CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 184, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 631, 1995 WL 242091
...Glass Associates, Miami, for respondent. R. Earl Welbaum of Welbaum, Zook & Jones, Coral Gables, amicus curiae for The Associated Gen. Contractors of America. WELLS, Justice. We have for review the following question certified to be of great public importance: WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
...We answer the certified question by holding that a contractor's statutory warranty of fitness does apply to manufactured items such as air-conditioning units supplied by the contractor for use in a building project but that the contractor does not warrant those items for a "specific purpose" under the provisions of section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...At the close of Leisure Resorts' case, Rooney moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion as to the developer's claims for breach of contract and negligence. The case then proceeded to a jury determination on Leisure Resorts' indemnity claim for breach of the statutory warranties in section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992). [2] The court ruled as a matter of law that the contractor impliedly warranted the fitness of the condensers pursuant to section 718.203(2) and instructed the jury as follows: The issues for your determination on Leisure Resorts' claim against Rooney for indemnity based on breach of warranty are whether the air conditioning equipment supplied by Rooney for the individu...
...The equipment was defective if it was not reasonably fit for the specific purpose for which it was supplied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Leisure Resorts and awarded the developer $250,000 in damages and $133,000 in attorney fees. Rooney appealed. In its opinion, the district court set forth a detailed analysis of section 718.203....
...Based on this analysis, the court concluded that manufactured items for which there would be a manufacturer's warranty do not fall within the language "materials supplied" as set forth in section 713.203(2) or "all other improvements and materials" as used in section 718.203(2)(b)....
...of the words used in the statute. See Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984); United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Tuggle,
216 So.2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). Specifically, we conclude that manufactured items constitute "materials" as that term is used in section
718.203(2)....
...ich are the subject of this case. We do approve the district court's conclusion that the contractor's warranties and developer's warranties differ in scope. The district court noted a material distinction between the developer's warranty mandated by section 718.203(1) and the contractor's warranty mandated by section 718.203(2)....
...ork performed and quality of the materials supplied in constructing condominium buildings based upon the plans and specifications encompassed within the building contract are matters within the control of the contractor. To be in compliance with the section 718.203(2) implied warranty of fitness then, the contractor must provide work and materials which conform with the generally accepted standards of workmanship and performance of similar work and materials meeting the requirements specified in the contract....
...its during its negotiations with Rooney. Rather than Carrier units as originally specified, the contract as amended called for General Electric, Carrier, or their equal as approved by the engineer. [2] The trial court interpreted the 1979 version of section 718.203, but as the district court noted, the relevant portions of that statute contain the same language as section 718.203, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992). [3] Section 718.203 reads in pertinent part: (1) The developer shall be deemed to have granted the purchaser of each unit an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability for the purposes or uses intended as follows: ......
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 1323
...8 Rather, the central issue in Stomps was the causal link between the claimant's pneumoconiosis and his coal mine employment. Unlike Lollar and Hicks, the claimant in Stomps had worked as a coal miner for only nine years and was thus ineligible for the section 718.203(b) presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from his employment. He therefore had to demonstrate "such a relationship" under section 718.203(c)....
...Stomps,
816 F.2d at 1537-38 (briefly addressing "[t]he remaining question of whether Stomps is totally disabled by his pneumoconiosis"). The source of the generous causation language in Stomps on which the petitioners would rely, see id. at 1536 , is 20 C.F.R. Secs. 718.201 and
718.203(a), which address solely the link between pneumoconiosis and coal mine employment....
...District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation 1 The basis for this Court's jurisdiction is 30 U.S.C.A. Sec. 932 (a) (incorporating by reference the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. Sec. 921 (c)) 2 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.203(b) provides a rebuttable presumption, in the case of a claimant who has worked for ten years or more in coal mining, that any pneumoconiosis suffered by the claimant arose from such employment. It is not disputed that both Lollar and Hicks are entitled to this presumption in this case 3 ABC argued before the BRB that the ALJ erred in finding that ABC had failed to rebut Lollar's section 718.203(b) presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from coal mine employment....
