Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...This was the situation which gave rise to the appellees' claims of procedural and substantive unconscionability. In March of 1986, the appellees, 241 of the park's tenants/mobile home owners, filed a complaint alleging the rents charged were unconscionable under section 723.033 Florida Statutes (1985)....

...onscionable". As we said at the outset, we view the evidence from the same vantage point as the trial court to determine whether the court's conclusion in this case is correct. This is because the determination of conscionability is a matter of law. § 723.033(1), Fla....

...urt. We are further convinced that the legislature knows how to distinguish between these two terms when it so chooses and that it has distinguished them in the relevant statutes here. Historically, chapter 723 contained the word "unconscionable" in section 723.033 in all its former versions....

...or fraud nor misrepresentation theories, but merely that, under the statute, the rents were unconscionable. We, therefore, do not address these issues in deciding this case. The sole basis of our holding is the legal issue of unconscionability under section 723.033....

..." are used interchangeably by the trial court. [5] Were we properly called upon to resolve this issue we would likely have no trouble approving the studied and comprehensive method chosen by the trial court as a workable and proper interpretation of section 723.033 in avoiding an unconscionable result by refusing to enforce the unconscionable provisions of the contract....

...vous anguish, pain and suffering causing injury, loss of reputation and medical expenses dismissed; dismissal not addressed in appeal where only constitutionality of new act addressed). [6] Because of our holding, this evidentiary issue is moot. [7] Section 723.033 provides: (1) If the court, as a matter of law, finds a mobile home lot rental agreement, or any provision of the rental agreement, to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may: (a) Refuse to enforce the rental agreement....

...name (Section 723.006); (3) the obligation of good faith and fair dealings in rental agreements (Section 723.021); (4) regulations as to the mobile home lot rental agreement (Section 723.031); (5) provisions for unconscionable lot rental agreements (Section 723.033); (6) mediation or arbitration provisions concerning lot rental increases, reduction in services or utilities, or changes in rules or regulations (Section 723.037); and (7) dispute settlements (Section 723.038)....

...Others have indicated that they are not. See generally Avila; Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So.2d 884 (Fla.3d DCA 1982), review denied, 434 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1983); Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 398 So.2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1981). Section 723.033(2), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides a cause of action for unconscionable rental agreements states: When it is claimed or appears to the court that the rental agreement, or any provision thereof, may be unconscionable, the part...

...Aspen Emerald Lakes Associates, Ltd., 446 So.2d 177, 180 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Among its provisions is the section under which this suit is brought, which authorizes the court to refuse to enforce or limit the application of any rental agreement or provision thereof which it deems unconscionable. § 723.033, Fla....

...The increases are grossly excessive when compared with rents charged by similarly situated mobile home parks in the county. The tenants believed the increases were unconscionable mobile home lot rental agreements in violation of section 83.754 and its successor statute, section 723.033....

...("Homeowners Association") and individual parties [1] attorney's fees and costs. *75 The Homeowners Association sued Natale Munao, II, and Natale Munao, III, the owners of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park, claiming that the rent charged was unconscionable pursuant to section 723.033, Florida Statutes (1989), because appellants reduced the amenities provided to residents of the mobile home park. The Homeowners Association subsequently moved to amend the complaint to change unconscionable to unreasonable so that the complaint would comport with the amended statutory language of section 723.033, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)....

...aintiffs, the trial court applied a contingency risk multiplier of 1.5. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing the Homeowners Association to amend its complaint to assert a claim for unreasonable rent because the 1990 amendment to section 723.033, Florida Statutes, was not in effect at the time the residents entered into their rental agreements....

...Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs to appellees and in applying a contingency risk multiplier to the attorney's fees awarded to the Homeowners Association and Homeowners Association/Guest Fee Plaintiffs. We affirm. First, appellants do not dispute that section 723.033, Florida Statutes (1989), *76 prohibited unconscionable lot rental agreements, and that the 1990 version prohibited unreasonable lot rental agreements. Appellants contend, however, that the 1990 amendment to section 723.033 cannot be applied to this case because it was not in effect at the time the parties executed their lot rental agreements....

...all contract and property rights are held subject to [the state's] fair exercise [of the police power]. Strong, 300 So.2d at 885 (quoting Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, North Carolina, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721 (1914)). The application of the 1990 version of section 723.033 does not result in impairment of the rental contracts....

...The contract clause must be construed in harmony with the state's reserved power to safeguard the vital interests of the people. See Strong, 300 So.2d at 886-87. Second, appellants argue that in order for the lot rental agreements to be unreasonable under the 1990 version of section 723.033, Florida Statutes, the trial court had to determine that the rental amount being paid by the mobile home owners was in excess of market rent charged by comparable facilities....

...In conjunction with this issue, the Florida Manufactured Housing Association (the Association) appeared as amicus curiae on the *77 side of the mobile home park owner. The Association argues that the trial court's failure to use the market rent standard provided for in section 723.033, Florida Statutes, results in a standard that is unconstitutionally vague....

