Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...a particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer's conduct." [9] While Section 447.309(1) contains no similar statement, Section 447.203(14), defining collective bargaining, states in part, "neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession......

...The Court consistently deferred to the trial court's findings and overrode the views of the Legislature: The trial court examined the statute independently to ascertain whether the committee staff's views, which reflect the state's position, were borne out. To that end, the trial court took evidence on whether section 447.203(3)(j) serves a compelling state interest and whether it does so by means least burdening state employees' rights to bargain collectively. The lower court found [that the State's interest in maintaining the lawyer-client relationship was compelling but that section 447.203(3)(j) was not the least intrusive means of serving that interest].......

...hen rendered its decisions. PERC concluded that a sheriff is an entity with "sufficient legal distinctiveness properly to carry out the functions of a public employer" and determined that deputy sheriffs are public employees within the definition of Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The two questions presented were whether a sheriff is a public employer and whether deputy sheriffs are public employees as defined in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975). The District Court held that a sheriff is an agency of the State and, therefore, comes within the definition of public employer as set out in Section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which provides: "`Public Employer' or `employer' means the state or any county, municipality, or special district or any subdivision or agency thereof which the commission determines has sufficient legal distinctiveness properly to carry out the functions of a public employer... ." The District Court further determined that although deputy sheriffs are officers, they are also public employees within the definition of Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975), since Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), includes persons appointed to their positions and public officers....

...hey work. Respondents, Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of the Police, contend that a sheriff is a public employer and that this Court expressly stated in State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, supra, that an office is an agency of the State. Comparing Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1975), and Section 112.044, Florida Statutes (1976), (which does contain an exclusion for any law enforcement agency) respondent argues that had the Legislature intended to exclude sheriffs from the coverage of Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1975), it would have expressly done so as it had done in Section 112.042, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...r Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), we find that the language employed by the Legislature in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975), does not reveal a legislative intent to include appointed deputy sheriffs within the definition "public employee." Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975), defines "public employee" as: "......

...sheriff, such as typists, stenographers, bookkeepers, cooks, janitors or others, who are not deputy sheriffs and whose duties and powers do not constitute a part of the sovereign power, who would be embraced by the definition of "public employee" in Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...mismanagement, malfeasance, gross waste of public funds, or gross neglect of duty. Section 112.3187(6) directs that for disclosures concerning a local governmental entity, the information must be disclosed to a chief executive officer as defined in section 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official and section 112.3197(7) protects employees who disclose information on their own initiative in a written and signed complaint or employees who file any written complaint to their supervisory officials....

...old that would effectively gut the life of the statute providing for bargaining by public employees. There are certain tradeoffs in the statutory scheme not the least of which is the lack of right to strike. Section 447.505, Florida Statutes (1977), Section 447.203(6), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...In Service Employees this Court was presented with a similar question certified by the Fifth District involving public employees who have historically been categorized as "deputies": Are deputy court clerks, unlike deputy sheriffs, public employees within the contemplation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes? 752 So.2d at 570. The Court answered affirmatively and held that deputy clerks were in fact public employees entitled to collective bargaining rights under section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...n contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the Act." The Court also noted that the "appointed/employed" distinction was of little significance under chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1997), because the definition of "public employee" in section 447.203 itself drew no such distinction....

...ng was in Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.1999), wherein we struck down a statutory attempt to deny collective bargaining rights to lawyers employed by government. In Chiles, we addressed the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), which prohibited "`[t]hose persons who by virtue of their positions of employment are regulated by the Florida Supreme Court' from engaging in collective bargaining with their government employer." 734 So.2d at 1031. This section was enacted as an exception to the definition of "public employee" in section 447.203(3)....

...The city quarrels about this but cites us no authority for the proposition that Lewis' right to the advice of a union representative (as contrasted to his right of tenure) was different depending on whether he occupied a probationary or permanent employment status. See § 447.203(3), Fla....

...Brooks and Anthony D. Demma of Meyer and Brooks, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellees. WELLS, J. We have on appeal Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), a decision in which the First District Court of Appeal declared section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The State regulates public employee collective bargaining under chapter 447, part II, Florida Statutes. Section 447.203(3)(j) of this chapter in effect prohibits "[t]hose persons who by virtue of their positions of employment are regulated by the Florida Supreme Court" from engaging in collective bargaining with their government employer....

...scipline of attorneys." Id. at 1095. *1032 Less than two months after we denied the State's petition, Governor Chiles signed into law chapter 94-89, House Bill 2281 entitled "An act relating to public employees." Ch. 94-89, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 447.203(3)(j), Fla....

...on Empl. & Mgmt. Rel., HB 2281 (1994) Staff Analysis 3 (final April 11, 1994) (on file with comm.). Based on this new law, PERC dismissed SEAG's petition. State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 20 F.P.E.R. ¶ 25151 (1994). SEAG appealed, arguing that section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), was unconstitutional. The district court affirmed PERC's decision "without prejudice to SEAG's right to seek a declaratory judgment in circuit court concerning the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994)." State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 653 So.2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). SEAG, along with a government lawyer, filed an action in the circuit court seeking a declaration that section 447.203(3)(j) was unconstitutional under article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. [1] After a three-day bench trial, the court struck down section 447.203(3)(j), concluding that it unconstitutionally infringed upon the right of government lawyers to bargain collectively....

...The right to bargain collectively is a "fundamental right." Hillsborough County G.E.A., 522 So.2d at 362. A statute abridging the right of state employees to bargain collectively is consonant with the constitution only if it vindicates a compelling state interest by minimally necessary means. Because section 447.203(3)(j) diminishes this fundamental right, the state must demonstrate that the statute can withstand strict scrutiny....

...These conclusions do not, however, obviate the need for judicial scrutiny. The trial court examined the statute independently to ascertain whether the committee staffs views, which reflect the state's position, were borne out. To that end, the trial court took evidence on whether section 447.203(3)(j) serves a compelling state interest and whether it does so by means least burdening state employees' rights to bargain collectively....

...fashioned to accommodate both the public employers' interests in assuring fidelity and competence in their attorneys and the attorneys' constitutional right as public employees to bargain collectively. We hold that the trial court correctly declared section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional....

...ce; rather, we seek to ascertain whether an attorney has permitted that antagonism to overstep the boundaries of the employer/employee bargaining relationship and has actually compromised client representation. Id. at 1157. Accordingly, we hold that section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), is unconstitutional and affirm the decision below....

...We find no error in the Commission's rejection of the County's request for a reopened hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence on a proposed "blue collar-white collar" bargaining unit, nor in the Commission's failure to designate certain employees as managerial or confidential under Section 447.203(4) and (5), Florida Statutes, as urged by the County....

