Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The declaratory statement indicated that the exclusive *603 agreements violated the clear dictates of section 550.6305(9)(g)(1), relating to simulcast signals, but specifically stated that "[n]othing in this declaratory statement should be construed as a statement by the Division that Gulfstream Park has, in fact, violated section 550.615(3) [relating to intertrack wagering in general]." Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v....

...In response, Gulfstream sued TBD in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that Gulfstream's exclusive dissemination agreements with the out-of-state tracks were valid and enforceable under state law. Gulfstream, 399 F.3d at 1278. TBD filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that sections 550.615(3) and 550.6305(9)(g)(1) of the Florida Wagering Act prohibited such agreements....

...revent other pari-mutuel venues from engaging in intertrack wagers on the simulcast signals disseminated by TBD, which provides a monetary impact to the present dispute. TBD asserts that the DPW's declaratory statement also supports the premise that section 550.615(3) of the Florida Statutes prohibits enforcement of these restrictions in the agreements....

...However, our review of the declaratory statement reveals that this assertion is without support. While the DPW stated in the declaratory statement that an agreement which operates to prohibit TBD from rebroadcasting these simulcast signals violates both sections 550.615(3) and 550.6305(9)(g)(1) of Florida's Wagering Act, the declaratory statement expressly declined to find that Gulfstream violated section 550.615(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...prohibit the venues receiving such signals from conducting intertrack wagering on those signals, would also violate the Wagering Act. Therefore, DPW's declaratory statement impacts only one element of the certified question. However, our analysis of section 550.615(3) leads us to conclude that the statutory provision does, in fact, prohibit enforcement of the provisions in the exclusive agreements which would restrict the right of TBD to contract with other pari-mutuel venues to allow those venues to conduct intertrack wagering on the simulcast signals disseminated by TBD. Section 550.615(3) states: If a permitholder elects to broadcast its signal to any permitholder in this state, any permitholder that is eligible to conduct intertrack wagering under the provisions of [this act] is entitled to receive the broadcast and conduct intertrack wagering under this section. . . . *605 § 550.615(3), Fla....

...sorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction." McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). Gulfstream asserts that reference to the "signal" of a "permitholder" in section 550.615(3) restricts the application of that section to only intrastate signals of live races taking place at Florida pari-mutuel facilities and does not address simulcast signals from out-of-state tracks....

...We have stated that "[t]he title [of a statute] is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent." State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981) (citing Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945)). The title of section 550.615 is "intertrack wagering." See § 550.615, Fla....

...m . . . another in-state pari-mutuel facility" includes the current method of disseminating simulcast signals of out-of-state thoroughbred races that is at issue in the instant matter. See § 550.002(17), Fla. Stat. (2005). The words "its signal" in section 550.615(3) are intended to include a simulcast signal of a race occurring live at an out-of-state location if an in-state facility disseminates that signal to other in-state facilities. At the very least, this interpretation creates ambiguity as to the meaning of the words "its signal" in section 550.615(3)....

...Under this reasoning, the statutory requirement that an in-state facility which "elect[s] to make its signal available for intertrack wagering . . . must make that signal available to any eligible permitholder," Committee Report at 3, would apply to intertrack wagering of simulcast. See § 550.615(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). Similarly, the statement in section 550.615(3) that pari-mutuel facilities receiving these signals are permitted to conduct intertrack wagering on those signals would likewise apply to disseminated simulcast signals. This construction of section 550.615(3) also provides consistency with the unambiguous language in section 550.6305(9)(g)(1), which requires that pari-mutuel facilities accepting wagers on simulcast signals make those signals available to other pari-mutuel venues....

...Pari-mutuel venues would have no interest in receiving these simulcast signals if they could not conduct intertrack wagering with regard to the signal. Therefore, we conclude that enforcement of the exclusive agreements involved in the instant action is also prohibited by section 550.615(3), and this analysis also supports and causes the answer to the certified question to be in the affirmative....

...Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 371-78 (Fla.2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and summarized here, I believe that staff analyses are unreliable indicators of legislative intent. In this case in particular, the majority correctly interprets the plain language of sections 550.615(3) and 550.6305(9)(g)(1), Florida Statutes (2004), as well as their interplay with the definitions of "intertrack wager" and "simulcasting" in sections 550.002(17) and 550.002(32), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Hamilton and Linda Collins Hertz of Holland & Knight, LLP, Miami, for Appellants. William P. Cagney, III, of William P. Cagney, III, P.A., Miami and James S. Alves of Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee. PADOVANO, J. At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 550.615(9) Florida Statutes, which enables one thoroughbred horse breeder operating within the state to obtain an exclusive license to conduct parimutuel wagering at its sales facility....

...operates a thoroughbred horse sales facility in Marion County, where it has conducted thoroughbred horse sales for twenty-four years. In addition to the permits necessary to sell and race thoroughbred horses, Ocala Breeders obtained a license under section 550.615(9) to conduct intertrack wagering....

...The patrons in the remote location are allowed to place bets on the televised events occurring at the host location, and the proceeds are split according to a statutory formula. Intertrack wagering is available only at a licensed parimutuel wagering facility and is generally not authorized in other remote facilities. Section 550.615(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), extends intertrack wagering beyond pari-mutuel wagering facilities by allowing remote betting at a facility operated by a thoroughbred horse breeder....

...Among the other provisions of the statute, only section (e) is material to the issues presented here. Section (e) allows the holder of a quarter horse racing permit to qualify for a license to conduct intertrack wagering even if grounds exist to revoke the permit. Ocala Jai Alai challenged the constitutionality of section 550.615(9) in a declaratory judgment suit in the circuit court....

...2) the statute violates the right to equal protection of the law, because the criteria for obtaining a license bear no reasonable relationship to the object of the law. On December 5, 1997, the trial court rendered a final summary judgment declaring section 550.615(9) unconstitutional....

...Finally, the court found that, although Ocala Breeders holds a quarter horse racing permit, it had never used the permit to conduct live quarter horse racing. The failure to conduct live racing is a ground for revoking a quarter horse permit, but, as section 550.615(9)(e) provides, it does not disqualify the holder of a quarter horse permit from obtaining a license to conduct intertrack wagering. These facts led the trial court to conclude that the statutory classification in section 550.615(9) is based on criteria that only Ocala Breeders could ever meet....

...When a trial court has declared a state statute unconstitutional, the reviewing court must begin the process of appellate review with a presumption that the statute is valid. See State v. Slaughter, 574 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We need not defer to the trial court, however, to conclude that section 550.615(9) is a special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...1st DCA 1986); Classic Mile, supra . This test applies even if only one entity currently qualifies under the statute and even if the House and Senate members voting on the bill were aware that it would benefit only one specific entity. See Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club; Summersport. Section 550.615(9) presently applies only to Ocala Breeders but, by the precedents we have cited, that alone does not make it a special law....

...Although it is possible that another horse breeder could meet the general qualifications for a license to conduct intertrack wagering, no other horse breeder could ever obtain the single license available, because Ocala Breeders would always prevail on the application of the tiebreaker provisions of the statute. According to section 550.615(9)(b), if more than one applicant qualifies, the Division must award the license based on: (1) the length of time the applicant has conducted thoroughbred horse sales in this state; (2) the length of time the applicant has had a perma...

...cense under the mandatory language of the statute. Hence, we conclude that the tiebreaker provision in subsection (b) is an essential feature that cannot be construed in isolation from the rest of the statute. We also agree with the trial court that section 550.615(9) violates the right to equal protection of the law....

