CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 26457
...such fee, charge, or assessment shall not be used by the park owner or developer as a cause for eviction in any court of law. ..... (9) No rental agreement shall provide for the eviction of a mobile home owner on a ground other than one contained in s. 723.061....
...4, 1984, effective date of Chapter 723; (2) tenancy in a mobile home park is continuous from the date a lot rental agreement is entered into or the home owner assumes occupancy, until the homeowner terminates the agreement or is evicted pursuant to section
723.061; (3) section
723.037 is a procedural notice provision which must be read in pari materia with all of Chapter 723, and does not authorize the park owner to amend the prospectus in a manner inconsistent with Chapter 723 upon ninety day...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 256189
...[6] We note that chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1996) provides a number of grounds upon which a mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home from a lot leased in a mobile home park or change the use of the land comprising the mobile home park entirely. See § 723.061, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 9518
...ctured Housing Ass'n, Inc., amicus curiae. BARFIELD, Judge. This appeal involves challenges to a final judgment determining the constitutionality of two provisions of "The Florida Mobile Home Act," section
723.033, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), and section
723.061(2), Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court found section
723.033 constitutional and section
723.061(2) unconstitutional, and denied the mobile home park owners' request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C....
...of unlimited duration; that it grants the tenant, but not the park owner, the right to unilaterally set aside any allegedly "unreasonable" term of the rental agreement; and that subsection (3) establishes an irrebuttable and conclusive presumption. Section 723.061(2) requires a mobile home park owner who wishes to change his land use either to pay to have the tenants moved to another comparable park within fifty miles, or to purchase the mobile homes and appurtenances from the tenants at a statutorily determined value....
...e lot rental amounts charged by mobile home park owners" and that the statute does not "unconstitutionally abridge Plaintiff's rights to be rewarded for their industry, to engage in lawful business, or to rely on their contracts." They asserted that section 723.061(2) does not create an unconstitutional taking of park owners' land, and that it fully complies with both constitutions....
...on (6)," that a rent "in excess of market rent" is not unreasonable. It ruled that "shall" in subsection (3) "should reasonably be interpreted by a trial court as directory, rather than as mandatory and conclusive." *64 The trial court ruled that subsection 723.061(2) is unconstitutional, severed it from the rest of section 723.061, and enjoined DBR and FMO from enforcing it, finding that the challenged subsection is "arbitrary and capricious." Noting the other protections afforded mobile home owners by chapter 723, the court observed that the effect of subsection 723.061(2) "is not to make reasonable accommodation for competing interests, but to require the park owner to virtually guarantee a perpetual tenancy to a tenant in a regulated park in Florida," and that the unrebutted evidence of the subsect...
...bile home owner, but by the location of the park land and the types of amenities offered by the park owner," and that it would cost the park owner 32%-1174% of the land's value to purchase all the mobile homes and appurtenances. The court found that section 723.061(2) constitutes both a physical taking and a regulatory taking of the park owner's property which does not substantially advance a public purpose, in violation of the Florida and federal constitutions....
...occupancy of a park owner's land is by purchasing or moving all the affected homes" at its own expense, and that the lessees already have the statutory right to purchase the land if the park owner wishes to change the land use. The court found that section 723.061(2), "on its face, compels a park owner to suffer possession, occupancy, and perpetual tenancy of his land by others until he complies with an economically impossible requirement to purchase or move property that he does not own," and...
...clude others, and to do so for the exclusive benefit of a limited class who are lessees, not owners, of his land and who have chosen not to become owners of his land." The court found that the state defendants "have the duty and authority to enforce section
723.061, Florida Statutes," but declined to assess attorney fees against them, finding that "Plaintiffs have not proved any activity of any of the Defendants that would give rise to any liability under Count VI of Plaintiff's complaint concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The park owners appealed the finding that section
723.033 is constitutional; DBR and FMO cross-appealed the finding that section
723.061(2) is unconstitutional....
