CopyCited 15 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 82 Fed. R. Serv. 970, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69440, 2010 WL 2505912
...Beasley’s testimony meets the federal standards for expert testimony admissibility, in that he is qualified to render testimony on coverage given his roles as a public and independent adjustor as set forth under Florida Statutes. He is currently a public adjustor, as defined under Fla. Stat. §
626.854 (1), and he was previously an independent adjustor under §
626.855....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...surance contract claims on their behalves. The trial court in each homeowner's case granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the assignments could not confer standing because they violated state law ( Florida Statutes section 626.854(11)(b) (2014) ) 1 prohibiting public adjusters from entering into a contract that charged the homeowners more than twenty percent of the payments made on the insurance claims....
...er damage in Matusow's home. When Citizens refused to pay, Gables Recovery sued for breach of the insurance policy. Citizens answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that Gables Recovery had no standing because the Matusow assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b) - the twenty percent statutory compensation cap for public adjusters....
...Citizens then moved for summary judgment based on the assignment's purported violation of the statutory cap, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d) (prohibiting public adjusters from entering contracts for compensation in excess of limits in section 626.854(11) )....
...Gables Recovery responded that: (1) summary judgment was premature because it had not completed discovery; (2) the statutory caps did not apply because it was not "receiving compensation for work done as a public adjuster ," and, instead, it was acting "from its assigned ownership of a post loss insurance claim"; and (3) section 626.854 does not prohibit the assignment of insurance claims to a public adjuster or other person or entity....
...home. When Citizens refused to pay the additional claim, Gables Recovery sued for breach of the insurance policy. Citizens answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that Gables Recovery had no standing because the Difilippi assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d)....
...Because the agreements violated state law and public policy, the trial courts concluded, the assignments were invalid to give Gables Recovery standing to sue on behalf of Matusow and Difilippi. Gables Recovery contends that the trial courts got it wrong for two reasons. First, it says, the twenty percent cap in section 626.854(11)(b) did not apply because it only applies to public adjusters and Gables Recovery was no longer Matusow and Difilippi's adjuster when it filed the lawsuits. Second, Gables Recovery argues, its agreements with Matusow and Difilippi complied with section 626.854(11)(b). We will discuss each of these issues, but before we do, we pause to address the argument in Citizens' answer brief that, in addition to the twenty percent cap in section 626.854(11)(b), the Matusow and Difilippi agreements violated a slew of other state statutes and administrative regulations....
...urance contract or who advertises for employment as an adjuster of such claims. The term also includes any person who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, solicits, investigates, or adjusts such claims on behalf of a public adjuster. § 626.854(1), Fla....
...to facilitate the pursuit of recovery on the claim" and provide "access to ... information, statements, testimony at or before trial proceedings in the effort toward recovery of the funds due, owing and/or payable." The dissenting opinion says that section 626.854(1)"does not address the point at which the claim becomes a lawsuit," suggesting that Gables Recovery was not a public adjuster at the point the lawsuit was filed....
...were aimed at negotiating and settling Matusow's claim. Based on the agreements and the affidavit of the company representative, there was no genuine dispute that Gables Recovery was acting as Matusow and Difilippi's "public adjuster" (as defined in section
626.854(1) ). Was Gables Recovery a duly licensed attorney? Section
626.854(1) excepts attorneys from the definition of public "adjuster" - and from the requirements of section
626.854, including the twenty percent cap - if the attorney is "a duly licensed attorney at law as exempted under section
626.860." §
626.854(1), Fla....
...required to be licensed under the provisions of this code to authorize them to adjust or participate in the adjustment of any claim, loss, or damage arising under policies or contracts of insurance." Id. §
626.860. Gables Recovery was licensed as a section
626.854 public adjuster, and not a duly licensed attorney. Gables Recovery's executive director swore that the company was "a duly licensed public adjusting entity in the State of Florida as per [ section]
626.854 and provides public adjusting services to insureds under residential and commercial insurance policies." Its executive director - the one that signed the Matusow and Difilippi agreements agreement for Gables Recovery - was "also the principal licensed insurance public adjuster." The company, in other words, agreed it was a section
626.854 public adjuster. As a section
626.854 public adjuster, Gables Recovery was subject to the twenty percent cap in subsection (11)(b). Did the Matusow and Difilippi agreements violate section
626.854(11)(b) ? Gables Recovery next argues that the trial court erred because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether its agreements with Matusow *622 and Difilippi violated the twenty percent cap. There is no dispute as to the Matusow agreement but there is as to Difilippi's. "In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section
626.854 of the Florida Statutes to include new regulations on public adjusters doing business in Florida." Sink v. E. Coast Pub. Adjusters, Inc. ,
40 So.3d 910 , 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Among the provisions passed was section
626.854(11)(b), "capping the maximum fee that may be charged by a public adjuster." Id. Section
626.854(11)(b) specifically provides: (b) A public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept from any source compensation, payment, commission, fee, or any other thing of value in excess of: ... 2. Twenty percent of the amount of insurance claim payments made by the insurer for claims that are not based on events that are the subject of a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor. §
626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...h regard to a particular claim shall enter into any contract, agreement or other arrangement with any person, which would allow the public adjuster to accept an amount that would exceed the limitation of the public adjuster's compensation imposed by Section 626.854(11), F.S....
...Under the Matusow agreement, the homeowner agreed to pay Gables Recovery twenty percent of any recovered insurance money plus "any attorney fees and costs under
627.428 or any other applicable provision of state or federal law entitling the prevailing party to attorney fees and costs." This violated section
626.854 because "[a] public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept from any source compensation, payment, commission, fee, or any other thing of value in excess of ... [t]wenty percent of the amount of insurance claim payments made by the insurer." §
626.854(11)(b) 2., Fla....
