Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...To me, the statutory scheme to conduct bingo under section 849.0931 is analogous to the scheme under chapter 550, Florida Statutes (1997), regarding pari-mutuel wagering, such as betting on horseracing. A permit to conduct pari-mutuel operations may be *204 granted to qualifying organizations under section 550.054....

...Because the Act is a special law unconstitutionally enacted in the guise of a general law, as shown through undisputed evidence in the record, we conclude that the trial court should have granted an earlier motion for summary judgment by Appellants. I.FACTS The Act added the following text to section 550.054, Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 2010: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1....

...nd subject to such provisions before a conversion pursuant to this section occurred. Ch. 2009-170, § 6 at 1777-78, Laws of Fla. Appellees West Volusia Racing, Inc., and License Acquisitions applied for the conversion of their jai-alai permits under section 550.054(14)(a) on the day the Act became effective....

...Shortly thereafter, Appellant Debary instituted this declaratory judgment action. Appellant Cos-ta later joined the suit as an additional plaintiff. Appellants contended below, and now argue on appeal, that the Act is a special law because the criterion specified in section 550.054(14)(a)l permanently closes the class of permits eligible for conversion. This criterion provides that a permit is not eligible unless it is “located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to [section 550.054].” § 550.054(14)(a)l....

...rsion absent a change in the law. Seeking summary judgment, Debary and Costa supported this contention with the deposition testimony of Jim Barnes, whose position with the Division requires him to process the applications for permit conversion under section 550.054(14)(a). Barnes opined that a permit cannot qualify for conversion under section 550.054(14)(a) unless it is located in a county that has exactly two permits issued under section 550.054 (no more and no fewer)....

...Jai-alai permits, including those recently converted under the Act, exist in nine Florida counties: Broward, Gadsden, Hamilton, Hillsborough, Marion, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, and Volusia. Of these counties, only Marion, Palm Beach, and Volusia have precisely two permits that have been issued under section 550.054. Three counties have only one such permit, and the remaining counties have more than two. The three counties with one section 550.054 permit, which is a jai-alai permit, are Gadsden, Hamilton, and St....

...He explained that Marion County does not qualify for conversion because there is no greyhound permit in the county with which the jai-alai permit could pair. This opinion is apparently based on the assumption that no jai-alai permitholder would convert its permit under section 550.054(14)(a) unless the permitholder could enter into a leasing arrangement with another greyhound facility and take advantage of the card-room provision of section 550.054(14)(b). Barnes also confirmed, however, that Marion County’s jai-alai permit is active. Barnes’ testimony indicates that the issuance of new section 550.054 permits in the counties with a jai-alai permit that is currently the only section 550.054 permit in the county would be legally impossible due to restrictions contained in section 550.054(2)....

...This provision prohibits the issuance of a permit “to conduct horse-races, harness horse races, or dograces at a location within 100 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility, or for jai alai within 50 *162 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility.” § 550.054(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). According to Barnes, only two locations exist in Florida where a new pari-mutuel facility can be located consistently with the mileage restriction of section 550.054(2)....

...One such location is in an unspecified county in the Panhandle, and the other is in Dixie County. After acknowledging these locations, Barnes confirmed that a single new pari-mutuel facility in either location would not bring the county within the geographical requirements of section 550.054(14), because the county would need two section 550.054 permits to qualify and neither county has an existing facility. Ultimately, Barnes confirmed that no counties can come within the reach of section 550.054(14)(a)l, because of either the buffer requirement of section 550.054(2) or “other factors such as being the only permit in the county.” License Acquisitions urged the trial court to read subsections (a) and (b) of section 550.054(14) together to determine if the law can be applied to others in the future....

...ith particular attention to the parimutuel legislation context; decide whether subsection (b) should play a part in classifying the law as special or general; and then resolve disagreements between the parties concerning the proper interpretation of section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...e notice of intent to enact the law or conditioning the law’s effectiveness upon a referendum of the electors of the areas affected. There is no dispute that the Legislature failed to follow this requirement in passing the Act. At issue is whether section 550.054(14) is actually a special law passed in the guise of a general law....

