Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...It drew this conclusion from the language of Title VII defining "employer" as the actual employer or his or her agent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. III 1985). We note that the Florida Human Rights Act, again using Title VII as a model, also defines "employer" to include the actual employer and his or her agents. § 760.02(6), Fla....

...nd local entities with that purpose in mind. Such an evasive purpose is especially unlikely in a state like Florida, which has enacted its own anti-discrimination legislation and made it applicable to local governmental agencies. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02 (6) (West 1997) (defining "person" under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to include "any governmental entity or agency.")....

...handicap . . . in the area[] of . . . public accommodations gives rise to a cause of action for all relief and damages described in § 760.11(5), unless greater damages are expressly provided 57 for.” Section 760.02(11) provides that “[f]or the purposes of §§ 760.01-760.11 and 509.092” -- i.e., for purposes of § 760.07 -- “Public accommodations” means places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in se...

...Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this section: (a) Any inn, hotel, motel . . . . (b) Any . . . facility principally engaged in selling food . . . . (c) Any . . . place of exhibition or entertainment. . . . Thus, § 760.02(11)’s definition of “public accommodations” does not include medical facilities like MRN. Sheely does not contend otherwise....

...is invited,” id. § 413.08(1)(c). Although § 760.07 of the FCRA provides a private right of action for “any Florida statute” making discrimination in places of public accommodation 58 unlawful, § 760.02 of the FCRA expressly states that its narrow definition of “public accommodation” applies to § 760.07....

...apparently concluded that there was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice had occurred in violation of the FCRA. The Commission’s letter to Sheely states that “[b]ased on the information you provided, we are unable to pursue this matter further” because § 760.02(11)’s definition of public accommodation does not apply to MRN....

and the Florida Civil Rights Act, West's F.S.A. § 760,2 alleging that their discharges were the result

...loyment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status." Under the Act, the term "employer" is defined to mean "any person employing 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person." § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). The Act further defines "person" to include "the state; or any governmental entity or agency." § 760.02(6), Fla....

...t noted in Haddock for Use and Benefit of Wiggins v. Florida Motor Lines Corporation, supra. That legislative intent is clearly expressed in Fla. Stat. § 768.01, F.S.A., as being the establishment of a right of action for wrongful death; Fla. Stat. § 760.02, F.S.A., specifies the persons who may bring such action; Fla....

...on), by waiting the requisite number of days before filing this action, and by timely filing this action within 545 days of the date his charge affidavit was filed. Klonis alleged that the appellee is an "employer" within the meaning of the F.C.R.A. § 760.02(7), Fla....

...numerated, supra. See § 760.10, Fla. Stat. (1997). Second: "Employer" means any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person. § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). Third, the statutory definition of "person" expressly includes "the state" or "any governmental entity or agency." § 760.02(6), Fla....

...Therefore, if Blount neglected to file such a complaint, she is unable to bring a claim in this Court under the Act. [2] Even if Blount filed a complaint with the commission and had been issued a reasonable cause determination, she would still be unable to recover under the Act against Dresnick individually. Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7) defines "employer" in substantially the same language as is used in the federal definition....

...edy available to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff cannot bring a claim directly under Article I § 2 of the Florida Constitution. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 20. In support of this contention, the defendants cite to § 760.02(5), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that the governmental entities of the state are included within the coverage of the Florida Human Rights Act....

...Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Code ch. 11A, art. III, §§ 11A-2 to 11A-40 (1985). The Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 governs similar misconduct. Dade County's home rule charter specifically provides that the supremacy of state legislation must be preserved. Because section 760.02(6) limits the scope of the Human Rights Act to employers with fifteen or more employees, while the ordinance applies to employers with five or more employees, the union argues that the ordinance conflicts with the statute....

..." Fla.Stat. § 760.10(1)(a) (emphasis added). "`Employer' means any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." Fla.Stat. § 760.02(7)....

...nd local entities with that purpose in mind. Such an evasive purpose is especially unlikely in a state like Florida, which has enacted its own anti-discrimination legislation and made it applicable to local governmental agencies. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02 (6) (West 1997) (defining “person” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to include “any governmental entity or agency.”)....

...INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs April Stevens ("Stevens") and Anita Harris ("Harris") are African-Americans. See Docket No. 2. Stevens and Harris claim that defendant Steak n Shake, Inc. ("Steak n Shake") violated Florida law — the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla.Stat. § 760.02 et....

...because of such individual's ... religion." Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). The FCRA defines an "employer" as "any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 760.02(7). "Person" is defined to include a corporation. Id. § 760.02(6)....

