Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Florida law (¶¶ 26(b) & 43), failed to obtain a license for mortgage lending prior to performing mortgage lending services (¶ 26(c)), collected consumer debts without first registering as a Florida debt collector (¶ 42) and failed to comply with § 559.715 when it obtained the right from third party mortgage note owners to collect a debt (¶ 57)....

...In opposition to H&K’s motion, Burt filed an affidavit stating that H&K did not loan her money, did not confer on her any benefit, and that she did not owe them $85,192.22. She swore that she never received notice from H&K or its predecessors in interest that the debt had been assigned as required by section 559.715, Florida Statutes....

provide a notice of debt assignment pursuant to § 559.715, Fla. Stat. [ECF No. 95, p. 4], The Court will

...signment of the Debt- or’s Note and Mortgage from Wells Fargo, N.A. (Doc. 1, ¶ 38). The Debtor acknowledged at the hearing on the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Complaint that the Objection to Claim is predicated on state law. Specifically, § 559.715 of the Florida Statutes provides: § 559.715....

...actical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default. Fla. Stat. § 559.715 . The Debtor’s Objection to Claim involves HSBC’s compliance with § 559.715 of the Florida Statutes....

...The bank brought a mortgage foreclosure suit against the appellee, Barbara C. Siefker (“the borrower”). In her amended answer, the borrower raised the following as an affirmative defense: “Defendant states that Plaintiff failed to comply with F.S. § 559.715 which required Plaintiff to give Defendant written notice of the alleged Assignment.” The borrower was referencing section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012), which requires a debt creditor’s assignee to provide notice of the assignment to the debtor no later than thirty days before “any action to collect the debt.” This case proceeded to trial and at the close of evidence, the borrower moved for involuntary dismissal, arguing among other things that “[t]here was zero evidence that they complied with [section 559.715] and that is a condition precedent to bringing this foreclosure action.” The bank responded that the statute does not apply to mortgage foreclosure suits....

...*813 After the trial court entered a final judgment of foreclosure, the borrower moved for rehearing whereupon the trial court granted the motion with respect to the borrower’s argument that the bank had failed to comply with the notice requirement of section 559.715....

...“Both acts generally apply to the same types of conduct, and Florida courts must give ‘great weight’ to federal interpretations of the FDCPA when interpreting and applying the FCCPA.” Read v. MFP, Inc., 85 So.3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting § 559.77(5), Fla. Stat.). Section 559.715, at issue in this appeal, is contained in the FCCPA, and provides as follows: This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default. § 559.715, Fla....

...money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 1 The first issue we must address is whether section 559.715 applies to mortgage foreclosure suits....

...(2012) (defining “debt” and “consumer debt”). Given that the bank brought the suit in order to obtain what it was owed, through sale of the property and, if necessary, a deficiency judgment, the suit is an action to collect a debt and thus falls within the requirements of section 559.715. See Freire v. Aldridge Connors, LLP, 994 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1288 (S.D.Fla.2014). Having determined that section 559.715 applies to the mortgage foreclosure suit brought in this case, we next determine whether the notice requirement in the statute acts as a condition precedent to bringing suit....

...Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 183 So.3d 1215, 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), rev. denied, No. SC16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 (Fla. March 22, 2016). The Second District, however, certified the following question as one of great public importance: “Is *816 the provision of written notice of assignment under section 559.715 a condition precedent to the institution of a foreclosure lawsuit by the holder of the note?” Id....

...by the statutes for libel and slander actions, medical malpractice suits, and condominium-related suits, which all require some prior act or condition before suit can be brought: “Because the Legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the Legislature did not enact.” Id. at 1219 . The Second District also addressed the Brindises’ argument that they would have no remedy for the violation of the FCCPA if the notice requirement of section 559.715 was found not to operate as a condition precedent: [T]he FCCPA imposes a sweeping scheme of administrative enforcement....

...t consumers from harassing collection efforts. The Brindises have not demonstrated that the mere filing of a foreclosure suit, even one seeking money damages, implicates those concerns. Thus, where administrative enforcement mechanisms exist, making section 559.715 a condition precedent is not necessary to the primary purpose of the FCCPA. Id. at 1220 (citation omitted). In her dissent, Judge Khouzam opined that the plain language of section 559.715 does create a condition precedent to foreclosure....

...She disagreed with the majority’s finding that the language was not specific enough to constitute a condition precedent: It is true that the legislature has, in other areas of the law, created more involved and specific conditions precedent. But that fact does not undermine the clear mandate found in section 559.715 that an assignee must give the debtor written notice of an assignment at least thirty days before taking any action to collect the debt....

...e must provide the debtor with notice of the assignment. The statute further specifies a timeframe for giving the required notice: “[A]s soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt.” § 559.715, Fla....

...s v. Cape Canaveral Hosp., Inc., 898 So.2d 973, 975 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). These rules permit us to examine the legislative history of the statute. 3 Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla.2013). The legislative history of section 559.715 does not reflect any intent by the Legislature that the notice provision of section 559.715 should operate as a condition precedent to filing a mortgage foreclosure suit....

...t 1220 (quoting Summerlin Asset Mgmt. v Tr. v. Jackson, No. 9:14-CV-81302, 2015 WL 4065372 (S.D.Fla. July 2, 2015). To that end, chapter 559 provides “a sweeping scheme of administrative enforcement.” Id. Additionally, the legislative history of section 559.715 reflects that the “legislature intended the statute to streamline the collection of consumer debts.” Id....

...Here, the Legislature has created a statutory scheme governing mortgage foreclosure suits. See Ch. 702, Fla. Stat. (2012). The statutes comprising chapter 702 do not provide, as a condition precedent to filing suit, that creditors’ assignees must give debtors notice of the assignment. Further, section 559.715 is contained in a chapter that provides fob sanctions for noncompliance with the chapter’s provisions....

...Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing for judicial enforcement by injunction to restrain violations of any provision of the chapter). A bar to filing suit is not provided for as a sanction. The borrower argues that the sanctions which apply to violations of section 559.715 are weak, and thus, in order to give section 559.715 any effect, we must read it as providing for a condition precedent to fil-ingsuit....

...We reverse and remand for the trial court to reinstate the final judgment of foreclosure. Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of final judgment. LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur. . This definition now appears in section 559.55(6), Florida Statutes (2016). . The Second District has more recently held that section 559.715 does not apply where the holder of the note, rather than the assignee of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt, brings the foreclosure suit, See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr....