...officers, agents, representatives and-or supervisors and-or managerial employees who acted on behalf of the hospital could not support a finding that the two employees were managerial employees since such designation could not be stipulated to under Section 447.203(3)(d)....

...ulty, was denied by PERC's chairman on January 22, 1976 on the ground that the organization, whose purpose was to oppose collective bargaining in the academic community, was "not required to register with the Commission." There was no error in this. Section 447.203(10) broadly defines "employee organization" as including any association or professional society or group "however organized or constituted" which represents or seeks to represent public employees in matters relating to their employment by a public employer....

...mitted that under the PBA's proposal, the City would be limited to selecting lieutenants from those individuals who are existing sergeants. While there has been no formal determination that the rank of lieutenant is a management position under PERA [Section 447.203(4), Florida Statutes (1981)], the City relied on the testimony of acting police chief Howard McClain who testified that he viewed the position of lieutenant as an initial management position and that as such there was a need for flexibility in the selection of such personnel....

...mandated by the new constitutional provision. This new provision, however, does not mandated that collective bargaining as to retirement be eliminated. Collective bargaining not only does not require that a government agree to a retirement benefit [Section 447.203(14), Florida Statutes] but the new provision prohibits a government from agreeing to a benefit that will render the retirement fund actuarilly unsound unless it makes provision for the funding of the benefit on a sound actuarial basis....

...1st DCA 1979). It would be an abdication of our duty to protect and enforce constitutionally guaranteed rights were we to base our holding on such a tenuous premise. Cases arising from disputes between local school boards (the legally defined "employer," section 447.203(2)) and teacher's bargaining representatives may produce different factual or procedural scenarios than do cases arising because of legislative action allegedly impacting unconstitutionally upon collective bargaining rights....

...ement until agreement is reached on a permissive subject of negotiations. 7 FPER 12300 at p. 596. Although PERC's concern is well founded, the problem it fears here is possible with any subject which may not be insisted upon to impasse. In addition, section 447.203(14) bars PERC from imposing an agreement where none has been reached....

...hat § 447.501(2)(f) does not impede "organization of graduate assistants by an employee organization." The Board argues that PERC's order misconstrued statutory law by determining graduate assistants were "public employees" within the definition in § 447.203(3), since they were not barred from collective bargaining by the provisions of § 447.501(2)(f). We affirm. The Board of Regents is included within the definition of a public employer under § 447.203(2), while a public employee, defined by § 447.203(3), is one "employed by a public employer," subject to certain specific exceptions which do not include graduate assistants....

...1st DCA 1977). AFFIRMED. SMITH, Acting C.J., concurs. MELVIN, J., dissenting. MELVIN, Judge, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent. The resolution of this case hinges on the constructions placed on several, seemingly, contradictory statutes. The first, Section 447.203(2), provides that the petitioner here, the Board of Regents, is a "public employer". The second, Section 447.203(3), defines a "public employee" as being one "employed by a public employer"....

...City of Winter Park v. Fla. Pub. Emp. Rel., 349 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). It is equally clear to me that one may be in the apparent "employment" of a "public employer" and still not be a "public employee", even without a specific exemption in Section 447.203(3)....

...Section 447.301(2) assures public employees the right, through a certified bargaining agent, to negotiate collectively with their public employer. For the employees represented by the petitioner herein, the respondent BOR is designated the public employer. (Section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes 1975) If and when the negotiations between the public employer and the bargaining agent produce an agreement, the chief executive officer of the public employer must, pursuant to Section 447.309(2), in his annual...

...icient to fund the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The "legislative body" is defined to mean "the State Legislature ... or the governing body of an instrumentality or unit of government having authority to appropriate funds... ." (Section 447.203(10), Florida Statutes 1975) The Florida Legislature is thus the "legislative body" for the public employees represented by the petitioner....

...For example, the written notice required by Section 447.403(3), the discussions between parties, the recommendation for settling by the Chief Executive Officer, the public hearing before the legislative body, and the legislative body's action, taken in the public interest are all obviated by the ordinance. Furthermore, Section 447.203(14), which provides that "neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or required to make a concession unless otherwise provided in this part" is likewise nullified by the ordinance....

...*1246 The defendant's third argument is also without merit. The defendant argues the plaintiff did not complain to Sheriff Hunter personally. Under Fla.Stat. § 112.3187(6), an employee must report any incidents under this section to a "chief executive officer as defined in § 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official." The plaintiff alleges she reported the incidents not to a chief executive officer but to her supervisors who are appropriate local officials....

...Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla.1978), the Florida Supreme Court held that deputy sheriffs appointed by constitutional sheriffs were not "public employees" within the contemplation of the Public Employees Relations Act. In reaching that determination, the Court first noted that section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, defines a "public employee" as "any person employed by a public employer"....

...When a challenge is made to a state statute, and that statute has been authoritatively construed by the state's highest court, the words of the court become the words of the statute. See NAACP v. Button, supra . In the case at bar, then, this court is bound by the Florida Supreme Court's construction of section 447.203(3); that is, the section must be read to include among its stated exceptions deputy sheriffs who are appointed by a sheriff. The fact that this court is bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, does not, however, preclude this court from *77 further examination of the plaintiffs' claim....

...If a conflict exists, we have no alternative; it is our judicial responsibility to make the hard decision and declare the ... provision invalid. Hunt v. Roth, supra, 648 F.2d at 1155. In this action, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the state supreme court's interpretation of section 447.203, Florida Statutes, is violative of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and additionally violates Art....

...at the plaintiff deputy sheriffs are not employees, the court finds that plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining. Accordingly, neither the defendants' conduct nor the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, violates any First Amendment right enjoyed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants' conduct and the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, violate their right to collective bargaining guaranteed them by Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution....

...ively. Because this court has held that it is similarly bound by the Florida Supreme Court's determination that deputy sheriffs are not employees, the court finds that neither the defendants' conduct nor the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, violates any rights of the plaintiffs under the Florida Constitution. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution....

...See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); University of New Hampshire Chapter of American Association of University Professors v. Haselton, supra . The court has already held that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203, Florida Statutes, does not violate any First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. Because the court has found that the classification, created by the state supreme court's interpretation of section 447.203, Florida Statutes, does not interfere with a federal "fundamental right", the standard of review to be applied is the rational basis test....

...Mack, supra , that the Florida Supreme Court did not arrive at its determination that deputy sheriffs are appointees in an arbitrary fashion. Rather, the court examined the unique historical status of deputy sheriffs and concluded that they were not employees within the meaning of section 447.203, Florida Statutes....

...their exclusion from the coverage of the Chapter 447, Part II, Florida Statutes, is reasonable and is not invidiously discriminatory. Accordingly, the court finds that neither the defendants' conduct nor the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution....

...he proposed bargaining unit. Communications Workers of Am. v. City of Safety Harbor, 22 F.P.E.R. ¶ 27125 (1996). The final order entered by PERC must be reversed and a new election held. This court is not required to defer to PERC's construction of section 447.203(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), insofar as PERC has determined that compliance with section 447.203(13)(a)4....

...See Pensacola Jr. College v. Public Employees Rels. Comm'n, 400 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist. v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 429 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), appeal dismissed, 452 So.2d 568 (Fla.1984). Section 447.203(13) provides: (13) "Professional employee" means: (a) Any employee engaged in work in any two or more of the following categories: 1....

...Has completed the course of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in subparagraph 4 of paragraph (a); and 2. Is performing related work under supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). § 447.203, Fla....

...See School Dist. of Leon County v. Leon Educ. Support Personnel Ass'n, 21 F.P.E.R. ¶ 26187 (1995); Government Supervisors Ass'n of Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County, 19 F.P.E.R. ¶ 24184 (1993). Respectfully, we are unable to agree with PERC's construction of section 447.203(13)(a). The introductory clause of the statute, section 447.203(13)(a), imposes the requirement that a professional employee must be engaged in work "in any two or more" of the following four enumerated categories....

...with language comparable to Florida's "any two or more." Accordingly, we hold that PERC's construction of the statute is erroneous. Because there has been no suggestion that Safety Harbor's Recreation Leaders II do not meet the first two criteria of section 447.203(13)(a), they fall within the definition of "professional employee" pursuant to section 447.203(13)(a)....

...es of collective bargaining which includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of each group votes for inclusion in such unit." § 447.307(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (1995). I. I would leave undisturbed PERC's construction of subsection 447.203(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), insofar as PERC determined that compliance with subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)4....

...The majority's contrary interpretation of a statute PERC administers runs afoul of accepted *269 canons of statutory construction. Consistently since Florida Police Benevolent Association v. State, 10 F.P.E.R. ¶ 15228 (1984), PERC has interpreted subsection 447.203(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), to require that a "professional employee" must meet at least one of the three criteria set out in subsubsections 447.203(13)(a)1., 2., and 3., along with the criterion set out in subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)4....

...Has completed the course of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in subparagraph 4 of paragraph (a); and 2. Is performing related work under supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). § 447.203, Fla. Stat. (1995)(emphasis supplied). In short, the statute in question defines a "professional employee" as any employee whose work falls within any two or more of the following categories: 1....; 2....; 3....; and 4.... § 447.203(13)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). PERC has construed the statute to mean any two of 1., 2., (or) 3.; and 4. PERC's construction precludes coupling (for example) the criteria set out in subsubsections 447.203(13)(a)2. and 3. in order to classify as professional numerous jobs not now deemed professional. In effect, the majority faults PERC for failing to substitute "or" for "and" after subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)3. But those who drafted the statute used the word "and" instead of the word "or." The majority's interpretation ignores more than the Legislature's choice of conjunction. In interpreting subsection 447.203(13)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), PERC appropriately looked to the federal statute on which it is modeled, viz., 29 U.S.C....

...Not one of the fifteen state statutes the majority has collected eliminates this criterion for professional employees. With today's decision, Florida now apparently stands alone in not requiring that professional employees "must be engaged in work requiring knowledge of an advanced type." II. If subsection 447.203(13)(a) is construed correctly, it is necessary to reach a question the majority does not address, in order to decide whether PERC correctly construed subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)4., which, to reiterate, provides: 4....

...The jobs they fill involve the performance of work of a predomina[nt]ly intellectual nature requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. There has been no suggestion that Safety Harbor's recreation leaders II do not meet both the subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)1....

...A review of the record indicates that experience may be substituted for a degree and *274 that one [of only two] employee[s] in this position does not have a degree. Accordingly, the position of Recreation Leader is not a professional employee under § 447.203(13), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Addition of the words "or an equivalent combination of training and experience which provides the required knowledge, abilities, and skills" (emphasis supplied) does not alter the nature of the work the recreation leaders perform for the City of Safety Harbor. The statutory test set out in subsubsection 447.203(13)(a)4., Florida Statutes (1995), was met on this record....

...In this case, the Orlando City Commission is the public employer responsible for negotiating, in an adversary setting, a collective bargaining contract with the City's firefighters. Yet once a contract impasse occurs, the City Commission must put on its legislative hat because it is also the legislative body. Section 447.203(1), Florida Statutes....

...gaining agent for, among others, "graduate assistants" employed by the State University System at the University of Florida and the University of South Florida. UFF challenges the constitutionality of Chapter 81-305, Laws of Florida, now codified as Section 447.203(3)(i), Florida Statutes (1981) as a denial of the right to bargain collectively and the right to equal protection, both guaranteed by the Florida Constitution....

...Public Employees Relations Commission, 393 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In 1974, the legislature enacted Chapter 447, Part II, excluding a number of employee groups from the definition of "public employee," with no mention of graduate assistants. § 447.203(3), Fla....

...er, the bill never became law because it was vetoed by the governor. The exclusion of graduate assistants from the definition of "public employee" was revisited and passed in the 1981 session becoming Chapter 81-305, Laws of Florida, and codified as Section 447.203(3)(g), (h), and (i), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Thus, the Commission in its initial certification hearing concluded that graduate assistants were not only employees within the purview of Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution, they were also, in the absence of a specific statutory exception, "public employees" within the meaning of Section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1977) and entitled to all of the rights afforded other public employees under Chapter 447, Part II, Florida Statutes....

...ng rights to that group. Other, and more compelling state interests must be advanced and demonstrated. We hold that "graduate assistants" are employees within the normal and ordinary meaning of the word and that the inclusion of that category within Section 447.203(3)(i), Florida Statutes (1981) unconstitutionally denies graduate assistants the right to collectively bargain as guaranteed to all public employees by Article I, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution. We do not address whether the other groups listed in Section 447.203(3)(i) may be excluded from the right to collectively bargain, because the parties have limited their arguments to "graduate assistants" and have not presented us with record evidence from which we could determine their status as "employees" under Article I, Section 6. Accordingly, the term "graduate assistants" in Section 447.203(3)(i), Florida Statutes (1981) is hereby deleted....

...1978). PERC's order vacating certifications is hereby reversed to the extent that it affected the certification of UFF as bargaining agent for graduate assistants. JOANOS, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired), Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] 447.203 Definitions As used in this part: * * * * * * (3) "Public employee" means any person employed by a public employer except: (g) Those persons appointed to inspection positions in federal/state fruit and vegetable inspection service whose conditions of appointment are affected by the following: 1....

...n the State University system who perform part time work for the State University System. [2] Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida: Section 1. Legislative Intent It is the intent of the Legislature to exempt, by the provisions of s. 447.203(3)(g), Florida Statutes, fruit and vegetable inspection service appointees and by the provisions of 447.203(3)(h), Florida Statutes, persons employed by the Florida Public Relations Commission from the provisions of chapter 447, Florida Statutes, because: (1) All fruit and vegetable inspection appointees are required by the Federal Government to be...

...artment employees. The City claims that the captains and lieutenants are "managerial employees" [1] and "confidential employees" [2] and therefore are not entitled to the collective bargaining rights provided in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975). Section 447.203 provides definitions for "managerial" and "confidential" employees who are to be excluded from collective bargaining....

...We find no departure from the requirements of law in the Commission's order for a self determination election by the captains and lieutenants. [4] Accordingly, the petition for review is denied. ALDERMAN, C.J., and MAGER and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 447.203(4). [2] § 447.203(5)....

...certified as exclusive bargaining agent of attorneys employed by the State of Florida. The parties state, correctly, that PERC was required by law to dismiss the petition. [1] We affirm, but decline to reach the question of the constitutionality of section 447.203, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...state-employed attorneys. The supreme court denied that petition. State ex rel. Chiles v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 630 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1994). Thereafter, in the 1994 legislative session, the Florida Legislature passed an amendment to section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, excluding persons employed by the State in their capacity as members of The Florida Bar from those public employees entitled to engage in collective bargaining....

...issing the certification petition. The parties agree that PERC lacked the authority to decide the constitutionality of the statute, and was required to apply it in the manner below. However, they now ask this court to decide the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1st DCA), review denied mem., 494 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1986). Therefore, although we affirm PERC's decision to dismiss the petition for certification, we do so without prejudice to SEAG's right to seek a declaratory judgment in circuit court concerning the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he exclusion of those other groups, as to which no such record evidence had been supplied). AFFIRMED. ALLEN, J., and SMITH, Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] PERC was required to dismiss the petition because Chapter 94-89, Laws of Florida, codified at section 447.203(3)(j) (Supp....

...Having considered the merits of the joint motion, we exercise this Court's power and hereby withdraw the mandate and clarify the opinion previously published. The parties direct the court's attention to the holding in the case that "graduate assistants" are employees and as such are deleted from Section 447.203(3)(i), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...We agree that the opinion is susceptible of inconsistent application and, to eliminate the perceived obfuscation, do modify the final paragraph of the opinion to read as follows: Accordingly, the several categories of graduate students collectively and generically referred to as "graduate assistants" shall be deleted from Section 447.203(3)(i), Florida Statutes (1981) ( State ex rel....

...uted (the state). After a non-jury trial, the circuit court concluded that state employees working as attorneys have a "fundamental right to collectively bargain, as provided by Florida's Constitution, [which] is unconstitutionally infringed upon by Section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes." The state now appeals the final order and declaration embodying this conclusion....

...on of attorneys to the practice of law or the discipline of attorneys." State ex rel. Chiles v. PERC, 630 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla.1994). In the wake of the supreme court's decision, the Legislature enacted a new definitional provision, now codified as section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...lic employee ("any person employed by a public employer"), subsubsection (3)(j) excludes "[t]hose persons who by virtue of their positions of employment are regulated by the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to s. 15, Art. V of the State Constitution." § 447.203(3)(j), Fla....

...The new statutory provision took effect less than two months after the supreme court's decision in State ex rel. Chiles. Ch. 94-89, § 1, at 310, Laws of Fla. Following the decision in State ex rel Chiles, SEAG renewed its representation-certification petition, which PERC dismissed on the basis of then recently enacted section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...Noting the lack of a factual record in the PERC proceedings, see generally Rice v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 386 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we affirmed the dismissal "without prejudice to SEAG's right to seek a declaratory judgment in circuit court concerning the constitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)." SEAG, 653 So.2d at 489. Urging the unconstitutionality of section 447.203(3)(j), SEAG then filed suit in circuit court for declaratory judgment....

...Nor are they either supervisory, managerial or confidential employees. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 21 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1108. Managerial and confidential employees—who may be lawyers— are excluded from collective bargaining both in the private sector and in the public sector. § 447.203(4) & (5), Fla Stat....

...The right to bargain collectively is a "fundamental right." Hillsborough County G.E.A., 522 So.2d at 362. A statute abridging the right of state employees to bargain collectively is consonant with the constitution only if it vindicates a compelling state interest by minimally necessary means. Because section 447.203(3)(j) diminishes this fundamental right, the state must demonstrate that the statute can withstand strict scrutiny....

...These conclusions do not, however, obviate the need for judicial scrutiny. The trial court examined the statute independently to ascertain whether the committee staff's views, which reflect the state's position, were borne out. To that end, the trial court took evidence on whether section 447.203(3)(j) serves a compelling state interest and whether it does so by means least burdening state employees' rights to bargain collectively....

...fashioned to accommodate both the public employers' interests in assuring fidelity and competence in their attorneys and the attorneys' constitutional right as public employees to bargain collectively. We hold that the trial court correctly declared section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional....

...otion for partial summary judgment. Given the limited nature of the ruling, we conclude the question is now moot. The ruling logically limited what evidence would be admissible in deciding the principal question before the trial court, viz., whether section 447.203(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997), ran afoul of the state constitution in forbidding collective bargaining by any and all public employees working as attorneys....

...Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part. MAY and GERBER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] eSembler is a web-based software that allows teachers to submit their lesson plans online. [2] The Union is the certified bargaining agent for Indian River County teachers. § 447.203(8), (12) Fla....

...may have a cause of action not pleaded, the proper procedure is to enter the summary judgment with leave to amend.”) (citing Hart Props., Inc. v. Slack, 159 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1963)). 10  officer as defined in s. 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official. § 112.3187(6), Fla....

...Regarding whether the corrections officer made her report to an “appropriate local official,” the court wrote: Under Fla. Stat § 112.3187(6), an employee must report any incidents under this section to a “chief executive officer as defined in § 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official.” The plaintiff alleges she reported the incidents not to a chief executive officer but to her supervisors who are appropriate local officials....

...at 1246 (emphasis added). In the more recent case of Quintini v. Panama City Housing Authority, 102 So. 3d 688, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), the plaintiff, an employee of the housing agency for Panama City, made a report to the U.S. Department of 6 Section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes (2009), states: “‘Chief executive officer’ for the state shall mean the Governor and for other public employers shall mean the person, whether elected or appointed, who is responsible to the legislative body of the public employer for the administration of the governmental affairs of the public employer.” Rustowicz argues Director R was “a chief executive officer as defined in s. 447.203(9)” because he answered directly to the Board, which Rustowicz contends was the “legislative body of the public employer.” Because it is not necessary to do so to resolve this appeal, we do not address the merits of this argument....

...Id. Adopting the reasoning of the Attorney General, as well as the reasoning by the courts in Quintini and Burden, we hold that for protection under the Whistleblower Act, disclosures of wrongdoing by a local government entity must be made to either: (1) a chief executive officer, as defined in s. 447.203(9), Florida Statutes (2009); or (2) an official or official entity who is affiliated with the violating governmental entity and has the authority to investigate, police, manage, or otherwise remedy the violation...

...vance procedure. That is still a protected non-mandatory subject of bargaining and has been recognized as such by PERC in its order in AFSCME, Local 1363, 8 FPER ¶ 13278 and in its brief in the instant case. PERC's order points to the provisions of Section 447.203(14) which, while requiring the parties to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, provides that "neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession unless otherwise provided in this part." PERC's reliance upon this provision is misplaced....

...The Hernando Classroom Teachers Association [HCTA] is the officially recognized collective bargaining representative for a unit of school teachers employed by the School Board of Hernando County, Florida [Board], a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Florida Board of Regents, effective July 1, 2001, [1] and established new criteria for local Boards of Trustees at each state university, [2] effective *272 January 7, 2003. Ch. 02-387, §§ 3, 83, at 3152, 3236, Laws of Fla. The Legislature amended section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (2001), which set forth that "the Board of Regents shall be deemed to be the public employer with respect to all public employees within the State University System ..." by replacing the "Board of Regents" with the "university board of trustees" and prescribing that the individual boards would "be the public employer with respect to all public employees of the respective state university...." Ch. 02-387, § 1006, at 4129, Laws of Fla. Thus, section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides, in pertinent part, that: With respect to all public employees determined by the commission as properly belonging to a statewide bargaining unit composed of State Career Service System employees o...

...er 447 Florida Statutes. BE IT RESOLVED that it is the intent of the Board of Governors that the university boards of trustees shall be the sole public employer with respect to all public employees of the respective state universities as provided in s. 447.203(2) and (10) F.S....

...olution on constitutional grounds. According to the hearing officer, the issue did not raise disputed issues of material fact; however, the pleadings raised disputed issues of law. [5] In his legal analysis, the hearing officer concluded that, until section 447.203(2), which provides that the Boards of Trustees are to serve as the public employers of their respective universities, was repealed by the Legislature or judicially determined to be invalid or unconstitutional, PERC was bound by it....

...lic employer because the resolution granted that authority to the Boards of Trustees. Following the filing of appellant's exceptions to the recommended order, PERC issued its Order Dismissing Petitions. Therein, PERC found appellant's exception that section 447.203(2) was not controlling meritless and determined that the statute clearly and unambiguously set forth that the Boards of Trustees were deemed the public employers. PERC further determined that the statute was not qualified in any manner that would suggest that it pertained only to boards created by legislative fiat and not by constitutional amendment. PERC concluded that, until and unless section 447.203(2) was repealed or invalidated, it was bound to recognize the Boards of Trustees as the public employers, without distinction as to when or how those boards were created. In declining to address the constitutionality of the Board of Governors' resolution, PERC determined that the resolution was superfluous based upon section 447.203(2) and that any defect in the resolution would have no effect on the Boards of Trustees' public employer status. This appeal followed. In denying appellant's petitions, PERC relied solely upon section 447.203(2) and its provision that the Boards of Trustees are to serve as the public employers of their respective universities....

...Because the Board of Governors has addressed this issue, notwithstanding the fact that it reached the same conclusion as the Legislature did, the Legislature's pronouncement that the Boards of Trustees are to serve as the public employers of their respective universities is no longer enforceable. As such, section 447.203(2) cannot serve as the basis for PERC's denial of appellant's petitions. On appeal, the Board of Governors contends that, regardless of PERC's reliance on section 447.203(2) in denying appellant's petitions, it reached the correct result because the Board of Governors' action of designating the Boards of Trustees as the public employers of their respective universities constituted a legitimate exercise of constitutional authority....

...As the majority correctly notes, the dismissal of appellant's petitions to amend certifications pursuant to which appellant represented four statewide bargaining units of state university employees was based entirely on PERC's conclusion that language in section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (2002), specifying that "the university board of trustees shall be deemed to be the public employer with respect to all public employees of the respective state university [sic]" controlled and that, accordingly,...

...that representation be established through a vote of the bargaining unit members." Although I disagree somewhat with the analysis by which it arrived at its decision, I agree with the majority that PERC's initial conclusion regarding the portion of section 447.203(2) upon which it relied was erroneous....

...h became article IX, section 7, vested in the newly created Board of Governors of the State University System complete authority to "establish the powers and duties of the boards of trustees" called for by section 7(c). At that point, the portion of section 447.203(2) relied upon by PERC *276 (by which the legislature bestowed upon university boards of trustees the power to engage in collective bargaining with employees) became irreconcilable with, and was superceded by, the new constitutional provision....

...public employees of their respective universities. Where I find myself obliged to part company with the majority, however, is with regard to its ultimate decision to affirm PERC's order. I would, instead, reverse and remand for further proceedings. Section 447.203(2) defines a "public employer" in general as "the state or any county, municipality, or special district or any subdivision or agency thereof which the commission [i.e., PERC] determines has sufficient legal distinctiveness properly t...

...Prior decisions by PERC clearly demonstrate that it has recognized as much. See, e.g., Communication Workers of Am. v. Gainesville Hous. Auth., 14 F.P.E.R. ¶ 19046, at p. 114 (1988) (stating that, in determining whether an entity qualifies as a public employer for purposes of section 447.203(2), PERC considers the "powers" the entity possesses, "includ[ing] the authority to raise revenue by issuing bonds, to acquire property through exercise of the power of eminent domain, the ability to purchase and sell property, enter...

...Hillsborough County Bd. of Criminal Justice/Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dep't, 8 F.P.E.R. ¶ 13051, at p. 94 (1981) (examining the powers of the Hillsborough County Board of Criminal Justice, and concluding they were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 447.203(2) for a "public employer")....

...etermine whether those determinations are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See City of St. Augustine v. Prof'l Fire Fighters, 440 So.2d 416, 417-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (whether employees qualify as "managerial employees" for purposes of section 447.203(4) is a factual issue to be determined by PERC, and a reviewing court's role "is limited to a determination of whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the determination"); City of Winter Park v. Fla. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 349 So.2d 224, 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (same). Here, PERC made no factual determination regarding whether the boards of trustees satisfy the general definition of a "public employer" set out in section 447.203(2)....

...Defendants Peck, Shattler, and Buckley in their Official Capacities Defendants move to dismiss Peck, Shattler, and Buckley in their official capacities. Defendants refer to subsection 6 of Fl. St. § 112.3187 which requires that disclosures regarding a community college be made to a "chief executive officer as defined in § 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official"....

correctly applied the statutory criteria, section 447.203(4), (5), Florida Statutes, to those facts.

...We initially look to Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, in order to determine what authority PERC has to designate employees as managerial or confidential. Clearly, it must, at some point, make such a determination. The provisions of PERA apply only to public employees. (F.S. 447.03, 447.201) According to F.S. 447.203(3), "`public employee' means any person employed by a public employer except: ......

...447.307(2)) PERC has not formulated the equivalent of 8H-2.10 in situations where a petition is filed pursuant to F.S. 447.307(2), apparently feeling that F.S. 447.307(3) adequately describes the proper procedure. Essentially, PERC's position is that F.S. 447.203(3)(d) implicitly mandates that it do more than merely approve or reject a proposed bargaining unit in considering voluntary recognition petitions....

...The Court has therefore vacated, not simply as erroneously decided but as void for lack of power, a ruling made by the Commission in response to a School Board petition which explicitly sought determination of an essential matter committed to the Commission by § 447.203(3)(d), F.S. 1975. Commission Rule 8H-2.10, Fla.Adm.Code, which advances the purposes of §§ 447.203(3)(d) and 447.307(1), and which has survived legislative scrutiny under § 447.607,` [1] is also a casualty of the majority decision....

...77 their community of interest with those included. Sec. 447.307(4)(c), (f), F.S. The proposed bargaining unit may be found to include "managerial" or "confidential" employees, who plainly are excluded from labor's side of the bargaining table. Sec. 447.203(3)(d), (4), (5), F.S....

...loyed by a public employer except: ...... "(d) Those persons who are designated as managerial or confidential employees pursuant to criteria contained herein upon application of the public employer to the public employees relations commission." Sec. 447.203(3), F.S....

...be useful; the Rule simply identifies one occasion on which the Commission will surely be concerned with the subject and invites the employer, whose views might not otherwise be made known, to participate in the determination as contemplated by Sec. 447.203(3)(d), F.S....

...City of Jacksonville, 15 FPER ¶ 20327 (1989); IAFF, Local 2135 v. City of Ocala, 5 FPER ¶ 10252 (1979), aff'd, 394 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). I would therefore affirm the order under review as to both of the points on appeal. NOTES [1] Though the City was the employer, section 447.203(10), Florida Statutes provides that the "legislative body" for purposes of resolving an impasse, can be the governing body of a municipality....

...Section 447.501(1)(a) provides that, (1) Public employers or their agents or representatives are prohibited from: (a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing public employees in the exercise of any rights guaranteed them under this part. (Emphasis added.) "Public employee" is defined by section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, as any person employed by a public employer except appointed or elected persons, military employees, negotiating representatives, managerial or confidential employees, employees of the Florida Legislature, crimin...

...the Public Employees Relations Commission, and undergraduate state university students who conduct part-time work for the university. Contrary to PERC's finding, at the time of his application for rehire, Stanley was not a public employee within the section 447.203(3) definition....

...at 189. Under those facts, PERC held that the dismissal or discipline of a managerial employee violates section 447.501(1)(a) when it indicates restraint and coercion of employees who are public employees under Chapter 447, Part II. Id. at 193; see also § 447.203(3)(d), Fla....

...federal claims. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138-1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218, 227-29 (1966). II. LAW A. State Law Claim Under Pendent Jurisdiction. In 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted session law 76-39, amending Fla.Stat. *1338 § 447.203 by adding subsection (3)(f) to expressly exclude state inmates from the definition of "public employee." The amendment became effective on May 31, 1976, upon the Governor's approval....

...Campbell, 285 So.2d 62, 63 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1973). An amendment to the specific state statute by which pendent jurisdiction is invoked (the Florida PERA, Fla.Stat. § 447.201 et seq. ) was involved in the decision of Miami-Dade Community Coll. v. PERC, 341 So.2d 1054 (1st D.C.A.Fla.1977). Section 447.203 of the PERA, as originally enacted in 1974, and as it became effective on January 1, 1975, established a three-part, disjunctive definition of `managerial employees.' Managerial employees, are expressly excluded from the definition of `public employees' under the PERA....

...at 1056. The present case is an even stronger instance of the controlling effect of a change in statutory law upon a pending case. When this case was commenced, state inmates were not mentioned in the PERA's definition of `public employees.' Fla.Stat. § 447.203(3) (Supp.1975)....

...der the statute, and (2) if the inmates were in any sense `employed by' the prisons. In 1976, however, the Florida legislature unmistakably expressed its intent to exclude state inmates from the *1339 PERA's coverage for public employees, Fla. Stat. § 447.203(3)(f) (Supp.1976)....

...§ 447.201 (Supp.1976) provides in pertinent part: It is declared that the public policy of the state, and the purpose of this part, is to provide statutory implementation of Section 6, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Florida ... [4] Fla.Stat. § 447.203(3) (Supp.1975) provided: (3) "Public employee" means any person, employed by a public employer except: (a) Those persons appointed by the governor or elected by the people, agency heads, members of boards and commissions....

...(c) Those individuals acting as negotiating representatives for employer authorities. (d) Those persons who are designated as managerial or confidential employees pursuant to criteria contained herein upon application of the public employer to the public employees relations commission. [5] Fla.Stat. § 447.203(3)(f) (Supp.1976) provides: (3) "Public employee" means any person, employed by a public employer except: * * * * * * (f) Those persons who have been convicted of a crime and are inmates confined to institutions within the state.

...erially less than fifteen cents per page. In a quasi-judicial hearing before the Commission conducted pursuant to section 447.207(6) of the Florida Statutes (2005), Local 3178 argued that by charging a fee greater than actual cost, the City violated section 447.203(17), Florida Statutes (2005), which includes among a non-exclusive list of indicia of bad faith bargaining by an employer, "(d) Refusing, upon reasonable written request, to provide public information, excluding work products as defined in s. 447.605." § 447.203(17)(d), Fla....

...elation to Chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes. We also reject the Commission's argument that because a collective bargaining agent can obtain records for its purposes that may not be available to the general public, all records obtained pursuant to section 447.203(17)(d), Florida Statutes are not exclusively "public records" within the contemplation of Chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes, thus making it illogical to apply Chapter 119 to records so sought....

...the statutory maximum established by the legislature to be paid by all citizens of this state if it desires copies courtesy of the provider. In reaching a contrary conclusion, we believe the Commission errs by conflating convenience with obligation. Section 447.203(17)(d) only obligates a public employer to "provide public information" — that is, lay it on the table for inspection and use by the bargaining agent....

...We do not question the assertion that analysis by Local 3178 of the requested documents would be accomplished more comfortably in their own offices than at City Hall. However, Florida law does not require the City insure Local 3178's creature comforts. Florida law requires only that relevant information be provided. § 447.203(17)(d)....

..., it is apparent that except in the advocate's eye of the Commission, there is no conflict between Chapter 447 and Chapter 119 with respect to the cost of providing public records. The public employer's obligation to provide public information under section 447.203(17)(d) and the statutory obligation to pay for copies under section 119.07(4) can be readily harmonized....

...1st DCA 1979); City of Winter Park v. PERC, 349 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, whether employees in a particular case are managerial is a factual matter to be determined by an examination of their duties and responsibilities *418 and the criteria listed in section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1981). Once this determination is made by PERC, our authority is limited to a determination of whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the determination. Section 447.203(4) prescribes the criteria for managerial employees as follows: "Managerial employees" are those employees who: (a) Perform jobs that are not of a routine, clerical, or ministerial nature and require the exercise of independent judgme...

...ployee. While the chief or city manager may countermand such action, this would be done only in rare circumstances. Clearly the duties and operating procedures of the St. Augustine Fire Department bring the captains within subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of section 447.203(4)(a). In addition, paragraph (b) of section 447.203(4) which specifically recognizes that firefighters may be managerial employees directs PERC to consider the paramilitary organizational structure of the department and permits the consideration of historic relationships of the employee to the public employer and to co-employees....

...We have for review Service Employees International Union v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 720 So.2d 290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), wherein the district court certified the following question: Are deputy court clerks, unlike deputy sheriffs, public employees within the contemplation of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes? Service Employees, 270 So.2d at 291 (capitals omitted)....

...gainst strikes by public employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition. § 447.201, Fla.Stat. (1997). The Act established PERC and set forth a procedural framework governing collective bargaining practices for public employees. Section 447.203 defines the term "public employee" broadly as "any person employed by a public employer." The section then sets forth an exhaustive list of exceptions....

...ed form over substance in contravention of the plain language and broad purpose of the Act. The fact that deputy sheriffs are said to be "appointed" rather than "employed" is of little import under chapter 447—the definition of "public employee" in section 447.203(3) draws no such distinction....

...n language of chapter 447 controls and applies across the board to all public workers, regardless of job title. The abiding bright line for determining coverage under part II is the simple "public employee/managerial employee" dichotomy set forth in section 447.203. If an individual works as an employee in the ordinary sense of the word under the criteria set forth in section 447.203(3), he or she is entitled to the protections of part II. On the other hand, if an individual works as a managerial level employee under the criteria set forth in section 447.203(4) or falls *574 within any of the other exceptions listed in section 447.203(3), the protections of part II are inapplicable....

...termination was either Court Specialist V or Clerk V. The present record does not disclose the nature of her duties. Accordingly, we return this case to PERC to determine whether O'Brien worked as an employee in the ordinary sense of the word under section 447.203(3) or as a managerial level employee....

...NOTES [1] The record is unclear as to O'Brien's exact job title. [2] See Ch. 74-100, Laws of Fla. [3] See, e.g., Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Florida Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So.2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997). [4] Section 447.203 provides in relevant part: 447.203 Definitions.—As used in this part: ....

...Work of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; and 4. Work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.... § 447.203, Fla.Stat....

...g the payment of step pay increases to employees during the pendency of negotiations between the school board and Sarasota Classified/Teachers Association (CTA). We reverse. The Sarasota County School Board is a public employer within the meaning of section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (1989). It is also a legislative body as defined by section 447.203(10), Florida Statutes (1989). The Sarasota Classified/Teachers Association is an employee organization within the meaning of section 447.203(11), Florida Statutes (1989), and is, and has been for many years, the certified bargaining agent for the school board's classified and instructional employees' bargaining units....

...See Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1969). Chapter 447, Part II, Florida Statutes (1989), implements this right and sets forth the procedures to be followed in bargaining. As mentioned above, the school board is a public employer pursuant to section 447.203(2) and it is also a legislative body under section 447.203(10). CTA is an employee *1147 organization within the meaning of section 447.203(11) and is the certified bargaining agent for the school board's classified and instructional employees' bargaining units....

of four additional employees, contending that § 447.203(5), Florida Statutes, compels exclusion of the

...sifications of firefighter/EMT/paramedic and lieutenant, and "on-call" volunteer firefighters. The Commission excluded the "part-time" volunteers from the defined bargaining unit concluding that they were not "public employees" within the meaning of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, for purposes of collective bargaining....

...The City also alleges that the Commission improperly excluded "part-time" volunteers from the defined bargaining unit. We disagree. Determination of whether certain employees are to be included or excluded from a collective bargaining unit pursuant to section 447.203, Florida Statutes, involves a factual determination as to whether certain employees fall within the statutory categories or not....

...Our review of the record confirms the existence of competent substantial evidence that "part-time" volunteers were properly excluded from the defined bargaining unit pursuant to the Commission's determination that "part-time" volunteers do not meet the definition of "public employee" under section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes....

...he defined bargaining unit and consequently, the voters were not deprived of a free and fair choice in the election. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's final agency action. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The City is a public employer within the meaning of section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

employee organization within the meaning of section 447.203(11), Florida Statutes (1983), is not challenged

...As to attorney's fees on appeal, since my view is that appellee's position should substantially prevail, I would grant attorney's fees. NOTES [1] All statutory references will be to Florida Statutes (1983) unless otherwise indicated. [2] The commission's finding that SPALC is an employee organization within the meaning of section 447.203(11), Florida Statutes (1983), is not challenged on appeal....

managerial employees within the meaning of Section 447.203(4), Florida Statutes (1981), and thus excluded

that Order correctly interprets Florida Statute § 447.-203(5) as requiring a factual determination as to

noted that under the definition of “strike” in § 447.203(6), Florida Statutes (1975), some sort of withholding

...The criteria for determining whether an entity is a public employer for labor relations purposes are different than those used to determine whether a private entity is primarily acting on behalf of a public agency for purposes of sovereign immunity. Compare § 447.203(2), Fla....

...s a proper finding. The circuit court focused on the fact that section 447.605(2) requires collective bargaining to be conducted in the sunshine when negotiations involve a “bargaining agent.” Considering the definition of bargaining agent in section 447.203(12), Florida Statutes (2013), the circuit court found that it included more than just PERC-certified bargaining agents as it also included the certified entities’ “representative.” Thus, the fact that the Board had not been f...

Section 6 of the Florida Constitution and section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes. The starting point of

designation could not be stipulated to under Section 447.203(3)(d).3 PERC found however there was nothing

...section 775.15(12)(b). We understand the term “public employee” in its plain and ordinary sense to include public school teachers. This plain-language interpretation is consistent with the understanding reflected in other sources of law. See § 447.203(2)-(3), Fla....

not managerial employees under Florida Statutes § 447.203(4) is contrary to the facts, inter alia, that

managerial employee within the meaning of Section 447.203(4),1 Florida Statutes (1979), and that certain

persons in a defined "bargaining unit" under section 447.203(8), Florida Statutes? You indicate that the

of "chief executive officer" contained in section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes, need not be interpreted

defined in [section] 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official.” Id. Section 447.203(9) provides

of public employees under the provisions of section 447.203(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2001), and are excluded

...tition which sought to represent, for the purpose of collective bargaining, a unit of assistant principals and vice principals employed by the School Board of Miami-Dade County. We affirm and decline to reach the question of the constitutionality of section 447.203, Florida Statutes (2001) or section 228.041, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...PERC found the petition was sufficient and assigned a hearing officer. After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued a recommended order, concluding that the assistant principals met the criteria of managerial employees and administrative personnel as defined in section 447.203(4)(a) and section 228.041(10), respectively, and were, therefore, precluded from collective bargaining....

...PERC adopted the hearing officer's recommended order and issued a final order dismissing the petition, finding that the proposed unit was inappropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining because the unit remained managerial pursuant to their job duties and responsibilities under sections 447.203(4)(a)6. and 228.041(10), and the managerial status that is specific to the school district personnel found in section 447.203(4)(a)6....

...The parties agree that the hearing officer's recommended order is supported by competent substantial evidence. Because the statutes at issue were construed in a manner against its interest, Local 77 now seeks a constitutional interpretation of sections 447.203(4)(a)6....

...Florida Department of Insurance, 485 So.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). Accordingly, we affirm PERC's order dismissing the petition for certification without prejudice to Local 77's right to seek a declaratory judgment in circuit court concerning the constitutionality of sections 447.203(4)(a)6....

employer in collective bargaining negotiations. § 447.203(2), Fla. Stat. As part of the statute, § 447

to a chief executive officer as defined in section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes,2 or "other appropriate

to a chief executive officer as defined in section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes,5 or "other appropriate

terms of said presumptively valid statute. Section 447.203(2), F.S. (1974 Supp.), created by Ch. 74-100

made to a “chief executive officer as defined in § 447.203(9) or other appropriate local official”. Defendants

defined in Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (1975). Section 447.203(2), Florida Statutes (1975), defines a public

College are managerial employees as defined in Section 447.-203(4), Florida Statutes (1976). At the time the

to its “legislative body” for resolution. Section 447.-203(10) defines legislative body specifically

the pending collective bargaining issues. Section 447.203(9) of Part II, Chapter 447, Florida Statutes

managerial employees within the meaning of F.S. 447.-203(4). We agree and affirm PERC’s order. For an

definition of “confidential employees” in section 447.203(5), Florida Statutes (1977): There is no need

not public employees within the meaning of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm. In

...*1519 Plaintiff FOP apparently is included among the plaintiff class in Sikes, too. The district court in Sikes first held that under NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), [1] it is bound by the Supreme Court of Florida's construction of Section 447.203(3) [2] in Murphy v. Mack, 358 So.2d 822 (Fla.1978). In Murphy, the supreme court thoroughly analyzed the history and prior judicial interpretation of Section 447.203(3), and concluded that a deputy sheriff is an "appointee," and not a "public employee." Id....

...serves as a basis for later injunctive relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee note. Factually, Sikes can easily be defined as a (b)(2) class action. The FPBA in Sikes sought a declaratory judgment that the supreme court's interpretation of § 447.203 (denying deputy sheriffs `employee' status) was unconstitutional, and an order to permanently enjoin the Florida Public Employees Relations Committee from enforcing the supreme court's interpretation....

...Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 10th day of February, 1984. NOTES [1] Button holds that a federal court is bound by the interpretation placed on a state statute by the highest court of the state. [2] Section 447.203(3) provides: "Public employee" means any person employed by a public employer except: (a) Those persons appointed by the Governor or elected by the people, agency heads, and members of boards and commissions....

...graduate teaching associates, graduate research assistants, or graduate research associates and those persons enrolled as undergraduate students in the State University System who perform part-time work for the State University System. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 447.203(3) (West Supp.1983)....

to a chief executive officer as defined in section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes,4 or "other appropriate

to a chief executive officer as defined in section 447.203(9), Florida Statutes, 6 or "other appropriate

collective bargaining through a labor union. Section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1981). There are, of course

bargaining shall be exempt from s. 286.011. (e.s.) Section 447.203(9) of Part II, Ch. 447, provides a definition

...FOP refused to submit the resulting collective bargaining agreement to its members. Instead it filed an Unfair Labor Practice charge with PERC alleging the Sheriff failed to submit the impasse issues to the Pasco County Board of County Commissioners ("Board") as the appropriate legislative body. PERC concluded that under section 447.203(10), Florida Statutes, the Board is the appropriate legislative body to resolve the impasse between FOP and the Sheriff, and ordered the Sheriff to submit the impasse issues to the Board. Section 447.203 defines "legislative body" in pertinent part as follows: "Legislative body" means the State Legislature, the board of county commissioners, the district school board, the governing body of a municipality, or the governing body of an instrumentality or unit of government having authority to appropriate funds and establish policy governing the terms and conditions of employment and which, as the case may be, is the appropriate legislative body for the bargaining unit. § 447.203(10), Fla....

...Further the Board appropriates the funds for the Sheriff's Office. While the Sheriff has the right to appeal certain budget decisions of the Board to the Florida Administration Commission, appeal rights do not equate to appropriations authority. It is clear the Legislature defined "legislative body" in section 447.203(10) so as to ensure the entity resolving collective bargaining impasse issues is the entity with authority to fund the resulting collective bargaining agreement....

...And see Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 683 (1989) (defining "legislative" as "belonging to the branch of government that is charged with such powers as making laws, levying and collecting taxes, and making financial appropriations"). *1075 Thus PERC's interpretation of section 447.203(10) is not erroneous....

determining “managerial employees” are set out in section 447.-203(4), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

independent judgment in the performance of the job. § 447.203(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Among those kinds of managerial

redetermination in light of the amendment of Section 447.203, Fla.Stat., and petitioner having filed no

and SMITH and WENT-WORTH, JJ., concur. . Section 447.203(4)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, prescribes

employee within the meaning and application of Section 447.203(5), Florida Statutes (1977). We decline to

managerial or confidential employees under section 447.203, Florida Statutes (1979). PERC’s order also

arguments, supra, require consideration of section 447.203(14), Florida Statutes, requiring parties engaged

this case is the board of directors of HART. See § 447.203(10).

Petersburg Junior College is, as defined by Section 447.203(2), a public employer and a public employer

“managerial” employees as defined in Fla.Stat. § 447.-203(4) as amended in 1976. Respondent PERC asserts

in denying employee attorney’s fees under section 447.203(3)(e), Florida Statutes where employee had