthalmologist subsequently filed an Answer, asserting noncompliance with sections 766.102, 766.106 . . . court ruled that the infectious disease doctor’s affidavit was insufficient to comply with section 766.102 . . . Under section 766.102, if the defendant is a specialist, the medical expert must “[sjpecialize in the . . . These doctors do not “[sjpecialize in the same specialty.” § 766.102(5)(a)l. Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . plaintiff failed to obtain an expert opinion that satisfied the “specialization requirement” of section 766.102 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Pursuant to section 766.102, if the defendant doctor is a specialist, then the medical expert must “[ . . . condition that is the subject of the claim and have prior experience treating similar patients.” § 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5)(a)l. now defines the specialization requirement to include only those who “[specialize . . .

R. OLESKY, ESTATE OF E. OLESKY, v. J. STAPLETON, M. D. P. L. R. P. A., 123 So. 3d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 766.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASE- REPORT NO., 130 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 2013)

. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .

LAKELAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, a v. PILGRIM, a, 107 So. 3d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .

PEREZ, v. UNITED STATES, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 766.102(1): “the prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall . . . Stat. § 766.102(1). . . . Stat. § 766.102(3)(b); see also, Turner ex rel. Turner v. . . . Stat. § 766.102(4), and the relevant provisions of Fla. . . . Stat. § 766.102(5). . . .

FITCHNER, v. LIFESOUTH COMMUNITY BLOOD CENTERS, INC. a, 88 So. 3d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . recipient’s claim against a blood bank was not considered a claim for medical malpractice under section 766.102 . . .

BERRY D. v. PADDEN, M. D., 84 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . plaintiff against each named defendant upon receipt of written opinion of an appropriate expert defined by 766.102 . . .

PALMS WEST HOSPITAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a d b a f k a a d b a v. H. BURNS,, 83 So. 3d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .

BERY, v. FAHEL, D. O., 88 So. 3d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

JOSEPH, v. UNIVERSITY BEHAVIORAL LLC,, 71 So. 3d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . is whether a defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2008), states: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based . . .

WILLIAMS, v. OKEN, M. D., 62 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 2011)

. . . not an expert in the field of cardiology, and as a result, Williams had failed to comply with section 766.102 . . . Mary’s Hospital a notice of intent to initiate litigation, pursuant to section 766.102(2), alleging failure . . .

C. WEISS, D. O. C. D. O. P. A. H. D. O. H. D. O. P. A. a T. M. D. P. A. B. M. D. P. A. J. M. D. P. A. C. D. O. P. A. FMC a d b a FMC f k a FMC d b a v. PRATT, Jr., 53 So. 3d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . This leads us to section 766.102, Florida Statutes (2003), which governs expert witness testimony in . . . Section 766.102, which sets the standard for an expert witness’s qualifications, has also been the subject . . . In 2003, section 766.102 was amended and the specific provision applicable to emergency room physicians . . . changed from section 766.102(6)(a) to 766.102(9)(a). . . . . This statute is the predecessor of section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2003). . . . .

GALENCARE, INC. d b a A. G. n k a S. E. HCA, v. MOSLEY,, 59 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . The standard for recovery in a medical negligence case is set forth in section 766.102(1): In any action . . . The language of sections 766.102(1) and 766.202(4) is unambiguous, and our conclusion regarding the Pharmacists . . . but the Estate did not allege that that breach caused the “death or personal injury of any person.” § 766.102 . . . Conclusion The Estate carefully avoided invoking the presuit notice requirements of section 766.102 when . . .

HOLMES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. WIRTH, 49 So. 3d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .]” § 766.102(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . parties dispute whether a claimant’s expert was a "licensed health care provider,” as required by section 766.102 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . profession as the health care provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.” § 766.102 . . .

OLIVEROS, v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS SUNBELT, INC. d b a d b a Dr. D. Dr. LLC., 45 So. 3d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The appellees contend that a physician must fall within the requirements of section 766.102(9) in order . . . However, section 766.102(12) provides that “[t]his section does not limit the power of the trial court . . . The appellants argue that section 766.102(12) allowed the trial court to qualify Dr. . . . Sichewski’s qualifications as an emergency medicine expert to the strictures of section 766.102(9). . . . Sichewski did not qualify as an expert in emergency medicine under section 766.102(9), the appel-lees . . .

BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER OF BEACHES, INC. v. RHODIN, 40 So. 3d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2009), as referenced in section 766.202(6), defines the “requirements . . . Although not an issue in this case, we take note that the “licensed provider” referenced in section 766.102 . . . Byrne’s credentials satisfy the substantive requirements, at the least, in section 766.102(5)(c)l. and . . . Third, the person must meet the requirements of an expert witness addressed in section 766.102. . . .