...ction of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” The Complaint cites to Florida Statute § 559.715, which states: This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...0 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee' is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default. There is no private right of action to enforce a violation of § 559.715. See Fla. Stat. § 559.77 . However, the Complaint asserts that § 559.715 creates a condition precedent to the lawful collection of an assigned debt....

...rty days before receiving the collection letter, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant had no lawful authority to collect the debt and thus violated § 1692f(1). (Id.) In response, the Defendant points to two state court cases that have held that § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to the filing of a foreclosure lawsuit. Brindise v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 183 So.3d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that “Section 559.715 has no language making written notice of assignment a condition precedent to suit.”), cert. denied; Bank of America, N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So.3d 811, 817 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“The plain language [of § 559.715] does not impose a bar on filing suit if notice is not provided consistent with the statute ... ”). Florida’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal explained that “The Legislature knows how to create a condition precedent. Because the Legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the Legislature did not enact.” Brindise, 183 So.3d at 1219 . The court also recognized that, in light of the administrative enforcement mechanisms set forth in the FCCPA, such as disciplinary actions and cease and desist orders, “making section 559.715 a condition precedent is not necessary to the primary purpose of the FCCPA.” Id....

...e courts should be limited to the initiation of a lawsuit to foreclose on a mortgage. The Plaintiff cites to Schmidt v. Synergentic Commc’ns, Inc., in which the Middle District of Florida held that a plaintiffs allegation that a defendant violated § 559.715 could constitute a violation of the FDCPA. No. 14-cv-539-FtM-29CM, 2015 WL 248635 , *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2015) (citations omitted). However, the Court notes that this decision pre-dates the state court decisions holding that the § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent....

...also constitute FDCPA violations. Id. (quoting Carlson v. First Revenue Assurance, 359 F.3d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted). The only similarity the Court observes between the provision of the FCCPA at issue in LeBlanc and § 559.715 is that there is no private right of action to enforce either provision. There is no provision contemplating dual enforcement for violations of § 559.715 as there is for the provision at issue in LeBlanc. See Fla. Stat. Ch. 559. In addition, the Florida legislature has not designated violations of § 559.715 as criminal in nature. Id. The Court gives great weight to the two recent Florida state court decisions holding that § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to taking an action to collect on a debt....

...sive indication that the highest court of the state would decide the issue differently.” McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds, Horowitch v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., 645 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2011). Section 559.715 specifically states that “The assignee is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default.” If failure to provide 30 days’ notice of an assignment as required by § 559.715 does not impede an assignee’s right to collect a debt, then there is no violation of the FDCPA’s prohibition on “[t]he collection of any amount ......

...t the right does not exist. (Compl. ¶ 44(a), ECF No. 1.) First, the Plaintiff alleges that FNCB violated this provision by attempting to collect the debt before giving the Plaintiff thirty days’ notice of the assignment of the debt as required by § 559.715. (Id.) However, as the Plaintiff acknowledged in her response to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the FCCPA does not create a private right of action to enforce § 559.715. See Wright v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., No. 15-cv-249-FtM-38MRM, 2015 WL 6560444 , *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2015) (dismissing alleged violation of the FCCPA for failure to serve a notice of assignment pursuant to Florida Statute § 559.715 because the Florida legislature' did not authorize a private right of action to enforce § 559.715)....

...The Bank of New York Mellon, formerly known as The Bank of New York, filed the complaint as the Trustee for the Certificate Holders of the CWABS, Inc., Asset- Backed Certificates, Series 2007-4. -2- failed to comply with section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012); and that the Bank failed to properly verify the amended complaint. The Welkers moved for summary judgment on the bases that the Bank failed to comply with paragraph 22 and section 559.715, both of which the Welkers asserted were conditions precedent to filing suit. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for the Welkers conceded that the Bank had substantially complied with the paragraph 22 requirements and argued solely that the Bank failed to comply with section 559.715 as a condition precedent. The court granted summary judgment. As this court has previously held, providing the notice described in section 559.715 is not a condition precedent to foreclosure. Brindise v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 183 So. 3d 1215, 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Further, where the entity seeking to enforce the note is the holder of the note and not merely the assignee of the right to bill and collect the debt, section 559.715 is inapplicable. See § 559.715 ("This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...3d at 1219 (stating that the right of the note holder to enforce the note exists regardless of assignment). The Bank's status as a holder of the note in this case was contested at the time of the summary judgment, making summary judgment improper regardless of the Welkers' specific argument regarding section 559.715's applicability. -3-  Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the Bank's lawsuit and granting summary judgment, and we remand for reinstatement of the action....

...Defendant’s Argument with Respect to the FCCPA Defendant’s motion to dismiss argues that the December 2010 letter was not made in connection with the collection of any debt because Defendant was required to send the letter under the FCCPA, specifically Fla. Stat. § 559.715 , which states: This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...to collect the debt. The assignee is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default, (emphasis added). Defendant argues that the letter served as the notice required under section 559.715, informing Plaintiff that it was assigned the debt, providing Plaintiff with the new account information, and notifying Plaintiff that collection efforts would not occur on the account for at least thirty days. The parties are in agreement that the issue of whether a letter sent by a debt *1356 collector under section 559.715 can violate the FDCPA is a matter of first impression. The parties’ generous attention on section 559.715, however, is misplaced....

...§ 6801 et seq., did not, as a matter of law, eliminate its status as a communication made in connection with debt collection under the FDCPA). Thus, the appropriate inquiry here is simply whether the letter, regardless of whether it was sent in compliance with section 559.715, was made in connection with the collection of Plaintiffs debt. Defendant’s request that the Court hold that the letter’s compliance with section 559.715 bars Plaintiffs claims as a matter of law would potentially create a loophole in the FDCPA for letters sent from debt collectors to debtors, purportedly premised on the notice requirement of section 559.715....

...However, the trial court entered a default judgment against Ms. Quinion in July 2011. She did not participate in the proceedings below and has not made an appearance in this appeal. -2-  failed to comply with the requirements of . . . § 559.715[,] Fla. Stat. The litigation proceeded to a hearing on the Cresons' motion for summary judgment. The circuit court was persuaded that Deutsche Bank had failed to comply with a condition precedent the court construed from section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2014). On February 25, 2014, the circuit court entered its order of dismissal, which stated simply that "Plaintiff did not comply with Fla. Stat. 559.715." The court dismissed Deutsche Bank's complaint but without prejudice for it to file a new lawsuit....

...4th DCA 2004))). We review a court's dismissal of a complaint de novo. Williams v. Gaffin Indus. Servs., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2010), titled "Assignment of consumer debts," is part of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, and it reads as follows: This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...ding requirement upon a litigant who wishes to challenge the fulfillment of a condition precedent; under the rule, "[a] denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity." Assuming, as the trial court did, that section 559.715 imposed a condition precedent to Deutsche Bank's foreclosure action, the burden fell to the Cresons to first frame that issue, specifically and with particularity, in their answer. On appeal, they argue that their answer's averment that "Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of . . . § 559.715 Fla....

...hat the party -5- that is presumably in a better position to identify a noncompliance or nonoccurrence does so within its pleading"). Here, the Cresons did identify a Florida statute, section 559.715, which, they contend, was a condition precedent to Deutsche Bank’s filing of a foreclosure lawsuit....

...ble’s refusal to produce the requested documents. (Doc. No. 70, p. 1; Ex. A.) Moreover, Ms. Erickson submits that in her Second Amended Complaint she asserts that Equable did not provide a timely notice of assignment of debt pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 559.715 , and that, therefore, its collection attempts constitute a collection of debt that cannot legally be collected, a violation of FDCPA § 1692e(5)....

...Thus, the Court finds in favor of Equable and grants summary judgment on claims of violations of FDCPA § 1692c(a)(2) and FCCPA §§ 559.72(9) and (18). Furthermore, as to the issue of whether Equable provided a timely notice of assignment of debt to Ms. Erickson, as required under Fla. Stat. § 559.715 7 , the *1183 Court finds Ms....

...(internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, however, because the Court found that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was timely notice of assignment, the Court need not determine whether a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.715 would also violate the relevant provisions of the FDCPA....

...reinstatement of the foreclosure action and proceedings on the merits. See Brindise v. U.S. Bank, N.A, 183 So.3d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 2016 WL 1122325 , at *1- (Fla.2016) (rejecting borrowers’ argumént that the notice requirement of section 559.715 of the Florida Statutes applies in foreclosure actions); McCall v....

that Nationstar had failed to comply with section 559.715, Florida Statutes, which requires written notice

borrowers’ argument that the notice requirement of section 559.715 of the Florida Statutes applies in foreclosure

condition-precedent, i.e. notice pursuant to section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2016); and (3) lack of standing

...§ 203.604 does not operate as a condition precedent to foreclosure, as it is an administrative regulation subject to monetary sanctions and not a bar to filing a foreclosure complaint. We agree with that argument. In Bank of America, N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So. 3d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), we refused to construe section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012)—which requires a creditor to provide notice of assignment to the debtor no later than thirty days before any action to collect the debt—as a condition precedent to bringing a foreclosure suit. Id. at 818. We explained that because the Legislature provided sanctions for a violation of that statute—and because a bar to filing suit was not provided by the Legislature—we could not alter the statutory scheme by construing section 559.715 as a condition precedent to foreclosure....

...In the complaint, JPMorgan alleged that all conditions precedent to the filing of the action had been performed. The Ostranders moved for summary judgment on April 10, 2015, asserting that JPMorgan failed to comply with conditions precedent, specifically the notice requirements of paragraph 22 of the mortgage and section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...as a matter of law, and summary judgment was improper. Because of this result, we need not address JPMorgan's argument that the court erred in denying its motion for rehearing. We also note that the Ostranders' argument for affirmance based on section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2014), has been specifically rejected by this court....

...tatute of limitations, and claimed that the Bank had failed to comply with a condition precedent to foreclosure because it had not notified the borrower of the claimed assignment of the loan within thirty days of the assignment in accordance with section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012). The lost note was payable to ContiMortgage Corporation; it had not been indorsed in blank or payable to the order of the Bank....

...nthia Stevens. At the conclusion of the presentation of Ms. Stevens's testimony, the trial court rejected all of Ms. Peters' other arguments, including those based on the Bank's asserted lack of standing and noncompliance with the requirements of section 559.715....

...Peters contends that the Bank's claim to reestablish the lost note is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Third, she asserts that the Bank failed to prove that it gave Ms. Peters written notice of the assignment of the loan at least thirty days before the filing of the underlying action as required by section 559.715. Ms....

...SC16-300, (Fla. Mar. 22, 2016); Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Summers, 198 So. 3d 1162, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (per curiam affirmance citing Brindise with approval); cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So. 3d 811, 817-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that section 559.715 was applicable to the mortgage foreclosure action brought by Bank of America, but that the statute did not operate as a condition precedent to bringing a mortgage foreclosure -5- action)....

...Nicholas Lipari failed to make payment and the loan went into default. NCT then filed against both defendants. Appellee contends that NCT failed to provide notice of an assignment of the debt to him as required by the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), section 559.715, Florida Statues (2007), prior to filing suit....

...scheme for collecting consumer debts in the State of Florida. It provides that a holder of a promissory note can assign the right to bill and collect to a collection agency for the purposes of more expeditiously collecting consumer debt that is in default. Section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2007), requires a collection agency to give written notice to the debtor of the assignment at least thirty days prior to the filing of any action to collect on the debt. In the instant case, the entire note originally made by JPMorgan Bank, N.A., was assigned to NCT. No rights were retained by the assignor. There is nothing in section 559.715 that would indicate that written notice of the assignment is a condition precedent to filing suit. The Second District Court of Appeal under similar facts in Brindise v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 183 So. 3d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), albeit in a mortgage foreclosure action, held that the notice requirement set forth in section 559.715, Florida Statutes, was not a condition precedent to suit....

...The Second District Court of Appeal reaffirmed that principle in the case of Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Hagstrom, 203 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), and the Fourth District Court of Appeal has also 2 come to the same conclusion regarding section 559.715, Florida Statutes, in the case of Bank of America, N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So. 3d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). We agree with our sister courts that the notice requirement of section 559.715, Florida Statutes, is not a condition precedent to filing suit....

...Bank seeks review of a final summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Robert and Sheilah Adams. The summary judgment was based on the Adamses' argument that U.S. Bank failed to comply with the condition precedent of giving notice pursuant to section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2013), of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. We reverse because section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent....

...In the operative complaint, U.S. Bank alleged that all conditions precedent had been fulfilled or had occurred. In their answer, the Adamses alleged that U.S. Bank failed to give notice that the debt had been assigned to U.S. Bank as required by section 559.715 and failed to give notice of default as required by paragraph 22 of the mortgage....

...notice of assignment 30 days prior to filing this lawsuit. . . . (Footnote omitted.) -2-  U.S. Bank filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment in which it argued that section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to filing a mortgage foreclosure action....

...Bank, the Adamses' affidavits did not refute its assertion in the complaint that it complied with all conditions precedent because the affidavits failed to establish that the requisite notice had not been mailed. The hearing on the Adamses' summary judgment motion was brief. The Adamses argued that section 559.715 created a condition precedent and that U.S....

...Bank filed a motion for rehearing reiterating the arguments made in its memorandum and at the hearing. The court denied the motion. On appeal, U.S. Bank correctly observes that this court has recently determined that the notice provision in section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to foreclosure....

...See Brindise v. U.S. Bank N.A., 183 So. 3d 1215, 1221 (Fla. -3- 2d DCA), review denied, No. SC16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 (Fla. Mar. 22, 2016). Consistent with Brindise, the Adamses' defense of lack of notice under section 559.715 was legally insufficient to support a summary judgment....

...Bank failed to preserve this argument for review by not adequately addressing it at the summary judgment hearing. We disagree. Although U.S. Bank focused its argument at the hearing on the sufficiency of the Adamses' affidavits and made limited mention of section 559.715, it specifically argued that section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent in its memorandum in opposition to the Adamses' motion for summary judgment and in its motion for rehearing. At the summary judgment hearing, the Adamses addressed this issue and attempted to rebut it. Thus, U.S. Bank's argument against the application of section 559.715 was before the court, and we reject the Adamses' contention that U.S....

...explicitly state that the property might be sold, the letter unambiguously complies with all other requirements of paragraph 22."). In summary, the Adamses failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment based on U.S. Bank's alleged failure to give notice under section 559.715 because giving notice under that section is not a condition precedent to foreclosure. We are not persuaded that affirmance is nonetheless required based on the Adamses' paragraph 22 arguments....

...2d DCA 1992). Appellant filed her motion to amend 13 days before trial. Her proposed amended answer raised eight affirmative defenses, three of which she raises on appeal: (1) failure to comply with a condition precedent, i.e. acceleration; (2) failure to comply with a condition precedent, i.e. notice pursuant to section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2016); and (3) lack of standing....

...because the defense concerns the Bank’s failure to comply with its own documents. See Cobbum v. Citimortgage, Inc., 158 So. 3d 755, 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). The Bank also cannot show prejudice as to Appellant’s defense that it did not comply with the notice requirement in section 559.715 before filing suit....

...rating a good defense to the complaint.” Cady v. Chevy Chase Sav. & Loan, Inc., 528 So. 2d 136, 137-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Appellant’s defenses that the Bank failed to comply with the conditions precedent contained in her mortgage and section 559.715, Florida Statutes, are not futile....

...1 Rule 1.120(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires denials of performance of conditions precedent be made “specifically and with particularity.” A defendant must identify “both the nature of the condition precedent and the 1 The case law in Florida is unclear regarding section 559.715 and whether it creates a condition precedent in foreclosure actions....

BLACK, Judge. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Home Equity Loan Trust 2007-1, appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Jeffrey and Melissa Hagstrom based on the trial court’s application of section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2011). We reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings because section 559.715, by its clear language, is not applicable to Deutsche Bank, the holder of the note in this case....

...Thereafter, the Hagstroms filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavit. The Hagstroms’- motion alleged that Deutsche Bank is “not the original creditor yet failed to give [the Hagstroms] written notice of the assignment of the debt, as required by” section 559.715 and that “[a]s a-, result of [Deutsche Bank’s] failure to comply with this condition precedent” summary judgment in the Hagstroms’ fa *920 vor was appropriate....

...They further argued that the letter attached and referred to in the affidavit failed to establish that “the debt was assigned to Deutsche Bank.” Deutsche Bank gave a brief response before the court granted summary judgment for failure to comply with section 559.715. II. The appeal Deutsche Bank contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the alleged failure to comply with section 559.715 is a legally sufficient affirmative defense to the filing of its foreclosure action. See Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Kirian, 579 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla.1991) (“[A]n affirmative defense defeats the plaintiffs cause of action by a denial or confession and avoidance.”). It argues that section 559.715 is inapplicable to its foreclosure action because Deutsche Bank is not a debt collector for purposes of the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act (FCCPA), §§ 559.55-.785, Fla. Stat. (2011), of which section 559.715 is a part, and because the act ■ of filing a foreclosure lawsuit is not debt collection activity for purposes of the FCCPA. Alternatively, Deutsche Bank contends that if section 559.715 is applicable, it presented evidence of a disputed material fact via the affidavit with attached servicer letter and via the recordation of the assignment of mortgage in the public records in 2011....

...of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2008)); see also Scherer v. Vokisia ay. Dep’t of Corr., 171 So.3d 135, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“No part of a statute, not even a single word, should be ignored, read out of the text, or rendered meaningless, in construing the provision.”). Section 559.715 provides: [The FCCPA] does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...5th DCA 1997) (denying motion to stay or recall mandate and concluding “that the purchase of a condominium unit is not a ‘consumer’ ‘transaction’ [under the federal and state fair debt collection practices acts]”). Therefore, we consider the applicability of section 559.715 to Deutsche Bank based on Deutsche Bank’s relationship to the debt, i.e., the note....

...4th DCA 2015) (Conner, J., concurring) (stating that possession is a “core element” and “critical” for standing to enforce the note and discussing the concepts of “negotiation” and “transfer” of a note as having “significant importance for an analysis of standing”). However, section 559.715 applies only to assignees of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt not to assignees of the debt itself. By. it? express terms, section 559.715 permits “assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt” and establishes that the as-signee of the right to bill and collect the debt has standing to bring an action to collect the debt. Section 559.715 requires no action by the creditor or the note holder....

...ases where there is an assignment of the right to bill and collect the debt — on the action or inaction of the assignee. The use of the indefinite article “a” rather than a definite article like “the” to define the assignee’s interest in section 559.715 further supports the conclusion that there are real parties in interest other than the assignee of the,right to bill and collect the debt — namely, the note holder....

...Concluding that the assignee of the right to bill and collect the debt is the only real party in interest would run afoul of Florida law that the note holder has standing to enforce the note. See § 673.3011(1); Brindise, 183 So.3d at 1219 . While section 559.715 establishes that the assignee of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt is “a” real party in interest, there can be no question that the holder of a note is also a real party in interest entitled to enforce the note....

...80 of Florida’s UCC to these assignments. Conversely, the FCCPA contains no reference to notes, mortgages, or foreclosure, and there is no express connection between the FCCPA and foreclosure or Title XL. Moreover, as this court has recently held, section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to the filing of a foreclosure lawsuit, even where enforcement of the note is sought....

...2d DCA 2005) (dis *924 cussing the absence of express preemption language); see also Brindise, 183 So.3d at 1219 (“The [¡legislature knows how to create a condition precedent. Because the [¡legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the [¡legislature did not enact.”)....

...r 26, 2006, with in-dorsement in blank. It also provided the assignment of mortgage, dated July 26, 2011. Deutsche Bank was not the assign-ee of the right to bill and collect the debt; it was the holder of the note at the time the lawsuit was filed. Section 559.715 is inapplicable to Deutsche Bank. Section 559.715 simply does not apply to holders of notes secured by mortgages on real property....

...Neither is it an affirmative defense to foreclosure actions; it does not establish a condition precedent and in no other way avoids the claims to foreclose a mortgage and enforce a note. Because we resolve the appeal based on the plain language of section 559.715, we elect not to address Deutsche Bank’s remaining arguments....

...SC16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 (Fla. Mar. 22, 2016), recognized that U.S, Bank was the holder of the note and that by assignment of the note and mortgage it received "the full bundle of rights associated” with the note and mortgage, the opinion does not expressly assert that section 559.715 applies only to an assignee of the right to bill and collect. There is a critical distinction between an assignment of the right to bill and collect and an assignment of the debt, the latter of which is, by its express terms, a more encompassing act and one about which section 559.715 is completely silent. Section 559.715 simply does not address assignment of the debt....

...As in Brindise , paragraph 20 of the Hag-stroms’ mortgage states that the note may be sold without prior notice. This further substantiates that Deutsche Bank could bring the foreclosure lawsuit as note holder regardless of the clear language of section 559.715 requiring notice of assignment of only "the right to bill and collect.” . Even if this court had not already held that section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent, "[a]bsent some prejudice, the breach of a condition precedent does not constitute a defense to the enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.” See Gorel v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 165 So.3d 44, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). The Hagstroms did not allege how they were prejudiced by Deutsche Bank's alleged failure to comply with section 559.715.

...Amstones did not dispute the fact of the merger and did not file a motion to compel the merger documents. The Amstones raised numerous affirmative defenses in addition to challenging standing. For example, the Amstones argued failure to comply with section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2008); failure to post a cost bond pursuant to section 57.011, Florida Statutes (2008); failure to provide notice of breach and acceleration pursuant to Paragraph 22 of the mortgage; and a violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C....

... Affirmative Defenses. There are numerous Affirmative Defenses which the Affidavits filed by the Plaintiff do not touch on, including a failure to provide Notice of Assignment under Florida Statute 559.715, a failure to post bond under Chapter 57 ....

...KHOUZAM, Judge. Dyck O'Neal, Inc. (DONI), timely appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of Kami Ward in this action for a deficiency decree based on a final judgment of foreclosure. Because the trial court incorrectly determined that section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2013), creates a condition precedent to a deficiency action, we reverse.  In 2009, a final foreclosure judgment was entered against Ward....

...After the foreclosure sale, the judgment was assigned to DONI. DONI filed a complaint against Ward, seeking a deficiency decree based on the foreclosure judgment. Ward asserted as an affirmative defense that DONI had failed to comply with a condition precedent found in section 559.715, which provides as follows: This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...igned to the assignee and is in default. (Emphasis added.) She claimed that DONI had given her notice of the assignment only thirteen days before filing the deficiency complaint instead of waiting at least thirty days as required by section 559.715. The trial court agreed with Ward's reasoning and granted final summary judgment in her favor. Section 559.715 is part of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, §§ 559.55-.785 (2013) (FCCPA), which is much like the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C....

...interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act."). On appeal, DONI argues that the court erred in granting summary judgment based on DONI's failure to comply with section 559.715 because that section does not apply to deficiency actions....

...purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment."). It follows that a deficiency action is not an action to collect a consumer debt as contemplated by either act. Because a deficiency action is not an action to collect consumer debt, section 559.715's requirement that notice must be given "at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt" does not apply. DONI was not required to give Ward notice pursuant to section 559.715 before filing a deficiency action. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. LaROSE and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. -4- 

.... They claim that the trial court erroneously entered final judgment because, prior to filing suit, U.S. Bank National Association, the holder of the note, failed to give them written notice of the assignment of their mortgage loan as required by section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...The Brindises posit that U.S. Bank's failure of pleading and proof on this issue barred foreclosure. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm the final foreclosure judgment. In doing so, we hold only that providing the notice described in section 559.715 is not a condition precedent to foreclosure. Background In 2005, the Brindises took out a loan and signed a promissory note, secured by a mortgage, to buy a home in Lee County....

...A legend on the bottom of U.S. Bank's amended complaint states that the lawsuit "is an attempt to collect a debt." As a defense to the suit, the Brindises alleged that U.S. Bank failed to give them written notice of assignment as required by section 559.715....

...Because the parties ask us to interpret a statute, our standard of review is de novo. See W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012); Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lustre, 163 So. 3d 624, 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Enacted in 1989, section 559.715 is part of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA)....

...Section 559.77(5) provides that "[i]n applying and construing this section, due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to the [FDCPA]." Dish Network Serv., L.L.C. v. Myers, 87 So. 3d 72, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Section 559.715 provides as follows: Assignment of consumer debts....

...See Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for CS for SB 196 (1989) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 25, 1989). The written notice of assignment alerts the consumer that the creditor has delegated a right to recover to the assignee. It is not apparent, however, that section 559.715 applies neatly in the mortgage foreclosure context where, more often than not, a single note holder seeks to foreclose on a single mortgage and note upon the mortgagor's default. The assignee of the note is not a collection agent for others.2 Because section 559.715 applies to consumer debt, the parties battle over whether a foreclosure suit is an effort to collect a consumer debt....

...2015) (holding that publishing mortgage foreclosure notices amounts only to enforcement of a security interest and not a collection of debt for purposes of the FDCPA); Summerlin Asset Mgmt. V Trust v. Jackson, No. 9:14-cv-81302, 2015 WL 4065372 (S.D. Fla. July 2, 2015) (stating that compliance with section 559.715 of the FCCPA is not a condition precedent to the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action); Reese v....

...of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." Because the Brindises borrowed money to buy a home, they argue that they incurred a consumer debt to which section 559.715 applies. U.S....

...arily in a briar patch. We need not fight their fight. Even if a foreclosure suit is an effort to collect a consumer debt, several reasons compel us to conclude that the trial court did not err. First, we examine the statute's text. Section 559.715 has no language making written notice of assignment a condition precedent to suit....

...In the condominium context, the Legislature has mandated that the parties engage in an alternative dispute resolution process before seeking trial court relief. § 718.1255 (4), Fla. Stat. (2014). The Legislature knows how to create a condition precedent. Because the Legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the Legislature did not enact. Second, anticipating the assignment of the right to bill and collect to a third party, section 559.715 provides that the assignee is "a" real party in interest empowered to collect the debt....

...2d DCA 2015); Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So. 3d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). That right exists whether or not another entity services the loan or whether the holder acquired the note by assignment. U.S. Bank is "the" real party in interest. Third, viewing section 559.715 in the broader context of the FCCPA further undermines the Brindises' position. The Brindises argue that if compliance with section 559.715 is not a condition precedent to suit, they will have no remedy for the alleged failure to provide notice....

...he Brindises do not claim that U.S. Bank engaged in such untoward tactics. If it had, the legislature has created private causes of action for consumers to recover damages and other relief. See § 559.77. Those remedies, however, do not extend to section 559.715....

...Further, persons registered or required to be registered under section 559.553 are subject to disciplinary action for failure to comply with any provision of the FCCPA. § 559.565. We are unaware if the Brindises availed themselves of these procedures. Nevertheless, we are not prepared to conclude that not applying section 559.715 immunizes an alleged violator as they contend. The FCCPA prohibits egregious debt collection practices and provides legal remedies to protect consumers from harassing collection efforts....

...unlawful conduct by a debt collector or loan servicer. See, e.g., Birster, 481 F. Appx. 579; Lara v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-24405-UU, 2013 WL 4768004 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2013). -9- mechanisms exist, making section 559.715 a condition precedent is not necessary to the primary purpose of the FCCPA. Fourth, with this broader understanding of the FCCPA, we conclude that the Brindises' reliance on Gann v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 145 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), is misplaced. They contend that Gann compels the conclusion that filing a foreclosure suit constitutes a section 559.715 "action to collect a debt." But, Gann does not implicate section 559.715....

...3d 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), is also off the mark. In that case, the Fifth District reversed entry of summary judgment for a creditor because a material issue of fact remained as to whether the creditor had actually provided the written notice required by section 559.715. Id. at 1194-95. Reading far too much into Burt, the Brindises argue that the case establishes that section 559.715 has been incorporated into the elements of pleading a foreclosure complaint. Burt, however, did not even discuss section 559.715 as a condition precedent to suit....

...without prior notice to them. Specifically, paragraph 20 of the mortgage they executed - 10 - provides that the note "can be sold one or more times without prior notice to [the Brindises]." As a matter of contract, section 559.715 is inapplicable. We also find it significant that the Brindises contractually agreed with their lender on the procedure by which they would receive notice of any default and the manner in which the lender could accelerate all payments due....

...he continuing obligations of the parties in 6 Although not directly relevant to our decision, we observe that the Brindises have not shown what, if any, prejudice they suffered as a result of receiving no notice under section 559.715....

...They received the paragraph 22 letter, they appeared and defended in the lawsuit, and the original note was placed in the court file, eliminating the risk of another suit on the same note. We also observe that the paragraph 22 letter gave the Brindises a thirty-day cure period, a breathing period similar to that contained in section 559.715. - 11 - that relationship." Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007. Under paragraph 20, the Brindises are not entitled to the notice they claim is due under section 559.715. And, in the event of default, they agreed to a notice method independent of section 559.715. Conclusion We hold that failure to provide written notice under section 559.715 did not bar U.S....

...Bank's foreclosure suit, nor did it create a condition precedent to the institution of the foreclosure suit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's final foreclosure judgment. However, because innumerable foreclosure cases are pending in the trial and district courts where defendants have raised section 559.715 as a bar to foreclosure, we certify to the supreme court the following question as one of great public importance: IS THE PROVISION OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT UNDER SECTION 559.715 A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE INSTITUTION OF A FORECLOSURE LAWSUIT BY THE HOLDER OF THE NOTE? Affirmed; question certified. NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs. KHOUZAM, J., Dissents with opinion. KHOUZAM, Judge, Dissenting. I would hold that the plain language of section 559.715 does create a condition precedent to a foreclosure suit....

...Bank acknowledged in its amended complaint that the foreclosure suit was "an attempt to collect a debt." Once we establish that a foreclosure suit is an action to collect a debt to which the FCCPA applies, it becomes clear based on the plain language of section 559.715 that it creates a condition precedent to a foreclosure suit. Section 559.715 provides that an "assignee must give the debtor written notice of [an] assignment as soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt" (emphasis added)....

...Though the majority suggests that this language is not specific enough to effectively create a condition precedent, I disagree. It is true that the legislature has, in other areas of the law, created more involved and specific conditions precedent. But that fact does not undermine the clear mandate found in section 559.715 that an assignee must give the debtor written notice of an assignment at least thirty days before taking any action to collect the debt....

...The majority is correct that the Fifth District's decision in Burt v. Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 138 So. 3d 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), is not directly on point because it was an appeal of a final summary judgment and dealt with credit card debt; however, Burt does stand for the proposition that lack of compliance with section 559.715 may, at a minimum, be raised as a defense. Thus, I believe Burt does support the position that section 559.715 creates a condition precedent. Because the plain language of section 559.715 is clear and unambiguous, the majority's focus on the broader purpose of the FCCPA is misplaced....

...ourt should only apply rules of statutory - 16 - construction to determine legislative intent where the plain language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous). However, I also believe that interpreting 559.715 as creating a condition precedent to foreclosure does not conflict with the broader purpose of that section or the FCCPA as a whole. The majority points out that section 559.715 was intended to streamline the collection of consumer debts by allowing various creditors' claims against a single debtor to be consolidated and pursued by a collection agency....

...Rather, the statute simply permits the assignment of consumer debts and provides that the assignee must give the debtor written notice of the assignment "at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt." The majority also cites to the language in section 559.715 stating that the assignee is "a" real party in interest as opposed to "the" real party in interest, suggesting that this word choice shows that this section only applies where the assignor retains some rights....

...ainst debt collectors must be investigated and section 559.727 provides that corrective actions may be taken to remedy violations. But in my view the fact that these procedures were available to the Brindises does not negate the language found in section 559.715 providing for notice as a condition precedent to suit. Moreover, without notice of the assignment, it would be logistically difficult for borrowers like the Brindises to meaningfully pursue these administrative remedies. Additionally, the majority asserts that making section 559.715 a condition precedent is not necessary to the primary purpose of the FCCPA, which is to protect consumers from abusive and harassing collection efforts. The majority points out that the Brindises do not allege that U.S. Bank engaged in these egregious tactics. But the plain language of section 559.715 reveals that it does not address these egregious tactics that are the primary focus of the FCCPA; rather, section 559.715 allows the assignment of consumer debts and requires assignees to give notice of an assignment. The majority points out that Paragraph 20 of the mortgage allows the lender to transfer the note without prior notice to the Brindises, concluding that this provision renders section 559.715 inapplicable as a matter of contract law. But section 559.715 does not require notice prior to transfer and therefore does not conflict with Paragraph 20 in any way. Indeed, Paragraph 20 is completely consistent with section 559.715 because it goes on to provide that written notice of a change in loan servicer "will be given" to the borrower and specify that the notice must include "the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments s...

...and any other information RESPA [Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 USC §§ 2601-17] requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing." Finally, the majority opines that the Brindises are not entitled to a notice under section 559.715 because they received a notice under Paragraph 22 of the mortgage....

...It is true that Paragraph 22 of the Brindises' mortgage provides how they would be notified of any default and the manner in which the lender could accelerate all payments due. But Paragraph 22 does not provide for a notice of the assignment of debt, which is the notice that section 559.715 requires. Because Paragraph 22 addresses a completely different notice than section 559.715, a sufficient Paragraph 22 notice cannot substitute for a sufficient notice under section 559.715. For all of these reasons, I would hold that section 559.715 creates a condition precedent to a foreclosure suit and therefore I would reverse. - 19 - 

assignment of the debt pursuant to Florida Statute § 559.715; (9) Bank United, N.A. failed to notify the Wanes

...After acquiring the rights arising from the foreclosure judgment, Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., filed suit against Lanham to recover the deficiency balance due under the assigned obligation. Lanham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dyck-O’Neal failed to provide timely notice of the assignment under section 559.715, Florida Statutes, and that such notice was a condition precedent to bringing the deficiency action....

...The supreme court quashed our decision and remanded for further proceedings. The issue now before this Court is whether the trial court erred when it granted final summary judgment for Lanham. Dyck- O’Neal argued below as it does on appeal that the notice-of- assignment requirement in section 559.715 does not act as a condition precedent to bringing a deficiency action. * We agree. Section 559.715 is part of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act....

...§§ 559.55-559.785, Fla. Stat. It provides that an “assignee [of consumer debt] must give the debtor written notice of such assignment as soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt.” § 559.715, Fla....

...notice of the assignment of their mortgage prior to filing suit. 183 So. 3d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), rev. denied, SC 16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 (Fla. 2016). The Second District affirmed the final judgment, holding that “the notice described in section 559.715 is not a condition precedent to foreclosure.” Id. at 1216. The court reasoned, in part, that “[s]ection 559.715 has no language making written notice of assignment a condition precedent to suit.” Id. at 1219. The court observed that * We decline to address Dyck-O’Neal’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that a deficiency action is not an action to collect a consumer debt under section 559.715. For purposes of this opinion, we assume arguendo that Dyck-O’Neal is an “assignee” under section 559.715. 2  [t]he Legislature, of course, knows how to condition the filing of a lawsuit on a prior occurrence....

...the parties engage in an alternative dispute resolution process before seeking trial court relief. § 718.1255(4), Fla. Stat. (2014). The Legislature knows how to create a condition precedent. Because the Legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the Legislature did not enact. Id. Following the same rationale, the Fourth District also rejected a debtor’s attempt to use the notice-of-assignment requirement in section 559.715 to defeat a mortgage foreclosure action. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So. 3d 811, 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“The plain language [of section 559.715] does not impose a bar on filing suit if notice is not provided consistent with the statute and that makes this case distinguishable from the opinions relied on by the borrower, which all involve unambiguous statutory language providi...

...and do not include any discussion or analysis. However, we see no reason why the rationale adopted by this Court in the mortgage foreclosure context should not apply to an action for a deficiency decree based on a foreclosure judgment. Specifically, section 559.715 contains no language indicating compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent to debt collection....

...reasons compel us to conclude that the trial court did not err.”); see also Wright v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1221 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (concluding “it is irrelevant that this action stems from a deficiency judgment rather than a mortgage foreclosure” as “§ 559.715 does not create a condition precedent because the Florida Legislature did not draft it that way”); cf. Merrill v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 745 F. App’x. 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding there is no “persuasive indication” that the Florida Supreme Court would reject the Brindise line of cases and holding that section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to debt collection); Nat'l Collegiate Student Tr. 2007-1 v. Lipari, 224 So. 3d 309, 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (holding that section 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to collection of student loan debt and noting that “[t]he Legislature knows how to create a condition precedent when it so desires”). We therefore reverse the order granting final summary...

...§ 1692e, and the Florida Consumer Collection Protections Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 559.55 et seq., 3 in collecting on the deficiency balances. They contend that before sending the dunning letters and filing the deficiency suits, DONI failed to comply with Florida Statute § 559.715’s notice of assignment requirement. (Doc, 1 at ¶¶45-46). DONI now moves for a judgment on the pleadings. It argues that it did not violate the FDCPA and FCCPA because § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to debt collection....

...City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 831 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 700 (11th Cir. 2002)). DISCUSSION Starting with the FCCPA claim, Plaintiffs argue that DONI sent them dunning letters before complying with Florida Statute § 559.715’s notice of assignment requirement....

...2:14-cv-539, 2015 WL 248635 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2015); Trent v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 618 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2007), aff'd 288 Fed.Appx. 571 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding an allegation that the defendant failed to comply with *1221 § 559.715 does not establish a claim under the FCCPA)....

...For the same reasons the Court dismissed the FCCPA claim against Consuegra Law (Doc. 36), it also dismisses that claim against DONI. Turning to the FDCPA claim, Plaintiffs assert that DONI engaged'in false or misleading representations by seeking to collect on the debts before satisfying § 559.715 and its thirty-day notice period. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 62-63). DONI’s collection efforts included sending thé dunning letters and filing the deficiency cases. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 62). As stated, DONI responds that § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent to debt collection activity....