...ed. Before this Court, ABC defends the BRB's decision solely on the latter ground, and does not urge this Court to reverse the ALJ on the alternative ground which it presented to the BRB. Under these circumstances, we find that ABC has abandoned the section 718.203(b) issue, and we therefore decline to consider reversing the ALJ on this ground....
...effectively cloaks the BRB's decision with the same deference to which the ALJ is entitled 5 Pneumoconiosis is defined in Sec. 718.201. Standards for determining whether a claimant has pneumoconiosis are set forth in Sec.
718.202. Furthermore, Sec.
718.203(a) provides that in order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that his pneumoconiosis "arose at least in part out of coal mine employment." Section
718.203(b), however, provides that where a miner has shown at least 10 years of coal mine employment, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of his employment....
...n and of itself." 8 There is, at first glance, a paradox in the black lung regulations, which define "pneumoconiosis" as "a chronic dust disease of the lung ... arising out of coal mine employment," 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.201, and yet, in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.203, provide standards for "[e]stablishing [the] relationship of pneumoconiosis to coal mine employment." Section 718.201 also states that "[t]his definition includes ......
...d in more than one sense. Thus, it appears that section 718.201's definition of "pneumoconiosis" is satisfied only when "pneumoconiosis" is clinically diagnosed under section
718.202 and when either the causation standard or presumption set forth in section
718.203 is satisfied....
...disease 'arising out of coal mine employment' includes any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." (Emphasis added.) Section 718.203(a) states that "[i]n order for a claimant to be found eligible for benefits under the Act, it must be determined that the miner's pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal mine employment." (Emphasis added.) 10 The Director also directs our attention to the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Napier v....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...We have consolidated the two appeals. Sandarac has not sued the developer for breach of contract, and has not sued any party for breach of an express or implied warranty of habitability, fitness or merchantability. See Greenburg v. Johnston,
367 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); §
718.203, Fla....
...ce law. The courts have long recognized implied warranties for condominium purchasers. Gable v. Silver,
258 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA), decision adopted,
264 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1972). Likewise, the legislature has created certain statutory warranties. See §
718.203, Fla....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20384, 2004 WL 2163387
...). And the opinions of Drs. Marder,
Askew and Cohen were amply supported in the record. Taken as a whole, they
provide a sufficient evidential foundation for the ALJ’s conclusion.14
14
Moreover, as the ALJ noted, under 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b), a miner with
pneumonoconiosis who has worked for 10 or more years in coal mines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from coal mine employment....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6306
...ons to signify that Congress did not intend the causal burden to be an insurmountable one, regardless of length of coal mine employment. Id. at 71 . We find this interpretation confirmed by the regulations promulgated to implement the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (a) states that the proper causal inquiry is whether “the miner’s pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal mine employment.” If the coal miner has worked for less than 10 years, “it shall be determined that such pneumoconiosis arose out of that employment only if competent evidence establishes such a relationship.” Id. § 718.203(c)....
...As discussed above, the regulations provide that a claimant must establish a causal relationship between his pulmonary disability and former coal mine employment by competent evidence, but that he need not prove that his condition was caused solely by such employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (a)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22459124
...An informed purchaser might infer from this declaration that depending upon the date of completion of construction of the building or improvementsthe statutory implied warranties imposed on developers of condominiums and their contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers by section 718.203, Florida Statutes (2000), may be unavailable....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...mend, since it was apparent the proffered amendment would state a cause of action. We, therefore, reverse the final judgment. Appellant brought suit against appellees, alleging that he was entitled to damages under the implied-warranty provisions of § 718.203, Fla....
...(1977) because the condominium he purchased was defective. Appellees each moved for summary judgment and accompanied their motions with exhibits showing that construction of the condominium commenced prior to July 1, 1974, the operative date of the warranty provided in § 718.203(5), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...ublic importance: Does section
718.124, Florida Statutes [(1987)], grant a condominium association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings, beyond the time granted in section
718.203, Florida Statutes [(1987)], after unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration? Seawatch at Marathon Condominium Ass'n, Inc....
