Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

..., in good faith, and without notice of certain claims and defenses. See § 673.3021(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). As the party claiming that it was a holder in due course, Any Kind had the burden to prove that status by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 673.3081(2), Fla....

...PennyMac failed to do so at trial. PennyMac argues that JPMorgaris in-dorsement on the note was presumed to be authentic and authorized. This argument is beside the point. To be sure, a signature on an instrument is generally “presumed to be authentic and authorized.” § 673.3081(1), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co

...o.3d at 933 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). In addition, the “authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on [a negotiable] instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings.” Fla. Stat. § 673.3081 (1)....

...David J. Winker, P.A., and David John Winker, for appellant, Emad Selim. Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Kimberly S. Mello and Arda Goker (Orlando), for appellee. Before LOGUE, C.J., and HENDON and GORDO, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2020); Barsan v. Trinity Fin. Servs., LLC, 258 So. 3d 516, 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (explaining “the term ‘presumed’ in section 673.3081(1) means that until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff was not required to prove that it is valid (citing UCC comment 1 to section 673.3081), and because defendants failed to make any evidentiary showing to support their claim that the signer was unauthorized, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the presumption to obtain summary final judgment” (citing Bennett v....

...4th DCA 2010), where we held that an endorsement on a note was self-authenticating pursuant to section 90.902(8), Florida Statutes (2008). In Riggs , this court affirmed the final summary judgment of foreclosure relying on the statutory presumption in section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides: In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings....

...aiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized unless the action is to enforce the liability of the purported signer and the signer is dead or incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature. § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Crucial to this case is the language in section 673.3081(1) that the “signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized” in the absence of circumstances not applicable here. Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1 to section 673.3081 explains the operation of this presumption as follows: “Burden of establishing” is defined in Section 1-201....

...Comment 1 describes a “bursting bubble” presumption that is consistent with Florida law. See Locke v. Stuart, 113 So.2d 402, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959); *323 § 90.802(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §§ 301.1-308.1 (2012 ed.). In this case, the effect of the section 673.3081(1) presumption was to require the Bennetts to make some eviden-tiary showing to support their claim that Causseaux was unauthorized to sign the allonges....

...nding. However, as the blank indorsement appearing on Borrowers’ note is undated, and as Borrowers never denied Fremont’s authority to place the indorsement on the note in their pleadings, no such “contrary” evidence exists in this case. See § 673.3081(1), Fla....

...(2016) (“In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings.”); Riggs v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing section 673.3081 and holding that the borrowers could not challenge the authenticity of the indorsement because they never placed its authenticity at issue in their pleadings). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment entered in favor of Borrowe...

...Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). Because possession of the note is critical for the right to enforce a note, the Florida UCC also has provisions which are directives affecting entitlement of payment on the note by virtue of signatures on the note. Section 673.3081(2), Florida Statutes (2010), provides (2) If the validity of signatures is admitted or proved[,] . . . a plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to payment if the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforce the instrument under s. 673.3011, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim in recoupment. § 673.3081(2), Fla....

...than the plaintiff filing suit. In such case, documentation or evidence regarding ownership, assignment, or transfer of the note must prove the plaintiff has the rights of a holder. §§ 671.201(21); 671.2011(1); 673.2031(1), (2), and (3); 673.3011(2); and 673.3081(2), Fla....

...property and that they defaulted on the note and mortgage. Wells Fargo attached a copy of the note and mortgage, which contained the notarized signatures of Bruce and Mary Dias. There is a presumption that Mary Dias's signature is authentic under section 673.3081, Florida Statutes (2013). In Rutledge's motion for final judgment, he alleged that Mary Dias's signatures were forged and he filed the forensic document examiner's affidavit in support....

...Instead, this issue was raised by Polonsky, for the first time, during the trial. There can be no question that basic rules of pleading required Polonsky to place the Bank on notice that she was challenging the authenticity or validity of her signatures on the note and mortgage. See § 673.3081(1), Fla....

...Aurora Loan Svcs., LLC, 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (noting that “[n]othing in the pleadings placed the authenticity of [appellant’s] signature at issue”); Ferris v. Nichols, 245 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (construing prior version of section 673.3081, Florida Statutes, and holding that “[h]ad the defendant desired to deny that he signed the note, he should have done so by a specific denial addressed to the appropriate allegations in the complaint”); Davis v....

...note and mortgage.1 The trial court thereafter considered all of the testimonial and 1 In light of this, the ultimate burden of establishing the authenticity or validity of the signature was on the Bank, but the signature was statutorily presumed to be authentic. See § 673.3081(1), Fla....

PER CURIAM. *410 AFFIRMED. See Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. , 124 So.3d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes, in absence of any evidence from mortgagors that signature was unauthorized)....