...87 at 2). ' Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim hinges on whether Florida Statute § 659.715 creates a condition precedent to collecting a debt. To decide this question, the Court examines the statutory language and Florida case law interpreting the statute. Section 559.715, a provision of the FCCPA, states that [t]his part does not prohibit the assignment, by a, creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

...actical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default. Fla. Stat. § 559.715 . The issue of whether § 559.715 creates a condition precedent in the mortgage-foreclosure context came to head twice in 2016: Brindise v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 183 So.3d 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) and Bank of Am., N.A. v. Siefker, 201 So.3d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In both cases, the Florida courts held that § 559.715’s notice requirement is not a condition precedent to a mortgage foreclosure....

...by the statutes for libel and slander actions, medical malpractice suits, and condominium-related suits, which all require some prior act or condition before suit can be brought: “Because the Legislature declined to be more specific when enacting section 559.715, we will not expand the statute to include language the Legislature did not enact.” Siefker, 201 So.3d at 816 (citing Brindise, 183 So.3d at 1219 ). Although defendant-mortgagors in Brindise and Siefker unsuccessfully used § 559.715 as an affirmative defense to defeat a mortgage foreclosure suit, the courts’ reasoning as to why that section does not create a condition precedent remains relevant here. In addition, it is irrelevant that this action stems from a deficiency judgment rather than a mortgage foreclosure. The principles are the same for why § 559.715 is not a condition precedent....

...like the [FDCPA] is to eliminate abusive and harassing tactics in collection of debts. It is not meant to preclude a creditor or someone otherwise holding a secured interest from invoking legal process to foreclose’ ” *1222 (citations omitted)). At bottom, the Court is persuaded that § 559.715 does not create a condition precedent because the Florida Legislature did not draft it that way. Plaintiffs present two avenues to sidestep this inevitable conclusion. First, they argue that Burt v. Hudson & Keyse, LLC, 138 So.3d 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) is the only intermediate appellate court in Florida to consider whether § 559.715 is a condition precedent to a lawsuit....

...Because Burt swore in her affidavit that she did not receive notice of the assignment, an issue of fact was created as to whether the notice was actually sent. Burt, 138 So.3d at 1195 (internal citations omitted). Burt is not the smoking gun Plaintiffs purport it to be because it does not discuss § 559.715 as a condition precedent to debt collection....

...In fact, the Second DCA in Brindise rejected the plaintiffs reliance on Burt for similar reasons: [t]he Fifth District reversed entry of summary judgment for a creditor because a material issue of fact remained as to whether the creditor had actually provided the written notice required by § 559.715. Reading far too much into Burt , however, the [plaintiffs] argue that the case establishes that section 559.715 has been incorporated into the elements of pleading a foreclosure complaint. Burt , however, did not even discuss section 559.715 as a condition precedent to suit....

...da Supreme Court would not decide the issue differently. This is so because the Brindise court certified to the Florida Supreme Court “the following question as one of great public importance: Is the provision of written notice of assignment under section 559.715 a condition precedent to the institution of a foreclosure lawsuit by the holder of the note?” Brindise, 183 So.3d at 1221 . The Florida Supreme Court declined review of that question. See Brindise v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, SC16-300, 2016 WL 1122325 , at *1 (Fla. Mar. 22, 2016). In short, Section 559.715 has no language making notice of assignment a condition precedent....

...n, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), appeals an order of dismissal entered in favor of the borrowers, Lisa and Michael Guess. The trial court granted Lisa Guess's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Wells Fargo failed to comply with section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2012). The notice requirement described in section 559.715, however, is not a condition precedent to foreclosure....

PALMER, J. Yarelys Ramos appeals the trial court’s summary final judgment order entered in *1151 favor of appellee, CACH, LLC, on her counterclaim alleging violation of Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”). 1 See §§ 559.715; 2 559.72, 3 Fla....

...not remitted, CACH filed the instant collection lawsuit. In her answer, Ramos asserted affirmative defenses as well as a counterclaim. In her counterclaim, Ramos asserted two claims arising from CACH’s alleged violation of the notice provision in section 559.715: (1) CACH’s violation of the notice provision constitutes a violation of section 559.72(9) and (2) her entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to sections 559.77 5 and 86.021 6 of the Florida Statutes (2010)....

...lish civil liability ... will not be construed as establishing a civil liability. The FCCPA creates a civil remedy only for a violation of § 559.72— Absent an indication of legislative intent to create a private cause of action for a violation of § 559.715, such a remedy may not be judicially engrafted onto the FCCPA. The plaintiff attempts to avoid the statutory scheme by alleging that CRS’s violation of section 559.715 constitutes an unlawful attempt to enforce a debt pursuant to section 559.72(9)....

...010 version of the statute states that the “assignee must give the debtor written notice of such assignment as soon as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt.” Thus, the 2010 changes to section 559.715 merely changed when notice is due; the changes did not create a private cause of action....

...st. Plaintiffs presumably reason that Defendant Con-suegra’s letters were an assertion of the existence of a legal right-the right to collect a debt-when it knew that right did not exist because notice of the prior assignment was never given under § 559.715. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Wright court emphasized legislative intent and the FCCPA’s structure: A debt collector’s obligation to provide a notice of assignment is set forth in a separate section, § 559.715, and no analogous requirement is contained in § 559.72. Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violating § 559.715, it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private right of action in the statute, or by referencing § 559.715 in § 559.72....

...on for it to graft into the FCCPA a remedy for failure to provide a notice of assignment. Id. (citations omitted). The court then concluded: In short, Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statutory scheme by alleging that Defendant Consuegra’s violation of § 559.715 constitutes an unlawful attempt to enforce a debt under § 559.72(9). Adopting Plaintiffs’ approach would result in an end-around the Florida legislature’s decision to exclude civil liability under § 559.715....

...Further, Ramos’ claim for injunctive relief is ancillary to her claim for declaratory- relief'and is, therefore, unavailable. AFFIRMED. LAWSON, C.J. and TORPY, JJ., concur. . John Prater has not appeared in tins appeal because he was voluntarily, dismissed as ⅜ party below, . Section 559.715 states: “This part does not prohibit the assignment, by a creditor, of the right to bill and collect a consumer debt....

Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA.”), section 559.715, Florida Statutes (2007), prior to filing suit