...s of one another. Id. at 619 . The three tracks to which the law applied when enacted were able to exist in such proximity to one another because they opened for business before the Legislature imposed the 100-mile-buffer requirement now embodied in section 550.054(2)....

...Such a possibility was insufficient to make the act at issue a general law. Id. B. Defining the Relevant Class for the Purpose of Determining Whether the Law Is Special Appellees assert that, to apply the foregoing principles concerning the open or closed nature of a class, we must consider subsections (a) and (b) of section 550.054(14) together....

...ons. The two subsections may work together as a practical matter, but nothing in the statutory language indicates that a jai-alai permitholder is prohibited from converting the permit under subsection (a) without taking advantage of the remainder of section 550.054(14). On the contrary, section 550.054(14)(b) provides that the holder of a permit converted under subsection (a) “may” relocate and operate a remote card room as long as it meets other conditions. It is legally possible for a jai-alai permit-holder to take advantage of subsection (a) even though the restrictions in subsection (b) may prevent it from obtaining the full extent of the benefits available under section 550.054(14) as a whole....

...The effect of making a law applicable to a closed class without providing for advance notice or a referendum does not change simply because the class is recognized in the same statute as an open class. C. The Meanings of “Only” and “Has Issued” The language at issue within the classification set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) embodies the requirement that a permit seeking conversion be “located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section.” The parties have conflicting interpretations of both...

...Hackley, 95 So.3d 92, 95-96 (Fla.2012). Although we may question the purpose of focusing on the number of permits that have ever been issued, this requirement is not absurd or at odds with any expressed legislative intent. In fact, this interpretation comports with the remainder of section 550.054(14)(a), which uses the historical consideration of whether a permit has ever been converted as one criterion for permit conversion....

...ion was arbitrary because “the descriptive technique [was] employed merely for identification rather than classification”). Barnes unequivocally testified that there are exactly two counties in Florida that currently qualify for conversion under section 550.054(14)(a)....

...he law is still “one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons or things.” Harris, 163 So. at 240 (defining “special law”). Barnes’ uncontested testimony establishes conclusively that, under the current state of the law, section 550.054(14)(a) has the potential of applying to three specific counties in Florida and no others. No counties other than Marion, Palm Beach, and Volusia had only two section 550.054 permits, including one jai-alai permit, either on the effective date of the Act or at the time of Barnes’ deposition. Three counties, St. Lucie, Hamilton, and Gadsden, had only one permit, which was the jai-alai permit. However, Gadsden was ineligible because its permit had already been converted, which violates the criterion specified in section 550.054(14)(a)2. St. Lucie and Hamilton Counties might qualify theoretically, but only if a new permit is issued in one of those two counties pursuant to section 550.054. Barnes’ testimony indicates that such an occurrence is legally impossible given the buffer requirement of section 550.054(2). According to Barnes, only two counties in Florida have a location consistent with the mileage restriction of section 550.054(2), and there is no existing pari *168 mutuel permit in either of those counties. From this testimony, we conclude that these two locations are the only places where a new section 550.054 permit can legally be issued. These facts leave room for only one scenario in which a permit-holder might qualify for conversion under section 550.054(14)(a) in the future. One might open any pari-mutuel facility under a section 550.054 permit in one of the two locations Barnes identified, and a new jai-alai facility might open fifty or more miles from that location, but still in the same county, fall dormant, and then apply for conversion. This possibility is merely technical, if it exists at all, and constitutes a highly contrived scenario that is insufficient to justify a conclusion that the class established by section 550.054(14)(a) is open. Appellees’ argument that counties with more than two permits at the present time might fall under the category of counties referenced in section 550.054(14) (a) 1 if a permit is revoked by the Division or acquired by another permitholder is misguided. Such a scenario would not change the number of permits that have been issued in any county. The same three counties would still be the only counties in this state with a presently existing jai-alai permit where the Department has issued only two section 550.054 permits. Barnes’ testimony indicates that the counties presently having only one permit will not be issued new permits due to the mileage restrictions of section 550.054(2). Therefore, the only additional permits that might ever comply with the criteria of section 550.054(14)(a) are those that do not yet exist....

