CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 147367
...The legislation concerning the sentencing guidelines distinguishes between state prison sentences and time spent in county jail. See, e.g., section
921.161, Florida Statutes (1993). Section
922.051, Florida Statutes (1993) also recognizes the distinction between state prisons and county jails. [3] Section
166.401, Florida Statutes, provides that municipalities may exercise the power of eminent domain "for the uses or purposes authorized pursuant to this part." Section
166.411(1), Florida Statutes, provides that municipalities may exercise the...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 611, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1637, 1992 WL 275893
..." §
166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, municipalities are not dependent upon the legislature for further authorization, and legislative statutes are relevant only to determine limitations of authority. City of Sunrise,
354 So.2d at 1209. Although section
166.401, Florida Statutes (1989), [6] purports to authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers, municipalities could exercise those powers for a valid municipal purpose without any such "grant" of authority. If the state has the power to take particular land for public purposes, then a municipality may also exercise that power unless it is "expressly prohibited." Although section
166.401(2) does not expressly grant the taking of an entire parcel by a municipality to save money, it also does not expressly prohibit a municipality from doing so....
...This subsection further provides that "this means of limiting the rising costs to the state of property acquisition is a public purpose." Section
127.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), grants this same power to the counties. [5] Ch. 73-129, § 1, Laws of Fla. [6] Section
166.401, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: (1) All municipalities in the state may exercise the right and power of eminent domain; that is, the right to appropriate property within the state, except state or federal property, for the uses or purposes authorized pursuant to this part....
...337.27(1) and the transportation corridor protection provisions of s.
337.273. The legislature has since amended the municipal eminent domain statute to expressly permit municipalities to exercise those powers granted the DOT under section
337.27(2). See §
166.401(2), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ses before the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. Substantially unlike any of the prior proceedings brought and subsequently dismissed in this cause, the petition herein was brought inter alia under the authority of Sections
166.401,
166.411(4), Florida Statutes (1977), and Ch....
...Under the law, the defense that the subject property was necessary for the successful operation of the railroad was, therefore, not available as a defense to the taking herein. The legislature has expressly authorized the condemnation sought in this case. C The eminent domain proceeding herein was also brought under Sections
166.401,
166.411(4), Florida Statutes (1977), which authorizes a municipality to condemn railroad property within its municipal limits for the purpose of establishing a public park....
..., Florida Statutes (1977), is applicable to this case as it clearly subordinates the railroad's eminent domain authority to that of a municipality as to property located within the municipality when such statute is read in pari materia with Sections
166.401,
166.411(4), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...It was to avoid just such a conflict that the doctrine of prior public use was developed. As no such conflict now exists in this case, the prior public use doctrine is inapplicable as a defense to the taking herein. It is, therefore, our view that the legislature through Sections
166.401,
166.411(4), 360.02, Florida Statutes (1977), has authorized a municipality by necessary implication to condemn railroad property located within the municipality to establish a public park without regard to whether the railroad is using or occupying the property....
...Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. City of Miami,
321 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1975); City of Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,
286 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Those proceedings, however, were not brought, as here, under Ch. 24708, Laws of Fla. (1947), or Sections
166.401,
166.411(4), Florida Statutes (1977), and were subsequently dismissed....
...City of Miami,
321 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1975), where in no way based on these statutes. The eminent domain proceeding brought in Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. City of Miami,
346 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), was based in part on Ch. 24708, Laws of Fla. (1947), and §
166.401, Fla. Stat. (1977), but not on §
166.411(4), Fla. Stat. (1977). [2] It should be noted, however, that §
166.401, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 37482
...[3] By section
127.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the legislature has expressly given counties this special eminent domain power granted DOT to take all of a tract of land when only a part is needed. The legislature has not seen fit to amend the statutes empowering municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain (§§
166.401,
166.411, Fla....
...[2] Previously section
337.27(3), Florida Statutes. [3] The constitutionality of this subsection (then §
337.27(3)) was upheld in Department of Transportation v. Fortune Federal . [4] Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. [5] Indeed, we note the legislature amended section
166.401, Florida Statutes, in 1988 to explicitly authorize municipalities to exercise eminent domain powers granted to DOT in section
337.27(1) but did not include in this authorization the power granted to DOT by section
337.27(2)....