...[was] not accompanied by any standards or guidelines to aid a court or administrative agency in ascertaining the true legislative intent underlying the act," the section was unconstitutionally vague. Id., The statute considered in National Manufactured Housing differs significantly from section 723.033, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990). Section 723.033 provides: (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lot rental amount, rent increase, or change, or any provision thereof, may be unreasonable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as...

...factors, including, but not limited to, increases or decreases in the consumer price index, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor; increases or decreases in operating costs or taxes; and prior disclosures. Fla. Stat. § 723.033(2)-(6) (Supp.1990). The First District Court of Appeal considered whether section 723.033 was unconstitutionally vague in Aspen-Tarpon Springs. There, the trial court ruled that section 723.033 was constitutional, and concluded that section 723.033 "contains sufficient standards to guide trial courts in the exercise of their duties under that statute." Id....

...In making this determination, the trial court: [o]bserv[ed] that it was "obliged to construe the statute in a manner so as to avoid a constitutional defect, if a reasonable construction may be given it in order to achieve that result," the [trial] court read sections 723.033(3)-(5) in pari materia with section 723.033(6) and rejected the park owners'"conclusive presumption" argument....

...onclusive." Aspen-Tarpon Springs, 635 So.2d at 63. The First District affirmed the trial court's conclusions and held, ... that the "reasonableness" standard provided in the statute is adequate to guide trial judges in its implementation. Reading subsection 723.033(3) in pari materia with the other subsections of the statute, we find that it does not constitute a "conclusive presumption" and that it should be interpreted by trial judges as directory, rather than as mandatory and conclusive. Id. at 67. We agree with the holding in Aspen-Tarpon Springs. Market rent is a factor to be considered in conjunction with the additional elements set forth in sections 723.033(2) and (6)....

...Skelding, Jr., of Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry, Tallahassee, for Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc., amicus curiae. BARFIELD, Judge. This appeal involves challenges to a final judgment determining the constitutionality of two provisions of "The Florida Mobile Home Act," section 723.033, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), and section 723.061(2), Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court found section 723.033 constitutional and section 723.061(2) unconstitutional, and denied the mobile home park owners' request for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C....

...(FMO), representing mobile home owners and tenants, was allowed to intervene as a party defendant. Chapter 723 applies to tenancies in mobile home parks offering at least ten lots for rent, *63 where only the lots are leased by the mobile home owners. Section 723.033 authorizes relief when the court finds "a mobile home lot rental amount, rent increase, or change, or any provision of the rental agreement, to be unreasonable." Subsection (3) provides that "a lot rental amount that is in excess of market rent shall be considered unreasonable." The park owners claimed that section 723.033 contains no meaningful guidance for determining whether a rental amount is reasonable; that it establishes statewide rent controls of unlimited duration; that it grants the tenant, but not the park owner, the right to unilaterally set...

...d; that it violates due process guarantees of both the Florida and the federal constitutions; and that it constitutes a taking of their property without compensation, in violation of both constitutions. The answers filed by DBR and FMO asserted that section 723.033 "provides ample and adequate guidance for Courts to resolve issues about the lot rental amounts charged by mobile home park owners" and that the statute does not "unconstitutionally abridge Plaintiff's rights to be rewarded for their...

...f a statistician and finance professor, a property appraiser, and an economist and professor of real estate valuation. They also presented the testimony of two mobile home park managers. DBR and FMO presented no witnesses. The trial court ruled that section 723.033 is constitutional....

...s form of legislation" and that "[t]he constitution cannot be raised as a bar to a regulation limiting rents or rental increases to a reasonable amount when the other party to the bargain does not stand on even remotely equal footing." It found that section 723.033 "contains sufficient standards to guide trial courts in the exercise of their duties under the statute" and did not violate the Florida Constitution. Observing that it was "obliged to construe the statute in a manner so as to avoid a constitutional defect, if a reasonable construction may be given it in order to achieve that result," the court read sections 723.033(3)-(5) in pari materia with section 723.033(6) and rejected the park owners' "conclusive presumption" argument....

...fees against them, finding that "Plaintiffs have not proved any activity of any of the Defendants that would give rise to any liability under Count VI of Plaintiff's complaint concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The park owners appealed the finding that section 723.033 is constitutional; DBR and FMO cross-appealed the finding that section 723.061(2) is unconstitutional....

...Strong. Id at 1137. The park owners contend that the trial court erred in refusing to adhere to the precedent set in National Manufactured Housing, which they assert is directly on point and dispositive of the issue of the constitutionality *65 of section 723.033....

...nacted without a housing emergency which would justify such drastic regulation, contains an open-ended set of vague standards for determining whether a rent increase is "unreasonable," and unlawfully delegates legislative authority. They assert that section 723.033 is facially unconstitutional and that "all of the lower court's stated grounds for its decision were grounds which the Supreme Court in National Manufactured Housing considered and rejected as insufficient to save the practically iden...

