CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9597, 2015 WL 3875556
...000, when the amendment was recorded in the public records. However, the statute of limitations on this claim did not begin to run as to the Association until December 31, 2002, when control of the Association was turned over to the unit owners. See § 718.124, Fla....
...This claim is not at issue in this appeal and remains pending in the trial court. . The trial court stayed the order pending disposition of this appeal. . The Developer "withdrew” Issue V after briefing was completed. Accordingly, we express no view on that issue or the related issue of whether, based on section 718.124, Florida Statutes, the Master Association might be able to assert the claims raised by the Association in this case when the Developer turns over control of the Master Association to the unit owners....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...The trial judge found from the allegations of the complaint that the cause of action arose in 1974 and, therefore, under the four year limitation period of §
95.11(3), the action was barred. Regency Wood argues that §
95.11(3) was not properly applied in this case. In January 1977, the legislature adopted §
718.124, Florida Statutes, entitled "Limitation on Actions by Associations," which provides: The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association or cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. According to the allegations of the complaint, the developer maintained majority control of the association until January 8, 1976. If §
718.124 applies, the four year period of §
95.11(3) would not begin to run until January 8, 1976, and the complaint, filed on November 28, 1979 would be timely. The appellees have argued that §
718.124 is inapplicable for several reasons. Citing B & J Holding Corporation v. Weiss,
353 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), they contend that §
718.124 applies only to a cause of action arising out of Chapter 718, while the theories of recovery in this case arise out of common law....
...riod of § 711.24 did not apply was easy to understand. The statute in this case by its terms applies to " any actions in law or equity which a condominium association ... may have... ." Unlike § 711.24, there is no justification in the language of § 718.124 for limiting its application to actions under Chapter 718; in fact, the opposite intent is expressed. *443 The second argument made by appellees is that the legislature did not clearly express an intention that § 718.124 be retroactively applied to a cause of action arising out of events occurring prior to the statute's effective date....
...Morris,
339 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1976), and Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales,
400 So.2d 965 (Fla. 1981), appellees contend that if the intent is not sufficiently manifested, the statute should be prospectively applied only. In response, Regency Wood points out that at the time §
718.124 became law, the association's cause of action was still viable....
...According to the Court, "a statute of limitations will be prospectively applied unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and manifest." Thus, our duty in this case is to determine whether the legislature intended § 718.124 to apply to causes of action which accrued prior to the effective date of that statute. In this regard, the statute in this case is distinguishable from the statute in Homemakers, Inc. ; we determine that § 718.124 was intended to apply to causes of action which accrued prior to the effective date of the act....
...a period of limitation, the legislature must by statute allow a reasonable time to file actions already accrued." Just as the obvious purpose of the provision in Homemakers, Inc. was to apply to a shortened limitations period, the obvious purpose of § 718.124 was to lengthen the limitations period for particular causes of action. Section 718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough to bar a potential cause of action which the unit owners might otherwise have been able and willing to pursue....
...The legislature's intention to apply this provision *444 to pre-existing causes of action which were viable at the effective date of the statute is expressed through its application to "any actions ... which a condominium association... may have ... ." (e.s.) As of the effective date of § 718.124, Regency Wood had a viable cause of action against the developer and its contractors for the damage to one of the association's common elements....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Div. of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes. *923 SHAW, Justice. We have for review a decision presenting the following certified question of great public importance: Does section
718.124, Florida Statutes [(1987)], grant a condominium association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings, beyond the time granted in section
718.203, Florid...
...The district court reversed, reasoning thusly: Section
718.203(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides a cause of action for breach of implied warranty; section
95.11(3)(c) provides a four-year limitations period for bringing implied warranty actions; and section
718.124 tolls the running of the limitations period until control of the condominium association passes from the developer to the unit owners....
...his four-year period. The legislature has further provided in chapter 718 that the running of the limitations period on suits filed by a condominium association is tolled until control of the association passes from the developer to the unit owners: 718.124 Limitation on actions by association....
... The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. §
718.124, Fla. Stat. (1987). The purpose of this tolling provision was explained in Regency Wood Condominium, Inc. v. Bessent, Hammack & Ruckman, Inc.,
405 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): [T]he obvious purpose of §
718.124 was to lengthen the limitations period for particular causes of action. Section
718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough to bar a potential cause of action which the unit owners might otherwise have been able and willing to pursue....
...HARDING, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority's conclusion that section
718.203, Florida Statutes (1987), allows a condominium association to bring a breach of warranty claim separate from the unit owners' action and that the broad language of section
718.124 tolls the statute of limitations for that claim is a jump I am unwilling to make....