...will come into existence and proceed to meet the remaining requirements of the class. Because the undisputed material facts establish that there is no reasonable possibility that any permits other than those that have either already converted under section 550.054(14)(a) or the one that may convert if it falls dormant for ten years, we conclude that chapter 2009-170, section 6, is a special law....

...ns’ evidence was sufficient to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the reach of subsection (b) or whether Appellants’ counter evidence was sufficient to overcome such a showing. . None of the parties have acknowledged that section 550.054(14)(a)l may be applied to Marion County in the future....

...ng tracks within a twenty-five mile radius of each other. However, these conditions do not exist at present, because the other sections of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act now prohibit the issuance of permits for horse racing tracks this close together. Section 550.054(2) states in part, "[A]n application may not be considered, nor may a permit be issued by the division or be voted upon in any county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dograces at a location within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility. . . ." § 550.054(2), Fla....

...ithin twenty-five miles of each other. Because new horse racing tracks would have to be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) will not be replicated. Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility....

...acks within a twenty-five mile radius of each other. However, these conditions do not exist at present, because the other sections of the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act now prohibit the issuance of *806 permits for horse racing tracks this close together. Section 550.054(2) states in part, “[A]n application may not be considered, nor may a permit be issued by the division or be voted upon in any county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dograces at a location within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility....” § 550.054(2), Fla....

...ithin twenty-five miles of each other. Because new horse racing tracks would have to be at least one hundred miles apart, the conditions that trigger the statutory prohibition against intertrack wagering in section 550.615(6) will not be replicated. Section 550.054 was enacted in 1992 and has been in effect continuously since then to prohibit the issuance of a permit to conduct horse races within one hundred miles of an existing pari-mutuel wagering facility....

location, the permit-holder must comply with section 550.054, Florida Statutes (2012), if it seeks to relocate

...Finally, we have not overlooked the Division’s argument that this case is moot based on the recent changes in the law *1163 regarding quarter horse racing. See Ch. 2010-29, § 5, at 295, Laws of Fla. (making applications for quarter horse permits subject to section 550.054(2), which provides that an application may not be considered, or a permit issued, to conduct races at a location within 100 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility)....

...Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, seventeen other counties currently have pari-mutuel facilities thereby making them the only ones eligible for slot machines because statutory locational restrictions prevent new facilities absent legislative action. § 550.054(2), Fla....

...Gretna Racing correctly notes that other than Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, seventeen other counties currently have parimutuel facilities thereby making them the only ones eligible for slot machines because statutory locational restrictions prevent new facilities absent legislative action. § 550.054(2), Fla....

...This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeal, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 112 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which held section 550.054(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), to be an invalid special law. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the following reasons, we reverse the First District and hold that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law. FACTS Appellants, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), License Acquisitions, LLC, and West Volusia Racing, Inc., f/k/a Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc., appeal the First District’s per curiam decision declaring section 550.054(14)(a) to be invalid as a special law enacted without either providing advance notice of intent to enact the law or conditioning the law’s effectiveness upon a referendum of the electors of the areas affected in violation of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Based on this ruling, the district court concluded that the trial court should have granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Debary, 112 So. 3d at 160. Effective July 1, 2010, section 550.054(14) provides as follows: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division [of pari-mutuel wagering] to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1....

...550.6305(9)(d) and (f) shall apply to any permit converted under this subsection and shall continue to apply to any permit which was previously included under and subject to such provisions before a conversion pursuant to this section occurred. § 550.054(14), Florida Statutes (2010). West Volusia Racing, Inc. (West Volusia Racing), and License Acquisitions, LLC (License Acquisitions), applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits under section 550.054(14)(a) on the day section 550.054 became effective. Approximately three weeks later, the DBPR granted the applications. Shortly thereafter, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Debary), instituted a declaratory judgment action alleging in pertinent part that section 550.054(14) is an -3- unconstitutional special law—a law designed to operate upon particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classificat...