...y percent cap, which is prohibited by the statute. The Difilippi agreement, however, compensated Gables Recovery ten percent of any insurance proceeds and any applicable attorney fees and costs. The Difilippi agreement, on its face, does not violate section 626.854(11)(b)....
...The Matusow and Difilippi agreements call for Gables Recovery to receive "attorney fees " in excess of the twenty percent contingency. Having its attorney's fees paid, in addition to the twenty percent contingency fee, is exactly what is covered in section 626.854(11)(b)....
...nder the agreements are not being paid to attorneys. Only Gables Recovery is "entitled to ... receive" this money under the contract. Together with the twenty percent contingency, Gables Recovery agreed to be paid in excess of what was allowed under section 626.854(11)(b)....
...the Matusow agreement. (b) Actual compensation The dissenting opinion next argues that because Gables Recovery has not been paid, we cannot know, for summary judgment purposes, whether its actual compensation will exceed the twenty percent cap. But section 626.854(11)(b) prohibits more than just accepting in excess of twenty percent. The statute says that a "public adjuster may not charge, agree to , or accept ... any ... thing of value in excess of ... twenty percent of the amount of the insurance claim payments made by the insurer." § 626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...The twenty percent cap prohibits public adjusters from even "agree[ing] to" more compensation than is allowed by law. We don't have to wait for Gables Recovery to "accept" money, as the dissenting opinion suggests, to know the Matusow agreement violates section 626.854(11)(b) because Gables Recovery "agree[d] to" be paid more than twenty percent of the insurance claim....
...as any other chose in action. (quotations and footnote omitted) ). But for at least 110 years, assignments that violated state statutes have been invalid and unenforceable. See Hall ,
47 So. at 612 . The Matusow assignment violated a state statute, section
626.854(11)(b), because it agreed to give Gables Recovery more than twenty percent of what is collected on the insurance claim....
...Thus, Matusow did not validly assign her claim, and without the assignment, Gables Recovery did not have standing to sue Citizens. We affirm the summary judgment in case number 15-2320. There's a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Difilippi assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b)....
...l summary judgment for Citizens in Case No. 3D16-87 (Christopher Difilippi is the insured). The difference in analysis and outcomes turns largely on my view that Gables Recovery never exceeded the limits on compensation imposed by the Legislature in section 626.854(11)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), 5 in Mrs....
...Faithful adherence to the text of the statute does not support such a result-indeed, the statute is silent as to the inclusion of attorney's fees in "compensation." The text also specifies that an agreement purporting to exceed the "limits on compensation" in section 626.854(11) is "punishable as provided under s....
...ess an assortment of statutory and regulatory arguments raised here for the first time, and not raised in Citizens' motions for summary judgment in the trial court. I will first highlight parts of the records before us in these cases, and then apply section 626.854(11)(b) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d) to the contracts and facts in those records....
...nd Mrs. Matusow). In May 2015, Citizens moved for final summary judgment on the grounds that Gables Recovery "lacks standing to sue *630 Citizens" and "is prohibited from obtaining a full assignment of the insured's claim pursuant to Florida Statute section 626.854(11)(b) and Florida Administrative Code section [sic] 69B-220.201(4)(d)." Citizens argued that, despite the twenty percent compensation provision of the December 2013 public adjuster agreement, Mrs....
...ot raised its lack of standing defense in its original answer and affirmative defenses (Citizens moved to amend to add that defense, but leave had not been granted at that point); (2) discovery was in process and incomplete; and (3) an argument that section 626.854(11)(b) does not apply to post-loss assignment agreements after a public adjuster has completed its specified services as public adjuster....
...Local laws," and that proceeds recovered by Gables Recovery would be "remitted to [Mr. Difilippi], less [Gables Recovery's] fee." Nevertheless, apparently persuaded that the assignment of all proceeds by Mr. Difilippi amounted to a fee prohibited by section 626.854(11), as concluded by the trial judge in Mrs....
...The majority resolves this omission in favor of the invalidation of a private contract. B. The Public Adjuster Statutes and Rule Focusing, then, on the statute and administrative rule relied upon by Citizens and the trial judges as a basis for invalidating the Assignments by the insureds to Gables Recovery, section 626.854, entitled " 'Public adjuster' defined; prohibitions," begins, "The Legislature finds that it is necessary for the protection of the public to regulate public insurance adjusters and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law." Subsec...
...insureds in both cases: 20%, in the case of Mrs. Matusow (agreement of December 16, 2013), and 10% in the case of Mr. Difilippi (agreement of June 13, 2013). Citizens has neither argued nor established that those public adjuster agreements violated section 626.854, either as to form or as to compensation actually paid....
...izens; Gables Recovery agreed in writing with its insureds to limit its compensation to the allowed percentages. • Citizens did not pay the claims, so of course it did not demonstrate any actual compensation paid to Gables Recovery in violation of section
626.854. • The Professional Services Agreement provisions pertaining to attorney's fees and "[c]laims handled by in house counsel for legal actions by Gables [Recovery]" are not prohibited by section
626.854. Indeed, any legal services provided by Gables Recovery's staff attorneys licensed by The Florida Bar and in good standing are expressly exempted from the provisions of section
626.854 by virtue of sections
626.854(1) and
626.860....
...the definition of a "public adjuster" and are exempted from licensure under the insurance code statutes. The record before us contains no evidence that a licensed individual public adjuster with Gables Recovery gave legal advice in contravention of section 626.854(3), nor any evidence that any licensed public adjuster employed by Gables Recovery engaged in a "maneuver, shift, or device through which the limits on compensation set forth in [ section 626.854(11)(d) ] are exceeded." 15 • The definition of "public adjuster" in section 626.854(1) applies to persons or entities "negotiating for or effecting the settlement" of an insurance claim; it does not address the point at which the claim becomes a lawsuit (as here, when Gables Recovery's counsel commenced the underlying lawsuits)....
