Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Congress directed the Commissioner to apply state intestate property law in determining whether an applicant is the "child" of an insured individual. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), (h)(3)(C). The ALJ applied Florida law, Gar's domicile at that time of his death. R. 10. Florida Statute § 742.17 provides that a child conceived from the sperm of a person who died before the transfer of his sperm to a woman's body is not eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the decedent provided for the child in the decedent's will....

...[8] Under Florida law, a child conceived from the sperm of a person who died before the transfer of sperm to a woman's body is not eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will. Fla. Stat. § 742.17 (pertaining to "Disposition of eggs, sperm, or preembryos; rights of inheritance")(enacted May 14, 1993, effective May 15, 1993, as amended 1998)....

...Because the children were "legitimate" children under Arizona law, the Ninth Circuit saw no need to consider whether the children could inherit property from their deceased father under Arizona intestacy law. Id. Florida law, however, does deal specifically with posthumously-conceived children. See Fla. Stat. § 742.17 (pertaining to "Disposition of eggs, sperm, or preembryos; rights of inheritance")....

...[8] This case does not involve an "afterborn heir" within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 732.106. Under that statute, the heirs of a decedent conceived before his death, but born after his death, inherit intestate property as if they had been born in the decedent's lifetime. [9] Fla. Stat. § 742.17 provides: A commissioning couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple's eggs, sperm, and preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance....

...Florida Statutes that govern the donation and disposition of sperm recognize that sperm removed from the body becomes property. For example, section 742.14, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[o]nly reasonable compensation directly related to the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted." Section 742.17, Florida Statutes (2002), recognizes that control over the disposition of eggs, sperm, and preembryos may be governed by a written agreement....

...Steele’s intestate personal property, as is required in order to recover CIB. See id. § 416(h)(2)(A). The district court, the magistrate judge, and the administrative law judge all concluded no, reasoning that, un- der Florida Statute § 742.17(4), a child posthumously conceived— like P.S.S.—could inherit property only through the decedent’s will, and not through intestacy, as required to be entitled to CIB. Because the Florida Supreme Court, which i...

...individual was domiciled when he died”—here, Florida. Applying Florida law, the administrative law judge concluded that P.S.S. could not recover intestate property. The administrative law judge determined that the relevant Florida statute was section 742.17(4), 1 which provides that a posthumously conceived child “shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will.” The administrative law judge concluded that, under section 742.17(4), posthumously con- ceived children could “only inherit through the person’s will,” not through intestacy....

...��) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The district court referred the matter to 1 In doing so, the administrative judge law reasoned that, while there was no case law where a Florida court had specifically applied section 742.17 “to de- termine a child’s status for purposes of intestate succession,” it was “safe to assume that a Florida court would find [section] 742.17(4) applicable in deter- mining the claimant’s intestacy rights,” given “Florida precedent recognizing determinations of paternity under some parts of Chapter 742 for the purposes of determining intestacy rights.” USC...

...“did not qual- ify as an ‘afterborn heir’ under Florida intestacy law because he was born seventeen months after the death of Mr. Steele.” The magis- trate judge also found that the administrative law judge’s interpre- tation of section 742.17(4) was correct in determining that “posthu- mously conceived children cannot inherit property intestate under Florida law, but rather can only inherit property through a person’s will.” In doing so, the magistrate judge rejected Steele’s argument that section 742.17(4) allowed P.S.S....

...Steele argues that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and by not granting CIB to P.S.S. Specifically, Ms. Steele contends that the phrase “unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will” in Florida Statute § 742.17(4) effectively vests such a child USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Date Filed: 10/12/2022 Page: 7 of 14 RESTRICTED 20-11656 Opinion of the Court 7 with intestate rights in the event he or she is provided for by the decedent’s will....

...is considered a “child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act and is entitled to CIB. In response, the Com- missioner contends that the interpretation of the administrative law judge, magistrate judge, and district court is correct—i.e., that, under section 742.17(4), a posthumously conceived child may in- herit only through the decedent’s will, if provided for, and thus not through intestacy. We first turn to the relevant statutory provisions and case law....