...y choose, without duress, whether to enter into an agreement providing for specified rent amounts and the factors bearing upon future rent increases. *66 DBR and FMO contend that the trial court ignored precedent and the lack of evidence in striking section 723.061(2) as unconstitutional....
...ysical taking. They assert that nothing in the challenged statute requires a different result here. They contend that the park owners have failed to establish that the challenged statute constitutes a violation of substantive due process, i.e., that section 723.061(2) bears no substantial relationship to the general welfare, or that the statute constitutes a regulatory taking, i.e., that the regulation deprives the park owners of any economically viable use of their property. The park owners assert that the trial court correctly found section 723.061(2) to be unconstitutional....
...1986), required a factual record to support a facial due process challenge to the statute challenged in that case, because it involved issues of mixed fact and law, and that the trial court in this case properly considered the irrational and confiscatory impact of section 723.061(2)....
...They assert that the statute challenged in Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 N.E.2d 1059, cert. denied, City of New York v. Seawall Associates,
493 U.S. 976,
110 S.Ct. 500,
107 L.Ed.2d 503 (1989), cited by the park owners, differs substantially from section
723.061(2)....
...wing accommodations permanently from the rental market" unless provision was made for relocating the tenants in comparable quarters at rents no greater than they had paid. They argue that the trial court erred in finding a regulatory taking, because section 723.061(2) serves a legitimate public purpose in regulating the unique relationship between a landowner and mobile home tenant, and because the park owners retain an economically viable use of their land under the statute. The park owners assert that the trial court's rulings, that section 723.061(2) violated the constitutional provisions they presented, that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that DBR had the duty and power to enforce it, establish a violation of 42 U.S.C....
...an award unjust," and argue that no such circumstances exist here. We find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings, which in turn support its legal conclusions that section
723.033 is constitutional and that section
723.061(2) is unconstitutional....
...ve. Having carefully considered the principles set out in Yee v. City of Escondido , California, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Hodel v. Irving, Seawall Associates v. City of New York, and the other cases cited by the parties, we find that section 723.061(2) constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation....
...ting interests, [6] in effect coercing mobile home park owners to surrender indefinitely their rights to possess and occupy their land and to exclude others. Once the park owners have rented their property to mobile home owners, they are required by section 723.061(2) to continue doing so unless they buy all the mobile homes or pay to have them moved....
...Therefore, as a practical matter, the challenged statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the park owner's property and effectively extinguishes a fundamental attribute of ownership, the right to physically occupy one's land. Unlike section
723.033, the regulatory scheme contained in section
723.061(2) does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, but instead singles out mobile home park owners to bear an unfair burden, and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking of their property....
...NOTES [1] Since this litigation began, the Department of Business Regulation has been consolidated with the Department of Professional Regulation, but will be referred to in this opinion as "DBR". [2] DBR acknowledges that the most significant difference between the two regulatory frameworks is the additional requirement of section 723.061(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6543
...4th DCA 1989), in which the following question was certified as one of great public importance: Is the conversion of land comprising a mobile home park from use as a mobile home park to vacant land, or to no use, a "change in use" within the contemplation of section
723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985)?
550 So.2d at 1161....
...[1] Respondent Martin Regency, Ltd., a limited partnership, owns the Regency Mobile Home Park in Martin County, Florida. On August 30, 1985, the partnership sent eviction notices to its tenant mobile home owners, including petitioners, as required by section 723.061(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1985). Section 723.061(1)(d) provides: (1) A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section....
...ter and sewer facilities, and the probability of further restrictive legislation at the state level imposed on owners of mobile home parks, I must regretfully advise you that I wish to vacate the Regency Mobile Home Park. Florida law, in particular, Section 723.061(1)(d), F.S., requires that a six (6) month notice be given to residents of the Park....
...eviction action. On February 24, 1988, the circuit court denied summary judgment sought by the mobile home owners and granted summary judgment in favor of Martin Regency, Ltd., finding, in relevant part, that the notice satisfied the requirements of section 723.061(1)(d): If the land is no longer going to be used as a mobile home park and in effect becomes vacant land, to be put into some other commercial use or no use at all[,] this constitutes a change of use....