...,
483 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), involved a law firm's violation of anti-solicitation statutes making the contract "unlawful" and making the procurement of the contract a crime under both statutes. 16 The Legislature did not make a public adjuster's violation of section
626.854 a crime; the Legislature specified disciplinary guidelines in section
626.8698 that included a fine and the suspension or revocation of *636 the adjuster's license rather than criminal penalties....
...Matusow's assigned claim, in which I would reverse the final summary judgment), and I concur separately regarding the majority's decision to reverse and remand the final summary judgment in Case No. 3D16-87 (Mr. Difilippi's assigned claim). The legislature, in 2017, amended section 626.854, Ch. 17-147, § 2, Laws of Fla., but while the amendments do not affect our analysis, subsection (11)(b) has been renumbered to (10)(b). We cite to the 2014 version of section 626.854 throughout this opinion....
...cess to their insured." • "The public adjuster's contract does not comply [with] Fla. Admin. Code R. 69B-220.051(6)(b)2, because it does not identify the adjuster's license number." The dissenting opinion suggests that the public adjuster statute, section
626.854, is unclear and ambiguous. The Florida Supreme Court, we, and others have had no trouble applying the statute's plain meaning. See Atwater v. Kortum ,
95 So.3d 85 , 90 (Fla. 2012) ("In the instant case, we agree with the First District that the plain language of section
626.854(6) 'prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral' and that the Department's interpretation of the statute is untenable because it requires 'the court to eliminate the "initiate contact" prohibition inserted by the legislature.' (quoting Kortum v. Sink ,
54 So.3d 1012 , 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ) ). Indeed, we have applied the plain language of the twenty percent cap statute, section
626.854(11)(b)....
...See Sink v. E. Coast Pub. Adjusters, Inc. ,
40 So.3d 910 , 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("Based upon the plain language of this section, fraudulent and excessive claims, such as those purportedly being investigated by Cashier, are outside of the scope of section
626.854(11)(b)(2), and the Adjusters' attempt to attack and forestall these investigations by challenging the constitutionality of sections
626.854(6) and
626.854(11)(b)(2) is misplaced.")....
...sses for events subject to a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor is that the compensation of a public adjuster for such claims is limited by statute to ten percent rather than the twenty percent limitation applicable to other claims. § 626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...d in this record), Citizens can then raise its argument that Gables Recovery's in-house attorney's claim for attorney's fees and costs under section
627.428 is excess compensation which may not be recovered as a result of the statutory limitation in section
626.854(11)(b)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 1548, 2016 WL 455723
...ue under the policy. Thus,
there is no contractual language restricting the post-loss assignment of benefits under
"this policy" without Gulfstream's consent.
Gulfstream argues that the assignment of benefits to Bioscience violates
section 626.854(16), Florida Statutes (2012), a public adjusting statute....
...Gattus's
insurance claim for Gulfstream. The record before us demonstrates that Bioscience
provided emergency, post-loss water removal services to Ms. Gattus's home at her
request. It did not determine the amount due under the policy.
Even more, the text of section 626.854(16) expressly permits a contractor,
like Bioscience, to "discuss or explain a bid for construction or repair of covered
property with the residential property owner who has suffered loss or damage covered
by a property insurance po...
...at Bioscience
appropriately discussed the water loss repair with Ms. Gattus and was retained to make
-6-
those repairs. We thus reject Gulfstream's argument that assignment of benefits
contravenes section
626.854(16) under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Gulfstream further contends that the assignment of benefits to Bioscience
violates section
627.405, Florida Statutes (2012), because Bioscience, an assignee,
does no...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 2121178, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9579
...he sort. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y.,
200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1911). Similarly, in the present case, appellee should be “held” to the “words” and their “usual meaning.” Reversed and remanded. POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . Section
626.854(1), Florida Statutes (2009), defines a public adjuster as any person, except a duly licensed attorney at law ......
...or who ... acts or aids in any manner on behalf of an insured ... in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a claim or claims for loss or damage covered by an insurance contract.... Further, "[a] public adjuster may not give legal advice.” § 626.854(3), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 439, 2012 WL 2579677, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1317
...This case concerns a statutory regulation affecting public insurance adjusters, who are authorized to assist insureds and thirty-party claimants in the filing and settlement of insurance claims. We have on appeal Kortum v. Sink,
54 So.3d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), in which the First District Court of Appeal declared invalid section
626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), a provision regulating solicitation by public adjusters....
...During its 2008 regular session, the Legislature enacted a law similar to the Task Force’s proposal. The Legislature added to the proposal a provision stating that a public adjuster may not “initiate contact” with a claimant and reduced the period of the restriction from seventy-two to forty-eight hours. Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), thus provides: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract -with any i...
...nsurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. *88 The Legislature passed amendments to other portions of section
626.854 in 2009 and 2011, but there have been no revisions to section
626.854(6) since its enactment. In October 2009, Frederick W. Kortum, Jr., a public adjuster, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief “alleging that section
626.854(6) violates his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection of the laws, and to be rewarded for his industry.” Kortum,
54 So.3d at 1014 . Kortum asserted that the statute prohibits all public adjuster-initiated communication during the forty-eight-hour period. In response, the Department of Financial Services (Department) contended that section
626.854(6) does not prohibit a public adjuster from using written methods of communication to contact a potential claimant. Kortum,
54 So.3d at 1015 . The trial court determined that section
626.854(6) is ambiguous, accepted the Department’s interpretation that the statute prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, and ruled that the statute is constitutional. The trial court concluded that because section
626.854(6) primarily regulates conduct — not speech — the case was governed by United States v....
...In O’Brien , the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificates. In the decision now on review, the First District reversed the trial court’s decision. After determining that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral,” the First District concluded that section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech — not merely conduct....