...is successor owners and to the benefit of the developer." The plain language of section
718.203(5) does not give the condominium association a right to sue in its own behalf for breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. [4] Further, section
718.124, which tolls the statute of limitations for "actions in law or equity which a condominium association ... may have," does not affect the implied warranty rights established for unit owners in section
718.203. Thus, if a unit owner allows the statute of limitations to run out on his or her warranty claim, section
718.124 does not revive that suit for the condominium association....
...Thus, unit owners are the real parties in interest for some purposes and condominium associations may have actions as real parties in interest for other purposes. See Avila S. Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp.,
347 So.2d 599, 609 (Fla. 1977). The statute of limitations in section
718.124 applies only to those actions accorded to condominium associations....
...ny other exception, nor can we create by *927 judicial fiat a reason, or reasons, for tolling the statute since the legislature dealt with such topic and thereby foreclosed judicial enlargement thereof."
56 So.2d at 342. Further, there is nothing in section
718.124 that would preclude a unit owner from bringing a claim for breach of warranty within the given warranty period....
...l of the developer until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. But when the condominium association's right to sue for breach of warranty stems from the unit owners' claim, I cannot make the jump that section
718.124 extends the limitation period. The majority's reliance on Regency Wood Condominium, Inc. v. Bessent, Hammack & Ruckman Inc.,
405 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), to support its position is unfounded. Regency Wood is good authority to explain why section
718.124 should lengthen the limitation period for particular causes of action. The case does not, however, nullify the distinction between causes of action that belong to an association and those specifically accorded to unit owners. The court stated "[s]ection
718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough to bar a potential cause of action which the unit owners might otherwise have been able and willing to pursue." Id. at 443. Regency Wood illustrates that the purpose of section
718.124 is to toll the action where an association is the real party in interest, not to revive a cause of action that the unit owners let expire....
...But such an action is derivative of the unit owner's claim and does not give the condominium association a separate interest. See Reibel v. Rolling Green Condominium A, Inc.,
311 So.2d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). [5] §
718.203, Fla. Stat. (1987). [6] §
718.124, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 9784
...iginal owner had actual possession of the property. Thus the commencement period for the statute of repose was established in 1978. The appellants next argue that the turnover provision of the statute of limitations contained in the Condominium Act, Section
718.124, Florida Statutes (1995), extends to the statute of repose provisions contained in Section
95.11(3)(c)....
...According to the appellants, even if the certificates of occupancy establish the date of possession, the failure of the appellees to establish the date on which the developer turned over the association to the unit owners precludes summary judgment. We disagree. Section 718.124 provides that the statute of limitations for actions by a condominium association does not accrue until the unit owners have acquired control over the association....
...es from the developer to the unit owners. See Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. v. Seawatch at Marathon Condo. Ass'n., Inc.,
658 So.2d 922 (Fla.1995). However, a statute of limitations is not the same as a statute of repose. The clearly stated purpose of Section
718.124 is to lengthen the statute of "limitations" period, see Regency Wood Condo., Inc....
...To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power." See Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)(quoting American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida v. Williams,
212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). We decline the appellants' invitation to abrogate legislative power and therefore conclude that section
718.124 is necessarily limited to its terms and does not otherwise alter section
95.11(3)(c)....
...itations, "the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period." Angrand v. Fox,
552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). That being so, the plaintiff condominium associations enjoy the benefit of section
718.124, Florida Statutes, which tolls the statute of limitations for such associations until control is turned over to the unit owners....
...truction defects. The developers argued that the associations' claims were barred by the fifteen-year statute of repose. See §
95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1980). [3] The associations reply, among other things, that the repose period was tolled by section
718.124, Florida Statutes. Enacted in 1977, section
718.124, Florida Statutes, provides:
718.124 Limitation on actions by association....
...tion for the condominium association. See §
718.301, Fla. Stat. Only at a later point, after a sufficient number of units have been sold, does control of the condominium association shift from the developer to the unit owners. See id. The intent of section
718.124 is to suspend limitations periods until the condominium association has become entirely independent of the control of the developer. The association and the developers disagree sharply over whether section
718.124 tolls statutes of repose. Section
718.124 indicates that "[t]he statute of limitations ......
...shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board...." Id. The associations contend that the phrase "statute of limitations" includes all limitations of whatever kind, including statutes of repose. The developers say that "statute of limitations" in section 718.124 is used in a technical sense, and excludes statutes of repose....