...Furthermore, there does not appear to be any valid reason for requiring the mobile home park owner to specify the actual change in use in the eviction notice. Thus, we agree with the appellants' assertion that the trial court erred in finding their notices of eviction failed to comply with section
723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985)." Harris,
550 So.2d at 1161 (quoting Brown,
531 So.2d at 735). Second, the court held that the term "change in use" in section
723.061(1)(d) contemplated "converting the land comprising the mobile home park from use as a mobile home park to vacant land, or to no use," but certified the question above. Id. We begin our analysis by agreeing with the district court's conclusion that nothing in either section
723.061(1)(d) or other provisions in chapter 723, read in pari materia, requires a mobile home park owner to "`specify in the notices of eviction what the nature of the projected change of use of the land will be.'" Harris,
550 So.2d at 1161 (quoting Brown,
531 So.2d at 735). The question that remains to be resolved is what is a valid "change in use" under section
723.061(1)(d)....
...Each has basic property rights which must reciprocally accommodate and harmonize." Id. The legislature attempted to accommodate these competing property rights by allowing a mobile home park owner to evict a tenant mobile home owner only in limited circumstances. See § 723.061, Fla....
...may be voided if the mobile home owners can prove the park owner acted in bad faith. Reading these provisions in pari materia with the eviction statute, it would be illogical to conclude that the legislature intended the "change in use" provision of section
723.061(1)(d) to be applied broadly to allow a park owner to evade the requirements of section
723.071(1)....
...We see nothing in the statutory scheme to show that the legislature intended to prohibit a property owner from doing exactly that. Thus, we conclude that the only logical way to interpret "change in use" consistent with legislative intent and policy is to hold that section
723.061(1)(d) does not authorize an eviction if the purpose of the change in use is to sell the park property and evade the requirements of section
723.071(1). If the park owner in good faith merely wants to leave the land vacant, the owner may do so under the statute. [5] However, if the mobile home owners have good cause to believe that a park owner evicted them under section
723.061(1)(d) merely to sell the property and evade section
723.071(1), they may void the eviction....
...If, however, the trial court finds that Martin Regency, Ltd., intended merely to change the use of the property to vacant land, then the eviction *1299 action should be found appropriate under the circumstances of this case. In conclusion, we answer the certified question with a qualified affirmative: We hold that section
723.061(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1985) does contemplate the conversion of a mobile home park to no use or vacant land unless the purpose of the change in use is to sell the land and evade the requirements of section
723.071(1)....
...McDONALD and KOGAN, JJ., and EHRLICH, Senior Justice, concur. OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion. GRIMES, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, J., concur. OVERTON, Justice, dissenting. I fully concur with Justice Grimes' dissent. The majority, by its construction of section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), has opened the door to a possible holding by the federal courts that the entire statute is unconstitutional under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution....
...e of the land providing he gave notice a specified length of time before the change in order to give the mobile home owners a reasonable opportunity to move. § 83.69(d), Fla. Stat. (1973). With minor changes, the latter provision is now codified as section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which is the focus of our inquiry in this case. I agree with the majority that when a mobile home park owner decides to allow the land to become vacant, this constitutes a change of use as contemplated by section 723.061(1)(d) and the statute does not require the park owner to specify the nature of the change in use in the notice to the mobile home owners....
...The majority seems to suggest that it is evil for the owner to close the park and *1300 thereafter sell the property as vacant land in the hope of getting a higher price. However, chapter 723 is not designed to keep the park owner from selling the property at its best price. Section 723.061(1)(d) is only intended to guarantee the mobile home owner ample time to relocate in the event the park owner decides to change the use of the property....
...general public." See Brate v. Chulavista Mobile Home Park Owners Ass'n,
559 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We believe, however, that Martin Regency, Ltd., misperceives the problem. The problem created by the district court's broad interpretation of section
723.061(1)(d) is that it allows a park owner to purposefully circumvent the mobile home owner protections of section
723.071(1) merely by not making an "offer" until it evicts all the tenants....
