Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...IV. Where the putative father is not the child's biological father, the Legislature has provided that paternity established by his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity may be "disestablished" in accordance *161 either with section 742.10(4) or with section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007): There are two different ways for somebody whose voluntary acknowledgment of paternity has rendered him a child's legal father pursuant to section 742.10, Florida Statutes (2007), to disestablish paternity. See §§ 742.10(4), 742.18, Fla....

...basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger." § 742.10(4), Fla. Stat. (2007). A challenge may be brought on these grounds under section 742.10(4), whether or not all the requirements set out in section 742.18 are met. See § 742.18(11), Fla. Stat. (2007). In addition, "a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child," § 742.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2007), although neither fraud nor duress induced the signing of the acknowledgment of paternity, except in certain circumstances. [4] If he proceeds pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007), he must file a petition in circuit court that includes (1) an affidavit averring "that newly discovered evidence relating to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner's knowledge since the initial...

...affidavit in which the petitioner avers that he has substantially complied with any child support obligation for the child and that any delinquency resulted from his "inability for just cause to pay the delinquent child support" when it became due. § 742.18(1)(a)-(c), Fla....

...The circuit court must grant relief if it finds each of seven requirements is met, including a requirement that the petitioner has become aware of newly discovered evidence since paternity was initially determined or a child support obligation was initially established. See § 742.18(2)(a)-(g), Fla. Stat. (2007). But Mr. Travis has instituted no proceedings, either under section 742.10(4) or under section 742.18, to disestablish the paternity which his notarized, voluntary acknowledgment of paternity established under section 742.10(1)....

...ges in certain conduct after learning he is not the child's biological father, such as voluntarily acknowledging paternity pursuant to section 742.10(4) or consenting to be named on the child's birth certificate as the child's biological father. See § 742.18(3)(a)-(f), Fla....

...ssing T.M.H.’s due process and privacy arguments that application of the assisted reproductive technology statute abridges her fundamental right to be a parent. We then address the equal protection argument that section 742.14, in combination with section 742.18(2), unconstitutionally creates an unreasonable classification based on sexual orientation....

...rivacy provision of the Florida Constitution do not permit the State to deprive this biological mother of parental rights where she was an intended parent and actually established a parental relationship with the child. We further hold that sections 742.18(2) and 742.14, in providing an exception to the statutory relinquishment of parental rights for egg and sperm donors who are part of a heterosexual “commissioning couple,” but not those who are part of a same-sex couple, violate the Florida and federal Equal Protection Clauses....

...[4] For a more detailed discussion of the decisions of our sister states and relevant policy considerations, see the Fourth District's discussion in Parker, 916 So.2d at 930-34. [5] We note that the Legislature did, in fact, address some of these policy considerations when it enacted section 742.18, Florida Statutes, in 2006, which provides the circumstances and procedures under which a male may disestablish paternity and terminate a child support obligation. However, we have not considered and do not address the applicability of this new statute to the petitioner's circumstances. [6] Moreover, as referenced in footnote 5, supra, we note that section 742.18, which provides the means and procedures by which a male may petition the trial court to disestablish paternity and terminate a child support obligation, forecloses the right to be compensated for child support already paid. § 742.18(5), Fla....

...Brown, 980 So.2d 590, 590-91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). With respect to the second requirement, "good cause" would have existed for genetic testing under these facts if Lynch had instituted proceedings under section 742.10(4), Florida Statutes (2009), or section 742.18(1), Florida Statutes (2009), to "disestablish" paternity....

...ess, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger." "Absent any such allegation, and absent proof in support [of the allegation,]" the party challenging paternity fails to show good cause. Travis, 971 So.2d at 161. Under section 742.18(1), "a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child" by filing a petition in the circuit court that includes the following documents: (1) an affidavit a...

...r avers that he has substantially complied with any child support obligation for the child and that any delinquency resulted from his "inability for just cause to pay the delinquent child support" when it became due. Travis, 971 So.2d at 161 (citing § 742.18(1)(a)-(c))....

...r sufficiently established that there had been a "material mistake of fact" that was "sufficient to disestablish paternity"). Similarly, Lynch's one-page letter to the circuit court does not present sufficient grounds to disestablish paternity under section 742.18(1), as the letter does not include the two required affidavits. See § 742.18(1)(a), (c) (describing contents of the required affidavits). Further, the letter also does not contain the results of a paternity test, which is required by section 742.18(1)(b), as the reason Lynch filed the letter was to request such a test....

...Upon expiration of the sixty-day period, the paternity may be challenged only for fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. § 742.10(4). To disestablish paternity, a contesting father must file a petition with the court and follow the requirements enunciated in section 742.18(1). The court may not set aside paternity if the "father" signed a paternity acknowledgment form unless the court determines that all factors listed in section 742.18(2) existed....

...1st DCA 2011) (finding that “ ‘good cause’ would have existed for genetic testing under these facts if [the legal father who signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity] had instituted proceedings under section 742.10(4), Florida Statutes (2009), or section 742.18(1), Florida Statutes (2009), to ‘disestablish’ paternity.”) (quoting Travis, 971 So.2d at 161 )....

...y has been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.” There is no indication in the record that Mr. Flores and the Mother misinformed the hospital as to the Mother's marital status. . The limited record is unclear on this point. . Section 742.18(l)(a) "establishes circumstances under which a male, may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child.” (emphasis added)....

...Wilkerson, Jacksonville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Paul Hooks, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition to disestablish paternity based on the finding that Appellant failed to include newly discovered evidence with his petition, as required under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2009). Appellant argues that DNA test results, which showed that he was not the biological father of the child, constituted newly discovered evidence for purposes of section 742.18(1)....

...On November 30, 2006, the parties divorced, and without objection by either party, the divorce decree identified the child as the child of their marriage. On January 31, 2010, Appellant filed a petition to disestablish paternity of the child pursuant to section 742.18. Section 742.18 establishes the procedure for disestablishment of paternity and provides in relevant part the following: (1) The petition [for disestablishment of paternity] must include: (a) An affidavit executed by the petitioner that newly discover...