...onsidered a statutory employer for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act only if it employed more than fifteen employees in the state of Florida. Sinclair then filed this appeal. DISCUSSION Our starting point is the plain language of the statute. Section 760.02(7) defines an “employer” for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act as “any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02 (7)....

...loyees were employed in the state of Florida. By its own admission, De Jay employs approximately 100 employees at any given time. De Jay therefore falls squarely within the statutory definition. We are obliged to give effect to the plain language of § 760.02(7)....

...ules of statutory construction; the plain language of the statute must be given effect.” Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Fla.1995). The district court offered three reasons for its conclusion, notwithstanding the plain language of § 760.02(7), that a Florida employer must employ fifteen employees in Florida in order to be an employer within the meaning of the FCRA....

...ligion and national origin. The hearing officer noted in his report and recommendation that Palermo called himself as his sole witness and failed to introduce any evidence that his employer met the statutory definition of “employer” set forth in § 760.02(7)....

...To the contrary, subsection 768.28(16) declares the legislature's intention that Florida statutes not be construed to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity unless they explicitly waive immunity from suit in federal court. While Fla. Stat. § 760.10 applies on its face to governmental entities or agencies, see § 760.02(6)-(7); § 760.10, § 760 contains no express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court....

...s. § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1992). "Employer" is further defined as "any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." § 760.02(7), Fla....

...NOTES [1] This matter was originally filed in state court, and removed to this Court by Lowe's. ( See Doc. 1). Duffy's Complaint appears at Doc. 2. [2] Lowe's employs a sufficient number of employees to meet the definition of an "employer" found in Florida Statutes section 760.02(7), and is thus subject to the provisions of the FCRA, specifically section 760.10 which is entitled "Unlawful employment practices." F.S. §§ 760.02; 760.10....

...dual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Under section 760.02 the term "employer" is defined to include the state or any governmental entity or agency....

the Florida Civil Rights Act, West’s F.S.A. § 760, 2 alleging that their discharges were the

...state court under the Act. [1] *1108 Jones agrees that Brummer is immune from this claim unless the state legislature has expressly waived sovereign immunity and argues that sovereign immunity has expressly been waived in this case. Jones relies on section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes, which includes "the state; or any governmental entity or agency" within the definition of a "person" who may be an "employer" [2] subject to civil liability for unlawful employment practices under the Act....

...claims made in federal court under federal statutes; issues which are not present in this case. [2] "[A]ny person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year...." § 760.02(7), Fla....

...Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1264 (11th Cir.1997). Similarly, under the Florida Civil Rights Act, an employer is defined as “any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” Fla. Stat. § 760.02 (7)....

...sion on Human Relations, Tallahassee; James Mallue, Assistant General *760 Counsel, Florida Commission on Human Relations, Pinellas Park, for Appellee. THOMAS, J. In this case of first impression, we are called upon to determine whether, pursuant to section 760.02(11)(d), Florida Statutes, the presence of a cafeteria on the premises of Appellee (Hospital) transformed the Hospital into a "public accommodation" for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the Act)....

...ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this chapter, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, national *761 origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion. Section 760.02(11) defines "public accommodations" as "places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other covered establishments." Appellant concedes that hospitals are not included in the statutory definition of public accommodations. Appellant contends, however, that pursuant to section 760.02(11)(d), where a hospital has a cafeteria on its premises, the hospital derivatively becomes a public accommodation. Section 760.02(11) defines as a public accommodation: (d) Any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such cove...

...term “[p]ublic accommodations” is defined as “places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other covered establishments.” § 760.02(11), Fla....

...the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. § 760.02(11), Fla....

...Under the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the supreme court has reasoned that “the Legislature purposefully excluded items not included in a list.” Id. In support of his argument on appeal, Appellant relies upon the fact that section 760.02(11) does not expressly exclude libraries from the definition of “public accommodations.” However, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it can be said that the Legislature purposefully excluded libraries from the definition of “public accommodations” by not including them therein. While Appellant argues that a library could be considered a “place of entertainment” under section 760.02(11)(c), we disagree....

...ation against people with disabilities, defines “public accommodation” to include “a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection.” Museums and galleries are far more similar to libraries than the places listed in section 760.02(11)(c)....

...The commission, a commissioner, or the Attorney General may in like manner file such a complaint.” By its plain language, section 760.11(1) allows a filing with the state agency by the “person aggrieved.” The definition section of the statute, specifically section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes, provides “ ‘Person’ includes an individual, association, corporation ......

...served. The Board's exercise of jurisdiction in this matter has brought into conflict certain provisions of the Human Rights Act of 1977 [Chap. 760, Fla. Stat. (1985)] with the Dade County ordinance, art. III, § 11A, Dade County Code. Specifically, section 760.02(6) of the Human Rights Act defines "employer" as "any person employing 15 *855 or more employees for each working day and each 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." The Act also provides that: It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer: ......