...his election to either buy the mobile home, or relocate the mobile home to another park owned by the park owner, or pay to relocate the mobile home to another mobile home park." Ch. 86-162, § 11, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). [6] Significantly, section 723.061 now has been amended further in order to address the needs of the mobile home owner in the event the park owner changes the use of the land. See § 723.061, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...We reverse the order awarding attorney's fees and the final judgment entered in favor of defendants/appellees. We remand for trial on the issue of whether the plaintiffs/appellants' conduct constituted a waiver of the eviction notices served pursuant to section 723.061, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...However, upon renewed motion by appellees, the trial judge granted a directed verdict at the conclusion of appellees' case, but before appellants' rebuttal. The trial court ruled, inter alia, that appellants' notices of eviction were defective under section 723.061, Florida Statutes (1985), because the notices failed to state the specific nature of the projected change of the use of the land comprising the mobile home park; that the notice of eviction was not delivered to all tenants affected thereby, in particular, the plaintiffs' son, Jeffrey M. Brown, as required by section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985); and that as a matter of law, appellants by their letters of June 27, 1986, and August 2, 1986, amended or rescinded the six-month notices of eviction previously delivered to the appellees. Also, in the final judgment, the trial court certified, as a question of great public importance, the following question: [W]hether Section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes, (1985), requires the owners of a mobile home park, in their notices of eviction, to specify what the nature of the projected change of use of the land will be. .. . We answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the notices of eviction were defective under section 723.061, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...Brown, who had appellants' power of attorney, sent notices of eviction by certified mail to all tenants on June 5 and 6, 1986. The notice stated: It is regrettable after 28 years as a Mobile Home Park, but notice for eviction, pursuant to current 1985 Florida State Statute 723.061(1)(d), is herein given....
...ing to go ahead with the eviction. The president of the tenants' association testified that the association always made it a point to indicate to the tenants that the eviction had not been revoked. *735 At issue in this case is the interpretation of section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides: (1) A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section....
...Furthermore, there does not appear to be any valid reason for requiring the mobile home park owner to specify the actual change in use in the eviction notice. Thus, we agree with the appellants' assertion that the trial court erred in finding their notices of eviction failed to comply with section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). We also agree with the appellants' contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the notices of eviction, pursuant to section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), were deficient because Jeffrey M....
...In the instant case, appellees were in no way prejudiced, injured, or misled by Jeffrey M. Brown's failure to mail a notice of eviction to himself. Appellees cannot rely upon this technical defect in notice to support their conclusion that the appellants did not comply with section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...tatutory change effective on June 10 required cross appellees to provide one year's notice of a change in use rather than six months' notice. Cross appellees argue that the notice is effective at the date of mailing, rather than the date of receipt. Section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Change in use of the land comprising the mobile home park, or the portion thereof from which mobile homes are to be evicted, from mobile home lot rentals to some other use, provided all tenant...
...The statute specifies in subsection (3) that: [D]elivery of any written notice required by this section shall begin on the date of postmark and be by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the mobile home owner at his last known address. § 723.061(3), Fla....
...Lucerne Sta." The lists are postmarked June 5 and 6, 1986. Since the lists are postmarked prior to June 10, 1986, only six months' notice was required and the trial court correctly denied cross appellants' motion for summary judgment. Therefore, cross appellants Trew were given notice in accordance with section 723.061, Florida Statutes (1985). *737 In summary, we answer the certified question in the negative and we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the notices of eviction were defective under section 723.061, Florida Statutes (1985). Furthermore, the trial court erred in ruling that the June 27 and August 2, 1986 letters, as a matter of law, constituted a waiver of the eviction notices served pursuant to section 723.061....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1140, 1989 WL 81210
...the issue of the length of a mobile home park tenancy after rejection by a Chapter 11 debtor under Section 365(h)(2). Simply put, they argue that Fla.Stat. § 723 is the sole basis upon which tenants from a mobile home park may be evicted. Fla.Stat. 723.061 [4] ....