HOLDEN, v. BOBER, M. D. Gu, M. D. W. M. D. P. A. d b a d b a, 39 So. 3d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . medical expert” as someone who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth under section 766.102 . . . The parties, in their argument before this court, cite the circuit court’s application of section 766.102 . . . The pertinent part of section 766.102(5) provides: A person may not give expert testimony concerning . . . Baker fails to meet the “similar specialty” requirement of an expert witness under section 766.102(5) . . . See § 766.102(9). . We observe that the time for Mr. . . .

B. DIRGA, v. A. BUTLER, M. D., 39 So. 3d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . of indemnity,” was repealed except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102 . . . In 2003, section 766.102(1) was updated to reference the newly-added definition of “health care provider . . .

SOUTH MIAMI HOSPITAL, INC. v. M. PEREZ L., 38 So. 3d 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102 provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any action for recovery of damages based on the death . . .

ESTATE OF ROTELL, L. ROTELL, L. a L. v. KUEHNLE, d b a a, 38 So. 3d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1998). . . .

PARHAM, L. v. FLORIDA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER, INC. d b a, 35 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 766.102. The field is heavily regulated both by case law and statutory law. . . .

JEFFREY A. HUNT, D. O. P. A. d b a v. HUPPMAN,, 28 So. 3d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5) provides, “A person may not give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional . . . Thus, under sections 766.203(2), 766.202(6), and 766.102(5), the written expert opinion that accompanies . . . licensed health care provider, and (4) satisfies the expert witness requirements set forth in section 766.102 . . . opinion under section 766.203(2) regardless of whether she meets the additional requirements of section 766.102 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . See F.S. 766.102. . . . Instruction 402.4a is derived from F.S. 766.102(1) and is intended to embody the statutory definition . . . The second bracketed paragraph is derived from F.S. 766.102(2)(a) and should be given only in cases involving . . . This instruction is derived from F.S. 766.102(3). . . .

ORTIZ, I. v. UNITED STATES, 353 F. App'x 412 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 766.102(1). . . .

ESTATE OF McCALL, v. UNITED STATES, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 766.102(1). . . . Stat. § 766.102(5), there is an exception to this requirement in situations where “only the exercise . . .

OKEN, M. D. a v. WILLIAMS,, 23 So. 3d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Foster meets the qualifications as an expert witness pursuant to section 766.102. . . . In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section 766.102 with respect to the requirements that must be . . . Prior to the 2003 amendment, section 766.102(2)(b) and (c) stated in pertinent part: (b) If the health . . . Thus, to corroborate respondent’s claim under section 766.102(5)(a)(l), Florida Statutes, respondent’ . . . When the Legislature altered the language of section 766.102, it replaced the phrase “similar health . . . take issue with the majority opinion’s assertion about the public policy behind the intent of section 766.102 . . . Oken and has extensive related experience in the field under review as specified by section 766.102(5 . . . in a similar specialty and is not qualified to testify and meet pre-suit requirements under section 766.102 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. F. TRACY, D. P. M., 994 So. 2d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . On October 2, 2006, pursuant to section 766.102, Gonzalez served Dr. . . . Lazzarin’s affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of sections 766.102, 766.202, and 766.203, Florida . . . Lazzarin’s affidavits do not satisfy section 766.102(5)(a)2 because his affidavit dated July 11, 2007 . . . from a university or college and who meets the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(5), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in relevant part: (5) A person may not give expert . . .

FOX M. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,, 994 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 458.331(l)(t) further provides, “The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, “The existence of a medical injury shall not create . . .

TENET SOUTH FLORIDA HEALTH SYSTEMS d b a v. B. JACKSON,, 991 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .

MARAJ v. NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,, 989 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 766.202(6) requires an expert to meet the requirements contained in section 766.102. . . . 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department.” § 766.102 . . . We held that the affiant on which the Marajs relied did not constitute a medical expert under § 766.102 . . .

BOHANNON, W. W. Jr. A. v. SHANDS TEACHING HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, INC. a, 983 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . amended complaint, which is identical to the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .

OLSTEN HEALTH SERVICES, INC. d b a v. CODY,, 979 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The requested instruction was patterned after section 766.102(4), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides . . . Section 766.102(4) has been renumbered, and currently appears in section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes . . .

COLUMBIA JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED, v. SANGOUNCHITTE, 977 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The hospital argues that Shorr was not qualified to testify under section 766.102(7), Florida Statutes . . .