...The appellants argued that the statute is a general law—a law that operates uniformly within a permissible classification and is not subject to the notice or referendum requirements of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, Debary alleged that section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...Debary subsequently amended its complaint to add an additional plaintiff. The appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment supporting their contention that the statute was a special law with the following facts. At the time of the statute’s enactment, there were twenty-one total section 550.054 permits existing in nine counties in Florida, eleven of which were jai alai permits....

...West Volusia Racing and License Acquisitions held jai alai permits that were eligible for conversion at the time of the statute’s enactment because the permits were dormant for ten years and were located in counties where the DBPR had issued exactly two section 550.054 permits, which include permits for greyhound racing, jai alai, -4- thoroughbred horse racing, and harness horse racing....

...time of the statute’s enactment and no other permits would ever be eligible for conversion. As a result, the appellees argued at the trial court level, to the First District, and here on appeal that two permits met all the criteria set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) at the time the statute was enacted, and that no reasonable possibility exists that any other permits will ever qualify for conversion absent a change in the law due to the restriction in subsection (14)(a)1....

...The trial court denied the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The appellees then sought leave to amend their first amended complaint, which was granted.1 Thereafter, License Acquisitions moved for summary judgment regarding the allegation that section 550.054(14)(a) was an 1. In the second amended complaint, the appellees requested: (1) the issuance of a writ of quo warranto directed to the DBPR because it lacked authority under section 550.054(14)(a) to convert the pari-mutuel permits held by License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing; (2) the issuance of a writ of quo warranto directed to West Volusia Racing to prevent it from exercising any rights or privileges under th...

...application is either void or voidable; (5) the issuance of a declaration that West Volusia Racing did not qualify for conversion and the order granting the conversion application is either void or voidable; and (6) the issuance of a declaration that section 550.054(14)(a) is an unconstitutional special law. -5- unconstitutional special law, arguing that the statute was a general law because sections 550.054(14)(a) and (b), when read together, created a classification rationally related to the purpose of the statute because the statute would be capable of application to additional parties....

...Finally, the court stated that the standard for determining the openness of the class is whether there is a reasonable possibility that others will join the class in the future. Id. Turning to the appellants’ arguments, the First District rejected the argument that subsections (a) and (b) of section 550.054(14), read together, were the relevant classification for determining whether the law was a special or general law....

...always be paired with an open class to steer clear of constitutional challenges. This determination was not challenged here on appeal. -7-  The First District then discussed the meanings of “only” and “has issued” as used in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...alai permits may be converted to greyhound permits. Accordingly, the court held that the statute was an unconstitutional special law because there was no reasonable possibility that any other permits would join the class. Id. On appeal to this Court, the appellants contend that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law, arguing that the First District declared the statute invalid because it misinterpreted the words “has issued” and “only” in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...at 809. The parties do not dispute that the Legislature did not provide notice of its intent to enact the statute or condition its effectiveness on a referendum of the electors of the areas affected. Thus, the issue on appeal to this Court is whether section 550.054(14)(a) is unconstitutional as a special law passed under the guise of a general law....

...d at the time of the trial court proceedings only applied to License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing. The basis of their divergence—rooted in their disagreement regarding the definitions of “has issued” and “only” as they appear in section 550.054(14)(a)1.—is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the class is open to additional parties. Section 550.054 provides: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1. Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section; § 550.054 (14)(a)1., Fla....

...The appellees, on the other hand, contend that the First District correctly determined that the classification scheme is closed because “only” means “precisely,” and “has issued” refers to the number of permits the DBPR has historically issued. Thus, according to the appellees, section 550.054(14)(a) creates a classification scheme that is closed and will only ever apply to License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing. Accordingly, whether - 12 - section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law or an invalid special law is dependent on the meaning of “only” and “has issued.” Interpretations of “Only” and “Has Issued” Here, the appellees argue that the s...

...Specifically, appellants argue that the total number of permits issued in a given county could be reduced in the future by reduction of permits in those - 14 - counties by either revocation pursuant to sections 550.0251(10), 550.054(9)(b), 550.175, and 550.1815, Florida Statutes, or by merger (holder of one permit within the same county acquires another permit and consolidates or abandons)....