...A male who suspects he is not the father but does not have access to the child to have scientific testing performed may file a petition requesting the court to order the child to be tested. Id. There are seven statutory requirements which must be satisfied to prevail on a petition to disestablish paternity. § 742.18(2). Two of the statutory requirements are at issue in this case. Pursuant to section 742.18(2), a trial court could grant relief on a petition filed in accordance with section 742.18(1) upon a finding that: (a) Newly discovered evidence relating to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner's knowledge since the initial paternity determination or establishment of a child support obligation....

...(b) The scientific test required in paragraph (1)(b) was properly conducted. Id. In the petition, Appellant asserted that the results of scientific testing ("DNA test results"), which showed that he was not the biological father of the child, constituted newly discovered evidence for purposes of section 742.18(1). Appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition should be dismissed because Appellant failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of section 742.18 that the petition include newly discovered evidence....

...uestion he had in that regard. Appellant chose not to undergo DNA testing and proceeded to legitimate the child. On appeal, Appellant seeks reinstatement of his petition, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of section 742.18. Appellant asserts that the trial court's interpretation of section 742.18 indicates that no male would be able to disestablish paternity when it has previously been established. Appellant also asserts that DNA test results constitute newly discovered evidence for purposes of section 742.18(1) as a matter of law. As support of his argument, Appellant relies upon the fact that section 742.18 requires filing a petition to disestablish paternity within ninety days from acquisition of DNA test results....

...ould not be construed as mere surplusage." Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198-99 (Fla.2007) (internal citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue in this case. After examination of the text in section 742.18, we find that the plain language in section 742.18 requires a showing of newly discovered evidence in addition to DNA test results indicating that a male is not the father of the child....

...d evidence and DNA test results. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(2) provides that newly discovered evidence is evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a trial or rehearing. Prior to the enactment of section 742.18, the only remedy for males to challenge paternity was to bring an action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. See Johnston v. Johnston, 979 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The Florida Legislature clearly borrowed this term from Rule 1.540 and placed it in the language of section 742.18....

...To satisfy his curiosity, he took A.G. to a medical lab that specialized in DNA testing. The clinical results indicated that there was a zero percent chance that he was A.G.’s biological father, prompting the Former Husband to file a petition to disestablish paternity pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...the fact that during that same time he and the Former Wife always used a condom during sexual intercourse. The trial court entered an order denying the Former Husband’s petition and concluding (1) that the Former Husband could not avail himself of section 742.18’s mechanism for disestablishing paternity because he was not a “male ordered to pay child support” as referred to in the statute, (2) that the new DNA test results did not provide newly discovered evidence because he “knew all...

...elievable than the Former Husband’s testimony that pri- or to receiving the DNA test results, he always had believed himself to be AG.’s biological father. On appeal, the Former Husband first argues that the trial court erred in determining that section 742.18 was inapplicable here because the Former Husband has not been ordered to pay child support....

...As such, for purposes of the statute, he may be considered a “male ordered to pay child support.” The Former Husband also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that the DNA test results attached to his petition did not constitute the “newly discovered evidence” required by the statute. See § 742.18(l)(a), (2)(a). Section 742.18(1) provides as follows: (1) This section establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child....

...ld support payments for the child for whom relief is sought.... (Emphasis added.) Here, the Former Husband’s petition identified the DNA test results as the new *780 ly discovered evidence that entitled him to relief. He maintains that pursuant to section 742.18(2), “[t]he court shall grant relief on a petition” that it finds satisfies an enumerated list of conditions....

...(f) The male ordered to pay child support did not act to prevent the biological father of the child from asserting his paternal rights with respect to the child. (g) The child was younger than 18 years of age when the petition was filed. (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed here that the Former Husband has satisfied section 742.18(2)(b)-(g)....

...The trial court specifically found this testimony to be more credible than that of the Former Husband. 1 *781 We therefore agree with the Former Husband that based on this record, the trial court was obligated to grant relief on his petition unless it found that he was precluded by a provision of subsection (3). Section 742.18(3) mandates that the trial court “shall not set aside the paternity determination or child support order if the male engaged in [certain] conduct after learning that he is not the biological father of the child.” (Emphasis added.)...

...agreeing to support the child and being required to pay support based on the agreement, disregarding a written notice from a state agency to appear for scientific testing, and signing a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity as provided for by law. § 742.18(3)(a)-(f)....

...vorce action and in all postjudgment attempts by the Mother to pursue modification.... The language of subsection (3), however, clearly refers to the male engaging in these acts “after learning that he is not the biological father of the child.” § 742.18(3)....

...lief as required by subsection (2). We recognize that our conclusion here conflicts with the First District’s opinion in Hooks v. Quaintance, 71 So.3d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In that case, the Fust District concluded that “the plain language in section 742.18 requires a showing of newly discovered evidence in addition to DNA test results indicating that a male is not the father of the child.” Id....

...wly discovered evidence so long as they meet the statute’s other time requirements. We further conclude that because the plain language of the statute only addresses the petitioner’s “knowledge since the initial paternity determination,” see § 742.18(l)(a), (2)(a), any suspicions he may have had prior to that initial establishment of paternity are irrelevant....

...the biological father has been ordered to pay child support. In that typical situation, the statute requires the biological father to continue to meet his parental responsibility — paying child support — in order to even maintain the action. See § 742.18(l)(c) (requiring that the petition for disestablishment include an affidavit of the petitioner stating that he “is current on all child support payments for the child ......

...Hawkins, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Nancy Jones Gaglio of Jones Gaglio, P.A., Panama City, for Appellee. THOMAS, J. Former Husband seeks review of the dismissal of his petition to disestablish paternity *338 and terminate a child support obligation. The petition was filed under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2006), and was dismissed by the trial court under the authority of Parker v. Parker, 950 So.2d 388 (Fla.2007), and D.F. v. Department of Revenue ex rel. L.F., 823 So.2d 97 (Fla. 2002). We reverse pursuant to the authority of section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2006), enacted by the Legislature during its 2006 session....

...2006-265, § 1, Laws of Fla. This statute creates circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when he receives "newly discovered evidence" demonstrating that he is not the biological father of the child. § 742.18(1)(a), Fla....

