CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13358, 1995 WL 544743
...rsement. 2 In addition to the contractual warranty obligations between the parties, the Florida Automobile Dealer Act, Fla.Stat. §
320.01 et seq. (1998) (“Dealer Act”), also governs certain-aspects of the parties’ relationship. In particular, §
320.696 of the Dealer Act addresses a manufacturer’s warranty reimbursement obligation....
...Plaintiff contends that this statute requires a manufacturer/licensee to compensate dealers for warranty parts at a “retail rate.” 4 Conversely, Defendant denies that it has any duty to reimburse Plaintiff at a retail rate for parts used in warranty repairs or service under the terms of Florida Statute § 320.696....
...its retail prices for *861 warranty parts in the future 6 (D-2, ¶¶ 6-7, 9 and 12). Defendant now seeks summary judgment as a matter of law on both of Brandon’s claims. Plaintiff, however, seeks partial summary judgment specifically as to whether § 320.696 of the Florida Statutes requires the manufacturer to compensate a dealer for parts used in warranty service at a rate not less than the amount charged by the dealer for like work to retail customers for nonwarranty work. The Defendant contends that § 320.696 does not require the manufacturer to reimburse the dealer for “parts” at a “retail rate.” The parties agree that this case presents one determinative issue regarding the interpretation of Florida Statute § 320.696 for warranty parts reimbursement (D-ll, pg....
...from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of
320.60-320.70, or from failing or refusing.to comply with the requirements of this law or any rule or regulation adopted hereunder_. In the instant case, the Plaintiff claims that the language of Florida Statute §
320.696 is clear and that the statute on its face requires retail compensation to dealers for warranty parts....
...definition of “reasonable compensation.” This definition provides that compensation “shall not be determined to be less than the amount charged by a dealer for like work to retail customers for nonwarranty repairs and service....” Fla.Stat. § 320.696 (1993)....
...ictionary, 9 case law, and other statutory contexts, is explained in terms of physical acts, not materials, and equates “work” with “labor.” Thus, Defendant contends that “work” can only mean “labor” in the context of Florida Statute § 320.696....
...10 Moreover, Defendant asserts that if the Florida legislature intended for a dealer to be reimbursed for warranty “parts” at a retail rate, it would have specifically used the word “parts” as it did in §
320.63(5) of the Florida Statutes. Fla. Stat. §
320.63 (5) (1993). Upon the Court’s analysis of §
320.696 and the parties’ different interpret tations of the statute, the Court finds that the statutory language is ambiguous....
...Looking at the statute on its face, the Defendant is correct in its assertion that nowhere in the statute does it mention any obligation on the manufacturer to reimburse the dealer for “parts” at a “retail rate.” The word “part” is not used at all in § 320.696. Rather, the statute provides that a manufacturer must compensate a dealer for “work” as to warranty obligations. Section 320.696 further states that “reasonable compensation” shall be paid to the dealer for “warranty repairs or service,” and shall not be “less than the amount charged by the dealer for like work to retail customers for nonwarranty repairs or service” (emphasis added)....
...See Gonzalez,
980 F.2d at 1420 . The Plaintiff has not set forth any such legislative intent, nor is this Court aware of any. The Court further agrees with Defendant’s assertion that if the legislature intended to include “parts” in the scope of §
320.696, it would have specifically stated so....
...ically enumerated in the statute and “parts” was not. See DeSisto,
706 F.Supp. at 1495 . Assuming also that the legislature acted intentionally and purposely when including the word “parts” in Florida Statute §
320.63(5), and omitting it in §
320.696, 12 the Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiffs argument that §
320.696 requires compensation for warranty parts at a retail rate based on the inclusion of the word “parts” in §
320.63(5)....
...nsee to file of an affidavit stating the rates for dealer reimbursement of “parts and labor.” Requiring a man-ufaeturer/lieensee to file an affidavit stating the rates it agrees to reimburse the dealer for warranty parts is not inconsistent with §
320.696 which simply requires reimbursement of labor at a retail rate. While §
320.63(5) implies a duty on the manufacturer to in fact reimburse a dealer for warranty parts, such reimbursement is provided for in the SSA between the parties, and this Court does not find that such practice violates §
320.696 on its face....
...The Kronon court held that the statute does not require the manufacturer to reimburse the dealer for warranty parts at a retail rate. Id. at 341 . The court further commented that, “[i]f dealers want broader protection against the manufacturers, they must seek it from the legislature.” Id. Notably, Florida Statute § 320.696, very closely parallels the Illinois statute. The one significant difference between the two statutes, is that the Illinois statute specifically requires adequate and fair compensation for “labor and parts.” See 815 ILCS 710/6(a). Whereas, Florida Statute § 320.696 requires “reasonable compensation” for “work,” including “warranty repairs or service.” 17 Thereafter, both statutes go on to define “reasonable compensation” in strikingly similar language both concluding with the same sta...
...pairs. Moreover, even in the Illinois statute which specifically mentions compensation for “parts,” the Kronon court concluded that it did not specifically mention “parts” when addressing reimbursement at a retail rate, as in Florida Statute § 320.696....
...Had the legislature intended to establish a *865 rule of parity for parts as well as labor, it could have said so very simply; there would have been no occasion even to mention wage rates; Id. at 340 . 18 Based on the strikingly similar language of Florida Statute § 320.696 to the Illinois warranty reimbursement statute, this Court adopts Kronon’s rationale....
...chise for the same parts when not provided in satisfaction of a warranty.” Acadia,
44 F.3d at 1052 (citing 10 M.R.S.A. § 1176 (1991) (Me.Rev. StatAnn. tit. 10, § 1176 (West Supp.1994)) (emphasis added)). Unlike the Maine statute, Florida Statute §
320.696 does not expressly state reimbursement for “parts” at a retail rate....
...21 The Court thus finds the Northwood case unpersuasive. Notably, the legislatures of other states which have warranty reimbursement statutes in place, provide another source of comparison and instruction for this Court in construing Florida Statute § 320.696....
... or “work” included parts. Obviously, the other states did not make such an assumption in that they expressly provided for “parts.” Likewise, this Court will not make such an assumption. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds § 320.696 to be ambiguous, such ambiguity should be exercised in favor of the dealer, for whom the statute was designed to protect....
...This Court will not infer legislative intent or policy, nor will it venture into the .domain of the legislature. By finding in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court would be overstepping its bounds of authority. CONCLUSION Having ruled on the statutory interpretation of Florida Statute § 320.696 and finding that the Plaintiff is-not entitled to reimbursement for warranty parts at a retail rate, this Court need not reach the Defendant’s other grounds for its dispositive motion for summary judgment. Thus, based on the Court’s findings as to § 320.696, the Defendant’s arguments that the Plaintiff has failed to preserve its right to compensation under the statute for past reimbursement, as well as Plaintiffs relinquishment of rights based on accord and satisfaction are moot....
...The foregoing portion of this statute was enacted in 1977, and amended to its present form in 1988, by adding the remaining portion of the statute.' . This term refers to a rate not less than the amount charged by the dealer for like work to retail customers for nonwarranty repairs and service. See Fla.Stat. § 320.696 (1993); (D-2, ¶6)....
...698, 703 ,
88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). See also Labor. Black’s Law Dictionary 1439 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). . Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's focus on the word “work” is too narrow, and therefore misconstrues its use in the context of §
320.696....
...e's rules have no force); Fla. Stat. §
320.64 (19) (1993) (denies, suspends, or revokes manufacturer's license if any contractual provisions are contrary to §§
320.60-320.70). .Notably, the Court has attempted to review the legislative history of §
320.696 by investigating the legislative committee’s documentation in drafting the statute. The documentation that was available on §
320.696 with the Florida State Archives is deficient in any relevant information useful in resolving the issue before the Court. . The "Act" refers to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Franchise Act. . The Court notes that § 6(b) of this statute was added by amendment in 1983, four years after § 6(a). See Kronon,
41 F.3d at 340 . . See Fla.Stat. §
320.696, supra at 860....