...Apatov, of McGlinchey Stafford, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Bennet v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 124 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes, in absence of any evidence from mortgagors that signature was unauthorized). PALMER, ORFINGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. 2 

...Bank of America, in the fixation of an endorsement to the promissory note. They contended that the endorsement was added after the original holder of the note, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., was dissolved; thus, the appellee lacked standing to enforce the note. The appellee relied on section 673.3081, Florida Statutes (2012), to establish its standing, which provides for presumption of authenticity and authority of signatures on secured instruments, shifting to the party opposing the validity of the note the burden to offer some showing to negate the presumption....

...The only aspects 6 shared between the instant case and Sorenson are that both are foreclosure cases, and both have Mr. Jacobs as counsel. Mr. Jacobs also contends that Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 124 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) holds that section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes, “instructs that once an endorsement is challenged as a forgery, discovery into the endorsement is proper.” Mr. Jacobs’ Motion at 19. Our sister court in Bennett relied on the Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1 to section 673.3081 which explains that “until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff is not required to prove that it is valid.” Bennett, 124 So....

...aint, the Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part because the Defendants affirmatively question the veracity and authenticity of any possible endorsement made on any purported note or allonge the Plaintiff may produce pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 673.3081 (2011), assuming, without conceding, that such endorsement exists....

...1st DCA 1990) (“[A] decision whether a pleading or motion is legally sufficient involves a question of law subject to de novo review by the appellate court.”). Throughout the proceedings below and in this appeal, the parties and the circuit court have framed the sufficiency of the homeowners’ defense in terms of section 673.3081, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...That statute, a part of Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code, includes what is arguably a *97 heightened civil pleading requirement when a dispute over a signature’s authenticity is raised in connection with a negotiable instrument such as a mortgage note. Section 673.3081(1) reads, in relevant part: In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically de~ nied in the pleadings....

...stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with such particularity as the circumstances may permit.” The circuit court — and to a large measure, the homeowners, as well — appeared to accept Pennymac Trust’s underlying premise that section 673.3081(1) alters civil pleading practice by imposing a heightened specificity requirement when the authenticity of a note’s signature is challenged....

...Sanabria’s signature was an issue that was adequately pleaded and presented. for. adjudication. None of the cases Pennymac Trust cites in support of affir-mance persuades us otherwise. Indeed, the few Florida decisions to address the pleading requirement that section 673.3081(1) appears to impose only arise in the context of a .defendant who failed to plead the issue of authenticity as an affirmative defense....

LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); Bennett v. Deutsche Bank

recoupment described in § 673.3051(1). . Section 673.3081(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), provides

...rebut the summary judgment motion and that judgment was properly entered in favor of Bank of America. Id. Completing the trilogy, our court in Barsan, 258 So. 3d at 516, issued a citation per curiam affirmed opinion which reads in full: Affirmed. See § 673.3081(1), Fla. Stat. (2016); Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 124 So. 3d 320, 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that the term “presumed” in section 673.3081(1) means that until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff was not required to prove that it is valid (citing UCC comment 1 to section 673.3081), and because defendants failed to make any evidentiary showing to support their claim that the signer was unauthorized, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the presumption to obtain summary final judgment). See also Applegate v....

...A signature can be placed on an instrument by a person or a person’s representative. Id. § 673.4021(1). “In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings.” Id. § 673.3081(1). The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) Comment to this provision explains that “until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff is not required to prove that it is valid.” 2 Id., U.C.C....

...3d DCA 1998), Florida courts look to U.C.C. Comments in interpreting the corresponding provisions of Florida’s U.C.C. See, e.g., Rivera v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 189 So. 3d 323, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (looking to U.C.C. Comment in interpreting section 673.3081). 6 forged or unauthorized); Bennett v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 124 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding bank could rely on statutory presumption of validity of signatures on allonge, based on section 673.3081(1), in absence of any evidence from mortgagors that signature was unauthorized). Because the original plaintiff had standing to foreclose when it filed the complaint with a copy of the blank-indorsed note attached and PMT es...

...(2019). A signature, “regardless of the intent of the signer,” is an indorsement unless the instrument unambiguously indicates the intent was to not sign as an indorser. § 673.2041(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). The signature on an indorsement is presumed to be authentic and authorized. § 673.3081(1), Fla....

...facts as to how or why it came to be the owner and holder of the note and mortgage when the Note was secured.” Another affirmative defense challenged the “lack of authenticity and/or validity of any signatures or indorsements on the Note . . . pursuant to Florida Statute 673.3081.” 3....

...See Lamb v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 174 So. 3d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“This court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to prove standing to bring a foreclosure action de novo.”) (citation omitted). On the borrowers’ second argument, section 673.3081(1), Florida Statutes (2010), Uniform Commercial Code Comment, provides: “[U]ntil some evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff is not required to prove that it...