...ter, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment" that serves the public. 4 A municipal softball field would appear to be a "public accommodation" as a "place of exhibition or entertainment" within the scope of section 760.02 (11), Florida Statutes....

...odation" for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act. As discussed in my response to Question One, a municipal park may constitute a "public accommodation" as it could be seen to constitute a place of exhibition or entertainment within the scope of section 760.02 (11), Florida Statutes....

...Sincerely, Bill McCollum Attorney General BM/tgh 1 See Miami-Dade County Code of Ordinances, Chapter 11A "Discrimination," Article III, "Public Accommodation." 2 See s. 760.01 (1), Fla. Stat., providing the short title for the act. 3 Section 760.01 (3), Fla. Stat. 4 Section 760.02 (11)(c), Fla....

...es of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. § 760.02(11), Fla....

...A person 1 The Legislature has expressly indicated twice that the Florida Civil Rights Act includes specific statutory sections in both chapters 760 and 509, Florida Statutes. § 760.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092 shall be cited as the ‘Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992’”); § 760.02(1) (“‘Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992’ means ss....

...premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.” Fla. Stat. § 760.02(11)(d) (emphasis added)....

...service establishments.” CONCLUSION Because the eating establishments are not covered under the Florida Civil Rights Act, they do not turn the Hospital into a “place of public accommodation” under section 760.02(11)(d)....

...In a case on all fours, the third district, in Jones v. Brummer, 766 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rejected the public defender’s contention that he had sovereign immunity from being sued under the same statute. As the third district pointed out, section 760.02(6) includes “the state; or any governmental entity or agency” within the definition of a “person” as an “employer” subject to civil liability for unlawful employment practices under the Act....

...local entities with that purpose in mind. Such an evasive purpose is especially unlikely in a state like Florida, which has enacted its own anti-discrimination legislation and made it applicable to local governmental agencies. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02(6) (West 1997) (defining “person” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to include “any governmental entity or agency.”). We think that where a state legislative body creates a public entity and declares it to be sepa...

...local entities with that purpose in mind. Such an evasive purpose is especially unlikely in a state like Florida, which has enacted its own anti-discrimination legislation and made it applicable to local governmental agencies. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02(6) (West 1997) (defining "person" under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to include "any governmental entity or agency."). We think that where a state legislative body creates a public entity and declares it to be separate an...

...Along with the charge, Appellant submitted material from the marina's website indicating that either on its grounds or within close proximity were, among other things, a restaurant and a tiki hut. The Commission denied the charge, finding the marina was not a "public accommodation" under Section 760.02(11) Florida Statutes (2010) and, therefore, did not trigger any protection offered by the Act. Section 760.02(11)(a, d), Florida Statutes, defines a "public accommodation" as: Any [] restaurant, hotel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, [] including any establishment which is physically located within the premis...

...Furthermore, the Commission did not address whether the marina holds itself out as serving patrons of the restaurant and tiki hut. If the restaurant and tiki hut are located on the marina's property, and if the marina serves their patrons, the marina would qualify as a "public accommodation" under Section 760.02(11)(a, d)....

...ivil Rights Act only if it employed more than fifteen employees in the State of Florida. Sinclair then filed this appeal. DISCUSSION Our starting point is the plain language of the statute. Section 760.02(7) defines an "employer" for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act as "any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02(7)....

...yees were employed in the State of Florida. By its own admission, De Jay employs approximately 100 employees at any given time. De Jay therefore falls squarely within the statutory definition. We are obliged to give effect to the plain language of § 760.02(7)....

...statutory construction; the plain language of the statute must be given effect." Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064, 1067 (Fla.1995). The district court offered three reasons for its conclusion, notwithstanding the plain language of § 760.02(7), that a Florida employer must employ fifteen employees in Florida in order to be an employer within the meaning of the FCRA....

...eligion and national origin. The hearing officer noted in his report and recommendation that Palermo called himself as his sole witness and failed to introduce any evidence that his employer met the statutory definition of "employer" set forth in § 760.02(7)....

...rida Civil Rights Act only if it employed more than fifteen employees in the State of Florida. Sinclair then filed this appeal. DISCUSSION Our starting point is the plain language of the statute. Section 760.02(7) defines an “employer” for purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act as “any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.02(7)....

...ees were employed in the State of Florida. By its own admission, De Jay employs approximately 100 employees at any given time. De Jay therefore falls squarely within the statutory definition. We are obliged to give effect to the plain language of § 760.02(7)....