...he manufacturer and supplier of the concrete; and Epic Metals Corporation, the manufacturer of the metal decking system. The suit was based on the "breach of implied warranties deemed to have been granted to the plaintiff Unit Owners pursuant to ... section
718.203, Florida Statutes [1987]." The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice without giving a rationale. The district court reversed, reasoning thusly: Section
718.203(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides a cause of action for breach of implied warranty; section
95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year limitations period for bringing implied warranty actions; and section
718.124 tolls the running of the...
...THE LAW The law governing the right of condominium unit owners and associations to sue is set out in chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1987), and the time limits for filing suit are contained in chapter 95, Florida Statutes (1987). A. Rights of the Association Section 718.203, Florida Statutes (1987), creates a statutory cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness in condominium construction: 718.203 Warranties....
...Accordingly, we conclude that under the express provisions of chapter 718, the right to bring an implied warranty claim belongs to the unit owners, and this right may be exercised by the unit owners in the aggregate through their condominium association in matters of common interest. B. Time Limits As noted in section 718.203 above, the guarantee established in that section applies to defects that occur during the lifetime of the warranty, i.e., within three years of the date of completion of construction of the condominium or improvement....
...In any event, the action must be commenced within 15 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, [or] the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy ... whichever date is latest. §
95.11, Fla. Stat. (1987). Accordingly, a suit for breach of implied warranty under section
718.203 ordinarily must be filed within this four-year period....
...court below in Seawatch. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, KOGAN and WELLS, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion. HARDING, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority's conclusion that section
718.203, Florida Statutes (1987), allows a condominium association to bring a breach of warranty claim separate from the unit owners' action and that the broad language of section
718.124 tolls the statute of limitations for that claim is a jump I am unwilling to make. *926 Section
718.203(5) clearly accords the warranties provided by section
718.203 [3] "to the benefit of each owner and his successor owners and to the benefit of the developer." The plain language of section
718.203(5) does not give the condominium association a right to sue in its own behalf for breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. [4] Further, section
718.124, which tolls the statute of limitations for "actions in law or equity which a condominium association ... may have," does not affect the implied warranty rights established for unit owners in section
718.203....
...right to bring an implied warranty claim belongs to the unit owners, and this right may be exercised by the unit owners in the aggregate through their condominium association in matters of common interest." Majority op. at 5-6. The plain language of section 718.203(5) does not support this conclusion....
...Regency Wood illustrates that the purpose of section
718.124 is to toll the action where an association is the real party in interest, not to revive a cause of action that the unit owners let expire. Thus, insofar as the certified question refers to actions for breach of warranty under section
718.203, I would answer the question in the negative and quash the opinion below. NOTES [1] The complaint was amended twice. The above allegations are contained in the second amended complaint. [2] The warranty also applies to defects occurring under certain other circumstances not relevant to our discussion here. See §
718.203, Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] Section
718.203, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in relevant part: (1) The developer shall be deemed to have granted to the purchaser of each unit an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability for the purposes or uses intended as follows: (a)...
...[4] The condominium association could sue in its capacity as a representative of the unit owners. But such an action is derivative of the unit owner's claim and does not give the condominium association a separate interest. See Reibel v. Rolling Green Condominium A, Inc.,
311 So.2d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). [5] §
718.203, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 245193
...levied against a party. The statute excludes from the definition of "dispute" any disagreement that "primarily involves ... the interpretation or enforcement of any warranty." A "warranty" *410 under section
718.1255(1) includes those enumerated in section
718.203....