...Here, Former Husband's petition alleges that he has independently verified that he is not the biological father of a child born during the marriage that was dissolved 17 years ago. Former Husband moved to disestablish his paternal obligations under section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

...nt of dissolution of marriage was a final determination of paternity and, as such, relitigation of paternity is barred by res judicata. We note, however, that the supreme court specifically mentioned that Parker does not address the applicability of section 742.18(1)(a) to a situation similar to Former Husband's. Parker, 950 So.2d at n. 5. Thus, it was error for the trial court to apply Parker to Former Husband's petition. Section 742.18, Fla....

...(2006), does not require a petitioner to prove fraud or duress when attempting to disestablish paternity. Rather, the statute clearly establishes the necessary allegations, requisite trial court findings, and conduct that would prohibit disestablishing paternity. §§ 742.18(1)-(3), Fla....

...Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198-99 (Fla.2007) (internal citations omitted). We hold that section 742.18 must be interpreted to authorize a male to seek to disestablish paternity without requiring a fraud allegation under rule 1.540. Although we acknowledge that Former Wife raises questions regarding whether Former Husband's petition meets the statutory requirements, it is clear that the petition was not dismissed due to any such deficiency under section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

...and Former Wife may then argue why he should not prevail under the statute. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court's order, and remand with directions for the trial court to analyze Former Husband's claim under the statutory provisions set forth in section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2006). PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See D.F., 823 So.2d at 100; Anderson v. Anderson, 845 So.2d 870, 871 (Fla.2003). [2] We have already determined that section 742.18 created a new cause of action for a male to disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation....

...On November 30, 2007, the lower court entered an Order for DNA Test and an Order on Motion for Scientific Paternity Testing. In its Order for DNA Test, the court stated that it considered Father's correspondence as a petition for disestablishment under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007), and ordered another DNA test due to Father's misunderstanding about the earlier test....

...that is outside the court's jurisdiction is enough to constitute irreparable harm."). The second issue raised is whether the lower court can treat Father's unsigned letter and accompanying motion as a petition for disestablishment of paternity under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007). This court recently noted that the plain language of section 742.18 establishes a new cause of action in situations where a father has newly discovered evidence on the issue of paternity. Johnston v. Johnston, 979 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Under section 742.18, Florida Statutes, a petition for disestablishment of paternity must include: (a) An affidavit executed by the petitioner that newly discovered evidence relating to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner's knowledge sinc...

...h his child support obligation for the applicable child and that any delinquency in his child support obligation for that child arose from his inability for just cause to pay the delinquent child support when the delinquent child support became due. § 742.18(1), Fla....

...In the present case, Father's unsigned letter and accompanying motion did not comply with the above statutory requirements. Accordingly, the lower court departed from the essential requirements of the law in treating the correspondence as a petition for disestablishment of paternity under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...In this case, Fernandez did not request a separate circuit court action and did not raise issues regarding custody or parental contact. *877 At the time Fernandez answered the administrative notice, Florida's separate statute on disestablishment of paternity was not yet effective. That statute, section 742.18, became effective June 20, 2006, and provides a remedy in circuit court for a male who wishes to disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when he is not the father of the child....

...[3] The new statute is very clear, however, that a petitioner must execute an affidavit stating that he is current on child support (or detailing his inability for just cause to make required payments), and that the duty to pay child support "shall not be suspended while the petition is pending except for good cause shown." § 742.18(1)(c) and (6), Fla....

Among other things, the trial court disr cussed section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2014), which provides the

...Demere Mason, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee. BILBREY, J. Appellant challenges on appeal the circuit court’s final judgment, based on the summary judgment against him and in favor of Appellee, on Appellant’s petition to disestablish paternity pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...1.540.” The order did not specify any other facts found or law applied. If any transcript of a hearing on the motion was prepared, it is not located in the record. On March 3, 2015, Appellant filed his petition to disestablish paternity, pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

...Appellant did not challenge the final judgment of paternity as the product of fraud or misrepresentations, but rather alleged in the petition that newly discovered evidence had come to his knowledge since the final judgment of paternity and child support determination. § 742.18(1)(a), Fla....

...Stat. In her response to Appellant’s petition to disestablish paternity, the mother denied Appellant’s allegations that he had discovered new evidence and that he was current with his child support payments. Accordingly, these facts under section 742.18 were disputed facts....

...pellant’s motion for relief from judgment settled the fact issues regarding statements by the mother. Despite Appellant’s counsel’s argument that the prior proceedings under rule 1.540(b)(3) differed from the statutory cause of action under section 742.18, the court concluded that the mother was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Hooks....

...overed evidence” under rule 1.540(b)(2), and the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for relief from judgment did not address any issues of material fact pertaining to “newly discovered evidence,” under either rule 1.540(b)(2) or section 742.18. Disestablishment of paternity is a separate action from a motion for relief from judgment due to fraud or misrepresentation, and the material facts necessary to establish the elements are not the same. This Court has previously recognized that prior to the 2006 enactment of section 742.18, the Florida Supreme Court held that “any challenge to a paternity determination must be brought under rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” Johnston v. Johnston, 979 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Upon the enactment of section 742.18 in 2006, “the Legislature intentionally created a new cause of action in situations where a father has ‘newly discovered evidence,’ rather than the allegations of fraud, as previously required.” Id. In general, the e...

...dissolution of marriage proceedings constitutes intrinsic fraud” which must be raised within the one-year time limit under rule 1.540(b). Parker v. Parker, 950 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. 2007). The material facts required to disestablish paternity under section 742.18 are set out in that statute. Fraud and misrepresentation prior to the paternity determination are not listed as grounds under section 742.18....

...A ruling by the trial court that the mother did not commit fraud prior to a final judgment of paternity, as presented here by the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for relief from judgment, is not a ruling on any “newly discovered evidence” as described in section 742.18(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Secondly, the trial court’s conclusion at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that it was bound to rule against Appellant under the ruling in Hooks was an overbroad application of that opinion....