...If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
447 U.S. at 566 ,
100 S.Ct. 2343 . The First District concluded that section
626.854(6) satisfies the first three prongs of this test but held that the statute does not satisfy the fourth prong of Central Hudson....
...usters for a period of 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may un *89 duly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior.” Kortum,
54 So.3d at 1020 . Because the First District concluded that section
626.854(6) unconstitutionally burdens the commercial speech of public adjusters, it did not address Kortum’s assertions that the statute violates his right to equal protection of the law or his right “to be rewarded for his industry” guaranteed by article I, section two of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 1014 . Jeffery Atwater, in his capacity as Chief Financial Officer and head of the Department, appealed the First District’s decision. The Department contends on appeal that section
626.854(6) does not restrict written communication and that because the statute regulates conduct and not the content of speech, the requirements of Central Hudson are not applicable....
...e statute is in “the rational relationship test category for the regulation of conduct” and that the statute should be sustained under this test. Appellant’s Initial Brief at 4. II. ANALYSIS In the analysis that follows, we first conclude that section 626.854(6) prohibits public adjusters from initiating any form of communication with a potential claimant during the hours immediately following a claim-producing event and that the statute regulates protected commercial speech. We then conclude that the First District was correct in applying the test outlined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of section 626.854(6)....
...The Department’s argument is predicated entirely on its position regarding the proper interpretation of the statute — a position that we reject. No alternative basis is asserted by the Department for sustaining the constitutionality of the statute and reversing the First District’s decision. Section 626.854, Florida Statutes (2008), defines and regulates public adjusters in Florida....
...contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. [[Image here]] The provisions of subsections (5)-(12) apply only to residential property insur- *90 anee policies and condominium association policies as defined in s.
718.111(11). Kortum asserts that section
626.854(6) acts as a forty-eight-hour ban on all commercial speech from public adjusters to potential clients. The Department in turn asserts that section
626.854(6) does not actually regulate commercial speech....
...riod. Neither party contends that the statute limits a public adjuster’s ability to engage in general advertising not targeted at a specific homeowner known to have experienced a recent loss. The First District concluded that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral” and declared the statute unconstitutional....
...in the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.” Donato,
767 So.2d at 1153 (quoting Fla. State Racing Comm’n v. McLaughlin,
102 So.2d 574, 576-77 (Fla.1958)). In the instant case, we agree with the First District that the plain language of section
626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral” and that the Department’s interpretation of the statute is untenable because it requires “the court to eliminate the ‘initiate contact’ prohibition inserted by the legislature.” Kortum,
54 So.3d at 1018 . Section
626.854(6) states that a public adjuster “may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact” with a potential claimant during the specified time frame. As noted above, the Legislature added the phrase “initiate contact” to the Task Force’s proposal when adopting section
626.854(6)....
...This Court is bound to “interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency,
789 So.2d 320, 324 (Fla.2001). Consequently, the Legislature’s insertion of the broad phase “initiate contact” causes us to conclude *91 that section
626.854(6) bans all public adjuster-initiated communication with a potential claimant during the forty-eight-hour period....
...— as the Department urges — a public adjuster to initiate the dissemination of written materials to a claimant during the forty-eight-hour period. The Department’s claim that the public adjuster-initiated contact and solicitation regulated by section 626.854(6) are conduct — not protected commercial speech — is unpersuasive....
...The Department offers no reason why solicitation by a public adjuster would not be protected speech when solicitation by a CPA is “clear[ly] ... commercial expression to which the protections of the First Amendment applies].” Id. at 765 ,
113 S.Ct. 1792 . O’Brien likewise supports the conclusion that section
626.854(6) regulates commercial speech....
...ain the customer’s con *92 sent to a contract. There is no reason for a public adjuster — in his capacity as a public adjuster — to contact a claimant but to engage in communication about the commercial transaction of public adjusting. Because section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech — not merely conduct— the First District was correct in applying the test from Central Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of the statute....
...The Department has failed to present any argument showing that the First District erred in concluding that the challenged restriction is more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interests. III. CONCLUSION As explained above, the plain language of section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact with potential claimants during the forty-eight-hour period following a claim-producing event....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...surance contract claims on their behalves. The trial court in each homeowner's case granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the assignments could not confer standing because they violated state law ( Florida Statutes section 626.854(11)(b) (2014) ) 1 prohibiting public adjusters from entering into a contract that charged the homeowners more than twenty percent of the payments made on the insurance claims....
...er damage in Matusow's home. When Citizens refused to pay, Gables Recovery sued for breach of the insurance policy. Citizens answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that Gables Recovery had no standing because the Matusow assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b) - the twenty percent statutory compensation cap for public adjusters....
...Citizens then moved for summary judgment based on the assignment's purported violation of the statutory cap, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d) (prohibiting public adjusters from entering contracts for compensation in excess of limits in section 626.854(11) )....
...Gables Recovery responded that: (1) summary judgment was premature because it had not completed discovery; (2) the statutory caps did not apply because it was not "receiving compensation for work done as a public adjuster ," and, instead, it was acting "from its assigned ownership of a post loss insurance claim"; and (3) section 626.854 does not prohibit the assignment of insurance claims to a public adjuster or other person or entity....
...home. When Citizens refused to pay the additional claim, Gables Recovery sued for breach of the insurance policy. Citizens answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that Gables Recovery had no standing because the Difilippi assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d)....
...Because the agreements violated state law and public policy, the trial courts concluded, the assignments were invalid to give Gables Recovery standing to sue on behalf of Matusow and Difilippi. Gables Recovery contends that the trial courts got it wrong for two reasons. First, it says, the twenty percent cap in section 626.854(11)(b) did not apply because it only applies to public adjusters and Gables Recovery was no longer Matusow and Difilippi's adjuster when it filed the lawsuits. Second, Gables Recovery argues, its agreements with Matusow and Difilippi complied with section 626.854(11)(b). We will discuss each of these issues, but before we do, we pause to address the argument in Citizens' answer brief that, in addition to the twenty percent cap in section 626.854(11)(b), the Matusow and Difilippi agreements violated a slew of other state statutes and administrative regulations....