...Therefore, the gravamen of this lawsuit involves the authority of the board of directors to "alter a common area or element", as well as the board's inherent duty to act on that authority. In my opinion, the primary issue is not the enforcement of a warranty, which is excluded from the statute. NOTES [1] See § 718.203, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 544520
...Northern Trust Bank of Florida,
890 So.2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Respondent, The Palms 2100 Ocean Boulevard, Ltd., is one of two plaintiffs in the case. The Palms filed a two-count complaint against Grinnell Corporation for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty under section
718.203(2) of the Florida Condominium Act. See §
718.203(2), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 349928
...Earl Welbaum of Welbaum Zook & Jones, Coral Gables, for amicus curiae The Associated General Contractors of America. MAGER, GERALD, Senior Judge. This is an appeal from a final judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict on a third-party indemnity claim for breach of statutory *774 warranty as prescribed in section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...for attorneys fees and costs for defending that claim. Various issues and claimed errors are raised in this appeal. We, however, find it unnecessary to address them in light of our interpretation of the scope of the statutory warranties contained in section 718.203, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...1992). In particular, we believe the trial court erred in failing to grant the contractor's motion for a directed verdict on the indemnity claim at the conclusion of the developer's case because, as a matter of law, the statutory warranty set forth in section 718.203(2) was not applicable to the contractor....
...ndemnify the owner against any loss resulting from the breach of its warranties for which the owner may be liable to others. This appeal requires that we determine the scope and extent of a contractor's "statutory" warranties. In particular, whether section 718.203(2) was intended to create a warranty as to the fitness of a product for the purpose or use intended, so that by selecting an air conditioning system, the contractor warranted to the developer and purchaser of a condominium unit the *7...
...han those applicable to developers. The law favors a rational and sensible construction of statutes. Higgins v. Higgins,
146 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). The legislative delineation of the developer's and contractor's warranties, as they appear in section
718.203, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), are set forth below: [2] THE DEVELOPER'S WARRANTY: THE CONTRACTOR'S WARRANTY: §
718.203 §
718.203 (1) The developer shall be deemed (2) The contractor, and all to have granted to the purchaser subcontractors and suppliers, grant of each unit an implied warranty to the developer and to the purchaser of fitness and merchantability for of...
..." The "intended purpose" or "intended use" is seemingly a matter more within the scope and control of the developer through its architect and engineer; whereas, the competency or fitness of the work being performed and the quality of the materials being supplied are more within the control of the contractor. Under section 718.203(1)(b) and (d), the unit owner receives an implied warranty from the developer that the "personal property that is transferred with, or appurtenant to each unit" and "all other personal property for the use of unit owners" will be fit...
...nded " for the "same period as that provided by the manufacturer. " We believe this broad language was intended to encompass within its scope a manufactured unit such as an individual air conditioning unit. This is further evident by the language of section 718.203(1)(f), which imposes an implied warranty upon the developer in favor of "the initial purchaser of each unit" for " all other property which is conveyed within a unit" for "a period of 1 year from the date of closing of the purchase or the date of possession, whichever occurs first." We are unable to find any language of a similar nature or import contained within section 718.203(2), relating to the contractor's warranties, reflecting a legislative intent to impose a warranty of fitness for the "purposes or uses intended" in favor of a developer and unit owner on a contractor on a manufactured item such as an air conditioner serving an individual unit....
...A court may not, in the process of construction, supply the omission. Dunham v. State,
140 Fla. 754,
192 So. 324 (1939). To extend the implied warranty of fitness for a particular use and purpose to the contractor would necessitate reading words or terms into section
718.203(2) that are not now present....
...warrant or guarantee the design or the sufficiency of the design of the improvements or that the materials or equipment furnished, assuming that they are the materials and equipment specified, will accomplish the purposes intended." The language in section 718.203(2) does not negate this contractual disclaimer and was not intended by the legislature to impose warranties upon a contractor for "design" or fitness for "purposes intended." For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is re...
...[3] Since the matter presented in this appeal involves a question of great public importance and is likely to have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout *779 the state, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
...NOT TO BE FIT FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE SUPPLIED? REVERSED and REMANDED. [4] ANSTEAD and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We note the relevant portions of the 1979 statute interpreted by the trial court contain the same language of section 718.203, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 318499
...e Court of Florida: Does section
718.124, Florida Statutes (1991), grant a condominium association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings, beyond the time granted in section
718.203, Florida Statutes (1991), after unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration? Seawatch at Marathon Condominium Association brought this class action as the representative of unit owners against num...
