CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6543
...sought to be accomplished." Id. (emphasis supplied). Among the total circumstances the legislature has considered in allowing and limiting eviction are the protections afforded mobile home owners in the event the owner puts the park up for sale. See § 723.071(1), Fla....
...Reading these provisions in pari materia with the eviction statute, it would be illogical to conclude that the legislature intended the "change in use" provision of section
723.061(1)(d) to be applied broadly to allow a park owner to evade the requirements of section
723.071(1)....
...as vacant land. Once all the tenants are evicted, the property no longer would be a mobile home park subject to chapter 723, and the mobile home owners would have been denied their statutory right to purchase the park. Allowing park owners to evade section 723.071(1) would be inconsistent with clear legislative policy....
...Thus, we conclude that the only logical way to interpret "change in use" consistent with legislative intent and policy is to hold that section
723.061(1)(d) does not authorize an eviction if the purpose of the change in use is to sell the park property and evade the requirements of section
723.071(1)....
...If the park owner in good faith merely wants to leave the land vacant, the owner may do so under the statute. [5] However, if the mobile home owners have good cause to believe that a park owner evicted them under section
723.061(1)(d) merely to sell the property and evade section
723.071(1), they may void the eviction....
...was because of a projected change in use of the park property. But the record is not clear as to whether Martin Regency, Ltd., intended to change the use of the property to vacant land for the purpose of selling it while evading the requirements of section 723.071(1), or whether it merely wanted to change the property to vacant land. These are factual questions to be resolved by the trial court, precluding summary judgment on the record before us. If the trial court concludes that Martin Regency, Ltd., wanted to avoid the requirements of section 723.071(1) in order to sell the property as vacant land, respondent's eviction action should be denied....
...In conclusion, we answer the certified question with a qualified affirmative: We hold that section
723.061(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1985) does contemplate the conversion of a mobile home park to no use or vacant land unless the purpose of the change in use is to sell the land and evade the requirements of section
723.071(1)....
...I cannot agree that the statute prohibits the owner from closing the park and offering the property for sale as vacant land. The majority opinion is premised upon the conclusion that by selling the property as vacant land the park owner has evaded section 723.071(1), Florida Statutes (1985). Yet, section 723.071(1) only provides that if the owner offers the mobile home park for sale, he shall notify the mobile home owners and give them the first option of buying the park upon the same terms....
...g used as a mobile home park. Of course, at that point the mobile home owners would no longer be interested in it anyway. In closing a park with the intent of selling the property as vacant land, the owner is not seeking to "evade" the provisions of section 723.071....
...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Subsequent to the date when Martin Regency, Ltd., issued the eviction notice, the legislature extended the six-month notice requirement to one year. Ch. 86-162, § 11, Laws of Fla. [3] Section 723.071 of the Florida Statutes (1985) provides in relevant part: 723.071 Sale of mobile home parks....
...c. [4] Nonetheless, Martin Regency, Ltd., asserts that the district court's interpretation does not enable the partnership to circumvent the right-to-purchase statute because it has not technically offered the park for sale. "Offer" is defined in subsection 723.071(3)(b) as "any solicitation by the park owner to the general public." See Brate v....
...We believe, however, that Martin Regency, Ltd., misperceives the problem. The problem created by the district court's broad interpretation of section
723.061(1)(d) is that it allows a park owner to purposefully circumvent the mobile home owner protections of section
723.071(1) merely by not making an "offer" until it evicts all the tenants....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 18456
...The Chulavista Home Owners Association brought an action against Britt, Brate and Neptune alleging that the sale of the park violated the Mobile Home Sales Act because Britt and Brate did not offer the Association the right of first refusal prescribed in section 723.071(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...Following a nonjury trial the court voided the sale and required certain acts to be performed consistent with the statute. Britt, Brate and Neptune have appealed from the final judgment. We reverse. Mobile home park owners are subject to unique requirements impairing the unfettered alienation of their realty. Section 723.071 provides in its pertinent parts that: (1)(a) If a mobile home park owner offers a mobile home park for sale, he shall notify the officers of the homeowners' association created pursuant to ss....
...We have not found any decision involving the application, interpretation or construction of the foregoing statutory scheme. This case appears to be one of first impression. The relevant statutory provisions contemplate the existence of an association at the moment when the "park owner offers a mobile home park for sale." § 723.071(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). The term "offer" as it is used in section 723.071(1)(a) and defined in section 723.071(3)(b) means "any solicitation by the park owner to the *1192 general public." The association, as a condition of its ability "to exercise the rights provided in s. 723.071 ......
...of which not less than two-thirds of all of the mobile home owners within the park shall have consented, in writing, to become members or shareholders." §
723.075, Fla. Stat. (1983). The association's entitlement to pre-sale notice is further conditioned upon its compliance with sections
723.075-723.079. §
723.071(1)(b) and (2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...In resolving this one issue, we need not reach the questions of whether the Association enjoyed a two-thirds membership at the time of the sale, had at that moment complied with sections
723.075-723.079, or whether Britt and Brate enjoyed an exemption from section
723.071(1) by reason of section
723.071(4)....
...Our review of the record compels the conclusion that the trial court was in error in its finding that Britt and Brate solicited the sale to Neptune, as a member of the general public, with the result that the sale was governed by subsection (1) of section 723.071, Florida Statutes (1983). As we have noted above, section 723.071(3)(b) defines "offer" as "any solicitation by the park owner to the general public." We reject the trial court's determination that Britt and Brate offered the park for sale to the general public....
...No signs were posted at or near the property, there were no for-sale notices placed in newspapers and, indeed, it appears that Britt was unwilling to sell the park until the moment of closing. We are not confronted in this proceeding with, nor do we purport to pass upon, any question of whether section 723.071(1) offends, either in a constitutional or common law setting, the right of mobile home park owners to enjoy unrestricted alienation of their real property....
...words, if they are unambiguous." Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners,
429 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for review denied,
438 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1983). We find absolutely no ambiguity in section
723.071(3)(b)'s use of the word "offer" which, in turn, is definitionally dependent upon the meaning of the word "solicitation." The dictionary meaning of "solicitation" is: earnest request; a seeking to obtain something from another....
...Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition, 1983. As we have said, the record will not support either a finding of solicitation or an offer to the general public. Finally, we are led to the conclusion that Neptune's purchase of the property is subject only to subsection (2) of section 723.071....