...yn Schwarz, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. ON CONFESSION OF ERROR TAYLOR, J. L.G., the legal father of a dependent child, appeals an order denying his petition to disestablish paternity under section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2016)....

...of being declared illegitimate, and the ‘legal father’ also faces the threat of losing parental rights which he seeks to maintain.” Daniel v. Daniel, 695 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1997). In 2006, however, after Privette, the legislature enacted section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

....” P.G. v. E.W., 75 So. 3d 777, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Here, the trial court erred in ruling that another putative father must be willing to establish paternity before appellant’s petition for disestablishment of paternity could be granted. Section 742.18 contains no such requirement. As noted above, Privette was decided prior to the enactment of section 742.18. To the extent Privette was not superseded by section 742.18, it has no application to these facts....

...father does not seek to maintain his parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the petition and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court finds on remand that all of the requirements for disestablishing paternity under section 742.18 are satisfied, the trial court shall grant relief on the petition. Reversed and Remanded. GERBER, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed mot...

...1st DCA 2007) (emphasizing that unchallenged voluntary acknowledgment of paternity serves to establish paternity and holding it was error for court to order DNA testing where father had not alleged grounds in 742.10(4) or the "newly discovered evidence" necessary to disestablish paternity under section 742.18)....

...and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see Section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

...Comm. on Judiciary, CS/SB 980 (1992) Staff Analysis (Feb. 28, 1992) (Fla. State Archives). [8] For example, section 760.40 omits section 742.12(2), which provides for court-ordered scientific testing at the request of a party in a paternity action and section 742.18, which provides for scientific testing to disestablish paternity....

...Hartsell was present at the hearing and available to testify, the trial court did not hear or otherwise receive evidence in support of his allegations. Rather, the trial court summarily granted Mr. Hartsell’s motion after finding that it substantially complied with the pleading requirements of séction 742.18, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...Hartsell’s eonclusory allegation (contained in his motions) that newly available evidence indicated that he was not C.L.M.H.’s biological father. Rather, the trial court summarily granted Mr. Hartsell’s motion after finding that it substantially complied with the requirements of section 742.18(1)....

...Accordingly, we find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law when it granted Mr. Hartsell’s motion without giving him an opportunity to prove, and the Department an opportunity to rebut, that there was newly discovered evidence placing his paternity in doubt. B. Compliance with Section 742.18, Florida’s Paternity Disestablishment Statute The Department argues that the trial court erred when it found that Mr. Hart-sell’s motion to terminate child support and for genetic testing substantially complied- with the requirements of section 742.18. Although we find this argument to be without merit, we believe it opportune to discuss our reasoning and to distinguish the facts' of the present case from others that have been adjudicated by this Court. Section 742.18(1) provides that a petition for disestablishment of paternity “must be served on the mother or other legal guardian or custodian of the child” and must' include: (a) An affidavit executed by the petitioner that newly discovered evi...

...upport’ when the delinquent child support became due. In State, Dep’t of Rev. ex rel. Lawson v. Young, 995 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), this Court found that “Father’s unsigned letter and accompanying motion did not comply with the [section 742.18(1)] statutory requirements,” The father in that case had already been adjudicated by default to be the legal and natural parent of, and to owe a duty of support to, the minor child at issue....

...davit requirements of section 92.50(1), Florida Statutes (2014). In addition, Mr. Hartsell expressly alleged discovery of new evidence, from Mrs. Hartsell and her mother, that he was not C.L.M.H’s biological father, thereby satisfying the first of section 742.18(l)’s three prongs....

...ew because it fails to reflect a finding of goqd cause for. a genetic ■ paternity test. We note that, by . virtue of our quashal of the order, Mr. Hartsell’s motion, which we find substantially complies with the pleading requirements of section. 742.18, .remains pending....

SALARIO, Judge. The Department of Revenue appeals from a final order granting MJ.M.’s petition to disestablish paternity pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...As we explain below, we find no merit in DOR’s arguments regarding newly discovered evidence and the timeliness of M.J.M/s petition. We agree with DOR, however, that the trial court failed to make legally required findings on the child support issue, and we therefore reverse its order and remand for that purpose. I. A. Section 742.18(1) identifies the “circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child.” The statute regulates both the manner in which a male...

...h his child support obligation for the applicable child and that any delinquency in his child support obligation for that child arose from his inability for just cause to pay the delinquent child support when the delinquent child support became due. § 742.18(1)....

...h his child support obligation for the applicable child and that any delinquency in his child support obligation for that child arose from his inability for just cause to pay the delinquent child support when the delinquent child support became due. § 742.18(2)....

...As a result, in August 2005, the trial court entered a final judgment establishing that M.J.M. was M.R.’s father and ordering him to make payments for the support of M.R. On December 6, 2012, M.J.M. through counsel filed a petition to disestablish paternity pursuant to section 742.18....

...rospects had become limited as a result of his inability to drive. The trial court did not, however, permit M.J.M. to offer a complete explanation of his reasons for nonpayment. DOR argued that the trial court was required to deny the petition under section 742.18 because the evidence was not newly discovered....

...se “may have existed” for MJ.M.’s failure to pay the delinquent child support. Based on these and other findings, the trial court disestablished paternity. II. We review the trial court’s findings of the facts necessary to grant relief under section 742.18 for competent substantial evidence, P.G....

...2d DCA 2011), and its interpretation of that statute de novo, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. T.L.S. v. S.J.W., 113 So.3d 85, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). DOR asserts that the trial court erred in determining that the mother’s admission and the 2010 DNA test constituted newly discovered evidence under section 742.18(2)(a). It also argues that M.J.M.’s petition is time-barred because it was not brought within ninety days of the 2010 DNA test under 742.18(l)(b). Finally, it asserts that the trial court failed to make the findings required by section 742.18(2)(c)....

...DOR argues that the mother’s admission and the DNA test results did not amount to newly discovered evidence because M.J.M. knew at the time of the original paternity proceedings that he was not the father. The unambiguous language of the statute, however, precludes this argument. Section 742.18(2)(a) provides for disestablishment of paternity when newly discovered evidence “has come to the petitioner’s knowledge since the initial paternity determination.” Id. (emphasis added); see also § 742.18(l)(a) (requiring petition to include an affidavit showing that newly discovered evidence has come to the petitioner’s knowledge “since the initial paternity determination or establishment of a child support obligation”)....