...Three rulings of the trial court are raised as error by Seawatch: (1) the damage to the condominium buildings does not give rise to an action in tort; (2) neither Toppino nor Epic are subject to liability for violation of the building code; and (3) the claims for breach of statutory implied warranties under section 718.203, Florida Statutes (1991), are time-barred....
...he Florida Building Code, section
553.84, Florida Statutes (1991). After the trial court entered an order dismissing with prejudice all claims against Toppino, Monroe, and Epic, except the claims for breach of statutory *472 implied warranties under section
718.203, Seawatch filed a second amended complaint repleading the section
718.203 claims and restating the claims against Turtle Kraals....
...f limitations period in section
95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1991); [2] or (2) that the original complaint was not filed within three years from the completion of construction of the condominium buildings and suit was, therefore, time barred under section
718.203(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...[3] The trial court dismissed with prejudice all remaining counts against Turtle Kraals, Monroe, Toppino, and Epic. The breach of statutory implied warranty claims against all defendants were dismissed on grounds of timeliness. [4] In this appeal the condominium association challenges the dismissal of the section 718.203 claims on statute of limitations grounds....
...It is undisputed that the complaint of May 13, 1988, was filed less than three years after the unit owners assumed control of the condominium association. It would appear that the filing was within the limitations period of sections
95.11(3)(c) and
718.203(2)(a)....
...f those who bought individual units in the condominium building. Section
718.124 was enacted, obviously, in response to that realization. In many instances, expiration of the period for bringing an action, as provided by both section
95.11(3)(c) and section
718.203(2), would have preceded the turnover from the developer to unit owners....
...ct, or licensed contractor and his employer, whichever date is latest; except that, when the action involves a latent defect, the time runs from the time the defect is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. [3] Section 718.203(2)(a) provides: (2) The contractor, and all subcontractors, suppliers, design professionals, architects, and engineers grant to the developer and to the purchaser of each unit implied warranties of fitness as to the work performed or...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17595, 1993 WL 231734
...t believe that individuals who have arterial blood oxygen pressures below the disabling level at rest should be subjected to an exercise test to determine whether there is a slight rise in their oxygen tension during exercise.” 3 . Under 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (b), a miner who has worked for 10 or more years in the coal mining industry is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from coal mine employment....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2254680
...ventilation rate. The Bellinis and Rocabe, Inc. (plaintiffs) [1] filed the instant action against Porto Vita asserting three theories of liability: Count I Breach of Statutory Implied Warranty of Fitness and Merchantability under Florida Statute Section 718.203; Count II Breach of Contract; and Count III Violation of the South Florida Building Code....
...The defendants cross-appealed the judgment as to Count I; this is the appeal presently before us. Porto Vita's principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs because the alleged defects are outside the scope of section 718.203, Florida Statute (2005), which sets forth the developer's statutorily implied warranties. In particular, it contends that the claim is barred by the language in subsection (1)(e) which excludes "mechanical elements serving only one unit." A short review of the history of Section 718.203 may assist us in the proper interpretation of the statute....
...1985) (holding that sellers, whether of new or used homes, have a duty to disclose to the buyer facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable). The holding in Gable was first codified in 1974 as section 711.65, now section 718.203....
...A condominium owner obtains title to a unit, together with an undivided share in common elements, i.e., all portions of the condominium property not included in the units. §
718.103(8), (11), Fla. Stat. (2005). Although divided into seven subsections, only subsection (1) of section
718.203 directly applies to developers....
...event more than 5 years. (f) As to all other property which is conveyed with a unit, a warranty to the initial purchaser of each unit for a period of 1 year from the date of closing of the purchase or the date of possession, whichever occurs first. § 718.203, Fla....
...m. Consequently, when examined in light of both the nature of the ownership rights of a condominium and the original and overall purpose of providing home buyers with a warranty that the new condominium they are buying meets reasonable expectations, section 718.203(1) must be read to include the claim presented by the plaintiffs here....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1883903
...ed. Among the defensive motions subsequently filed, the Contractor filed a motion to dismiss that read in part: Count IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to set forth ultimate facts of each breach or warranties pursuant to Florida States [sic] 718.203, which would provide a basis for any cause of action that would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations....
