...The district court held that the FCRA’s narrow
definition of “public accommodation” does not apply to MRN, and that Sheely
may not “import” §
413.08’s broader definition of “public accommodation” into
the FCRA. We agree.
Section
760.07 of the FCRA provides that “[a]ny violation of any Florida
statute making unlawful discrimination because of ....
...damages described in §
760.11(5), unless greater damages are expressly provided
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for.” Section
760.02(11) provides that “[f]or the purposes of §§
760.01-760.11 and
509.092” -- i.e., for purposes of §
760.07 --
“Public accommodations” means places of public accommodation,
lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other
covered establishments....
...all areas of a public accommodation that the public or customers are normally
permitted to occupy,” id. §
413.08(3), and defines “public accommodation”
broadly to include “places to which the general public is invited,” id. §
413.08(1)(c). Although §
760.07 of the FCRA provides a private right of action
for “any Florida statute” making discrimination in places of public accommodation
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unlawful, §
760.02 of the FCRA expressly states that its narrow definition of
“public accommodation” applies to §
760.07. Sheely therefore may not import §
413.08’s broader definition of “public accommodation” into the FCRA. As the
district court noted, this conclusion does not gut §
760.07. If MRN were a lodging,
food, or entertainment establishment, §
760.07 would provide a private right of
action for a violation of §
413.08.
Moreover, Sheely has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under
the FCRA....