...Under this clear language, the question is not—as DOR would have it—whether a petitioner ever knew of evidence that he was not the father; the question is instead whether newly discovered evidence came to the petitioner’s knowledge after paternity was established. This is exactly how our court has interpreted section 742.18....

...When the child was bom, the petitioner signed a birth certifícate as the father. After the child developed mental health issues of which the petitioner had no family history, he again questioned whether he was the father. A DNA test showed that he was not, and he filed a petition under section 742.18....

...twithstanding the petitioner’s reason to believe at the time of the initial determination of paternity that he was not in fact the child’s father. Id. at 781. With respect to whether the DNA test results were newly discovered evidence covered by section 742.18, we reasoned as follows: DNA test results performed since the initial determination of paternity satisfy the statutory requirement for newly discovered evidence so long as they meet the statute’s other time requirements .... [B]ecause the plain language of the statute only addresses the petitioner’s “knowledge since the initial paternity determination,” see § 742.18(l)(a), (2)(a), any suspicions he may have had prior to that initial establishment of paternity are irrelevant....

...ty chance the child was not his. When he tried to disestablish paternity years later on the basis of a DNA test, the trial court denied his petition. The First District affirmed and held that the test results were not newly discovered evidence under section 742.18 because, among other things, the petitioner could have had a DNA test done before the initial paternity determination but did not, thus failing to act diligently....

...Our reasoning in P.G.—including the conflict of that reasoning with the decision in Hooks—establishes that information in a petitioner’s possession before the paternity determination and his action (or lack thereof)' upon that information is not material to whether he has satisfied sections 742.18(l)(a) and (2)(a)....

...Based on that admission, M.J.M. got a DNA test, the results of which showed that he was not the father. Those test results, too, are new evidence. Both pieces of evidence came to MJ.M.’s knowledge “since the initial paternity determination.” See § 742.18(2)(a)....

...is controlling here and compels the conclusion that M.J.M. satisfied the newly discovered evidence requirement. B. DOR next contends that MJ.M.’s petition is untimely and therefore time-barred because it was not filed within ninety days of his DNA test results as required by section 742.18(l)(b)....

...This section requires that a petition to disestablish paternity include “[t]he results of scientific tests’... administered within 90 days prior to the filing of such petition, which results indicate that the male ordered to pay such child support cannot be the father.” § 742.18(l)(b) (emphasis added)....

...ment that is not filed within ninety days of the first DNA test a *1155 petitioner takes that shows that the petitioner is not the biological father of the child. DOR’s argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. By its terms, section 742.18(1) regulates what a petition to disestablish paternity must contain and provides that one thing it must contain is the results of a DNA test administered no more than ninety days before the petition is filed....

...There, a trial court dismissed a petition because the attached results relied on a test that was more than ninety days old. The petitioner argued that because the existence of a DNA test is not an element of a cause of action for the disestablishment of paternity, the failure of his petition to address the requirements of section 742.18(l)(b) could not serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss....

...y requirement.” Id. at 144 . It also stated that “once a man receives the results of a scientific test confirming he is not the father, he must choose to act .on those results within ninety days.” Id. Relying on that language, DOR asserts that section 742.18(l)(b) does effect a time-bar. The statement upon which DOR relies is dictum. The issue in Aulet was whether á petition that fails to comply with section 742.18(l)(b) may be dismissed on that account, not whether the petitioner’s right to seek disestablishment is substantively time-barred if a petition is not brought within ninety days of the first DNA test a petitioner ever takes....

...hat complied with the statute required that the trial court deny the petition at the final hearing as insufficiently pleaded. We believe that it does not because our court has recognized that minor, nonprejudicial variations from the requirements of section 742.18(1) within a petition do not require that the petition be denied at a final hearing....

...The petition was sworn to by the putative father, who stated that he did not have access to the child to conduct DNA testing. The putative father failed, however, to file an affidavit attesting to that fact as required by the statute. Id at 1109; see also § 742.18(l)(b) (requiring, where no DNA test results are attached, that the petitioner include “an affidavit ......

...not even raise the timeliness of M.J.M.’s petition in its written answer to it. Accepting those new DNA test results as the equivalent of the statutorily required DNA test neither caused prejudice to DOR nor undermined the purpose that the text of section 742.18(l)(b) evinces—namely, that a petition to disestablish paternity may be supported by a DNA test that is less than ninety days old....

...n ninety days old. C. Finally, DOR alleges that the trial court failed to make statutorily required findings regarding child support and that, at all events, the evidence adduced at the hearings would have been insufficient to support such findings. Section 742.18(2)(c) requires that where a petitioner is not current on child support, a trial court may not disestablish paternity unless it finds that the petitioner has “substantially complied” with his child support obligation and that there is “just cause” for any delinquency....

...It is also correct that the trial court’s just cause finding was ambiguous at best. The trial court found only that “just cause may have existed for [MJ.MJs failure to pay the delinquent child support when it became due.” Thus, the trial court did not actually make any of the findings that section 742.18(2)(c) requires....

...The trial court should then grant or deny the petition, depending on the result dictated by its findings about child support. We again certify conflict with Hooks, and we further certify conflict with Aulet to the extent its holding is inconsistent with our. holding about the meaning of section 742.18(l)(b)....

...Rule 1.540(b)(2) provides for relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence "which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing” in the proceeding in which the judgment was rendered, The fact that section 742.18 does not include similar language, and instead focuses on whether the evidence came' to light after *1154 the paternity determination, suggests that the legislature did not intend the same result....

...tion to order scientific ■ testing pursuant to section 742.12. Blocker is not without potential avenues for contesting his paternity. For example, the Department properly acknowledges that Blocker may be entitled to challenge his paternity through section 742.18, Florida Statutes, which allows a male to petition the court for disestablishment of paternity or termination of child support obligations when the male is not the biological father....

...12.635 (addressing relocation), as previously proposed by the Committee, and the alternative version of this rule proposed on the Court's own motion; and (3) eleven new relocation forms proposed by the Workgroup. Disestablishment of Paternity Forms Section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2009), permits a man who is not the biological father of a child to petition to disestablish paternity and terminate a child support obligation. Among other things, the statute sets forth the required content of a petition to disestablish paternity and specific factual findings which must be made by the court in granting such a petition. See § 742.18(1)-(2), Fla....

...tion must also be served on the Department of Revenue. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read "General Information for Self-Represented Litigants" found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see Section 742.18, Florida Statutes....

...requirements in circuit court, which include attesting that newly discovered evidence relating to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner's knowledge since the initial paternity determination or establishment of a child support obligation. § 742.18, Fla. Stat. (2015). In the case before us, it is clear that the father did not plead any basis to contest or disestablish paternity under subsection 742.10(4) or under section 742.18....

...The law is clear that “[t]o disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation, the male must.file a petition in the circuit court having jurisdiction over the child support obligation” and serve the *970 petition on the Department. § 742.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). One of the permissible grounds for seeking to disestablish child support is a DNA test reflecting that the male is not the child’s biological father. See § 742.18(l)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. However, “[t]he male’s previous status as father continues to be in existence until the order granting relief is rendered.” § 742.18(5), Fla....

...(2024) (“[A] signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shall constitute an establishment of paternity and may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger . . . .”); § 742.18(1), Fla. Stat....

...Judicial Administration 2.516. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see Section 742.18, Florida Statutes. Special notes ....

...t the time of conception, “they had been physically separated for approximately 6 years or more,” *145 and it was thus “physically impossible” that the child was his. The court heard the motion to intervene before the TPR trial. Finding that section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2016)—which outlines the procedure for disestablishing one’s paternity—had not been complied with because there still had been no DNA testing, the court denied the motion to intervene....

...al court issued an order denying DOR’s motion and found that Haughton was not responsible for the arrears due prior to disestablishing paternity because he was not the father of the child. ANALYSIS Section 742.18(5), Florida Statutes (2006), requires a party to pay child support arrears that accumulated during the time that he was considered the legal father of the child, even if his paternity is later disestablished....

...cting the interests of one parent defrauded by the other parent in the midst of dissolution proceedings. Parker, 950 So.2d at 393 . We note, however, that last term, the Legislature addressed a similar issue called the “paternity fraud law.” See § 742.18, Fla....

...Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see Section 742.18, Florida Statutes. Special notes ....

specific pleading requirements. See § 742.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). However, Silva has not

...Judicial Administration 2.516. Where can I look for more information? Before proceeding, you should read “General Information for Self-Represented Litigants” found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see Section 742.18, Florida Statutes. Special notes ....

...Upon expiration of the sixty-day period, the paternity may be challenged only for fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. § 742.10(4). To disestablish paternity, a contesting father must file a petition with the court and follow the requirements enunciated in section 742.18(1). The court may not set aside paternity if the “father” signed a paternity acknowledgment form unless the court determines that all factors listed in section 742.18(2) existed....

...M.J.M., 217 So. 3d 1148, 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Under certain circumstances, “a male may 2 disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation” when he “is not the biological father of the child.” § 742.18(1), Fla. Stat....

...�cannot be the father of the child,” and (c) an affidavit alleging that he is current on child support. Id. Husband complied with these requirements. When that is the case, the court “shall grant relief” upon making certain findings. Id. § 742.18(2)....

...showing of newly discovered evidence. * Certain conduct precludes relief even if the court makes all these findings, such as when the male acknowledged his paternity in a sworn statement that he made after learning that he is not the child’s biological father. See § 742.18(3), Fla. Stat. 3  Courts are split over whether the scientific testing in section 742.18 is itself “newly discovered evidence” under the statute. Compare Hooks v....

...In turn, those results led to Wife conceding that he did not father JMC or MMC. Accordingly, under either view of the statute, the court should not have denied Husband’s claim based on his vasectomy. III. Husband met the requirements of section 742.18(1). As such, the court needed to complete the analysis in section 742.18(2)....

LAGOA, J. The appellant, Juan Carlos Aulet (“former husband”), appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition to disestablish paternity and terminate child support filed pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2007). The trial court dismissed the petition because of the former husband’s failure to meet several of the requirements set forth in subsection 742.18(1), including his failure to include with the petition scientific tests administered within ninety days prior to the filing of the petition....

...f the child upon whom the tests were conducted. On September 28, 2007, the former husband filed a Verified Petition for Disestablishment of Paternity, Termination of Child Support Obligation, and Challenge of Acknowledgement of Paternity pursuant to section 742.18. Section 742.18 provides, in relevant part: (1) This section establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child....

...paternity tests were taken more than 90 days prior to the date of this Petition because the Former-Wife has refused the Former-Husband access to the subject minor child ... since May, 2007.” The petition did not attach an affidavit, pursuant to subsection 742.18(l)(b), stating that the former husband did not have access to the child to perform the DNA tests within the ninety-day period....

...Nor did the petition request the trial court to order the child to be tested. *143 The former wife filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition should be dismissed because the former husband failed to comply with several mandatory requirements of subsection 742.18(1), including the requirement that the petition include the results of scientific tests “administered within 90 days prior to the filing of such petition.” § 742.18(l)(b), Fla....

...The former husband responded that subsection (l)(b) serves only as a time limitation to presenting a valid DNA test. The trial court granted the former wife’s motion to dismiss finding, among other things, that the “clear and unambiguous language” of subsection 742.18(l)(b) “mandates that the administration of the test and the filing of the petition cannot be more than ninety days apart” and that “this was not done here.” As to the former husband’s claim that the DNA tests had not been adm...

...after the test is administered ... when access to [the child], logically, would have been achieved.” On appeal, the former husband seeks reinstatement of his petition, arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of section 742.18....

...As support for his argument, the former husband relies upon the fact that the statute provides that a father may file a petition without including a DNA test when he suspects that he is not the father but does not have access to the child to permit testing performed prior to the filing of the petition. See § 742.18(l)(b), Fla....

...The former husband also relies upon the fact that the statute does not specifically provide that a petition would be “legally insufficient” if filed beyond the ninety-day period. We disagree with the former husband and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his petition. We find the language of section 742.18 to be plain and unambiguous....

...Therefore, contrary to the former husband’s argument, the plain language of the statute makes clear that scientific testing is indeed a mandatory requirement for a trial court to consider and grant a petition to disestablish paternity. See Johnston v. Johnston, 979 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“[Section 742.18] clearly establishes the necessary allegations, requisite trial court findings, and conduct that would prohibit disestablishing paternity.”) This Court has already held that when the petitioner relies upon tests administered prior to the filing of the petition, the mandated test must also comply with the ninety-day provision. See State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Brinson, 953 So.2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (noting that section 742.18 “requires the man to file a court petition within ninety days of obtaining a paternity test”)....

...” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the statute. Cf. State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Young, 995 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (where father’s letter and motion did not comply with section 742.18(1), the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in treating them as a petition for disestablishment under the statute and ordering scientific tests)....

...Instead, the former husband’s argument is that there is no time limit to a father’s filing of a petition to disestablish paternity, merely a ninety-day restriction on the validity of a DNA test, when one is relied upon. In his motion for reconsideration of the order, the former husband specifically argued that section “742.18 is not a statute of limitation for when a disestablishment of paternity case must be filed....

...interests” of the child inquiry during the 2011 proceedings. See Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in P.G. v. E.W., 75 So. 3d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (recognizing 2006 enactment of section 742.18, Florida Statutes, authorizing action to disestablish paternity)....

... The Florida Department of Revenue appeals a trial court order granting Farouto Augustin’s petition to disestablish paternity and terminate child support obligation as to the minor child. Because the trial court failed to make the requisite findings under section 742.18(2), Florida Statutes (2015), we reverse. In 2013, the trial court determined Augustin’s paternity to the child, Farouto Augustin, Jr., (born 11/15/2006) as a matter of law under section 742.10, Florida Statutes. In August 2015, Augustin filed a petition to disestablish paternity under section 742.18....

...“testified that he had been aware that [the child] . . . was not his child since 2009. [Augustin] testified that the Obligee agrees that he is not the father. [Augustin] testified that [the child] lives with his real mother and father.” This appeal followed. Section 742.18, Florida Statutes “establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation” when he 2 receives “newly discovered evidence” demonstrating that he is not the biological father of the child. §742.18(1). To grant relief under section 742.18(2), a trial court must find that seven factors enumerated in the statute are met. §742.18(2)(a)- (g)....

...Among these factors, a trial court must determine that “newly discovered evidence relating to the paternity of the child has come to the petitioner’s knowledge since the initial paternity determination,” and that a scientific test to show a probability of paternity “was properly conducted.” §742.18(2)(a)-(b). Here the trial court failed to make the requisite findings on these points and the record indicates these factors were not established. Thus, Augustin did not meet his statutory burden of proving the factors set forth in section 742.18(2)(a)- (g)....

...plenary appeal.” Lynch, 53 So. 3d at 1156. We have repeatedly held that an order applicable statute requires such a petition to be accompanied by scientific test results showing that the petitioner is not the child’s biological father. See § 742.18(1)(b), Fla....

...To establish good cause, the father must allege (and ultimately prove) that he signed the paternity affidavit on the birth certificate due to fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact, § 742.10(4), Fla. Stat. (2014), or that there is newly discovered evidence of the paternity of the child, § 742.18(1)....

...Hickman was ordered to pay $751 in monthly ongoing child support and $49 monthly toward the $20,277 in child support arrearages. In early 2011, DNA test results revealed that Mr. Hickman was not A. J.H.’s biologi *514 cal father. As a result, pursuant to section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2011), Mr....

...Hickman’s petition and entered an order disestablishing his paternity and terminating his ongoing child support obligation, but continuing to hold him responsible for the previously determined support arrearage. On appeal, Mr. Hickman contends that the trial court erred by concluding that under section 742.18, Florida Statutes, he remains responsible for previously adjudicated child support ar-rearages. Enacted in 2006, section 742.18 created a new cause of action for disestablishing paternity....

...ief is rendered. All previous lawful actions taken based on reliance on that status are confirmed retroactively but not prospectively. This section shall not be construed to create a cause of action to recover child support that was previously paid. § 742.18(5), Fla....

...When construing a statute, it must be considered in its entirety and all parts of a statute read together in order to achieve a consistent whole. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 787 (Fla.2007). Here, we conclude there is a reasonable question as to whether “prospective child support payments” include arrearages. Section 742.18(5) specifically confirms all previous legal actions based on the father’s status prior to disestablishment, and disallows its use to recover previously paid child support....

...eel money judgment’s effects, it is not “prospective”). Consequently, even when a money judgment is prospective in the sense that it remains unpaid, such a judgment is nevertheless a final order and not prospective for purposes of relief under section 742.18. Thus, we hold that the relief from prospective child support payments granted by section 742.18 to disestablished fathers does not include relief from arrearages....

...established father from prospective “payments” as opposed to prospective “obligations,” evidencing the *515 intent that successful application of the statute ceases all prospective payments, including those for arrearages. We again disagree. Section 742.18 indicates the intent to relieve the disestablished father of future obligations, not previously established support, and, despite the statute’s failure to employ that specific term, courts, in dicta, have suggested as much. See Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Donaldson v. Blocker, 988 So.2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting “section 742.18 ......

...Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. DAVIS, Judge. J.C.J. challenges the trial court's order denying his petition to disestablish his paternity of the minor child of O.S.B. (the Mother). The trial court denied the petition, concluding that it did not comply with the requirements of section 742.18(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). That statute "establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child." § 742.18(1)....

...However, the trial court concluded that because the test results, which were admitted into evidence at the hearing, had not been obtained within ninety days prior to the filing of the counterpetition, J.C.J. failed to comply with the requirements of section 742.18(1)(b)....