CASTILLO v. VISUAL HEALTH AND SURGICAL CENTER, INC. W. J. M. D., 972 So. 2d 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The second issue involves section 766.102(3), Florida Statutes (2007). . . . The appellants moved for directed verdict, in which counsel argued that section 766.102(3) shifted the . . . Section 766.102(3) provides that “the discovery of the presence of a foreign body, such as a sponge . . . . parties have not cited, nor has our own research revealed any Florida case law interpreting section 766.102 . . . question as to whether the defense met their burden in overcoming the presumption created by section 766.102 . . .

LIFESOUTH COMMUNITY BLOOD CENTERS, INC. v. FITCHNER, v. a, 970 So. 2d 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . In addition, in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2003), entitled “Medical negligence; standards . . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, now provides: In any action for recovery of damages based on the . . .

WATERS, M. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE,, 962 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 766.102 when enforcing this paragraph. . . .

EDWARDS, v. J. SIMON, M. D. P. A., 961 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers,” § 766.102 . . .

R. HENSON, v. UNITED STATES, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 766.102. . . .

J. CORBO, P. A. v. GARCIA,, 949 So. 2d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . where the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1) provides that the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the greater weight . . . Section 766.102(1) refers to the definition of health care provider in section 766.202(4), which includes . . .

SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA, INC. v. E. ASHE,, 948 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Serratore prove [a deviation] from an accepted standard of medical care, which is required under section 766.102 . . .

LAKELAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. a v. Q. ALLEN, F., 944 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Allen’s demise is not determined under the medical negligence standard of care established in section 766.102 . . .

MIRZA, M. D. v. TROMBLEY, 946 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . that before serving a notice of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation pursuant to section 766.102 . . .

LINN, v. D. FOSSUM, M. D., 946 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Allowing qualified experts to testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care under section 766.102 . . . See 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . that they consulted with unidentified individuals who may or may not meet the requirements of section 766.102 . . . The very definition of standard of care in section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2005), requires proof . . . According to section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, the prevailing standard of care for a health care . . .

QUINTANILLA, v. CORAL GABLES HOSPITAL, INC., 941 So. 2d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . whether the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care, as set forth in section 766.102 . . .

D. WOODS, v. UNITED STATES, 200 F. App'x 848 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 766.102(1) (1999) (amended 2003). . . .

T. LAMBERT, v. UNITED STATES M. M. I- X B., 198 F. App'x 835 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 766.102(1). . . .

SWEET, v. F. SHEEHAN, M. D., 932 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2004), codifies this duty, stating that a health care provider . . . is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.” § 766.102 . . .

E. JACKSON, v. UNITED STATES, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (2002), codifies the prevailing professional standards of care. . . .

BRAVO a v. UNITED STATES M. D., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (S.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . Section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes. . . .

LARGIE v. GREGORIAN, M. D. M. D. P. A. A. R. N. P. C. M. D. M. D. P. A., 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 766.102(6), Fla. . . . Stat. (2004)(defining a medical expert as one who meets the requirements of section 766.102). . . .

J. PALEY, M. D. M. D. v. MARAJ, 910 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . contained in section 766.202(6) is one who meets the requirement of a trial expert witness under section 766.102 . . . Where the malpractice claim is against emergency room physicians, as in this case, section 766.102(9) . . . trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss because the court erroneously concluded that section 766.102 . . .

TORRES, v. E. SULLIVAN, Jr. M. D. E. Jr. M. D. P. A. SMH d b a d b a W. M. D. W. M. D. P. A., 903 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

GELSTHORPE v. I. WEINSTEIN, M. D. R. M. D. P. A. d b a s, 897 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 766.102(5)(a)(l), Fla. . . .

SENDZISCHEW, M. D. M. D. v. JOHNSON,, 934 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 766.102(2), Fla. Stat. (2003); § 768.81(3)(6), Fla. Stat. (1991); Osler v. . . .

LINN v. D. FOSSUM, M. D. M. M. D., 894 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . According to section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes, the prevailing standard of care for a health care . . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Dr. . . .

R. FASSY, M. D. P. A. v. P. CROWLEY,, 884 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . misinterpreting the significance of section 393.13(4)(c) to establish a standard of care outside section 766.102 . . . whether the plaintiff must rely on the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . where the plaintiff must rely upon the medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . can be proved by showing a breach of a standard of care other than medical malpractice under section 766.102 . . .

PAGAN v. SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL BOARD, d b a SMH a d b a L. M. D. M. M. D., 884 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 4.2(a). . . .