...of or by itself; without anything more; exclusive; [or] nothing else or more.” Black’s Law Dictionary 982 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, according to the authorities listed above, the definition of “only” indicates that the statutory condition in section 550.054 of “only two permits” means “precisely two permits.” An alternate definition of “only,” however, demonstrates that the Legislature’s use of “only” is ambiguous and, therefore, subject to statutory construction....

...Finally, section 641.65(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that members of a district managed-care ombudsman committee “may serve only two consecutive terms,” which creates a maximum amount of terms. As demonstrated above, “only” as used in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...Further, evidence in the record establishes that no other counties have a jai alai permit holder who can convert the permit under the statute. For instance, Gadsden County is ineligible due to a previous conversion that disqualifies the permit holder. See § 550.054(14)(a)2. (“Such permit was not previously converted from any other class of permit. . . .”). St. Lucie County, Hamilton County, and two counties that currently do not have a single pari-mutuel wagering permit under section 550.054 are also ineligible due to the mileage buffer requirement of section 550.054(2), which makes it legally impossible to add a second section 550.054 pari-mutuel permit. See § 550.054(2) (“In addition, an application may not be considered, nor may a permit be issued by the division or - 20 - be voted upon in any county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dog races at a location within 100 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility, or for jai alai within 50 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility. . . .”); § 550.054(14)(a)1. (“Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari- mutuel permits pursuant to this section.”)....

...l of the remaining permits except one— thus a total of ten of the eleven existing permits at the time of the statute’s enactment—without a change in the law. Indeed, review of the record demonstrates that Hillsborough County had three total section 550.054 permits, one of which was a dormant jai alai permit; Gadsden County had a dormant jai alai 3. It is difficult to formulate a reasonable rationale to limit conversion of permits to permit holders in counties that have exactly two section 550.054 permits, and prevent permit conversion to permit holders from counties that have zero additional competing section 550.054 permits. - 21 - permit, but it previously converted and could never be eligible; Miami-Dade County and Broward County both had two active jai alai permits, and five total section 550.054 permits; St. Lucie County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits; Hamilton County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits; Marion County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits4; and two other counties, possibly Bay County and Dixie County, did not presently have any 550.054 permits and could legally acquire a permit without violating the mileage restrictions in section 550.054(2) noted above....

...was the openness of the class). 4. The record shows that Marion County has one jai alai permit and a “limited intertrack wagering license.” As the appellees correctly note and the appellants do not dispute, the record does not specify that this license is not a section 550.054 permit, but it is, in fact, a license granted pursuant to section 550.6308. Thus, Marion County only has one section 550.054 permit. - 22 -  Indeed, application of every enumerated condition for conversion set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) demonstrates that the conditions are reasonably related to the purpose of the statute. Section 550.054 is titled “Application for permit to conduct pari-mutuel wagering.” Pari-mutuel wagering is a heavily regulated industry in Florida....

...permits with the aim of maximizing revenue generation and limiting competition within certain geographical areas.5 5. Review of other provisions in this section demonstrates the Legislature’s interest in generating revenue and limiting geographic competition. For example, section 550.054(2) establishes a mileage buffer, section 550.054(3)(h) requires applicants to provide a business plan for the first year of operation, section 550.054(10) allows the DBPR to revoke a permit if construction of the facilities is - 23 -  As noted previously, section 550.054(14)(a) provides: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1....

...during a period of 10 years immediately preceding his or her application for conversion under this subsection. The restriction regarding the number of permits in a county is consistent with the Legislature’s policy of limiting the number of similar permits, section 550.054 permits in this case, within a given area....

...from constantly converting their permits; the Legislature could have reasonably determined that a more consistent business model would generate more revenues than a constantly evolving one. For instance, greyhound racing, thoroughbred lagging, section 550.054(13)(a) restricts transfer of a thoroughbred racing permit or license if the transfer is intended to permit a licensee to change the horse racetrack’s location subject to enumerated exceptions, and section 550.054(14)(b) allows a holder of a converted jai alai permit, subject to further conditions, to move the location within a thirty-mile radius, which enables the permit holder to conduct pari-mutuel wagering and operate a cardroom....

...It is also noted that in Gulfstream Park, this Court held that “a statute that appears to apply to one . . . area at the time of enactment may still be considered a general law if it could be applied to other . . . areas in the future.” 967 So. 2d at 808. As discussed above, although section 550.054(14)(a) applied to two permits at the time of enactment, it could be applied to other permits in the future. Finally, we also find that the alternative interpretations of “has issued” and “only” represent a fair constr...

...competition of pari-mutuel wagering activities within a given geographic area. When “only” is used as an adjective in this context, it does not serve a discernible purpose—no articulated legislative policy would be served by requiring exactly two section 550.054 permits as a condition of conversion....

...a fair construction of the statute that is consistent with legislative intent and results in a determination that the statute is a valid general law. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we reverse the First District’s decision holding section 550.054(14)(a) unconstitutional and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellees because we hold that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law in which the classification scheme reasonably relates to the purpose of the statute. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., dissents. QUINCE, J., recused...

...This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeal, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 112 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which held section 550.054(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), to be an invalid special law. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the following reasons, we reverse the First District and hold that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law. FACTS Appellants, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR), License Acquisitions, LLC, and West Volusia Racing, Inc., f/k/a Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc., appeal the First District’s per curiam decision declaring section 550.054(14)(a) to be invalid as a special law enacted without either providing advance notice of intent to enact the law or conditioning the law’s effectiveness upon a referendum of the electors of the areas affected in violation of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Based on this ruling, the district court concluded that the trial court should have granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Debary, 112 So. 3d at 160. Effective July 1, 2010, section 550.054(14) provides as follows: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division [of pari-mutuel wagering] to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1....

...550.6305(9)(d) and (f) shall apply to any permit converted under this subsection and shall continue to apply to any permit which was previously included under and subject to such provisions before a conversion pursuant to this section occurred. § 550.054(14), Florida Statutes (2010). West Volusia Racing, Inc. (West Volusia Racing), and License Acquisitions, LLC (License Acquisitions), applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits under section 550.054(14)(a) on the day section 550.054 became effective. Approximately three weeks later, the DBPR granted the applications. Shortly thereafter, Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Debary), instituted a declaratory judgment action alleging in pertinent part that section 550.054(14) is an -3- unconstitutional special law—a law designed to operate upon particular persons or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when classificat...

...The appellants argued that the statute is a general law—a law that operates uniformly within a permissible classification and is not subject to the notice or referendum requirements of article III, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, Debary alleged that section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...Debary subsequently amended its complaint to add an additional plaintiff. The appellees then filed a motion for summary judgment supporting their contention that the statute was a special law with the following facts. At the time of the statute’s enactment, there were twenty-one total section 550.054 permits existing in nine counties in Florida, eleven of which were jai alai permits....

...West Volusia Racing and License Acquisitions held jai alai permits that were eligible for conversion at the time of the statute’s enactment because the permits were dormant for ten years and were located in counties where the DBPR had issued exactly two section 550.054 permits, which include permits for greyhound racing, jai alai, -4- thoroughbred horse racing, and harness horse racing....

...time of the statute’s enactment and no other permits would ever be eligible for conversion. As a result, the appellees argued at the trial court level, to the First District, and here on appeal that two permits met all the criteria set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) at the time the statute was enacted, and that no reasonable possibility exists that any other permits will ever qualify for conversion absent a change in the law due to the restriction in subsection (14)(a)1....

...The trial court denied the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The appellees then sought leave to amend their first amended complaint, which was granted.1 Thereafter, License Acquisitions moved for summary judgment regarding the allegation that section 550.054(14)(a) was an 1. In the second amended complaint, the appellees requested: (1) the issuance of a writ of quo warranto directed to the DBPR because it lacked authority under section 550.054(14)(a) to convert the pari-mutuel permits held by License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing; (2) the issuance of a writ of quo warranto directed to West Volusia Racing to prevent it from exercising any rights or privileges under th...

...application is either void or voidable; (5) the issuance of a declaration that West Volusia Racing did not qualify for conversion and the order granting the conversion application is either void or voidable; and (6) the issuance of a declaration that section 550.054(14)(a) is an unconstitutional special law. -5- unconstitutional special law, arguing that the statute was a general law because sections 550.054(14)(a) and (b), when read together, created a classification rationally related to the purpose of the statute because the statute would be capable of application to additional parties....

...Finally, the court stated that the standard for determining the openness of the class is whether there is a reasonable possibility that others will join the class in the future. Id. Turning to the appellants’ arguments, the First District rejected the argument that subsections (a) and (b) of section 550.054(14), read together, were the relevant classification for determining whether the law was a special or general law....

...always be paired with an open class to steer clear of constitutional challenges. This determination was not challenged here on appeal. -7-  The First District then discussed the meanings of “only” and “has issued” as used in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...alai permits may be converted to greyhound permits. Accordingly, the court held that the statute was an unconstitutional special law because there was no reasonable possibility that any other permits would join the class. Id. On appeal to this Court, the appellants contend that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law, arguing that the First District declared the statute invalid because it misinterpreted the words “has issued” and “only” in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...at 809. The parties do not dispute that the Legislature did not provide notice of its intent to enact the statute or condition its effectiveness on a referendum of the electors of the areas affected. Thus, the issue on appeal to this Court is whether section 550.054(14)(a) is unconstitutional as a special law passed under the guise of a general law....

...d at the time of the trial court proceedings only applied to License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing. The basis of their divergence—rooted in their disagreement regarding the definitions of “has issued” and “only” as they appear in section 550.054(14)(a)1.—is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the class is open to additional parties. Section 550.054 provides: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1. Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari-mutuel permits pursuant to this section; § 550.054 (14)(a)1., Fla....

...The appellees, on the other hand, contend that the First District correctly determined that the classification scheme is closed because “only” means “precisely,” and “has issued” refers to the number of permits the DBPR has historically issued. Thus, according to the appellees, section 550.054(14)(a) creates a classification scheme that is closed and will only ever apply to License Acquisitions and West Volusia Racing. Accordingly, whether - 12 - section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law or an invalid special law is dependent on the meaning of “only” and “has issued.” Interpretations of “Only” and “Has Issued” Here, the appellees argue that the s...

...Specifically, appellants argue that the total number of permits issued in a given county could be reduced in the future by reduction of permits in those - 14 - counties by either revocation pursuant to sections 550.0251(10), 550.054(9)(b), 550.175, and 550.1815, Florida Statutes, or by merger (holder of one permit within the same county acquires another permit and consolidates or abandons)....

...of or by itself; without anything more; exclusive; [or] nothing else or more.” Black’s Law Dictionary 982 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, according to the authorities listed above, the definition of “only” indicates that the statutory condition in section 550.054 of “only two permits” means “precisely two permits.” An alternate definition of “only,” however, demonstrates that the Legislature’s use of “only” is ambiguous and, therefore, subject to statutory construction....

...Finally, section 641.65(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that members of a district managed-care ombudsman committee “may serve only two consecutive terms,” which creates a maximum amount of terms. As demonstrated above, “only” as used in section 550.054(14)(a)1....

...Further, evidence in the record establishes that no other counties have a jai alai permit holder who can convert the permit under the statute. For instance, Gadsden County is ineligible due to a previous conversion that disqualifies the permit holder. See § 550.054(14)(a)2. (“Such permit was not previously converted from any other class of permit. . . .”). St. Lucie County, Hamilton County, and two counties that currently do not have a single pari-mutuel wagering permit under section 550.054 are also ineligible due to the mileage buffer requirement of section 550.054(2), which makes it legally impossible to add a second section 550.054 pari-mutuel permit. See § 550.054(2) (“In addition, an application may not be considered, nor may a permit be issued by the division or - 20 - be voted upon in any county, to conduct horse races, harness horse races, or dog races at a location within 100 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility, or for jai alai within 50 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility. . . .”); § 550.054(14)(a)1. (“Such permit is located in a county in which the division has issued only two pari- mutuel permits pursuant to this section.”)....

...l of the remaining permits except one— thus a total of ten of the eleven existing permits at the time of the statute’s enactment—without a change in the law. Indeed, review of the record demonstrates that Hillsborough County had three total section 550.054 permits, one of which was a dormant jai alai permit; Gadsden County had a dormant jai alai 3. It is difficult to formulate a reasonable rationale to limit conversion of permits to permit holders in counties that have exactly two section 550.054 permits, and prevent permit conversion to permit holders from counties that have zero additional competing section 550.054 permits. - 21 - permit, but it previously converted and could never be eligible; Miami-Dade County and Broward County both had two active jai alai permits, and five total section 550.054 permits; St. Lucie County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits; Hamilton County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits; Marion County had one active jai alai permit and no other section 550.054 permits4; and two other counties, possibly Bay County and Dixie County, did not presently have any 550.054 permits and could legally acquire a permit without violating the mileage restrictions in section 550.054(2) noted above....

...was the openness of the class). 4. The record shows that Marion County has one jai alai permit and a “limited intertrack wagering license.” As the appellees correctly note and the appellants do not dispute, the record does not specify that this license is not a section 550.054 permit, but it is, in fact, a license granted pursuant to section 550.6308. Thus, Marion County only has one section 550.054 permit. - 22 -  Indeed, application of every enumerated condition for conversion set forth in section 550.054(14)(a) demonstrates that the conditions are reasonably related to the purpose of the statute. Section 550.054 is titled “Application for permit to conduct pari-mutuel wagering.” Pari-mutuel wagering is a heavily regulated industry in Florida....

...permits with the aim of maximizing revenue generation and limiting competition within certain geographical areas.5 5. Review of other provisions in this section demonstrates the Legislature’s interest in generating revenue and limiting geographic competition. For example, section 550.054(2) establishes a mileage buffer, section 550.054(3)(h) requires applicants to provide a business plan for the first year of operation, section 550.054(10) allows the DBPR to revoke a permit if construction of the facilities is - 23 -  As noted previously, section 550.054(14)(a) provides: (14)(a) Any holder of a permit to conduct jai alai may apply to the division to convert such permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai if: 1....

...during a period of 10 years immediately preceding his or her application for conversion under this subsection. The restriction regarding the number of permits in a county is consistent with the Legislature’s policy of limiting the number of similar permits, section 550.054 permits in this case, within a given area....

...from constantly converting their permits; the Legislature could have reasonably determined that a more consistent business model would generate more revenues than a constantly evolving one. For instance, greyhound racing, thoroughbred lagging, section 550.054(13)(a) restricts transfer of a thoroughbred racing permit or license if the transfer is intended to permit a licensee to change the horse racetrack’s location subject to enumerated exceptions, and section 550.054(14)(b) allows a holder of a converted jai alai permit, subject to further conditions, to move the location within a thirty-mile radius, which enables the permit holder to conduct pari-mutuel wagering and operate a cardroom....

...It is also noted that in Gulfstream Park, this Court held that “a statute that appears to apply to one . . . area at the time of enactment may still be considered a general law if it could be applied to other . . . areas in the future.” 967 So. 2d at 808. As discussed above, although section 550.054(14)(a) applied to two permits at the time of enactment, it could be applied to other permits in the future. Finally, we also find that the alternative interpretations of “has issued” and “only” represent a fair constr...

...competition of pari-mutuel wagering activities within a given geographic area. When “only” is used as an adjective in this context, it does not serve a discernible purpose—no articulated legislative policy would be served by requiring exactly two section 550.054 permits as a condition of conversion....

...a fair construction of the statute that is consistent with legislative intent and results in a determination that the statute is a valid general law. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we reverse the First District’s decision holding section 550.054(14)(a) unconstitutional and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the appellants because we hold that section 550.054(14)(a) is a valid general law in which the classification scheme reasonably relates to the purpose of the statute. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., dissents. QUINCE, J., recused...

...to convert its permit to a permit to conduct a summer jai alai fronton.” ([E]mphasis supplied). Section 550.0745, Florida Statutes, creates an exception to the general requirements to obtaining a pari-mutuel permit found in section 550.054, Florida Statutes....