...n the matter because J.C.J. failed "to meet the strict requirements of the subject statute despite the [legislature's] obvious intent to allow disestablishment of paternity under certain circumstances." We disagree with the trial court's conclusion. Section 742.18(1)(b) provides that the father's petition to disestablish paternity must include "[t]he results of scientific tests that are generally acceptable within the scientific community to show a probability of paternity, administered within 9...

...ition." This section thus sets forth what is required to be included in the petition in order for it to sufficiently state a cause of action. Subsections (2) and (3) describe the factual findings that the trial court must make to grant the petition. Section 742.18(4) requires that the petition be denied if the petitioner "fails to make the requisite showing required by this section." In other words, subsection (4) requires the denial of the petition if the petitioner fails to state a cause of ac...

...[3] J.C.J., however, did not fail to state a cause of action under subsection (1). By his pleadings, he swore under oath that he did not have access to the child to have further testing performed, and he requested that the trial court thus order such testing. See § 742.18(1)(b) ("A male who suspects he is not the father but does not have access to the child to have scientific testing performed may file a petition requesting the court to order the child to be tested.")....

...of appellate review. [2] This seems to suggest that J.C.J. recognized that the statute requires the lab results to have been obtained within ninety days of the filing of the petition for them to be evidence sufficient to disestablish paternity. See § 742.18(1)(b), Fla....

...The trial court granted the petition after the mother failed to produce the child, J.L.T., for DNA testing. Because the trial court did not determine whether the mother's failure to submit the child for testing was willful, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Section 742.18, Florida Statutes (2008), provides for the disestablishment of paternity or the termination of a child support obligation when a male is not the biological father of a child....

...for the paternity test. An amended order was entered but the amendment is not pertinent to the issue on appeal. The Department filed a motion for rehearing and argued that the trial court failed to make the findings on the seven factors required by section 742.18(2)(a)-(g) and disestablished paternity without any evidentiary basis and solely because the mother did not appear for the paternity test....

...paternity. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing on the basis that the mother failed to appear. On appeal, the Department contends that the trial court did not require G.A.T. to meet his statutory burden of proving the factors set forth in section 742.18(2)(a)-(g) before granting the petition to disestablish paternity. The statute provides that the court shall grant relief on the petition "upon a finding by the court of all of the following" factors listed in that section. § 742.18(2). We note that the factor in section 742.18(2)(b) is that "[t]he scientific test required in paragraph (1)(b) was properly conducted." The Department also argues that the trial court never provided the mother an opportunity to explain *1085 her non-appearance with her child for the DNA test. This court has recognized that the trial "court may not set aside paternity if the `father' signed a paternity acknowledgment form unless the court determines that all factors listed in section 742.18(2) existed." Dep't of Revenue ex rel. T.E.P. v. Price, 958 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). However, section 742.18(7)(b) provides for the situation when a party fails to appear for scientific testing, (b) If the male ordered to pay child support willfully fails to submit to scientific testing or if the mother or legal guardian or custodian of the c...

...testing, the court shall issue an order determining the relief on the petition against the party so failing to submit to scientific testing. If a party shows good cause for failing to submit to testing, such failure shall not be considered willful. § 742.18(7)(b)....

...4 Rodriguez subsequently withdrew her petition to disestablish Castillo’s paternity, and on June 19, 2018, Rodriguez and Coira filed a joint amended petition. The three-count, joint amended petition sought disestablishment of paternity for Castillo pursuant to sections 742.10(4) and 742.18, Florida Statutes, and establishment of paternity for Coira as the biological father of LC. On October 24, 2019, Rodriguez filed a motion for partial summary judgment relying on sections 742.12(4), 742.18(11) and 742.10(4), Florida Statutes, as the bases for disestablishment of paternity for Castillo. Specifically, Rodriguez argued that summary judgment could be entered based on a material mistake of fact—specifically, that the DNA results...

...and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, our standard of review is de novo.” Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION Rodriguez avers that sections 742.18(11), 742.12(4), and 742.10, Florida Statutes, support her petition to disestablish paternity. However, nothing in 5 the cited Florida Statutes permit the trial court to disestablish paternity based on the facts of this case. Section 742.18, Florida Statutes, governs disestablishment of paternity. This section “establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child.” § 742.18(1), Fla....

...provides that: “[n]othing in this section precludes an individual from seeking relief from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding pursuant to Rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or from challenging a paternity determination pursuant to s. 742.10(4).” § 742.18(11), Fla....

...After sixty days, however, the document “may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the challenger.” § 742.10(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Alternatively, an affiant may file a petition to disestablish paternity pursuant to section 742.18(1), Florida Statutes. In the instant case, the presumed father conceded he executed the acknowledgment of paternity, and the acknowledgment was never rescinded. He did not allege in his petition that the document was the product of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, or that he endeavored 4 to disestablish paternity. See § 742.18, Fla....

Florida Statutes, when read in pari materia with section 742.18, Florida Statutes. I would quash the lower

...The court found that only a party who is named as the father of the child has the statutory authority to petition to set aside paternity. The court also noted that Butler acknowledged paternity after he learned that he may not be the biological father and therefore, pursuant to section 742.18(3), Florida Statutes, Bauer cannot disestablish paternity....

...der must be reversed.”). Bauer should be allowed to raise the facts necessary to support a finding that the acknowledgment of paternity was executed under fraud, duress, or mistake of fact. As to Bauer’s motion to disestablish paternity, section 742.18(1), Florida Statutes, “establishes circumstances under which a male may disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation when the male is not the biological father of the child.” Under this section, only the male determined to be the legal father of the child can petition to disestablish his paternity. See In Interest of Y.R-P., 228 So. 3d 628, 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding section 742.18 does not provide a biological father standing to disestablish another’s paternity)....

or establishment of a child support obligation. § 742.18,- Fla. Stat. (2015). In this case, however

...action lies. 1 We have *723 considered and reject the additional claims raised by Williams-Raymond and, thus, affirm the order of dismissal. Affirmed. KLEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . Effective in June 2006, the legislature created Florida Statutes section 742.18, which permits a "male” to file a petition in circuit court to "disestablish paternity or terminate a child support obligation” when that male is not the child's biological father and certain other conditions exist....