TENET ST. MARY S INC. d b a St. s v. SERRATORE,, 869 So. 2d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . allegations of the complaint do not seek to state a cause of action for medical negligence under section 766.102 . . . whether the defendant is liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Mary’s employee deviated from an accepted standard of medical care, which is required under section 766.102 . . . Section 766.102(1) states: In any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury . . .

APOSTOLICO, v. ORLANDO REGIONAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INC., 871 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . See also § 766.102(1), Fla. . . . does not require a corroborating opinion from a medical expert as more narrowly defined by section 766.102 . . . ” followed by the noun “one,” which can only, grammatically and logically in the context of section 766.102 . . . See §§ 766.102, 766.203, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . The 2002 version of section 766.102(6), Florida Statutes, does not delineate the requisite qualifications . . .

W. WELKER, v. SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA, INC. a, 864 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . that the defendant failed to meet the “medical negligence standard of care as set forth in section 766.102 . . . According to section 766.102(1), a plaintiff must carry such a burden to recover only if “death or injury . . . resulted from the negligence of,a health care provider as defined in s. 768.50(2)(b).” § 766.102(1), . . .

GOLDFARB, v. URCIUOLI,, 858 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Section 768.50(2)(b) was repealed except to the extent that it is incorporated by reference into section 766.102 . . .

LOADHOLTZ v. W. ANDREWS, M. D., 855 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . On appeal, they argue that the ruling that their medical expert was unqualified under section 766.102 . . . Specifically at issue in the present appeal is the proper application of section 766.102(2)(c)(2), Florida . . . Section 766.102(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (2002), permits a physician to testify as an expert against . . . to testify in judgment of another health care provider’s actions or inactions are defined by section 766.102 . . . involvement in the prae-tice or teaching of medicine” within the five years preceding the incident. § 766.102 . . .

N. BRATT, a S. BRATT J. S. J. v. LASKAS, M. D. M. D. J. M. D. R. M. D. M. D. P. A. d b a M. M. D. M. M. D. P. A. G. II, M. D. G. II, M. D. P. A. L. M. D. L. M. D. P. A. B. M. D. D. M. D. F. M. D. R. M. D. M. D. M. M. D. M. M. D. P. A. A. M. D. M. D. P. A. n k a P. A. M. D. M. D. P. A. d b a G. M. D. M. D. M. D. P. A., 845 So. 2d 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . May is not a “similar health care provider” within the meaning of section 766.102(2), Florida Statutes . . . the same specialty; and (2)[i]s certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty.” § 766.102 . . . practice or teaching of medicine within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim. § 766.102 . . .

INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC. v. LANG- REDWAY,, 840 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002)

. . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (citing § 768.50(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985)). . . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Such a nurse is a “health care provider” for the purposes of section 766.102(1), and we continue to believe . . . Lang-Redway’s cause of action arose in 1997 and is governed by section 766.102(1), which for the purpose . . . Specifically, section 766.102(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines this standard as follows: In any action . . .

J. GOSS, D. O. v. PERMENTER, 827 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 766.102(6)(a) provides that in malpractice actions against emergency room physicians, the court . . .

E. GROSS, M. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,, 819 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . ." § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .

HUGHES, v. D. SLOMKA, M. D. B. M. D. P. A. G. M. D. P. A., 807 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . excluded Odyniec’s testimony because he was not a "similar health care provider," as defined in section 766.102 . . .

ANESTHESIOLOGY CRITICAL CARE PAIN MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, P. A. d b a St. v. S. KRETZER, J. a, 802 So. 2d 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 766.102, Fla. Stat. (1995); Cohen v. . . .

DEAN, v. G. VAZQUEZ, M. D. St. d b a St., 786 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Section 766.102 sets the standard for recovery in all medical malpractice claims. See Silva v. . . . adopt would be far more broad than intended, essentially circumventing the requirements of section 766.102 . . . the section 766.111 does not establish a cause of action independent of the requirements of section 766.102 . . .

L. PRESTON, v. HEALTH CARE AND RETIREMENT CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a, 785 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . against a nursing home if the professional medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . .

INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC. St. a k a a k a v. LANG- REDWAY, W., 783 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Stat. (1997), with § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . See § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (citing § 768.60(2)0»), Fla. Stat. (1985)). . . . actions of a health care provider under the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102 . . . Such a nurse is a “health care provider” for the purposes of section 766.102(1), and we continue to believe . . . within the Florida Statutes, it survives by virtue of the reference to this defunct statute in section 766.102 . . .

M. SANDERSON, v. ECKERD CORPORATION,, 780 So. 2d 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . . § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .