Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Although Appellee's decision was not in Appellants' best interests, it was neither capricious nor in contravention of the parties' reasonable expectations. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgement on Appellants' breach of contract claims. B. Fla. Stat. § 320.643 (1997)4 Section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes provides a cause of action to "[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of [Fla. Stat. §§ ] 320.60-320.70." Appellants contend that Appellee, a licensee,5 is liable under § 320.697 for violating Fla....

...Although Appellee’s decision was not in Appellants’ best interests, it was neither capricious nor in contravention of the parties’ reasonable expectations. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgement on Appellants’ breach of contract claims. B. Fla. Stat. § 320.643 (1997)4 Section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of [Fla....

...Those amendments, however, do not govern in this case. Cf. Barry Cook Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 So. 2d 512, 517 n.5 (1st DCA 1993). 11 Appellants contend that Appellee, a licensee,5 is liable under § 320.697 for violating Fla....

...76 Florida Statutes, section 320.64(6) also requires "coercion." That statute, in essence, prohibits motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors and importers from coercing or attempting to coerce motor vehicle dealers to enter into any agreements with them. Under section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes, any person that suffers a pecuniary loss on account of such coercion has a cause of action against the wrongdoer for damages....

...somewhat of a moot point." We will not review that which is not at issue. D. Other Violations of Florida Statutes 108 The district court found that American Honda violated sections 320.64(4) and (8) and section 320.641 of the Florida Statutes. Under section 320.697, an automobile dealer suffering pecuniary loss on account of a violation of these provisions by a motor vehicle manufacturer, distributor, and/or importer has a cause of action against that party for damages....

...Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation 1 American Honda argues the award is speculative and not supported by the evidence. Cabriolet argues that the damages awarded on account of American Honda's violations of the Florida statutes should have been trebled, pursuant to Fla.Statutes, Sec. 320.697 2 It is clear that the district court judge adopted virtually verbatim the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law tendered by appellee/defendant....

...BARKETT, Circuit Judge: 1 Appellants, Cross-Appellees Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc. (MSP) and Terry Taylor, Billy Grubbs and Terry Taylor Investments (collectively, Taylor) appeal the district court's summary judgment that the Florida Automobile Dealer's Act, Section 320.697, Florida Statutes (1985) does not mandate a treble damage award. Appellee, Cross-Appellant Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (Mercedes-Benz) cross-appeals the district court's summary judgment that Mercedes-Benz violated Sec. 320.643 and that Sec. 320.697 provides standing to a prospective purchaser of an automobile dealership....

...rt, that "[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been adversely affected because of a violation of Secs. 320.60-320.70 ... has a cause of action ... and may recover damages ... in an amount equal to 3 times the pecuniary loss." Sec. 320.697. There are three issues we must decide in this case. The first is whether the district court erred in holding that appellant, Taylor, has standing to bring a claim under Sec. 320.697....

...The second issue is whether the district court erred in declaring that Mercedes-Benz violated Sec. 320.643. In the event we answer the second question in the affirmative, we must decide whether the district court erred in finding that Florida Statutes Sec. 320.697 does not mandate the trebling of damages....

...Appellants brought this diversity action in federal court in the District of New Jersey. On Mercedes-Benz' motion, the action was transferred to the Middle District of Florida. DISCUSSION I. Standing of a Prospective Franchisee 8 Mercedes-Benz first contends that Taylor lacks standing to pursue a claim under Sec. 320.697 because the statute was not intended to provide a cause of action to a prospective franchisee....

...Taylor rejects this interpretation and argues that a plain reading of the statute makes clear that the legislature's use of the phrase "any person" was meant to include prospective franchisees. The question of whether a prospective franchisee has standing under Sec. 320.697 is one of first impression....

...Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). No further inquiry is required unless "an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion would result from a failure to do so." In Re McCollam, 986 F.2d 436, 437 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting In re McCollam, 612 So.2d at 573 ). 10 Section 320.697 provides that "[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss....

...n Sec. 320.643, namely, qualifications and character. 21 It is clear from the language of Sec. 320.643 that a licensee has a right to object to a proposed transferee and, when properly asserted, the objection is free from fear of reprisal under Sec. 320.697....

...by regulating the licensing of ... dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as ... dealers." Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.605. 29 Appellants contend that Sec. 320.697 is a remedial statute which plainly and unambiguously provides that, upon proof of a statutory violation, a manufacturer is liable for treble damages....

...trier of fact: 32 Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss ... may recover damages in an amount equal to three times the pecuniary loss.... 33 Where the language of a law is clear, judges should not replace it with an unenacted legislative intent. Section 320.697 is clear and unambiguous; its plain language mandates the trebling of damages when "any person" requests them....

...I dissent because the questions presented are important, heretofore undecided, questions of Florida law and should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court. 38 The questions are: (1) Does a prospective transferee of an automobile franchise have standing to bring a claim under Section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes (1985)? It seems clear that this statute was designed to protect holders of automobile dealerships....

...Must the manufacturer award a franchise to each of several transferees as to whom it has no objection to qualifications or moral character? Does good faith questioning of the bona fides of a proposed transfer subject the offender to damages? 40 (3) Does Section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes (1985) mandate the trebling of damages? We decide that, under Florida law, if one may bring an action for treble damages the court may not award less....

...tion is one that compensates an individual for specific harm suffered, while a penal action imposes damages upon the defendant for a general wrong to the public." United States v. NEC Corp., 11 F.3d 136, 137 (11th Cir.1993). In deciding whether Sec. 320.697 is remedial or penal, we must examine: "(1) whether the purpose of the statute was to redress individual wrongs or more general wrongs to the public; (2) whether recovery under the statute runs to the harmed individual or to the public; and (...

...We agree with the trial court's finding that appellant was not a "motor vehicle dealer" under the Florida ADDA. Appellant alleges violation of section 320.641, unfair cancellation of franchise agreements; section 320.645, restriction upon ownership of *65 dealership by licensee; section 320.695, injunction; and section 320.697, civil damages....

...DHSMV transferred the case to DOAH for a hearing. Following the filing of its complaint with DHSMV, Cook Ford filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking an injunction, a declaratory judgment and damages against Ford on the ground that the proposed termination was unfair under section 320.697, Florida Statutes....

...o the propriety of the intended termination is made by DHSMV. Section 320.641(5) provides that if the dealer prevails, he shall have a cause of action against the licensee for attorney fees and costs. The dealer also has a cause of action under sec. 320.697, which provides: Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss....

...(1987) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, while resort may be had to the administrative forum pursuant to section 320.641(3) to determine whether a threatened termination is "unfair or prohibited," the dealer may also base a cause of action for damages pursuant to section 320.697 upon a licensee's violation of section 320.64(7) by showing that the licensee threatened "unfairly ......

...Moreover, the statute providing for a civil damage action requires only a " prima facie showing" by the dealer that a violation by the licensee has occurred, whereupon the burden of proof "shall be upon the licensee to prove that such violation or unfair practice did not occur." § 320.697, Fla....

...made during the pendency of the section 320.641(3) administrative proceeding, Cook Ford was not required to continue to seek relief in the *517 administrative forum, but could avail itself of the independent statutory action for treble damages under section 320.697....

...ot permitted by the franchise agreement. As stated by this court in International Harvester Co. v. Calvin, supra , the initial burden is upon the dealer to show the unfairness of the licensee's decision to terminate the franchise agreement. See also § 320.697, Fla....

...alership, in Count II damages and attorneys' *1189 fees against Chrysler for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 and in Count III treble damages and attorneys fees against Chrysler pursuant to Sections 320.64, 320.696, and 320.697, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Howard Johnson's, Inc., *1190 201 So.2d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). We apply them again here, and reverse for a new trial on Count II. Next we turn our attention to the directed verdict on Count III. We assume for purposes of this discussion that at all pertinent times the remedies afforded by Section 320.697, Florida Statutes, were available to "any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation ..." of the applicable statutory sections....

enter into any agreements with them. Under section 320.697 of the Florida Statutes, any person that suffers

...) enjoin defendant JM Auto's alleged unlicensed operation of Lexus dealerships within the state of Florida and its alleged unlicensed operation of a Lexus distributorship. The plaintiff also sought monetary damages against the defendants pursuant to section 320.697....

...A single act in violation of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 shall be sufficient to authorize the issuance of an injunction. However, this statutory remedy shall not be applicable to any motor vehicle dealer after final determination by the department under s. 320.641(3). [2] Section 320.697 Civil damages.—Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss....

11); and for Attorney’s Fees under Fla. Stat. § 320.697 (Claim 12). It also alleges additional claims

plus costs and attorneys’ fees under Fla.Stat. § 320.697 (1993). That section provides as follows: Any

that the Florida Automobile Dealer’s Act, Section 320.697, Florida Statutes (1985) does not mandate a

Act. See Fla. Stat. § 320.698. And Fla. Stat. § 320.697 authorizes a dealer to bring a private cause of

...Appellants are the former shareholders of two such dealerships located in Jacksonville, Florida. Appellants claim Appellee violated the Florida Automobile Dealer's Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 320.60-320.70 (1997).1 For this violation, Appellants seek damages and attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 320.697....

...In that lawsuit, summary judgement was entered against Appellee. See Nissan Motor Corp. in USA v. Republic Indus., Inc., No. SACV 99-0109-DOC (C.D.Calif.Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished). In May 1999, Appellee and AutoNation entered into a PCA.  Appellants' suit is based on Fla. Stat. § 320.697, which provides a cause of action to "[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of [the Act]" (emphasis added)....

...words, according to Appellants, any licensee who exercises its rights under § 320.643 by filing a legally sufficient verified complaint, but who ultimately would lose on the merits, is in violation of the Act and subject to damages and attorney's fees under § 320.697....

...Since this is not a proper basis for a transfer challenge [under § 320.643], the [DHSMV] correctly dismissed the complaint. Mercedes-Benz, 561 So.2d at 624 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, the dealership and Mr. Taylor sued the licensee in federal court under § 320.697....

...to have violated this statute." Mike Smith, 32 F.3d at 533 (emphasis in original). We also stated, "It is clear from the language of § 320.643 that a licensee has a right to object to a proposed transferee and, when properly asserted, the objection is free from fear of reprisal under § 320.697." Id....

...fied complaint was "not permitted" and not "properly asserted" because, although the complaint was legally sufficient, Appellee would have ultimately lost on the merits. As such, Appellants contend that Appellee committed a "violation" pursuant to § 320.697. We disagree with Appellants' construction of Mike Smith and § 320.697. Mike Smith did not say that, for a licensee to be free from fear of reprisal under § 320.697, it had to file a successful or meritorious objection under § 320.643....

...referring to complaints that were legally insufficient under the Act—that is, complaints warranting dismissal because they lacked "a proper basis for a transfer challenge." Mercedes-Benz, 561 So.2d at 624. Thus, a licensee does not violate the Act pursuant to § 320.697 when it files a legally sufficient verified complaint, irrespective of whether the licensee would ultimately prevail in the challenge to the proposed transfer.10 IV....

...allegations about the transferee's lack of moral character. The ALJ correctly ruled that the allegations, if proven true, were legally sufficient for Appellee to block the equity transfer. As such, Appellee did not commit a "violation" pursuant to § 320.697,11 and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee. AFFIRMED. 10 In this case, Appellee's complaint was properly verified, as one of Appellee's officers swore under oath that the allegations were truthful. We do not decide whether a violation would have occurred had Appellee not properly verified the complaint. 11 Since we conclude Appellee did not violate § 320.697, we need not address the argument, advanced by Appellee, that holding it liable under § 320.697 would violate its "right ......

...Appellants are the former shareholders of two such dealerships located in Jacksonville, Florida. Appellants claim Appellee violated the Florida Automobile Dealer’s Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 320.60- 320.70 (1997).1 For this violation, Appellants seek damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 320.697....

...�� E.g., Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 242 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION Appellants’ suit is based on Fla. Stat. § 320.697, which provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of [the Act]” (emphasis added)....

...ng to Appellants, any licensee who exercises its rights under § 320.643 by filing a legally sufficient verified complaint, but who ultimately would lose on the merits, is in violation of the Act and subject to damages and attorney’s fees under § 320.697....

...Since this is not a proper basis for a transfer challenge [under § 320.643], the [DHSMV] correctly dismissed the complaint. Mercedes-Benz, 561 So. 2d at 624 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, the dealership and Mr. Taylor sued the licensee in federal court under § 320.697....

...to have violated this statute.” Mike Smith, 32 F.3d at 533 (emphasis in original). We also stated, “It is clear from the language of § 320.643 that a licensee has a right to object to a proposed transferee and, when properly asserted, the objection is free from fear of reprisal under § 320.697.” Id....

...Stated simply, in Appellants’ view, Appellee’s verified complaint was “not permitted” and not “properly asserted” because, although the complaint was legally sufficient, Appellee would have ultimately lost on the merits. As such, Appellants contend that Appellee committed a “violation” pursuant to § 320.697. We disagree with Appellants’ construction of Mike Smith and § 320.697. Mike Smith did not say that, for a licensee to be free from fear of reprisal under § 320.697, it had to file a successful or meritorious objection under § 320.643....

...referring to complaints that were legally insufficient under the Act — that is, complaints warranting dismissal because they lacked “a proper basis for a transfer challenge.” Mercedes-Benz, 561 So. 2d at 624. Thus, a licensee does not violate the Act pursuant to § 320.697 when it files a legally sufficient verified complaint, 11 irrespective of whether the licensee would ultimately prevail in the challenge to the proposed transfer.10 IV....

...ions about the transferee’s lack of moral character. The ALJ correctly ruled that the allegations, if proven true, were legally sufficient for Appellee to block the equity transfer. As such, Appellee did not commit a “violation” pursuant to § 320.697,11 and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee. AFFIRMED. 10 In this case, Appellee’s complaint was properly verified, as one of Appellee’s officers swore under oath that the allegations were truthful. We do not decide whether a violation would have occurred had Appellee not properly verified the complaint. 11 Since we conclude Appellee did not violate § 320.697, we need not address the argument, advanced by Appellee, that holding it liable under § 320.697 would violate its “right ....