...979 and that under current standards, rent control is constitutional unless it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the legislature's policy. It contends that the trial court correctly recognized the legislative purpose behind section 723.033 and properly upheld the statute, which contains the additional factors included in 723.033(6) for determining the "reasonableness" of rent increases. It asserts that section 723.033 differs from the statute stricken in National Manufactured Housing in several respects, including the fact that the determination of reasonableness in the challenged statute is to be made by the circuit court, "for whom determinations...

...s for use of utility poles by cable systems); and Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (involving a determination of whether rent increases were "reasonable under the circumstances"). The park owners reply that section 723.033(6) "provides absolutely no guidance" as to the relative weight to be accorded any factor used in determining the reasonableness of rent increases, and that it delegates to the courts the "unbridled discretion to consider any conceivab...

...ess special circumstances would render such an award unjust," and argue that no such circumstances exist here. We find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings, which in turn support its legal conclusions that section 723.033 is constitutional and that section 723.061(2) is unconstitutional. [5] We do not read section 723.033 as a traditional "rent control" statute, but as a legislative attempt to balance the interests of mobile home owners and park owners in the context of their unique economic relationship. We find that the "reasonableness" standard provided in the statute is adequate to guide trial judges in its implementation. Reading subsection 723.033(3) in pari materia with the other subsections of the statute, we find that it does not constitute a "conclusive presumption" and that it should be interpreted by trial judges as directory, rather than as mandatory and conclusive....

...le. Therefore, as a practical matter, the challenged statute authorizes a permanent physical occupation of the park owner's property and effectively extinguishes a fundamental attribute of ownership, the right to physically occupy one's land. Unlike section 723.033, the regulatory scheme contained in section 723.061(2) does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, but instead singles out mobile home park owners to bear an unfair burden, and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking of their property....

...strangers). [4] DBR also asserts that section 723.005 specifically provides that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes of the Department of Business Regulation does not have the power or duty to enforce the provisions of 723.033. But since the park owners did not prevail in their challenge of 723.033, this assertion is irrelevant....

...In Count III, the Association sought a declaratory judgment as to the rights and duties of the parties under the prospectus and Florida's Mobile Home Act [2] in light of the PSC's actions. Finally, Count IV requested declaratory relief, and any other equitable remedies pursuant to section 723.033, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...(b) Refuse to enforce the rent increase or change. (c) Enforce the remainder of the lot rental agreement without the unreasonable provision. (d) Limit the application of the unreasonable provision so as to avoid any unreasonable result. (e) Award a refund or a reduction in future rent payments. § 723.033(1), Fla.Stat....

...There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court found the $600 rental rate unenforceable during the twenty-four- month period. Indeed, the trial court lacked discretion to award a lower amount of rent absent a finding that the rate was unreasonable. Section 723.033(1) authorizes the trial court to refuse to enforce the rent increase if it finds, as a matter of law, that "a mobile home lot rental amount, rent increase, or change, or any provision of the rental agreement, to be unreasonable." It also Estates Limited Partnership, 137 So....

...lawsuits involving different claims, raised by different plaintiffs, and arising out of different accidents."). 11 authorizes the court to provide "such other equitable relief as deemed necessary." Id. However, the amount is only unreasonable under 723.033(3) if it "is in excess of market rent." There was no evidence presented at trial concerning whether the rent in the twenty-four months before the eviction action was consistent with the market rent....

...And the trial court's approval of prospective rent at that rate dispels any ongoing debate as to its reasonableness. Nor is there—or was there ever in Naples Estates' case against the Home Owners—any debate about Naples Estates' compliance with the other statutory requirements for raising rent. See generally §§ 723.033, .037, and .038, Fla....

ALTENBERND, Judge. In response to a motion to dismiss, the trial court entered a partial final judgment declaring section 723.033, Florida Statutes (1991), facially unconstitutional for a multitude of reasons....

...The complaint alleges that River Trails issued a notice of rent increase for the 1991-92 rental year, to which the tenants objected. After mediation pursuant to sections 723.037 and .038 reached an impasse, the Association filed this action. Count I seeks a judicial determination under section 723.033 that the rent increase is unreasonable....

...Following a hearing, the attorneys representing River Trails submitted a proposed fourteen-page partial final judgment that dismissed count I of the Association’s complaint with prejudice. This proposed judgment contains various “findings” and declares section 723.033 unconstitutional on its face under the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution....

...1st DCA), review denied, 494 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1986). The constitutional theories in this case involve conjplex economic issues that cannot be resolved as pure questions of law. We are aware that another circuit court has upheld the constitutionality of section 723.033 after a three-day trial....

...We are inclined to believe that the requirement of an “emergency” applies primarily to laws that compel owners to rent their property below fair market value when a housing shortage and the economic law of supply and demand result in unusually high market prices. In contrast, section 723.033(4), Florida Statutes (1991), on its face, does not require an owner to rent below fair market value....

...We reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants as to damages for the statutory violations and to fashion equitable relief for the unconscionable rents for the years in question guided by the criteria set out in section 723.033, Florida Statutes....

increases.3 The word “unconscionable” appears in section 723.033. That provision empowers the court to refuse