...tions. While the trial court did not specifically state the limitations period upon which it based its order of dismissal, the Contractor argues that the Association's "claim is barred by the three year limitations period pursuant to Florida Statute 718.203(2)." Section 718.203, Florida Statutes (2006), provides, in pertinent part as follows: 718.203 Warranties. ....
...ilding or an improvement, except mechanical elements serving only one unit. (b) For a period of 1 year after completion of all construction, a warranty as to all other improvements and materials. The Florida Supreme Court has found that: As noted in section 718.203 ....
...or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. §
95.11, Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). The Contractor also contends that because section
718.203(2)(a), Florida Statutes provides a warranty "[f]or a period of 3 years from the date of completion of construction of a building or improvement" in contrast to section
718.203(1)(e), which provides that a developer grants a warranty "for a period beginning with the completion of construction of each building or improvement and continuing for 3 years thereafter or 1 year after owners other than the developer obtain control of the association, whichever occurs last, but in no event more than 5 years," the turnover of control does not toll the limitations period. See §
718.203(1)(e), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). This analysis of the warranties set forth under section
718.203 is incomplete....
...f the board of administration. §
718.124, Fla. Stat. (2006). In Charley Toppino, the Florida Supreme Court, after quoting the language of section
95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes, stated that "[a]ccordingly, a suit for breach of implied warranty under section
718.203 ordinarily must be filed within this four-year period." Charley Toppino,
658 So.2d at 925....
...NOTES [*] Although Saltponds I involved the same amended complaint at issue in this case, it only addressed the statutory provisions relevant to the counts against the architect. As such, in Saltponds I, we did not address the warranty periods set forth in section
718.203 or their interrelation to section
95.11, Florida Statutes.
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 4726923, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 14106
...would not accept responsibility for the roof failure. Port Marina filed a complaint, seeking relief from Everglades, Best Roofing, and GAF under Florida’s Condominium Act, which contains an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability statute. § 718.203, Fla. Stat. (2012). GAF filed a motion to abate or in the alternative to dismiss, arguing that section 718.203(2) does not apply to product manufacturers like GAF....
...ominium Owners Ass’n. v. Harbor Landing, LLC,
78 So.3d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc.,
654 So.2d 911 (Fla.1995), in determining that GAF was a manufacturer and not a “supplier” within the meaning of section
718.203(2). Analysis Port Marina argues that the trial court erred in granting GAF’s motion to dismiss Count III because it sufficiently alleged that GAF was a “supplier” within the meaning of section
718.203(2)....
...The Florida implied warranty of fitness and merchantability statute for condominiums states, in relevant part: (2) The contractor, and all subcontractors and suppliers, grant to the developer and to the purchaser of each unit implied warranties of fitness as to the work performed or materials supplied by them.... § 718.203(2), Fla....
...ailable to consumers,” and “manufacturer” as “a person or entity engaged in producing or assembling new products.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009). In Harbor Landing, the court affirmed the dismissal of the appellant’s claim under section 718.203(2) because the appellant failed to sufficiently plead the first essential element-that the appellee was a supplier of materials to the condominium....
...nything for the condominium project.” Id. The court did not, however, create a categorical rule for manufacturers and stated, “[t]his is not to say that a manufacturer can never be considered a supplier for purposes of the warranties provided in section 718.203(2).” Id....