...As the parties agree, section 732.106 does not apply to P.S.S. because he was conceived after Mr. Steele’s death. In addressing this issue, the administrative law judge, mag- istrate judge, and district court—as well as the parties in their briefs—analyzed section 742.17(4), titled “Disposition of eggs, sperm, or preembryos; rights of inheritance.” Section 742.17(4) is not contained in Florida’s probate code; rather, it is in Florida’s do- mestic relations laws. Section 742.17(4) provides that “[a] child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the dece- dent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the dece- dent’s will.” Here, the parties dispute the meaning of the phrase “unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will” in section 742.17(4). The administrative law judge interpreted section 742.17(4) to provide that a posthumously conceived child cannot USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Date Filed: 10/12/2022 Page: 10 of 14 RESTRICTED 10 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 in...

...in favor of this interpretation on appeal. In doing so, the Commis- sioner asserts that intestacy under Florida law “occurs when a ben- eficiary collects all or a portion of a decedent’s estate in the absence of a will” and that section 742.17(4) does not implicitly establish intestacy rights for a posthumously conceived child that has no claims to a decedent’s estate except those created through a will. By contrast, Ms....

...Steele argues that the phrase “unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will” effectively vests such a child with intestate rights if he or she is provided for by the decedent’s will. In essence, Ms. Steele argues that section 742.17(4) allows a posthumously conceived child to inherit a decedent’s per- sonal property intestate as long as the child is provided for by the decedent’s will. We find that section 742.17(4) is reasonably open to both in- terpretations. On one hand, section 742.17(4) may be reasonably read as limiting the rights of posthumously conceived children to property devised in the decedent’s will, i.e., providing no right to inherit the decedent’s property intestate....

...Indeed, the provision of Florida’s probate code concerning afterborn heirs only addresses children conceived before the decedent’s death. See Fla. Stat. § 732.106. Moreover, as previously mentioned, we also note the placement of section 742.17(4) within the Florida code—it is in the USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Date Filed: 10/12/2022 Page: 11 of 14 RESTRICTED 20-11656 Opinion of the Court 11 title of the Florida code concerning domestic relations, not the pro- bate code. And we note that no Florida court has applied section 742.17(4) in this manner, although the administrative law judge be- lieved that Florida courts would apply section 742.17(4) in deter- mining a claimant’s intestacy rights given Florida state court prec- edent. On the other hand, the phrase “unless the child has been pro- vided for by the decedent’s will” in section 742.17(4) can be reason- ably read as a condition for a posthumously conceived child to in- herit a share of the decedent’s property intestate....

...nless; see Ruiz v. Wing, 991 F.3d 1130, 1138 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that, in analyzing the plain meaning of language, this Court looks “to the common usage of words for their meaning”). Thus, a reasonable reading of section 742.17(4) is that a posthumously conceived child cannot bring an intestate claim against the decedent’s estate except if the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will....

...We therefore certify to the Florida Supreme Court the fol- lowing questions under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150: 3 (1) Under Florida law, is P.S.S. “provided for” in the dece- dent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)? (2) If the answer is yes, does Florida law authorize a posthumously conceived child who is provided for in the decedent’s will to inherit intestate the decedent’s prope...

...Sec. (“Steele I”), 51 F.4th 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2022). In considering our certified questions, the Florida Supreme Court found our first ques- tion dispositive: “Under Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?” Id.; see Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (“Steele II”), No. SC2022-1342, 2024 WL 630219 (Fla. Feb. 15, 2024). In answering this question, the Florida Supreme Court held that “‘provided for’ in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the posthumously conceived child through the will” and that, as such, “the will must show that the testator contemplated the possibility of a child b...

...P.S.S., Mr. Steele’s posthumously conceived child. Id. As we explain below, we hold that Mr. Steele’s will does not provide for P.S.S. and that he is not “eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate,” § 742.17(4), based the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to our first certified question....

...at 558 (quoting § 416(h)(2)(A)). “Whether posthumously conceived children can inherit through intestacy under Florida law” was a question of first im- pression for this Court, Steele I, 51 F.th at 1064, and the parties dis- puted the meaning and application of Florida Statute § 742.17(4) to the case, which provides that a “child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible fo...