...filed bankruptcy, this Debtor/tenant, according to these parties' argument, could reject the lease under Section 365, yet remain in possession as long as the Debtor paid rent and did not violate the exclusive statutory bases for eviction. Fla. Stat. 723.061....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 36618
...Appellant, Myrna Gallo, resided in Ranch Margate Mobile Home Park in Margate, Florida, in a mobile home she purchased in 2001. In February 2006 the park owner, Celebration Point Townhomes, Inc. ("Celebration"), sent a Notice of Park Closing to all park residents, pursuant to section 723.061(1)(d)....
...fected are given at least 6 months' notice of the projected change of use and of their need to secure other accommodations. The park owner may not give a notice of increase in lot rental amount within 90 days before giving notice of a change in use. § 723.061(1)(d), Fla....
...and fair dealings in its performance or enforcement." §
723.021, Fla. Stat. (2005). In its pleading opposing the complaint, Celebration contended that section
723.083 did not apply to it and instead only applied to state action. It also pointed to section
723.061(3) which provides, "The provisions of s.
723.083 shall not be applicable to any park where the provisions of this subsection apply." §
723.061(3), Fla, Stat. (2005) (footnote omitted). The matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a report and recommendation to dismiss the complaint, as section
723.061(3) exempts the park owner from the application of section
723.083. In other words, defendants' only statutory responsibility, when evicting tenants for a change in use, is to comply with the notice requirements found in section
723.061, Because the defendants had complied with the statute, Gallo had no claim against Celebration....
...modified its statutes, particularly with respect *995 to the eviction of mobile home tenants for a change in use. It retained the right of the park owner to evict for change in use but increased the notice period to one year of any projected change. §
723.061(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1986). It adopted section
723.061(2) which required homeowners objecting to a change in use to file a petition for administrative or judicial remedies within ninety days from the date of their notice of eviction or be barred from relief. A homeowner was not prevented by this provision from objecting to a zoning change. §
723.061(2), Fla. Stat. The legislature also included a requirement that the park owner elect to either buy the mobile home owner's home, relocate it to another park, or pay the homeowner to relocate. §
723.061(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Where this purchase/relocation provision applied, "The provisions of s.
723.083 shall not be applicable. . . ." §
723.061(2)(d), Fla....
...ating conflicting interests. . . ." Id. at 67-68. The legislature responded in 2001 and again modified the statute, eliminating the purchase/relocate requirement. It reverted to requiring six months' notice of eviction for change in use of the park. §
723.061(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001). It eliminated section
723.061(2), regardihg the purchase/relocation obligation of the park owner, except for subsection (2)(d) regarding the application of section
723.083, which it renumbered subsection (3). Thus, that subsection read, "The provisions of s.
723.083 shall not be applicable to any park where the provisions of this subsection apply." §
723.061(3), Fla. Stat. The statutory revisors included a Note: "The reference to `this subsection' appears as it did prior to the amendment by s. 6, ch. 2001-227. Prior to the amendment, subsection (3) was paragraph (2)(d)." §
723.061(1)(d), Fla....
...(2001). To replace the purchase/relocation obligation, the legislature created the Florida Mobile Home Relocation Corporation to provide relocation assistance to mobile home tenants required to move pursuant to an eviction for change in use of the park. § 723.0611, Fla. Stat. (2001). The corporation would operate the Florida Mobile Home Relocation Trust Fund. § 723.06115, Fla....
...From this review of the statutes, it is apparent that the obligation of the government to consider the adequacy of parks for relocation, required pursuant to section
723.083, is independent of the park owner's right to evict a tenant for change in use, pursuant to section
723.061....
...It provided assistance for relocation first by requiring the park owner to purchase or relocate and then, after that provision was declared unconstitutional, from a special fund it created. Where this relief was provided, the legislature did not require compliance with section
723.083 by the government. See §
723.061(2)(d), Fla....