...urance contract or who advertises for employment as an adjuster of such claims. The term also includes any person who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, solicits, investigates, or adjusts such claims on behalf of a public adjuster. § 626.854(1), Fla....
...to facilitate the pursuit of recovery on the claim" and provide "access to ... information, statements, testimony at or before trial proceedings in the effort toward recovery of the funds due, owing and/or payable." The dissenting opinion says that section 626.854(1)"does not address the point at which the claim becomes a lawsuit," suggesting that Gables Recovery was not a public adjuster at the point the lawsuit was filed....
...were aimed at negotiating and settling Matusow's claim. Based on the agreements and the affidavit of the company representative, there was no genuine dispute that Gables Recovery was acting as Matusow and Difilippi's "public adjuster" (as defined in section
626.854(1) ). Was Gables Recovery a duly licensed attorney? Section
626.854(1) excepts attorneys from the definition of public "adjuster" - and from the requirements of section
626.854, including the twenty percent cap - if the attorney is "a duly licensed attorney at law as exempted under section
626.860." §
626.854(1), Fla....
...required to be licensed under the provisions of this code to authorize them to adjust or participate in the adjustment of any claim, loss, or damage arising under policies or contracts of insurance." Id. §
626.860. Gables Recovery was licensed as a section
626.854 public adjuster, and not a duly licensed attorney. Gables Recovery's executive director swore that the company was "a duly licensed public adjusting entity in the State of Florida as per [ section]
626.854 and provides public adjusting services to insureds under residential and commercial insurance policies." Its executive director - the one that signed the Matusow and Difilippi agreements agreement for Gables Recovery - was "also the principal licensed insurance public adjuster." The company, in other words, agreed it was a section
626.854 public adjuster. As a section
626.854 public adjuster, Gables Recovery was subject to the twenty percent cap in subsection (11)(b). Did the Matusow and Difilippi agreements violate section
626.854(11)(b) ? Gables Recovery next argues that the trial court erred because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether its agreements with Matusow *622 and Difilippi violated the twenty percent cap. There is no dispute as to the Matusow agreement but there is as to Difilippi's. "In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section
626.854 of the Florida Statutes to include new regulations on public adjusters doing business in Florida." Sink v. E. Coast Pub. Adjusters, Inc. ,
40 So.3d 910 , 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Among the provisions passed was section
626.854(11)(b), "capping the maximum fee that may be charged by a public adjuster." Id. Section
626.854(11)(b) specifically provides: (b) A public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept from any source compensation, payment, commission, fee, or any other thing of value in excess of: ... 2. Twenty percent of the amount of insurance claim payments made by the insurer for claims that are not based on events that are the subject of a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor. §
626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...h regard to a particular claim shall enter into any contract, agreement or other arrangement with any person, which would allow the public adjuster to accept an amount that would exceed the limitation of the public adjuster's compensation imposed by Section 626.854(11), F.S....
...Under the Matusow agreement, the homeowner agreed to pay Gables Recovery twenty percent of any recovered insurance money plus "any attorney fees and costs under
627.428 or any other applicable provision of state or federal law entitling the prevailing party to attorney fees and costs." This violated section
626.854 because "[a] public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept from any source compensation, payment, commission, fee, or any other thing of value in excess of ... [t]wenty percent of the amount of insurance claim payments made by the insurer." §
626.854(11)(b) 2., Fla....
...y percent cap, which is prohibited by the statute. The Difilippi agreement, however, compensated Gables Recovery ten percent of any insurance proceeds and any applicable attorney fees and costs. The Difilippi agreement, on its face, does not violate section 626.854(11)(b)....
...The Matusow and Difilippi agreements call for Gables Recovery to receive "attorney fees " in excess of the twenty percent contingency. Having its attorney's fees paid, in addition to the twenty percent contingency fee, is exactly what is covered in section 626.854(11)(b)....
...nder the agreements are not being paid to attorneys. Only Gables Recovery is "entitled to ... receive" this money under the contract. Together with the twenty percent contingency, Gables Recovery agreed to be paid in excess of what was allowed under section 626.854(11)(b)....
...the Matusow agreement. (b) Actual compensation The dissenting opinion next argues that because Gables Recovery has not been paid, we cannot know, for summary judgment purposes, whether its actual compensation will exceed the twenty percent cap. But section 626.854(11)(b) prohibits more than just accepting in excess of twenty percent. The statute says that a "public adjuster may not charge, agree to , or accept ... any ... thing of value in excess of ... twenty percent of the amount of the insurance claim payments made by the insurer." § 626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...The twenty percent cap prohibits public adjusters from even "agree[ing] to" more compensation than is allowed by law. We don't have to wait for Gables Recovery to "accept" money, as the dissenting opinion suggests, to know the Matusow agreement violates section 626.854(11)(b) because Gables Recovery "agree[d] to" be paid more than twenty percent of the insurance claim....
...as any other chose in action. (quotations and footnote omitted) ). But for at least 110 years, assignments that violated state statutes have been invalid and unenforceable. See Hall ,
47 So. at 612 . The Matusow assignment violated a state statute, section
626.854(11)(b), because it agreed to give Gables Recovery more than twenty percent of what is collected on the insurance claim....
...Thus, Matusow did not validly assign her claim, and without the assignment, Gables Recovery did not have standing to sue Citizens. We affirm the summary judgment in case number 15-2320. There's a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Difilippi assignment violated section 626.854(11)(b)....
