CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 393, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1026, 2009 WL 1955233
...ition of business damages if the total tak *979 ing (as opposed to a partial taking) resulted in a lower bottom line. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
532 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla.1988) (upholding the constitutionality of section
337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985))....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 110108
...Phillips, Jr., Palm Harbor, for appellees-respondents. KOGAN, Justice. We have for review the Second District Court of Appeal opinion in Department of Transportation v. Fortune Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n,
507 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), in which section
337.27(3), Florida Statute (1985) was held invalid. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The district court also certified the following question to this Court as one of great public importance: Whether section
337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985), which limits acquisition costs in eminent domain cases by allowing the state to condemn more property than is necessary to implement a valid public purpose, contravenes the Florida Constitution? Id. at 1178. Because we see the central issue before this Court differently than did the district court, we deem it necessary to restate the certified question as follows: Whether the public purpose of limiting acquisition costs under section
337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985), which allows the state to condemn more property than is presently needed where it would cost more to condemn only part of the property, contravenes the Florida Constitution? As restated, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the opinion of the district court....
...At the hearing conducted pursuant to DOT's eminent domain petition, testimony indicated that if only a portion of the property were taken, Fortune would be entitled to $2,000,000 in business damages under section
73.071(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). DOT attempted to invoke section
337.27(3) which allows the state agency to take an entire parcel of land when it would cost the state less money than if only part of the tract were taken....
...ct of land. The trial court granted only the petition for the taking of that portion of the tract needed by DOT to complete its project. It did not reach the constitutional issues raised by Fortune. On appeal the Second District Court of Appeal held section 337.27(3) unconstitutional as allowing a taking without a valid public purpose....
...This provision entitles Fortune to recover $2,000,000 in damages if DOT is permitted to take only part of the property. If DOT takes the entire parcel, Fortune is not entitled to business damages under the statute. The statute under scrutiny here, section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985), permits the state agency to condemn more property than is necessary when the state agency saves money by doing so....
...This subsection shall be construed as a specific recognition by the Legislature that this means of limiting the rising costs to the state of property acquisition is a public purpose and that, without this limitation, the viability of many public projects will be threatened. § 337.27(3), Fla....
...Brevard County Educational Facilities Authority,
247 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1971); State v. Reedy Creek Improvement District,
216 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1968); State v. Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District,
89 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1956). Thus, the legislature's statement that section
337.27(3) reflects the public purpose of limiting property acquisition costs must be upheld unless that purpose is beyond the power of the legislature and is clearly erroneous. In attempting to show that section
337.27(3) has no valid public purpose, Fortune argues that it is improper to require one private business to finance a *1270 public project, and thus reducing property acquisition costs at the expense of one business is beyond the power of the legislature....
...In any event, Fortune has certainly not shown that the property will be privately used. Accordingly, because Fortune has not sustained its burden of demonstrating that the public purpose stated by the legislature is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and unfounded, we uphold the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 289, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 402, 1988 WL 6398
...[2] DOT's powers in regard to the acquisition of real property are moreover set forth in Section
337.25, Florida Statutes (authorizing it to acquire, lease, and dispose of real and personal property), section
337.26 (empowering it to execute instruments of sale, leases or conveyances), section
337.27 (permitting it to exercise its power of eminent domain by condemning all necessary lands and property for the purpose of securing transportation rights of way, including borrow pits, drainage ditches, and water retention areas), and section
337.271 (enabling it to enter into negotiations for the acquisition of property)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 611, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1637, 1992 WL 275893
...against the agency asserting the power."
159 Fla. at 314,
31 So.2d at 485. Thus, it is only through another specific legislative grant that the DOT and the counties are authorized to acquire land in its entirety in order to reduce acquisition costs. Section
337.27(1), Florida Statutes (1989), vests in the DOT the power of eminent domain to secure transportation rights-of-way, while section
337.27(2) authorizes the DOT to acquire the land in its entirety if by doing so the acquisition cost will be less than the cost of acquiring only a portion of the property. The legislature granted these same powers to counties by expressly authorizing counties to exercise those powers granted to the DOT under subsections
337.27(1) and (2)....
...ietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. [4] Section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1989), authorizes the DOT to acquire an entire tract of land if the acquisition costs will be equal to or less than the costs of acquiring a portion of the property....
...The absolute fee simple title to all property so taken and acquired shall vest in such municipal corporation unless the municipality seeks to condemn a particular right or estate in such property. (2) Each municipality is further authorized to exercise the eminent domain powers granted to the Department of Transportation in s. 337.27(1) and the transportation corridor protection provisions of s. 337.273. The legislature has since amended the municipal eminent domain statute to expressly permit municipalities to exercise those powers granted the DOT under section 337.27(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...May 29, 1987. *1173 Franz Eric Dorn and A.J. Spalla, Tallahassee, for appellant. Charles M. Phillips, Jr., Clearwater, for appellee Fortune Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. We are here concerned with the constitutionality of section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985)....
...d the difference between the value of the .508 acres alone and the value of the entire tract. The FDOT's right-of-way administrator also testified that the bank's business damages would exceed the total value of the property. He testified that under section 337.271, Florida Statutes (1985), the FDOT was required to negotiate business damage claims with the landowner. He testified that a "whole take" pursuant to section 337.27(3) was justified because the "acquisition costs to the department would be equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the property." The trial court, in denying the FDOT's proposed "whole take," ruled that business damages were not a part of the "acquisition costs" mentioned in section 337.27(3) and that for section 337.27(3) to be applicable the direct cost of the land itself for the part taken plus severance damages must exceed the value of the whole tract of land....
...The trial court issued the following findings of facts and conclusions of law: [T]he FDOT did not proceed in its attempt to take the entire parent tract, including Tract 1 and Tract 2, on the basis of necessity of the entire tract for construction of the project, but relied solely upon § 337.27(3) as the basis for the taking. The pertinent portion of § 337.27(3), enacted in 1984, is: In the acquisition of lands and property, the Department may acquire an entire lot, block or tract of land, if, by doing so, the acquisition costs to the Department be equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the property....
...The entire parent tract includes Tract 2, which the FDOT admits unnecessary for construction of the project or any purpose of the FDOT. The statute submitted to the Court's scrutiny by the pleadings of the parties, their presentations at the Order of Taking hearing, and their briefs filed with the Court is § 337.27(3), enacted in 1984....
...Accordingly, the contention of FDOT counsel that "acquisition costs of lands and property" in §
73.071(3)(b), is unwarranted, is unsupported in law, and is not suggested by the text of either statute. To conclude otherwise would be to allow one statute (§
337.27(3)) to repeal or amend another statute (§
73.071(3)(b)) by implication, contrary to law, since nowhere in the text of the " property acquisition " statute is the " special damage " statute mentioned....
...The Supreme Court found that the statute constituted unconstitutional taking of property without compensation, and denial of due process. It would appear that the positions of the defendant in the case at bar on the subject of constitutionality of § 337.27(3) may well have merit, particularly in that the FDOT admitted that there is no necessity for the taking of Tract 2, and no use of the land embraced therein is proposed by the FDOT, and further, that the language of the statutory section ma...
...It may well be a public benefit to lessen the cost of acquiring property for public improvement, but depriving the land owner of full compensation for the land taken is not a proper public purpose. While the trial judge made a laudable attempt to hold section 337.27(3) constitutional by construing "acquisition costs" as excluding business damages, the trial judge misconstrued the statute. As evidenced by the language of section 337.27(3) and by the staff analysis and economic impact statement, the legislature clearly intended to limit the state's costs in partial taking situations. Section 337.27(3) allows the FDOT to take an entire parcel of land where the cost of a partial take would exceed the cost of a whole take....
...probable damages to such business which the denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause; any person claiming the right to recover such special damages shall set forth in his written defenses the nature and extent of such damages. Section 337.27(3) attempts to limit the state's expenses in exercising its eminent domain power by allowing the state to take an entire parcel of land where the acquisition costs of a partial take would exceed the cost of a whole take....
...ct costs might consist of draining or filling, or construction of access or protective structures, which would be necessary if only the smaller tract were taken, but which would be made unnecessary by acquisition of the entire parent tract." Reading section 337.27(3) in pari materia with section 337.271, Florida Statutes (1985), leads one to the inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended to include business damages within the definition of "acquisition costs." The title of Chapter 337 is: "Contracting; Acquisition, Disposal, and Use of Property." Section 337.27(3) is entitled: "Exercise of power of eminent domain by department; procedure; title; cost." Section 337.27(3) discusses the "acquisition of lands and property" and the limiting of "acquisition costs." Section 337.271, entitled "Negotiations for Acquisitions," outlines the procedure for claiming business damages. Because the legislature includes business damages under negotiations for acquisition, we conclude that business damages constitute part of "acquisition costs." Thus, section 337.27(3) would seem to allow a "whole" take where acquisition costs, including business damages, of a partial take would exceed a "whole" take....
...e for which it is being acquired." State Dept. of Natural *1178 Resources v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp.,
363 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Canal Authority v. Miller,
243 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1970); Dade County v. Paxson,
270 So.2d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Section
337.27(3) appears to be the legislature's attempt to limit acquisition costs in eminent domain cases by allowing a "whole" take when it is cheaper than a partial take with business damages....
...The FDOT only requires Tract 1 and that is the only property that the FDOT may take constitutionally. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's holding granting a partial taking and denying the FDOT's request for a "whole take" of appellee's property. We also hold unconstitutional section 337.27(3), Florida Statutes (1985). Because of the nature of our holding and the obvious fact that this question will be raised again, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 337.27(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), WHICH LIMITS ACQUISITION COSTS IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO CONDEMN MORE PROPERTY THAN IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT A VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE, CONTRAVENES THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? Affirmed....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 11739, 2000 WL 1299286
...Conform to the Evidence and Motion for Whole Take. DOT took the position that, if the jury's determination of the value of the whole property was equal to or less than the "acquisition costs" of the partial taking, DOT would seek a whole take under section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...of Transp. v. Robbins & Robbins, Inc.,
700 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur. NOTES [1] We note that section
337.27(2) was repealed, effective January 1, 2000....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 329456
...Michelle, Inc. WARNER, Judge. In this eminent domain case, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") challenges a trial court order denying a "quick take" of a parcel of property in its entirety. DOT had sought condemnation of the entire parcel under section 337.27(2), Florida Statutes (1995), on the ground that a partial taking of the property would increase acquisition costs....
...A partial taking of the building would bisect the building, leaving approximately 860 feet of the 2,500 foot building available. Because of the severity of the effects of the partial taking, DOT analyzed whether a condemnation of the whole property under the authority of section 337.27(2) and Department of Transportation v....
...acquisition costs of a partial taking, these issues involve elements of compensation. Therefore, pursuant to section
73.071(3), Florida Statutes (1995), jury resolution of compensation issues is required. Thus, the court denied the order of taking. Section
337.27(2) provides as follows: In the acquisition of lands and property, the department may acquire an entire lot, block, or tract of land if, by doing so, the acquisition costs to the department will be equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the property....
...Pursuant to Bunch, DOT bears the initial burden to show the reasonable necessity of the taking. In the instant case, DOT showed the reasonable necessity of the taking by presenting the testimony of the engineers on the road project. It further proved the public purpose, consistent with the section 337.27(2) directive to reduce acquisition costs, by providing the testimony of appraisers and business accountants....
...a condemnation before the matter reaches the jury. These matters are issues of necessity and public purpose which are determined by the judge. While appellees claim that the cost of acquisition is a compensation issue, we disagree in the context of section 337.27 and conclude that it is an issue of necessity and public purpose....