...enough to establish that GAF supplied materials to Port Marina. Likewise, merely pleading that GAF owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in “supplying” TOPCOAT is insufficient to establish that GAF was in fact a supplier within the meaning of section 718.203(2). Because Port Marina’s Complaint against GAF did not sufficiently allege an essential element of a cause of action under section 718.203(2), we affirm the trial court’s order granting GAF’s motion to dismiss Count III of the Complaint....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 16554, 2010 WL 4257559
...In the absence of a legislative pronouncement, we are free to apply common law, and this is a case of application of common law warranties. In fact, Gable I applied common law warranties in a condominium case before *910 the legislature first enacted warranties for condominiums in section 718.203, Florida Statutes (1976)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...8 Rather, the central issue in Stomps was the causal link between the claimant’s pneumoconiosis and his coal mine employment. Unlike Lollar and Hicks, the claimant in Stomps had worked as a coal miner for only nine years and was thus ineligible for the section 718.203(b) presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose from his employment....
...MANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. . The basis for this Court’s jurisdiction is 30 U.S.C.A. § 932 (a) (incorporating by reference the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 (c)). . 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (b) provides a rebuttable presumption, in the case of a claimant who has worked for ten years or more in coal mining, that any pneumoconiosis suffered by the claimant arose from such employment. It is not disputed that both Lollar and Hicks are entitled to this presumption in this case. . ABC argued before the BRB that the ALJ erred in finding that ABC had failed to rebut Lollar's section 718.203(b) presumption that his pneu-moconiosis arose from coal mine employment....
...ed. Before this Court, ABC defends the BRB's decision solely on the latter ground, and does not urge this Court to reverse the ALJ on the alternative ground which it presented to the BRB. Under these circumstances, we find that ABC has abandoned the section 718.203(b) issue, and we therefore decline to consider reversing the ALJ on this ground....
...he ALJ effectively cloaks the BRB’s decision with the same deference to which the ALJ is entitled. . Pneumoconiosis is defined in § 718.201. Standards for determining whether a claimant has pneumoconiosis are set forth in §
718.202. Furthermore, §
718.203(a) provides that in order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that his pneumoconiosis “arose at least in part out of coal mine employment.” Section
718.203(b), however, provides that where a miner has shown at least 10 years of coal mine employment, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of his employment....
...in and of itself.” . There is, at first glance, a paradox in the black lung regulations, which define "pneumoconio-sis" as "a chronic dust disease of the lung ... arising out of coal mine employment,” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 , and yet, in 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 , provide standards for "[e]stablishing [the] relationship of pneumoconiosis to coal mine employment.” Section 718.201 also states that "[t]his definition includes ......
...ore than one sense. Thus, it appears that section 718.201’s definition of "pneumoconiosis” is satisfied only when "pneumoconiosis” is clinically diagnosed under section
718.202 and when either the causation standard or presumption set forth in section
718.203 is satisfied....
...Section 718.201 states that "a disease 'arising out of coal mine employment’ includes any chronic pulmonary disease resulting in respiratory or pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." (Emphasis added.) Section 718.203(a) states that “[i]n order for a claimant to be found eligible for benefits under the Act, it must be determined that the miner’s pneumoconiosis arose at least in part out of coal mine employment." (Emphasis added.) ....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5971204, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 20553
...he validity of its warranties. 4. Upon completion of such repairs, the total obligation for the maintenance of such exterior cladding will be turned over to the Association, as is the Association obligation and responsibility under, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 718.203 .......
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 1321, 2012 WL 254971
...PER CURIAM. Appellant, Harbor Landing Condominium Owners Association, Inc., challenges an Order on Motions to Dismiss and argues that the trial court erred in dismissing Count XI of its complaint, which was a breach of statutory implied warranty claim under section 718.203(2), Florida Statutes, against Appellee Rohm and Haas Chemicals LLC. Finding no error in the trial court's determination that dismissal was appropriate because Rohm and Haas was not a "supplier" under section 718.203(2), we affirm....
...ior railings, it was Appellee Weatherguard Building Products, Inc. that actually supplied the railings for the condominium project. Counsel further argued that Rohm and Haas had no knowledge of the condominium project and that the word "supplier" in section
718.203(2) did not mean "manufacturer." The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, explaining, "Because they're the manufacturer. They didn't supply it." This appeal followed. The sufficiency of a complaint in a civil action is a question of law reviewable de novo. Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
727 So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Section
718.203(2), Florida Statutes (2010), which pertains to condominium warranties, provides in part that "[t]he contractor, and all subcontractors and suppliers, grant to the developer and to the purchaser of each unit implied warranties of fitne...