...d, regardless of whether there has as yet been an injury." Black's Law Dictionary 927 (citation omitted); see also Garner, supra, at 759; Kush v. Lloyd,
616 So.2d 415, 418-19 (Fla.1992). In my view, the condominium associations' analysis is correct. Section
718.124 must be read to toll all limitations periods, including those characterized as statutes of repose....
...fore, any substantial doubt on the question should be resolved by choosing the longer rather than the shorter possible statutory period." Angrand v. Fox,
552 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (citations omitted). Under that rule of interpretation, section
718.124 applies to all limitation periods, including statutes of repose....
...nt of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his employer, whichever date is latest. Id. To these four possibilities section
718.124 adds a fifth: the date of turnover of control of the condominium association. Turnover of control is analogous to the date on which a property owner assumes actual possession for purposes of section
95.11(3)(c). There is nothing conceptually wrong or inconsistent in saying that section
718.124 extends all of the time periods contained in section
95.11(3)(c)....
...It follows that the summary judgment must be reversed. II. I concur with the majority opinion that the statute of repose contained in section
95.11(3)(c) was effectively reenacted and extended in 1980, and that the fifteen-year repose period is applicable to this case. NOTES [1] Section
718.124, Florida Statutes (1997) states: "The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority o...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 318499
...Solomon and Lynn Wagner, Orlando, for appellees. Before HUBBART, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ. FERGUSON, Judge. Recognizing that this case presents a question of great public importance throughout the state, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: Does section
718.124, Florida Statutes (1991), grant a condominium association an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause of action for damage to common elements in condominium buildings, beyond the time granted in section
718.203, Florida...
...The breach of statutory implied warranty claims against all defendants were dismissed on grounds of timeliness. [4] In this appeal the condominium association challenges the dismissal of the section
718.203 claims on statute of limitations grounds. The court's ruling, according to Seawatch, disregarded section
718.124 of the Florida Condominium Act, chapter 718, Florida Statutes (1991), which provides a tolling period for actions brought by condominium associations. The statute defers the running of the limitations periods until control of the association is turned over from the developer to the unit owners. Section
718.124 provides: The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration....
...It is undisputed that the complaint of May 13, 1988, was filed less than three years after the unit owners assumed control of the condominium association. It would appear that the filing was within the limitations period of sections
95.11(3)(c) and
718.203(2)(a). Appellees argue, however, that the tolling provision of section
718.124 does not apply to actions brought by condominium associations in their capacity as class representatives of the unit owners, but instead applies only to those actions brought by condominium associations in their own right....
...s, the right to sue after taking control, where the developer for reasons of self-interest or oversight, failed to pursue a cause of action for breach of contract or negligent construction. From that indisputable intent, a reasonable construction of section 718.124 will not support the conclusion that the legislature intended to limit the period in which condominium associations could sue for construction defects to the same *473 period in which the developer could have brought suit....
...design and construction of a building. Experience taught that the developer's interest in building, selling, and getting out was not always the same as the longerterm interests of those who bought individual units in the condominium building. Section 718.124 was enacted, obviously, in response to that realization....
...In many instances, expiration of the period for bringing an action, as provided by both section
95.11(3)(c) and section
718.203(2), would have preceded the turnover from the developer to unit owners. In those cases, on the appellee's interpretation, section
718.124 is a nullity. We agree with the first district's different view: [T]he obvious purpose of §
718.124 was to lengthen the limitations period for particular causes of action. Section
718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough to bar a potential cause of action which the unit owners might otherwise have been able and willing to pursue....
...3d DCA 1975), relied on by appellees, does not hold that the condominium association is without standing to represent the interests of unit owners. Neither does this case turn on the absence of substantive contract rights in the condominium association. Section 718.124 gives a statutory right to a condominium association, as a successor to the condominium developer and as representative of unit owners, to proceed against contractors and engineers in its own name. Section 718.124, which is terse and unambiguous, makes no distinction between actions brought by the association on its own behalf and those brought on behalf of the unit owners....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1883903
...does not toll the limitations period. See §
718.203(1)(e), (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). This analysis of the warranties set forth under section
718.203 is incomplete. In examining an association's rights with respect to claims, we must also consider section
718.124 of the Florida Statutes which provides, in pertinent part: Limitation on actions by association. The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of administration. §
718.124, Fla....
..."[a]ccordingly, a suit for breach of implied warranty under section
718.203 ordinarily must be filed within this four-year period." Charley Toppino,
658 So.2d at 925. As further noted by the Florida Supreme Court: [T]he obvious purpose of [section]
718.124 was to lengthen the limitations period for particular causes of action. Section
718.124 was intended to prevent a developer from retaining control over an association long enough to bar a potential cause of action which the unit owners might otherwise have been able and willing to pursue....