...dequacy of remaining facilities. The legislature continued this exemption from section
723.083 when it amended the statute again in 2001 and set up the trust fund. When the legislature revised the statute, it eliminated the subsections of the former section
723.061(2), except subsection (d), providing for the inapplicability of section
723.083....
...It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that appropriate effect should be given to all the terms of the statute when it can be done without violating legislative intent. See Davis v. Florida Power Co.,
64 Fla. 246,
60 So. 759, 765 (1913). Gallo's interpretation would render section
723.061(3) meaningless....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12815, 2009 WL 2762679
...eir tenancy at the mobile home park was to be terminated effective October 13, 2008, because the City would be changing the use of the land from mobile home or other vehicle lot rentals to some other use. The eviction notices were served pursuant to section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2007)....
...The City filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found in favor of the City, holding that the City is not required to provide the housing study, as section
723.083 is inapplicable to it in its proprietary capacity. The trial court also found that sections
723.061 and
723.083 are facially constitutional....
...Upon entering summary judgment in favor of the City, appellants filed this appeal asserting that the City must comply with section
723.083, and that it must perform an alternative housing study before evicting residents from the mobile home park. We disagree. Section
723.061 provides in pertinent part:
723.061 Eviction; grounds, proceedings....
...h would result in the removal or relocation of mobile home owners residing in a mobile home park without first determining that adequate mobile home parks or other suitable facilities exist for the relocation of the mobile home owners. By its terms, section
723.061(3) specifically provides that section
723.083 does not apply when a mobile home park owner gives notice under section
723.061. See §
723.061(3), Fla....
...4th DCA 2008), and held: [I]t is apparent that the obligation of the government to consider the adequacy of parks for relocation, required pursuant to section
723.083, is independent of the park owner's right to evict a tenant for change in use, pursuant to section
723.061....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Any Participating Homeowner in default of this
order shall not be eligible for membership in any putative
2
class which may be approved in this action; shall be
subject to eviction pursuant to the proceedings set forth
in Section
723.061, Florida Statutes; and shall be
deemed to have waived any defenses, other than
payment, in any eviction action based upon such default
as set forth in Section
723.062(2), Florida Statutes.
In compliance with parag...
...Estates claimed they owed, which Naples Estates accepted until
October 1, 2015.
On October 28, 2015, Naples Estates sued the Home Owners
for eviction and damages (eviction action). Prior to instituting the
suit, Naples Estates mailed the Home Owners a letter pursuant to
section 723.061(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), demanding that they
remit $4,569.73 for the difference between what they paid during
the preceding twenty-four months and the $600 per month that
Naples Estates stated they owed....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2352, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 5423, 1989 WL 113874
...Appellants, the tenants of a mobile home park, appeal the entry of summary judgment in five consolidated eviction actions. Appellants contend that the eviction notices did not contain any of the exclusive statutory grounds for eviction of mobile home park tenants authorized by section
723.061, Florida Statutes (1985); that the conversion of the land comprising the mobile home park from use as a mobile home park to vacant land, or to no use, is not a “change in use” within the contemplation of section
723.061(l)(d), and; that genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved regarding appellee, the park owner’s, breach of the statutory duties of good faith and fair deal *1161 ing contained in section
723.021, Florida Statutes (1985)....
...ter and sewer facilities, and the probability of further restrictive legislation at the state level imposed on owners of mobile home parks, I must regretfully advise you that I wish to vacate the Regency Mobile Home Park. Florida law, in particular, Section 723.061(l)(d), F.S., requires that a six (6) month notice be given to residents of the Park....
...mobile home park. During the next few months you will need to secure other accommodations. We disagree with appellant’s argument that the notices were deficient because they did not state the nature of the projected change in the use of the land. Section 723.061 provides, in pertinent part: 723.061 Eviction; grounds, proceedings— (1) A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section....
...Furthermore, there does not appear to be any valid reason for requiring the mobile home park owner to specify the actual change in use in the eviction notice. Thus, we agree with the appellants’ assertion that the trial court erred in finding their notices of eviction failed to comply with section 723.061(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...at 735 . We also hold that the trial court did not err when it concluded that converting the land comprising the mobile home park from use as a mobile home park to vacant land, or to no use, constitutes a “change in use” within the contemplation of section 723.061(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...However, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court as being one of great public importance: IS THE CONVERSION OF LAND COMPRISING A MOBILE HOME PARK FROM USE AS A MOBILE HOME PARK TO VACANT LAND, OR TO NO USE, A “CHANGE IN USE” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 723.061(l)(d), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? Finally, appellants contend that a question of fact exists concerning whether ap-pellee intended in good faith to change the use of the land from mobile home lot rentals to some other use pursuant to section 723.061(l)(d)....
...Rinker Materials Corp.,
528 So.2d 450 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied,
537 So.2d 569 (Fla.1988). *1162 Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee. AFFIRMED. DELL and STONE, JJ., and FRANK, RICHARD H., Associate Judge, concur. . Section
723.061(l)(d), as amended in 1987, requires the mobile home park owner to give all affected tenants at least one year’s notice of the projected change of use and of their need to secure other accommodations,
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
adult daughter, Sharon Cheeseman, pursuant to section
723.061(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2022). After a bench
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2010).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...4 As previously recognized by this office, there are several provisions in Chapter 723 , Florida Statutes, which provide notice and safeguards to mobile home owners who may be subject to removal and relocation due to a change of use of the mobile home park land. 5 Section 723.061 (1)(d), Florida Statutes, allows a mobile home park owner to evict a mobile home owner, a mobile home tenant, a mobile home occupant, or a mobile home for: "Change in use of the land comprising the mobile home park, or the portion the...
...administrative or judicial remedies within 90 days of receiving notice or they will be barred from taking any subsequent action to contest the change in use; however, this does not prevent a homeowner from objecting to a zoning change at any time. 6 Section 723.061 (4), Florida Statutes, further requires: "A mobile home park owner applying for the removal of a mobile home owner, tenant, occupant, or a mobile home shall file, in the county court in the county where the mobile home lot is situated...
...lot and stating the facts that authorize the removal of the mobile home owner, tenant, occupant, or the mobile home. The park owner is entitled to the summary procedure provided in s.
51.011 , and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar." Section
723.0611 , Florida Statutes, creates the Florida Mobile Home Relocation Corporation (FMHRC) which has the primary purpose to make payments to mobile home owners under the relocation program established in Chapter 723 , Florida Statutes. 7 If a mobile home owner is required to move due to a change in use of the land comprising the park as provided in section
723.061 (1)(d), Florida Statutes, the mobile home park owner is required to pay specified sums to the trust fund administered by the FMHRC. 8 In turn, the mobile home owner who complies with the requirements in section
723.0612 , Florida Statutes, is entitled to payment from the FMHRC for relocation expenses....
...ark where the owner of the park has followed the mandates of Chapter 723 , Florida Statutes. Sincerely, Bill McCollum Attorney General BM/tals 1 See s.
723.002 (1), Fla. Stat. 2 Section
723.004 (1), Fla. Stat. 3 Section
723.004 (3), Fla. Stat. 4 See s.
723.061 (3), Fla....
...bsection" refers to subsection (2) [the provision addressing eviction for change of use] in which subsection (3) was contained prior to amendment by s. 6, Ch. 2001-227 , Laws of Fla. 5 See Inf. Op. to The Hon. Leslie Waters, November 14, 2005. 6 See s. 723.061 (2), Fla. Stat. See also s. 723.0612 , Fla. Stat., providing for relocation expenses to a mobile home owner required to move due to a change in use of the land under s. 723.061 (1)(d). 7 See also s. 723.06115 , Fla. Stat., establishing the Florida Mobile Home Relocation Trust Fund. 8 See s. 723.06116 , Fla. Stat. 9 See s. 723.0612 , Fla....
