Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...final agency action, but does not alter the nature of that action. In so holding, we agree with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Griffin v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 409 So.2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (discussing section 373.617 (1979), which is identical to sections 253.763(2) and 403.90(2), Florida Statutes (1981).) We note, however, that DER's denial of the permit must be based on the merits of the application before direct access to the circuit court is available....

...tion. Pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the circuit court erred in failing to resolve the inverse condemnation issue. The district court remanded the cause for further proceedings pursuant to section 373.617, Florida Statutes (1981), and the remainder of the circuit court's order was affirmed....

...ction is confiscatory and constitutes a taking without just compensation, in which event the action of the board must be stricken. A denial of rezoning cannot be both reasonable and confiscatory. We also hold that the district court's application of section 373.617 to the facts of this case was erroneous. Section 373.617(2) provides a method of judicial review of final action of any agency with respect to a permit. A "permit" is defined to mean "any permit or license required by this chapter." See § 373.617(1)(b). "Agency" is defined to mean "any official, officer, commission, authority, council, committee, department, division, bureau, board, section, or other unit or entity of state government." See § 373.617(1)(a)....

...permits are subject to the circuit court action established by the act. R. Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 75-85, Laws of Florida, 52 Fla.B.J. 741, 743 (1978) (footnotes omitted). The district court has clearly attempted to add to section 373.617 in order to make it cover a situation which is not within the meaning of the legislation....

...A final order is one which does not contemplate further judicial labor. McGurn v. Scott, 596 So.2d 1042 (Fla.1992). The instant order expressly contemplated further judicial labor when it remanded the matter to St. Johns Water Management District for further action pursuant to subsection 373.617(3), Florida Statutes....

...If the agency fails to submit a proposed order within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days which specifies an action that is a reasonable exercise of police power, the court may order the agency to perform any of the alternatives specified in subsection (3). § 373.617(4), Fla....

...permit denial by the Governor and the Cabinet sitting as the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, pursuant to section 373.114, Florida Statutes (1979); and further, that he would seek review of the agency action in the circuit court, pursuant to section 373.617, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...dministrative remedy" by completing the administrative appeal at the cabinet level. For the reasons stated herein, we dismiss this appeal. In Griffin's behalf we note with concern the complexity of the provisions in Chapter 373 dealing with appeals. Section 373.617, Florida Statutes (1979) provides: (2) Any person substantially affected by a final action of any agency with respect to a permit may seek review within 90 days of the rendering of such decision and request monetary damages and other...

...Some courts have also held that an issue, like "unjust taking" of property, must be raised in the Chapter 120 appeal before it can be raised in the circuit court. Coulter. However, none of these cases consider the later applicable statutes, section 253.763 or section 373.617....

...So long as one adequate method is established, due process does not require that the courts provide another, [2] and the statutory method should be followed. Fla. Welding & Erection Service, Inc. v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 285 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1973). Section 373.617(2) clearly sets up a bifurcated appeal procedure, both avenues of which must be pursued simultaneously because of the time deadlines....

...s or acted on competent substantial evidence, it must perfect its appeal in accordance with section 120.68. If it claims the agency action constitutes an "unconstitutional taking" of property, it must file an action in the circuit court, pursuant to section 373.617(2)....

...We reject the concept that the "taking" issue should first be raised and determined in the District Courts of Appeal under this statute. If that was done, at worst it would bar consideration of this issue by the circuit court on principles of res judicata thereby defeating the bifurcated appeal provision of section 373.617(2), and at best it would result in an "administrative morass" of undue proportions. [4] Therefore, we conclude that the portion of this appeal dealing with the "taking issue" should be dismissed without prejudice to appeal from the circuit court after conclusion of its efforts under section 373.617(2)....

...Johns had effected a taking of Mr. Koontz’s property, statutory law required St. Johns to take one of three possible actions: (a) agree to issue the permit; (b) agree to pay damages; or (c) agree to modify its decision to avoid an unreasonable exercise of police power. See § 373.617(3), Fla....

...Koontz $876,154 for a temporary taking of his property by St. Johns. On appeal, St. Johns first contended that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Koontz’s exac-tions claim because the statute under which the claim was asserted, section 373.617, Florida Statutes (1993), limited circuit court review to cases in which a constitutional taking has actually occurred. See Koontz IV, 5 So.3d at 10 . St. Johns asserted that although an exactions claim is a form of taking and is cognizable under section 373.617, no exaction occurred here because nothing had been taken from Mr....

...The District makes no challenge to the evidentiary foundation for these factual findings. Instead, it advances arguments directed to the trial court's jurisdiction and the legal viability of Mr. Koontz's claim. The District argues that the lower court never had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. Koontz's claim because section 373.617(2), Florida Statutes, the statute under which Mr....

...ional tests applicable to the Koontz property. [4] The District urged that Mr. Koontz had suffered no damage at all because his property had more than tripled in value during the eleven years. [5] See Town of Flower Mound, 135 S.W.3d at 630. [6] See § 373.617(2), Fla....

So.2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (discussing section 373.617 (1979), which is identical to sections 253

to rule on the inverse condemnation issue. Section 373.-617(2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that

...The amended final judgment is fully set forth in the appendix to this opinion. The first time this cause appeared before this court it was remanded for lack of finality to enable the trial court to issue a final judgment and to address the applicability of section 373.617, Florida Statutes, raised as an issue in count V of Womack's complaint....

...THE LITIGATION Womack did not appeal the District's final denial. Instead, he filed suit in circuit court alleging the District's action violated his equal protection and substantive due process rights, resulting in a temporary and permanent inverse condemnation of his land, and violated section 373.617, Florida Statutes....

...just compensation shall be decided in the favor of the St. John's Water District. The Plaintiff failed to show by the preponderance of the evidence that Womack should prevail on this Count. 39. Count V, a cause of action based upon Florida Statutes 373.617 shall be in favor of St....

...of the state law arguments that it declined to decide. Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2597 . We rejected that argument in Koontz I and Koontz TV, albeit without much elaboration. The decision in Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. preceded the enactment of section 373.617, Florida Statutes, and its predecessor....