...l summary judgment for Citizens in Case No. 3D16-87 (Christopher Difilippi is the insured). The difference in analysis and outcomes turns largely on my view that Gables Recovery never exceeded the limits on compensation imposed by the Legislature in section 626.854(11)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), 5 in Mrs....
...Faithful adherence to the text of the statute does not support such a result-indeed, the statute is silent as to the inclusion of attorney's fees in "compensation." The text also specifies that an agreement purporting to exceed the "limits on compensation" in section 626.854(11) is "punishable as provided under s....
...ess an assortment of statutory and regulatory arguments raised here for the first time, and not raised in Citizens' motions for summary judgment in the trial court. I will first highlight parts of the records before us in these cases, and then apply section 626.854(11)(b) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-220.201(4)(d) to the contracts and facts in those records....
...nd Mrs. Matusow). In May 2015, Citizens moved for final summary judgment on the grounds that Gables Recovery "lacks standing to sue *630 Citizens" and "is prohibited from obtaining a full assignment of the insured's claim pursuant to Florida Statute section 626.854(11)(b) and Florida Administrative Code section [sic] 69B-220.201(4)(d)." Citizens argued that, despite the twenty percent compensation provision of the December 2013 public adjuster agreement, Mrs....
...ot raised its lack of standing defense in its original answer and affirmative defenses (Citizens moved to amend to add that defense, but leave had not been granted at that point); (2) discovery was in process and incomplete; and (3) an argument that section 626.854(11)(b) does not apply to post-loss assignment agreements after a public adjuster has completed its specified services as public adjuster....
...Local laws," and that proceeds recovered by Gables Recovery would be "remitted to [Mr. Difilippi], less [Gables Recovery's] fee." Nevertheless, apparently persuaded that the assignment of all proceeds by Mr. Difilippi amounted to a fee prohibited by section 626.854(11), as concluded by the trial judge in Mrs....
...The majority resolves this omission in favor of the invalidation of a private contract. B. The Public Adjuster Statutes and Rule Focusing, then, on the statute and administrative rule relied upon by Citizens and the trial judges as a basis for invalidating the Assignments by the insureds to Gables Recovery, section 626.854, entitled " 'Public adjuster' defined; prohibitions," begins, "The Legislature finds that it is necessary for the protection of the public to regulate public insurance adjusters and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law." Subsec...
...insureds in both cases: 20%, in the case of Mrs. Matusow (agreement of December 16, 2013), and 10% in the case of Mr. Difilippi (agreement of June 13, 2013). Citizens has neither argued nor established that those public adjuster agreements violated section 626.854, either as to form or as to compensation actually paid....
...izens; Gables Recovery agreed in writing with its insureds to limit its compensation to the allowed percentages. • Citizens did not pay the claims, so of course it did not demonstrate any actual compensation paid to Gables Recovery in violation of section
626.854. • The Professional Services Agreement provisions pertaining to attorney's fees and "[c]laims handled by in house counsel for legal actions by Gables [Recovery]" are not prohibited by section
626.854. Indeed, any legal services provided by Gables Recovery's staff attorneys licensed by The Florida Bar and in good standing are expressly exempted from the provisions of section
626.854 by virtue of sections
626.854(1) and
626.860....
...the definition of a "public adjuster" and are exempted from licensure under the insurance code statutes. The record before us contains no evidence that a licensed individual public adjuster with Gables Recovery gave legal advice in contravention of section 626.854(3), nor any evidence that any licensed public adjuster employed by Gables Recovery engaged in a "maneuver, shift, or device through which the limits on compensation set forth in [ section 626.854(11)(d) ] are exceeded." 15 • The definition of "public adjuster" in section 626.854(1) applies to persons or entities "negotiating for or effecting the settlement" of an insurance claim; it does not address the point at which the claim becomes a lawsuit (as here, when Gables Recovery's counsel commenced the underlying lawsuits)....
...,
483 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), involved a law firm's violation of anti-solicitation statutes making the contract "unlawful" and making the procurement of the contract a crime under both statutes. 16 The Legislature did not make a public adjuster's violation of section
626.854 a crime; the Legislature specified disciplinary guidelines in section
626.8698 that included a fine and the suspension or revocation of *636 the adjuster's license rather than criminal penalties....
...Matusow's assigned claim, in which I would reverse the final summary judgment), and I concur separately regarding the majority's decision to reverse and remand the final summary judgment in Case No. 3D16-87 (Mr. Difilippi's assigned claim). The legislature, in 2017, amended section 626.854, Ch. 17-147, § 2, Laws of Fla., but while the amendments do not affect our analysis, subsection (11)(b) has been renumbered to (10)(b). We cite to the 2014 version of section 626.854 throughout this opinion....
...cess to their insured." • "The public adjuster's contract does not comply [with] Fla. Admin. Code R. 69B-220.051(6)(b)2, because it does not identify the adjuster's license number." The dissenting opinion suggests that the public adjuster statute, section
626.854, is unclear and ambiguous. The Florida Supreme Court, we, and others have had no trouble applying the statute's plain meaning. See Atwater v. Kortum ,
95 So.3d 85 , 90 (Fla. 2012) ("In the instant case, we agree with the First District that the plain language of section
626.854(6) 'prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral' and that the Department's interpretation of the statute is untenable because it requires 'the court to eliminate the "initiate contact" prohibition inserted by the legislature.' (quoting Kortum v. Sink ,
54 So.3d 1012 , 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ) ). Indeed, we have applied the plain language of the twenty percent cap statute, section
626.854(11)(b)....
...See Sink v. E. Coast Pub. Adjusters, Inc. ,
40 So.3d 910 , 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("Based upon the plain language of this section, fraudulent and excessive claims, such as those purportedly being investigated by Cashier, are outside of the scope of section
626.854(11)(b)(2), and the Adjusters' attempt to attack and forestall these investigations by challenging the constitutionality of sections
626.854(6) and
626.854(11)(b)(2) is misplaced.")....
...sses for events subject to a declaration of a state of emergency by the Governor is that the compensation of a public adjuster for such claims is limited by statute to ten percent rather than the twenty percent limitation applicable to other claims. § 626.854(11)(b), Fla....
...d in this record), Citizens can then raise its argument that Gables Recovery's in-house attorney's claim for attorney's fees and costs under section
627.428 is excess compensation which may not be recovered as a result of the statutory limitation in section
626.854(11)(b)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 20092, 2014 WL 6864000
...This provision merely
provides that the calculation of Dynamic’s fee will be based only on payments
made by Citizens on the supplemental claims and would not include the $1.2
million Citizens had already paid.1 It does not mean that Dynamic would recover
1 The contractual provision is consistent with section 626.854(11)(a), Florida
Statutes (2011), which provides:
If a public adjuster enters into a contract with an insured ....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
such claims on behalf of a public adjuster. §
626.854(1), Fla. Stat. (2015).
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 10866
CORTINAS, J. In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section 626.854 of the Florida Statutes to include new regulations on public adjusters doing business in Florida. Among these regulations were section 626.854(6), limiting the timing of a public adjuster’s initial contact with a potential client, and section 626.854(ll)(b)(2), capping the maximum fee that may be charged by a public adjuster....
...In opposition to the appellants’ motion to dismiss, the Adjusters filed several affidavits and correspondence purportedly demonstrating the Department’s activities warranting application of the sword-wielder doctrine. While the Adjusters apparently concede that the 48-hour wait period required under section 626.854(6) is not implicated by the Department’s actions, they maintain that the investigatory activity identified in their affidavits and correspondence relates to the fee cap required by section 626.854(ll)(b)(2)....
...Lastly, the Adjusters indicate that while the lawsuit was pending, the Department sent a letter in January 2010 to Premier requesting information and documentation as to one of its contracts that contained a commission of 25 percent, despite that “[ujnder Florida Statute 626.854(11)(b)(2), the cap is 20 percent.” We need not consider the January 2010 letter as it was not before the trial court at the time the motion to dismiss was heard, and, moreover, the investigation referenced therein was closed without further action....
...because he believed that one of East Coast’s employees ... had filed an excessive claim.” The affidavit filed by Premier’s president states that the Department’s agent was “investigating allegations that [Premier] had charged in excess of the fees allowable under Fla. Stat. 626.854.” We note that section 626.854 includes limitations on public adjuster fees outside of those in section 626.854(ll)(b)(2)....
...In response, the appellants filed two affidavits, including one by Cashier unequivocally stating that he had “not been asked to enforce, [nor had he] attempted to enforce or prosecute any person or entity with a violation of the 48-hour waiting period provision of section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2009) and the fee cap provisions of section 626.854(ll)(b), Florida Statutes (2009).” Cashier further attested that “[njone of the referenced investigations cited therein concerned allegations of misconduct pursuant to the above-referenced statutes.” On its face, section 626.854(ll)(b)(2) provides: (b) A public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept any compensation, payment, commission, fee, or other thing of value in excess of: 2. Twenty percent of the amount of all other insurance claim payments. § 626.854(11)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). Based upon the plain language of this section, fraudulent and excessive claims, such as those purportedly being investigated by Cashier, are outside of the scope of section 626.854(ll)(b)(2), and the Adjusters’ attempt to attack and forestall these investigations by challenging the constitutionality of sections 626.854(6) and 626.854(ll)(b)(2) is misplaced....
...iled, or when the threat of such action in said county is both real and imminent.” Carlile,
354 So.2d at 365 . The actions alleged in the complaint, namely the restrictions on speech and the time, place, and manner of conducting business caused by section
626.854(6) and the denial of due process by section
626.854(ll)(b)(2), do not coincide with, and appear to have no connection to, the alleged activities of the Department against the Adjusters in Miami-Dade County....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 20218, 2010 WL 5381934
...Maria Elena Abate and Elana H. Gloetzner of Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Amicus Curiae Florida Property and Casualty Association. VAN NORTWICK, J. Frederick W. Kortum, Jr., a public adjuster, appeals a final judgment determining that section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), which bans solicitation by public adjusters for a period of 48 hours, is not unconstitutional....
...Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Factual and Procedural History A public adjuster, for compensation, assists insureds in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a claim for loss or damages covered by an insurance policy. § 626.854(1), Fla....
...surance policy until at least 72 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. The language of the statute enacted by the legislature, see § 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), differed from the recommendation and provides as follows: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitatio...
...The legislature changed the language recommended by the Task Force by adding the phrase "initiate contact or" and reducing the temporal length of the solicitation restriction from 72 to 48 hours. Kortum, a public adjuster, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that section 626.854(6) violates his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection of the laws, and to be rewarded for his industry. Because we agree with Kortum that section 626.854(6) unconstitutionally burdens the commercial free speech rights of public adjusters, we do not address his further contention that the statute violates his right to equal protection of the law or his right "to be rewarded for industry" guaranteed by Article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution....
...nish recovery under the insurance policy by failing to preserve evidence, by failing to find damaged property, and by overspending on mitigation or restoration efforts. The Department's expert witness disagreed. Further, the Department asserted that section 626.854(6) did not prohibit a public adjuster from contacting a potential claimant through email or in writing....
...The Department candidly conceded at oral argument, however, that, if the statute is read as a total ban on all solicitation during the first 48 hours, it cannot pass constitutional muster. In its final judgment, the trial court found that the language of section 626.854(6) is ambiguous and, therefore, the agency's interpretation should be upheld unless that construction is clearly unauthorized or erroneous....
...The trial court found that a legitimate governmental purpose exists to provide a citizen who has been traumatized by a casualty loss with some "breathing room before making weighty decisions." To accomplish such purpose, the trial court found that section 626.854(6) was narrowly drawn and did not prohibit anything other than face-to-face solicitation and telephonic solicitations....
...to speak. This appeal followed. Commercial Speech The trial court's construction of a statute is subject to de novo review. Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health,
898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005). Appellee has relied upon two cases to support its argument that section
626.854(6) is a conduct statute, O'Brien and State v....
...l solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster," id. at 620,
115 S.Ct. 2371 and ruling that the regulation there was supported by a two-year study, statistical data, and anecdotal evidence). We find that section
626.854(6) satisfies the third prong of Central Hudson. Fourth Prong of Central Hudson Test Turning to the fourth prong, we are required to examine whether section
626.854(6) is more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental interest....
...1st DCA 1993). "It is fundamental that judges do not have the power to edit statutes so as to add requirements that the legislature did not include." Meyer v. Caruso,
731 So.2d 118, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Id. at 874. Examining the plain language of section
626.854(6), it is clear to us that it prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral....
...on of the statute. Though there may have been some support for the Department's argument in recommendations made by the Task Force, there has been no showing that the legislature adopted the findings and recommendations of the Task Force in enacting section 626.854(6)....
...Thus, direct in-person solicitation by lawyers is more in need of regulation.
507 U.S. at 774-75,
113 S.Ct. at 1802-03. Amicus curiae further asserts that public adjusters are soliciting clients who are in the same position as accident victims and that section
626.854(6) is designed to prevent the possibility that a public adjuster can take advantage of a traumatized person who is dealing with the aftermath of a disaster....
...for a period of 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical or unprofessional behavior. Nor has the Department demonstrated that the other provisions of section 626.854 and the Rules of Professional Conduct and Ethics governing the Florida Association of Public Insurance Adjusters are insufficient to regulate unduly coercive or misleading solicitation by public adjusters....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 543402
...Based on these and other findings of fact, the referee reached the following conclusions of law: 1) That Ronald York, Sr. is not and has not at any material time been an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida; 2) That Ronald York, Sr. is not and was not a "public adjuster" within the meaning of F.S. 626.854; 3) That the questioned conduct of Respondent Ronald York, Sr....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 WL 2925177
...Greenberg Traurig and Arthur J. England, Miami; Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod and Michell Widom and Lori P. Lustrin, for appellees. Before CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. CORTIÑAS, J. In 2008, the Florida Legislature amended section 626.854 of the Florida Statutes to include new regulations on public adjusters doing business in Florida. Among these regulations were section 626.854(6), limiting the timing of a public adjuster's initial contact with a potential client, and section 626.854(11)(b)(2), capping the maximum fee that may be charged by a public adjuster....
...In opposition to the appellants' motion to dismiss, the Adjusters filed several affidavits and correspondence purportedly demonstrating the Department's activities warranting application of the sword-wielder doctrine. While the Adjusters apparently concede that the 48-hour wait period required under section 626.854(6) is not implicated by the Department's actions, they maintain that the investigatory activity identified in their affidavits and correspondence relates to the fee cap required by section 626.854(11)(b)(2)....
...Lastly, the Adjusters indicate that while the lawsuit was pending, the Department sent a letter in January 2010 to Premier requesting information and documentation as to one of its contracts that contained a commission of 25 percent, despite that "[u]nder Florida Statute 626.854(11)(b)(2), the cap is 20 percent." We need not consider the January 2010 letter as it was not before the trial court at the time the motion to dismiss was heard, and, moreover, the investigation referenced therein was closed without further action....
...because he believed that one of East Coast's employees . . . had filed an excessive claim." The affidavit filed by Premier's president states that the Department's agent was "investigating allegations that [Premier] had charged in excess of the fees allowable under Fla. Stat. 626.854." We note that section 626.854 includes limitations on public adjuster fees outside of those in section 626.854(11)(b)(2)....
...In response, the appellants filed two affidavits, including one by Cashier unequivocally stating that he had "not been asked to enforce, [nor had he] attempted to enforce or prosecute any person or entity with a violation of the 48-hour waiting period provision of section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2009) and the fee cap provisions of section 626.854(11)(b), Florida Statutes (2009)." Cashier further attested that "[n]one of the referenced investigations cited therein concerned allegations of misconduct pursuant to the above-referenced statutes." On its face, section 626.854(11)(b)(2) provides: (b) A public adjuster may not charge, agree to, or accept any compensation, payment, commission, fee, or other thing of value in excess of: 2. Twenty percent of the amount of all other insurance claim payments. § 626.854(11)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). Based upon the plain language of this section, fraudulent and excessive claims, such as those purportedly being investigated by Cashier, are outside of the scope of section 626.854(11)(b)(2), and the Adjusters' attempt to attack and forestall these investigations by challenging the constitutionality of sections 626.854(6) and 626.854(11)(b)(2) is misplaced....
...s filed, or when the threat of such action in said county is both real and imminent." Carlile,
354 So.2d at 365. The actions alleged in the complaint, namely the restrictions on speech and the time, place, and manner of conducting business caused by section
626.854(6) and the denial of due process by section
626.854(11)(b)(2), do not coincide with, and appear to have no connection to, the alleged activities of the Department against the Adjusters in Miami-Dade County....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...rict found the public adjuster
was interested. Id. (citing Branco,
148 So. 3d at 491). First, the court
relied on the contract between the insureds and the public adjuster. Id.
Second, the court noted that Florida law regulates public adjusters, see §
626.854, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The Insureds’ Action Against the Public Adjuster
The insureds, still represented by the law firm, then filed a two-count
action against the public adjuster.
The insureds’ Count 1 against the public adjuster sought damages for
violation of section 626.854(14)(b), Florida Statutes (2020) (“A public
2
adjuster may not restrict or prevent an insurer … or other person acting
on behalf of the insurer from having reasonable access at reasonable
times...