...vided for by the decedent’s will.” (Emphasis added). Given this, we certified two questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) “[u]nder Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?”; and (2) “[i]f the answer is yes, does Florida law authorize a posthumously conceived child who is provided for in the decedent's will to inherit intestate the decedent's property?” Steele I, 51 F.4th at 1065. After considering our certified questions, the Florida Su- preme Court determined that the first question—the interpreta- tion of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4)—was USCA11 Case: 20-11656 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 02/29/2024 Page: 6 of 8 6 Opinion of the Court 20-11656 dispositive. 1 Steele II, 2024 WL 630219, at *2. Applying the suprem- acy-of-text principle to section 742.17(4), the Florida Supreme Court noted that “[t]he term ‘provided for’ is not defined in the statute or in any other part of chapter 742.” Id. (quoting § 742.17(4))....

...Therefore, the court looked to other “sources bearing on its objective meaning.” Id. After considering “era-appropriate” dictionaries and its case law in a related context, the Florida Su- preme Court concluded that “‘provided for’ in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the posthu- mously conceived child through the will,” i.e., “the child must have some inheritance right under the will.” Id....

...Steele died and necessarily excluded any posthumously conceived children, like P.S.S.” Id. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that “as it was impossible for P.S.S. to inherit anything from the will, it is clear that Mr. Steele did not provide for P.S.S. as contemplated by section 742.17(4).” Id. For the reasons stated in the Florida Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Steele II, we conclude that P.S.S., who was conceived after Mr. Steele’s death, was not “provided for” in Mr. Steele’s will, as contemplated by section 742.17(4). Therefore, under the intestacy law of Florida, P.S.S. is not “eligible for a claim against the dece- dent’s estate” under section 742.17(4) and cannot inherit Mr. Steele’s personal property through intestacy, which means that P.S.S....

...Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit about the meaning of a Florida statute that speaks to the inheritance rights of “[a] child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body.” § 742.17(4), Fla....

...Steele’s estate under Florida’s intestacy statutes. Such statutes, often located in Florida’s probate code, establish default rules for distributing a decedent’s property absent a valid will. Finding no controlling statute in the probate code, the ALJ turned to section 742.17—the statute noted at the beginning of this opinion....

...These alternative methods, though, are not applicable in this case. -4- take under Florida intestacy law—was one of first impression. Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2022). The court then assessed the parties’ competing interpretations of section 742.17(4), finding that each side had advanced a reasonable interpretation of it....

...One plausible interpretation, said the court, was that the statute “limit[s] the rights of posthumously conceived children to property devised in the decedent’s will.” Id. However, it also observed that “the phrase ‘unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will’ in section 742.17(4) can be reasonably read as a condition for a posthumously conceived child to inherit a share of the decedent’s property intestate.” Id....

...So, in light of the “two reasonable interpretations” and the absence of Florida case law on point, the court certified two questions of Florida law, asking: (1) Under Florida law, is P.S.S. “provided for” in the decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)? (2) If the answer is yes, does Florida law authorize a posthumously conceived child who is provided for in the decedent’s will to inherit intestate the decedent’s property? -5- Id. at 1065. Notably, while the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion discussed alternative answers to the second certified question, the opinion did not analyze the threshold question about the meaning and application of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4). This review proceeding follows. Analysis We answer only the first certified question because our interpretation of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4) is dispositive....

...person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will. § 742.17(4) (emphasis added). -6-  Under the statute, a will must “provide[] for” a posthumously conceived child in order for that child to “be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate.” Id....

...(last modification to statute). -8-  We think that our interpretation of “provided for” in that case has some relevance here since giving something to someone encompasses contemplation of the recipient. Thus, in the context of section 742.17, contemplation of the post-death conception of a child would be necessary in order for that child to be provided for in the will. Therefore, based on our analysis above, we conclude that “provided for” in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the posthumously conceived child through the will....

...ime Mr. Steele died and necessarily excluded any posthumously conceived children, like P.S.S. Therefore, as it was impossible for P.S.S. to inherit anything from the will, it is clear that Mr. Steele did not provide for P.S.S. as contemplated by section 742.17(4). 4....

... Conclusion Accordingly, based on the reasoning above, Mr. Steele’s will does not provide for P.S.S. Since P.S.S. is not provided for in the will, he is not “eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate.” § 742.17(4)....

...Steele, the tangible personal property would be distributed to the children living at the time of Mr. Steele’s death—a provision which unquestionably excludes P.S.S. Thus, Mr. Steele’s will does not “provide[] for” P.S.S. within the meaning of section 742.17(4), Florida Statutes (2019). Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No....