...utory construction; the plain language of the statute must be given effect.” Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064, 1067 (Fla. 1995). The district court offered three reasons for its conclusion, notwithstanding the plain language of § 760.02(7), that a Florida employer must employ fifteen employees in Florida in order to be an employer within the meaning of the FCRA....

...on religion and national origin. The hearing officer noted in his report and recommendation that Palermo called himself as his sole witness and failed to introduce any evidence that his employer met the statutory definition of “employer” set forth in § 760.02(7)....

...and in her capacity as the surviving spouse of Michael Cimino and natural guardian of their son, appeals the Florida Commission on Human Relations’ (“FCHR”) dismissal of the Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) she filed on behalf of her deceased husband. We reverse, as section 760.02, Florida Statutes (2014) provides that a “legal representative” is entitled to file a complaint for discrimination. According to the Charge, Mr....

...“Any person aggrieved by a violation of ss. 760.01– 760.10 may file a complaint with the commission within 365 days of the alleged violation . . . .” § 760.11(1). An “‘[a]ggrieved person’ means any person who files a complaint with the [FCHR].” § 760.02(10)....

...apprenticeship committee, joint-stock company, labor union, legal representative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bankruptcy, or unincorporated organization; any other legal or commercial entity; the state; or any governmental entity or agency.” § 760.02(6) (emphasis added)....

...3d 18, 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)). The pertinent statutory language clearly provides that any “person aggrieved” may file a complaint and that a “person” includes an “individual” as well as a “legal representative.” §§ 760.11(1), 760.02(6), (10), Fla....

corporations for acts of discrimination.” (quoting § 760.02(7), Fla. Stat.)) (emphasis omitted).

...there was reasonable cause. § 760.11(3), (4)(a)-(b), (5), (7), (8), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). Although the foregoing sections refer to a determination by “the commission”—defined as the “Florida Commission on Human Relations” in section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2015)—we understand “the commission” in this context may include the EEOC for two reasons. 5  First, as we stated above, section 760.11(1) provides, in pertinent...

and the Florida Civil Rights Act, West’s F.S.A. § 760,2 alleging that their discharges were the result

...hospital, as a hospital, was not regulated under FCRA. Instead she argued that because within the hospital there was an establishment covered by FCRA, namely the hospital cafeteria, the hospital was transformed into a covered establishment. Id. She relied on section 760.02(11), Florida Statutes,1 which defines as a public accommodation "any establishment ....

...rwise covered by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment. § 760.02 (emphases added)....

...the Agency for Health Care Administration or the Department of Children and Family Services or other similar place that is regulated under s. 381.0072. (Emphasis added). Marchman argues that based on section 760.02, particularly as discussed by Mena I, we should hold that because St. Anthony's has an onsite cafeteria, coffee shop, and vending machines covered by FCRA, St. Anthony's itself is -4- governed by FCRA.2 But to read section 760.02 in the way that Marchman beseeches requires that we turn a blind eye to the text of section 509.013....

...facilities certified or licensed and regulated by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). § 509.013(5)(b)(4). And because the latter provision is more specific, to give it effect does not do harm to the remainder of the statute. True, section 760.02 is written to cast a wide net, as is its federal counterpart....

...EEOC right-to-sue letter, which meant that the action was time- barred. Davis argued that the right-to-sue letter could not serve as notice under section 760.11(8) because the EEOC is not the FCHR or acting on its behalf as “the commission,” as the term is defined in section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes....

...at 137 (noting that the applicable statutes “refer to a determination by ‘the commission’— 2 Again, Davis’ remedy for FCHR’s failure to complete its statutory duties is mandamus. See note 1. 8 defined as the ‘Florida Commission on Human Relations’ in section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2015)[.]”). But despite this clear definition, the Aleu court concluded that “‘the commission’ in this context may include the EEOC[.]” Id. We disagree that we are free to substitute clear statutory terms in this manner. Section 760.02(2) provides the sole definition that we require: FCHR is “the commission” as that term is used in chapter 760. See § 760.02(2), Fla....

...The FCRA's definition of "employer" is essentially the same as under Title VII and says that an "employer" is one that has "15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Florida Statutes § 760.02(7)....

...The Complaint alleged that former Defendants SS & N ASSOCIATES, INC.; SS & N FINANCIAL SERVICES were “ ‘employers’ within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), Section 3(5) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (5), and § 760.02(6), Fla.Stat....

...TONG and CONSTANCE McCAUGHEY “were ... principals and shareholders of Defendant SALEM, SAXON AND NIELSEN, P.A. and [were] ‘employers’ within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), Section 3(5) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (5), and § 760.02(6), Fla.Stat., and fiduciaries with respect to the Plan within [the] meaning of Section 3(21)(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C....