...(noting that a claim in writing, stating the substance of a warranty defect "may be presented to the manufacturer, dealer, or supplier"); see also In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig.,
21 F.Supp.2d 593, 600-01 (E.D.La. 1998) (noting that the Legislature, through section
718.203, required developers to provide minimal warranties because a manufacturer's warranties may not be automatically assigned or otherwise extended to the ultimate purchasers and that the plaintiff, the entity who built several condominium...
...orida condominium, could have demanded an assignment of all applicable manufacturer's warranties from its suppliers and contractors). Further support for our conclusion that the Legislature did not equate suppliers with manufacturers for purposes of section 718.203(2) is that the Legislature used the term "manufacturers" in subsection (1) of section 718.203, which addresses a developer's implied warranty of fitness to unit owners. This is not to say that a manufacturer can never be considered a supplier for purposes of the warranties provided for in section 718.203(2)....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2013 WL 772613
...h the history of this case. On March 28, 2011, Porto filed a complaint against WB using this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. The complaint contained three counts. The first was for breach of statutory implied warranties pursuant to Florida Statute § 718.203 because the Porto property was allegedly not fit, merchantable, and suitable for its intended purposes....
...allenged by motions to dismiss. After the fray between WB and the third-party defendants abated, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. It asked the Court to rule as a matter of law that WB was a “developer” under Florida Statute § 718.203....
...dominium. The purchase agreements identified WB as the developer. On December 17, 2009, WB turned over control of the Board of Directors to the owners. [DE 497 at 2-3]. The Court examined whether WB was a “developer” according to Florida Statute § 718.203....
...Because WB had been created for the sole purpose of selling the Porto units, the Court concluded that WB was a “developer” that offered condominium parcels for sale in the ordinary course of its business. Plaintiff wanted the Court to conclude that as a developer, WB had to honor warranties created by § 718.203....
...That section deems developers “to have granted to the purchaser of each unit an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability for the purposes or uses intended” on the building; roof, mechanical, electrical and plumbing elements; personal property transferred or appurtenant to the unit; and other improvements. Id. § 718.203....
...Gates, McDonald & Co.,
382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.2004), the Court declined to consider the patent defect claim. III. RECONSIDERATION Having considered the arguments advanced by Porto and WB, the Court now agrees that it misapplied Chotka and Port Sewall to §
718.203 warranties....
... for purposes of applying Chotka and Port Sewall’s exception for *1335 lender-developers. [DE 497]. As a developer, WB is subject to the warranties the Florida Legislature placed upon it. In reaching this conclusion, the Court is not holding that § 718.203 is a necessarily good policy....
...The Florida Department of Business Regulation’s definition of “offer” was to provide context for when reporting requirements triggered, not when statutory warranties applied. Indeed, the regulations in force today explicitly state which sections of § 718 the definition applies to, and § 718.203 is not one of those sections....
...ply .... ”); id. r. 61B-79.001 (“In determining whether a developer has offered a contract for sale or lease pursuant to Section
719.502(2).... ”). Therefore, the Court does not conclude that the word “offering for sale” in Florida Statute §
718.203 means “offering for sale at a profit.” Second, WB argues that it did not sell condo units in the ordinary course of its business, much like the lender in ^ First Federal....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
warranty of habitability. As Appellant notes, section
718.203(1), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
warranty of habitability. As Appellant notes, section
718.203(1), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
warranty of habitability. As Appellant notes, section
718.203(1), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 WL 127637
...Drummond’s final contention is that McClendon’s alleged pneumoconiosis was unrelated to his coal mine employment. The Act, however, provides for a rebuttable presumption that the miner’s pneumoconiosis arose from such employment if he worked for ten or more years in the coal mines. 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (b)....
...lt of exposure to coal dust, but rather was due to his history of cigarette smoking. The regulations state clearly that the claimant only need demonstrate that the miner’s condition arose “at least in part” from coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.203 (a)....