...establish the value of property rights and is thus not a finding of just compensation. Therefore, it follows that there is no conflict with section
73.071(1) in ordering a quick taking. The trial court's conclusions as to the issues presented under section
337.27 constitute a determination solely as to whether the condemnation will *243 amount to a total taking of the parcel or a partial taking only....
...[3] Because this issue may affect condemnation proceedings across the entire state, we deem it a question of great public importance, and one whose answer is necessitated as a necessary corollary of Fortune Federal. We therefore certify the following question: WHERE CONDEMNATION UNDER SECTION
337.27(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS REQUESTED, AND THE PROPERTY OWNER DISPUTES THE RELATIVE VALUES OF A WHOLE TAKE OVER A PARTIAL TAKE, MAY A TRIAL COURT DENY A QUICK TAKING UNDER SECTION
74.031, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND DEFER THE QUESTION OF THE EX...
...ed by the condemnation of the entire parcel was resolved by a jury impaneled to determine the value of that property pursuant to section
73.071. [4] I believe the *244 procedure advocated by the majority is not only contrary to the plain language of section
337.27(2), but may result in a denial of due process....
...must prove that taking the excess portion of the parcel will advance the purpose of limiting the cost of acquisition by showing "the acquisition costs to the department will be equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the property." 337.27(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). Thus, the plain language of section 337.27(2) makes proof of these equal or lower acquisition costs a condition precedent to issuance of an order of taking of an entire parcel....
...ty, it must do so only for a public purpose in order to protect an individual's due process rights respecting private property"). This is not to suggest the quick take procedure can never be used when an entire parcel is sought to be condemned under section 337.27(2)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 37482
...political subdivisions", §
166.021(2), Fla. Stat., and since the State, Department of Transportation (DOT) as well as counties are expressly permitted by statute to condemn more property than is necessary where they would save money by doing so, §§
337.27(2), [2]
127.01(1)(b), Fla....
...blic purpose. Wilton v. St. Johns County,
98 Fla. 26,
123 So. 527 (1929); Knappen v. Division of Administration,
352 So.2d 885 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), cert. denied,
364 So.2d 883 (1978). However, the legislature has made a specific exception as to DOT in section
337.27(2), Florida Statutes, which essentially provides that when the cost to acquire an entire parcel is equal to or less than the cost of acquiring a portion of the tract, DOT is authorized to acquire the entire tract....
...1968); State Road Department v. Bramlett,
189 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1966); Douglass v. Hillsborough County,
206 So.2d 402 (Fla.2d DCA 1968); and Palm Beach County v. Awadallah,
538 So.2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), rev. denied,
548 So.2d 662 (1989). [2] Previously section
337.27(3), Florida Statutes. [3] The constitutionality of this subsection (then §
337.27(3)) was upheld in Department of Transportation v. Fortune Federal . [4] Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. [5] Indeed, we note the legislature amended section
166.401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section
337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section
337.27(2)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14921
...We grant the writ and quash the orders in question. The first question challenges the condemning authority’s power to condemn a rest area for a limited access highway. The property owners’ position is that the source of the power is found in Fla.Stat. § 337.27 (1973), and that rest areas are not there specified....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 16432
...In the case at bar, as appellee puts it, the Department of Transportation, as the State highway authority, is the sovereign when acting in the area of State road building. The property taken vests in the name of the State of Florida. The statutory authority for the department to condemn property is found in Section 337.27(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: The power of eminent domain is vested in the [Division of Administration of the Department of Transportation] to condemn all necessary lands and property for the purpose of securing rights o...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 7506, 1995 WL 410684
...ment Act and to challenge the propriety of the Department’s actions under the provisions of that act. We hold that the Department did not err in dismissing the petition. We do not need to determine whether the Department’s condemnation powers in section 337.27, Florida Statutes, can be reconciled with its regulatory powers in the Access Management Act because Dixie readily concedes that it presented evidence of, and presumably has now accepted damages for, the reduction in width of its driveways....