...." Id. at 629. Because that statute offered an unfair advantage to one business entity to the exclusion of others, the court held that it was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause. It is difficult to ascertain the purpose of section 550.615(9) from a reading of the statute alone. However, it is helpful to consider this part of the law in the context of the entire law. Section 550.615 was apparently designed to increase revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by allowing intertrack wagering. The entire section can be characterized as an exception to the state policy against off-track betting. Section 550.615(9) expands the exception by making it applicable to thoroughbred horse breeders....

...Based on the undisputed evidence, the trial court concluded that the statute was originally enacted "to serve the public purpose of benefitting thoroughbred horse breeding sales and related economic activities." We are unable to find any rational relationship between the detailed requirements of section 550.615(9)(a) and the object it was designed to accomplish....

...[2] If the specific topic of racing quarter horses is related in some way to the more general topic of breeding and selling thoroughbred horses, we are unable to perceive that relationship from the text of the statute. Likewise, there is no apparent basis for the requirement in section 550.615(9)(a) that a prospective licensee must conduct "at least one day of nonwagering thoroughbred racing, with a purse structure of at least $250,000.00 per year for 2 consecutive years." We have not been presented with any rational justif...

...Hence, we conclude, as the court did in West Flagler, that this requirement is not based on a reasonable classification, but rather it merely describes the entity that will be entitled to the license. Furthermore, there is no rational basis for the exemption in section 550.615(9)(e), which provides that the holder of a quarter horse permit is qualified for an intertrack wagering license even if the quarter horse permit is otherwise subject to revocation....

...Additionally, the court found that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering has revoked the quarter horse permits of other entities for failure to conduct live racing, but that the Division has never initiated a revocation proceeding against Ocala Breeders on this ground. Section 550.615(9)(e) cures this problem by providing that "[f]or each year such quarter horse permit holder must obtain the license set forth in paragraph (a), any provisions relating to suspension or revocation of a quarter horse permit for failure...

...the criteria for the license all the more suspect. We conclude, as the trial court did, that statutory requirements for obtaining an intertrack wagering license are not rationally related to the objective of the legislation. In summary, we hold that section 550.615(9) is invalid as a violation of Article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, because it is a special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...cle I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, because the criteria for obtaining a license to conduct intertrack wagering are not rationally related to the purpose of the law. Affirmed. MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] The complaint challenged section 550.615(8), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Smith, James S. Alves, and Gabriel E. Nieto of Hopping Green Sams & Smith, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and William P. Cagney, III, P.A., Delray, FL, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. We have on appeal a decision of the First District Court of Appeal declaring invalid section 550.615(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...(Breeders) owns a permanent thoroughbred horse racing and sales facility in Marion County, Florida, and has conducted horse sales there since 1975. In 1990, Breeders applied for and received a license to conduct intertrack wagering pursuant to section 550.61(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), an earlier version of section 550.615(9), [1] containing the same licensure criteria....

...In July of 1995, Florida Gaming Centers, Inc., d/b/a Ocala Jai Alai, (Jai Alai) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Breeders and the State of Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (the Division), asking the trial court to declare section 550.615(9) unconstitutional. Jai Alai claimed that in the event that Breeders and another pari-mutuel business applied for a section 550.615 license, Breeders would always prevail because the criteria in that section essentially described Breeders. After the trial court declared section 550.615(9) unconstitutional as a special law, Breeders and the Division jointly appealed to the First District Court of Appeal....

...After its motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied, Breeders appealed to this Court. DISCUSSION The contested statutory scheme outlines several requirements that applicants must fulfill to qualify for an intertrack wagering license. Section 550.615(9)(a) provides: Upon application to the division on or before January 31 of each year, any quarter horse permit holder that has conducted at least 15 days of thoroughbred horse sales at a permanent sales facility for at least 3 consec...

...re to conduct live quarter horse racing do not apply." The First District found that these statutory provisions in tandem created an impenetrable barrier to all intertrack wagering applicants except Breeders. [3] We agree. As that court found, under section 550.615(9)(b), also known as the "tiebreaker provision," Breeders would always prevail against another applicant because it has the longest history as a quarter horse permit holder, owns a permanent horse sales facility, and has generated a g...

...cannot be discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. See St. Mary's Hospital, 769 So.2d at 971; Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 *902 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1991); In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So.2d 40 (Fla.1980). The First District found that section 550.615 was enacted to increase revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by providing protection to thoroughbred horse breeders from the state policy against off-track betting, but that no rational relationship existed between this purpose and the detailed licensure criteria in the disputed statute. For instance, prior to the enactment of section 550.615(9), horse breeders had not been involved in pari-mutuel wagering, but that subsection required applicants to have conducted thoroughbred horse sales and racing....

...ts to those who hold quarter horse permits, nor is there a basis for requiring that a prospective licensee conduct "at least one day of nonwagering thoroughbred racing, with a purse structure of at least $250,000 per year for two consecutive years." § 550.615(9)(a)....

...ng permit. In addition, there appears to be no rational basis for the exemption given to the holder of a quarter horse permit that qualifies for an intertrack wagering license even if the quarter horse permit is otherwise subject to revocation under section 550.615(9)(e)....

...ance with its conditions. The act is therefore arbitrary and not uniform or equal in its specification of the thing as well as the county affected. West Flagler Kennel Club, 153 So.2d at 8. Likewise, no rational basis exists for the criteria used in section 550.615 and it, therefore, violates the equal protection rights of other potential licensees such as Jai Alai. For these reasons, we affirm the First District's decision finding section 550.615(9) unconstitutional as a special law. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 550.615(9) was repealed during the 2000 legislative session. See ch.2000-354, § 44 Laws of Florida. [2] On February 5, 1999, the Division granted Breeders a new license under section 550.6308, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), instead of section 550.615, to conduct intertrack wagering for the remainder of fiscal year 1998-1999....

...of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (the "Division") issued a declaratory statement. [17] The declaratory statement interpreted Florida Statutes Section 550.6305(9)(g)1 and determined whether exclusive dissemination agreements violated Florida Statutes Sections 550.615(3), 550.6305(9)(g)1, and Florida Administrative Code rule 61D-9.001....

...vailable to outside ITWS sites because it accepted wagers on out-of-state thoroughbred races. The Division also concluded that exclusive dissemination agreements that prohibit or operate to restrain rebroadcast of a simulcast signal violate Sections 550.615(3), 550.6305(9)(g)1, and Rule 61D-9.001. The declaratory statement did state, however, that "[n]othing in this declaratory statement should be construed as a statement by the Division that Gulfstream Park has, in fact, violated Section 550.615(3), Florida Statutes or Rule 61D-9.001, Florida Administrative Code." During the 2002-2003 racing season, TBD entered into agreements with and accepted wagers from a number of outside ITWS sites on out-of-state thoroughbred races, including tracks for which Gulfstream had exclusive dissemination rights....

...ENFORCEABILITY OF GULFSTREAM'S EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION AGREEMENTS Both TBD and Gulfstream moved for summary judgment on the enforceability of Gulfstream's exclusive dissemination agreements. TBD argues that Gulfstream's agreements are unenforceable under the plain language of Fla. Stat. § 550.615(3), Fla....

...of Palm Beach, 747 So.2d 374, 384-85 (Fla.1999) (involving a declaratory statement covering the pari-mutuel industry). 1. THE DECLARATORY STATEMENT In this case the Division interpreted two sections of the Florida Statutes: Sections 550.9305(g)1 and 550.615(3)....

...to make that signal available to ITWS sites. The Division also interpreted Section 550.9305(9)(g)1 as making illegal an exclusive dissemination agreement that prevented dissemination by others of a simulcast signal. Second, the Division interpreted Section 550.615(3) to prohibit exclusive dissemination agreements that operate to restrict the retransmission of a signal by an in-state thoroughbred racetrack to an ITWS site....

...Turning to the plain language of the sections, Section 550.6305(9)(g)1 states in relevant part: "[a]ny thoroughbred permitholder which accepts wagers on simulcast signal must make the signal available to any permitholder that is eligible to conduct intertrack wagering ...." Fla. Stat. § 550.6305(9)(g)1. While Section 550.615(3) states in relevant part: If a permitholder elects to broadcast its signal to any permitholder in this state, any permitholder that is eligible to conduct intertrack wagering ......

...is entitled to receive the broadcast and conduct intertrack wagering under this section .... A person may not restrain or attempt to restrain any permitholder that is otherwise authorized to conduct intertrack wagering from receiving the signal of any other permitholder or sending its signal to any permitholder. Fla. Stat. § 550.615(3) (emphasis added). While Section 550.6315(9)(g)1, by itself, does not directly prohibit an exclusive dissemination agreement, it must be read together with Section 550.615(3), which by its plain language does prohibit such arrangements....

...t of the statute. 2. NO NECESSITY THAT TBD REBROADCAST ITS SIGNAL Given the Division's interpretation of Florida law as contained in the declaratory statement, Gulfstream argues that its exclusive dissemination agreements still do not violate either Section 550.615(3), 550.6305(9)(g)1 or Rule 61D-9.001(1)(b) [20] because neither TBD nor Gulfstream rebroadcast an out-of-state racetrack's simulcast signal....

...Under Section 550.3551(5), jai alai frontons, greyhound race tracks, and other non-thoroughbred racing venues cannot directly receive broadcasts from an out-of-state thoroughbred racetrack. See Fla. Stat. § 550.3551(3). [21] This Court concludes that Sections 550.6305(9)(g)1 and 550.615(3) should not be construed so that an out-of-state racetrack violates Florida law if it transmits its simulcast signal via satellite. Second, neither Section 550.6305(9)(g)1 nor the last sentence of Section 550.615(3) explicitly require a rebroadcast or retransmission of a signal by TBD....

...Section 550.6305(9)(g)1 requires that TBD has to make a signal "available." The word "available" as used in Section 550.6305(9)(g)1 could include licensing an ITWS site the right to use a satellite television signal. Similarly, the last sentence of Section 550.615(3) makes it unlawful for a person to "restrain any permitholder ......

...(TBD) from licensing or sub-licensing another permitholder (an ITWS site) the right to receive by satellite transmission an out-of-state racetrack's signal to conduct intertrack wagering. Thus, section 550.6305(9)(g)1 *1302 and the last sentence of Section 550.615(3) do not explicitly require a re-broadcast or retransmission of a signal by TBD....

...s was to exclude TBD from competition in providing ITWS signals and wagering to the outside ITWS sites. See Dep. of Scott Savin, Vol. I, at 49. Based on his testimony, this Court concludes that Gulfstream's exclusive dissemination agreements violate Section 550.615(3) and Rule 61D-9.001(1)(b)....

...s, LLLP; and Florida Gaming Centers, Inc. Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Marc W. Dunbar and William H. Hughes III of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee. PADOVANO, J. This is an appeal from a final judgment declaring section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes, unconstitutional....

...The trial court determined that the statute is a special law and declared it invalid on the ground that it was not enacted according to the applicable procedures in Article III, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution. We affirm. The conditions that trigger the prohibition in section 550.615(6) against intertrack wagering apply only in one small geographic area straddling the border between Dade County and Broward County....

...Moreover, we conclude that the decision to single out a limited class of thoroughbred permit holders from the privilege of engaging in intertrack wagering was an arbitrary decision *619 that does not promote any valid public policy. For these reasons, we hold that section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes is a special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...nals. Gulfstream had been conducting horse races at its racetrack in Hallandale and selling the live broadcasts of the races to Pompano Park Racing, a harness racing track in Pompano Beach. The Department maintained that Gulfstream was prohibited by section 550.615(6) from selling its broadcasts within its market area, because it held a thoroughbred racing permit and because it was within twenty-five miles of at least two other horse race permit holders. Gulfstream filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court challenging the validity of section 550.615(6) on a number of constitutional grounds....

...horse race permit holders within twenty-five miles of one another is the area in South Florida that includes Gulfstream. Given the present requirements for the issuance of new pari-mutuel wagering permits, Mr. Cross concluded that the conditions in section 550.615(6) would not come into existence in any other part of the state. He conceded, however, that it would be possible to replicate the proximity requirements of section 550.615(6) in Key West, if someone were to obtain a thoroughbred horse racing permit there, if two others were to obtain quarter horse racing permits there, and if all three permit holders were located within twenty-five miles of each other....

...uld exceed the revenues lost by the decline in attendance at other pari-mutuel wagering facilities. The net gain to the state, in Dr. Thalheimer's view, would be approximately $3 million per year. Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that section 550.615(6) is a special law that could only be applied in the area where Gulfstream is located....

...The final judgment states that "there was at the time of enactment, during the entire time since enactment, and is now, precisely one area of the state where there are three or more horse race permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other." The court noted that neither party had attempted to explain the purpose of section 550.615(6), and concluded from this omission that the "most plausible explanation in the testimony was that there was no public policy that led to the twenty-five mile intertrack border." In the trial court's assessment, the prohibition again...

...vilege Gulfstream was required to give up for various other benefits. This, the court concluded, was exactly the sort of local interest that should not be regulated by a general law. Based on these findings and conclusions, the trial court held that section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...Whether the statute could be applied to permit holders in other areas of the state is, at least in part, an issue of fact. We accept the trial court's findings of fact and apply the de novo standard of review only to the legal conclusion drawn from the facts. The ultimate issue presented by the appeal is whether section 550.615(6) is a general law or a special law....

...Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla.1983); Summersport Enterprises, Ltd. v. Pari-Mutuel Comm'n, 493 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The critical question is not one of legislative intent; rather, it is whether the class regulated by the statute is open. By these principles, we conclude that section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes (1996), is a special law....

...three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other. Because new horse racing tracks would have to be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) will not be replicated. Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility. However, the prohibition in section 550.615(6) against intertrack wagering in areas where there are three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other was enacted subsequently in 1996. The timing of these two laws leads us to conclude that the purpose of the twenty-five-mile limit in section 550.615(6) was merely to describe the area where Gulfstream is located....

...Citing the population trends as reflected in the most recent census, the court noted that there were other Florida counties that were rapidly approaching the limit set by the statute and concluded that the class was open. The evidence presented in this case plainly shows that there is no reasonable possibility that section 550.615(6) will be applied in another area of the state....

...Alternatively, the Department would have to issue a stand-alone quarter horse permit in a twenty-five mile area that includes an existing thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other horse racing permit holder. These hypotheticals do not show that section 550.615(6) has any real potential to apply to others....

...horse racing permits and can afford to pay the fixed expenses of operating their race tracks with the revenues earned from other kinds of horse races. Applying the rationale of Biscayne Kennel Club and Crandon, we conclude that the class created by section 550.615(6) is closed....

...Thalheimer factored *624 that point into his conclusion that the prohibition results in a net loss to the state. Moreover, the parties have not explained why it would be important to protect live attendance at nearby facilities only in this one area of the state. For these reasons, we hold that section 550.615(6) is unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal declaring invalid a state statute. State Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 912 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The issue before this Court is whether section 550.615(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), is unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for the enactment of special laws....

...als. Gulfstream had been conducting horse races at its racetrack in Hallandale and selling the live broadcasts of the races to Pompano Park Racing, a harness racing track in Pompano Beach. The Department contended that Gulfstream was in violation of section 550.615(6), which prohibits Gulfstream from selling its broadcasts within its market area, because it holds a thoroughbred racing permit and is within twenty-five miles of at least two other horse race permitholders. Gulfstream filed an action for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court, challenging the provisions of section 550.615(6) on a number of constitutional grounds....

...Among the grounds was a claim that the statute was a special law and that it was not enacted according to the state constitutional requirements that apply to special laws. After taking evidence to determine the parties and areas of the state affected by the statute, the trial court concluded that section 550.615(6) was unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a general law: The plaintiff presented testimony sufficient to establish, and I now find, that there was at the time of enactment, during the entire time since enactment...

...thin 25 miles of each other.” The only area of the state where there are or were three horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other is the area of Dade and Broward Counties that includes Gulf-stream, Calder, Pompano Park and Hialeah Park. Section 550.615(6) was enacted in 96-364, Laws of Florida....

...r benefits. This sort of local interest horsetrading is specifically prohibited by Article III Section 10. [[Image here]] The preponderance of the evidence and Florida’s legislative scheme supports the conclusion that the classification created by section 550.615(6) was constitutionally closed at the time of its enactment and remains so....

...It is unsurprising under these circumstances that section 505.615(6) has since its enactment, applied to precisely one 25 mile area of the state. The classification was closed at the time of enactment and remains closed. To conclude otherwise would be to reduce Article III Section 10 to mere semantics. Section 550.615(6) applies only and can apply only to the Dade-Bro-ward market area and so constitutes a special law in violation of Article III, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution....

...e conclusion that the classification, “three or more horse-race permitholders within 25 miles of each other,” was and is closed in the constitutional sense. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision that section 550.615(6) violates article III, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, which states, “No special law shall be passed unless notice of intention to seek enactment thereof has been published in the manner provided by general law ......

...[unless the law] is conditioned to become effective on the vote of the electors of the area affected.” Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 618 . 2 In its opinion, the First District did its own constitutional analysis as to whether the classification created in section 550.615(6) was limited to one geographic area or remained open: When Gulfstream Park opened for business, the restrictions on the minimum distance between pari-mutuel wagering facilities were much more lenient, and that is why it was possible...

...three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other. Because new horse racing tracks would have to be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) will not be replicated. Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility. However, the prohibition in section 550.615(6) against inter-track wagering in areas where there are three or more horse racing permit holders within twenty-five miles of each other was enacted subsequently in 1996. The timing of these two laws leads us to conclude that the purpose of the twenty-five-mile limit in section 550.615(6) was merely to describe the area where Gulf-stream is located. It was, even at that time, the only area that could fit the description. [[Image here]] The evidence presented in this case plainly shows that there is no reasonable possibility that section 550.615(6) will be applied in another area of the state....

...Alternatively, the Department would have to issue a standalone quarter horse permit in a twenty-five mile area that includes an existing thoroughbred permit holder and at least one other horse racing permit holder. These hypotheticals do not show that section 550.615(6) has any real potential to apply to others....

...expenses of operating their race tracks with the revenues earned from other kinds of horse races. Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 621-23 . The Department and Hartman-Tyner, Inc, et. al. (“Intervenors”) now appeal the First District’s conclusion that section 550.615(6) is unconstitutional....

...class is open merely because there is a theoretical possibility that some day it might include someone else. That approach would undermine the constitutional requirements for the adoption of special laws.” Gulfstream, 912 So.2d at 622 . CONCLUSION Section 550.615(6) prohibits thoroughbred permitholders from engaging in in-tertrack wagering in “any area of the state where there are three or more horserace permitholders within 25 miles of each other.” Both the trial court and the district co...

...area where Gulfstream was located, and there was no reasonable possibility that they would ever exist in another part of the state. We concur in the findings of the trial court and the conclusion of the district court. As a result, we conclude that section 550.615(6) is an unconstitutional special law enacted in the guise of a general law....

...*810 LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. LEWIS, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs. . We decline to address the issue of whether Gulfstream was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before challenging the constitutionality of section 550.615(6)....