Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...§ 1983 action, asserted violations of Buxton’s property and liberty interests as guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Count II alleged a pendent state claim based on violations of Florida’s Policeman’s Bill of Rights, Fla. Stat. § 112.532 (1982)....

...On June 2, 1987, Plant City and Chief Surrency filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment as to Count I of the complaint, Buxton’s liberty interest claim, dismissed the remaining count, violation of the Florida policeman’s bill of rights, Fla.Stat. § 112.532 (1982), and entered judgment....

...plinary proceedings against the Plaintiff Police Officer for alleged misconduct of the Police Officer in his official capacity while arresting the Defendant in an alleged domestic disturbance. 2. The claim for relief is made in the complaint under F.S. 112.532(3)(1983), the so-called "Policeman's Bill of Rights"....

...If the procedure followed by the Defendant involved a Judicial or Quasi-Judicial proceeding, then an absolute privilege attaches and there can be no cause of action herein, even assuming malice, for all statements that were made relevant to those proceedings. * * * * * * BACKGROUND I. F.S. 112.532 was enacted to provide a means for Police Officers to recover damages and also to provide them with a system comporting with due process for "......

...st Amendment to the United States Constitution or under the Declaration of Rights Art. I, § 5 of the Florida Constitution) be restricted in any way, nor can a restriction be inferred from it." Mesa supra 713. In Mesa, the Supreme Court ruled that F.S. 112.532 passed a constitutional muster both facially and as applied because therein the Defendant Rodriguez (same name but not the same person) did not choose to "....

...Herein, the Defendant did exactly what the Supreme Court indicated he should do and followed the procedures set up by the Metropolitan Dade County Government. The public has an absolute constitutional right to petition for the redress of grievances. The Police have a right to be protected from libel and slander. F.S. 112.532, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mesa, supra, tries to trail blaze a path to protect both rights....

...ity on a finding of vicarious liability for Bennett’s Communications Act and REMAND the case for retrial of those issues. CASE NO. 3743 We REMAND the judgment awarding costs for reconsideration in the light of our observations supra. 1 . Fla.Stat. § 112.532 (1979) provides in pertinent part: All law enforcement officers employed by any employing agency shall have the following rights and privileges: (2) Complaint review boards....

...s. As one of the surrounding circumstances the court stated that "[a]t no time during the interview did [the defendant] express a desire to contact his attorneys."). [16] We note that the denial of counsel to the officers may have violated Fla.Stat. § 112.532(1)(i) which provides that: At the request of any law enforcement officer or correctional officer under investigation, he shall have the right to be represented by counsel or any other representative of his choice, who shall be present at a...

...Appellants were then dismissed from the police department and advised of their rights to apply for a hearing before the City's Civil Service Board. Neither appellant applied for a hearing. Rather, appellants sought to have a complaint review board empaneled pursuant to Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Broward County v. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc., 408 So.2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Therefore, of the relief requested by appellants in the trial court, mandamus could apply, if at all, only to obtaining a hearing before the complaint review board. Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: (2) COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARDS....

...allenged. We do not mean to suggest that a complaint review board so constituted would necessarily act in a biased manner; only that it gives the impression of impropriety, which the legislature would obviously have avoided at all costs. Finally, Subsection 112.532(4), Florida Statutes, mandates that the law enforcement officer faced with dismissal or certain other personnel actions shall receive notice together with the reasons for action to be taken against him. It would have been a simple matter, had the legislature intended that a complaint review board be available to the officer under such circumstances, to make reference to Subsection 112.532(2), Florida Statutes, in that regard. The lack of such a reference is but one additional factor that inclines us to the view that Sections 112.533 and 112.532(2) are to be utilized for disposition of complaints made by outside persons and are not intended to provide a forum for any issue other than whether a particular complaint has a basis in fact. Under our interpretation of the purpose of Section 112.532 et seq., appellants would have been entitled to a hearing on the basis of the original written complaint against them....

...Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We agree with the decision of the district court in Migliore, adopt its opinion as our own, and disapprove the opinion in West. The district court in Migliore correctly held that Complaint Review Boards, authorized by section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981), were not created to review disciplinary action against police officers and correctly concluded that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing their dismissal to the Civil Ser...

...int. They alleged that the City's decision to abolish the position of Lead Patrol Officer ("LPO") constituted a deprivation of their due process rights under section 1983. They also claimed a violation of the Florida Police Officers' Bill of Rights, section 112.532(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...eeding for redress.... [4] The Police Officers' Bill of Rights claim also went to the jury. The jury verdict does not differentiate between recovery for the substantive due process violation, and the Police Officers' Bill of Rights claim pursuant to section 112.532(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901, 98 S.Ct. 3118, 57 L.Ed.2d 1144 (1978) ("City employment which allows a termination only for cause creates a constitutionally protectable property interest."). Moreover, Florida Statutes § 112.532(4), a provision of the "Police Officer's Bill of Rights," requires that law enforcement officers be given prior notice of any demotion to which they shall be subjected along with the "reasons therefor." Requiring that an employer or other...

...rd is too unclear at this point for the court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim. See id. At the very least, Plaintiff has the right not to be denied promotion based on the exercise of his rights under the Police Officer's Bill of Rights. Florida Statutes § 112.532(5)....

...Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants on the lack of municipal liability would be inappropriate. Count II: Violation of the Police Officer's Bill of Rights Plaintiff claims in Count II that Defendants have violated his rights as a police officer as set forth in Florida Statutes § 112.532....

...red retaliatory action from the Defendants in the form of transfers, reassignments, constructive demotions, and denials of promotion as a consequence of his filing this lawsuit and exercising other such rights under the statute. See Florida Statutes § 112.532(3). Retaliatory action is expressly prohibited by the statute. Florida Statutes § 112.532(5). Though Defendants have not contended that an absence of factual dispute exists as to the procedural aspects of Plaintiff's § 112.532 claim, they do assert that no evidence exists as to the retaliatory aspects of his claim. The court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated the existence of disputed facts on the issue of retaliation in violation of § 112.532(5)....

...See Sylvester v. City of Delray Beach, 431 So.2d 738 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1983), appeal after remand, 486 So.2d 607 (1986). Defendants, alternatively, move for partial summary judgment on the issue of the scope of the remedies available for violations of § 112.532....

...Plaintiff counters that Cosgrove's limitation of remedies applies only to suits against municipal entities and does not prevent awards of money damages under the statute when violations are asserted against municipal officials in their individual capacities. Plaintiff argues that § 112.532(3) gives him the express right to sue all entities, other than his employer, for damages under the statute. [14] The court finds that the holding in Cosgrove was intended to quash all suits for damages under § 112.532....

...d of damages against both the municipality and a defendant in his individual capacity. [15] Moreover, the reasoning in Cosgrove is persuasive of its own right. Florida Statutes § 112.534 expressly sets forth the remedies available for violations of § 112.532....

...The sole remedy provided for in § 112.534 is injunctive relief. [16] As the court in Cosgrove observed, "where one thing is expressed and others are not, the Legislature is presumed to have intended to omit the items not expressed." Cosgrove, 516 So.2d at 1127. Kamenesh misreads § 112.532(3) in arguing that it creates a private right of action for damages against individual offenders....

...tiff's § 1983 claims of *597 deprivation of protected property and liberty interests is DENIED. It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count II is DENIED, except to the extent that Florida Statutes § 112.532 shall be deemed to provide Plaintiff the remedy of injunctive relief only....

...[13] Because the Defendants have asserted their qualified immunity defenses as a single argument, equally applicable to all Defendants, rather than as a defense separate and unique to each individual officer, the court has limited its discussion of qualified immunity to those general parameters. [14] Section 112.532(3) reads: (3) Civil Suits brought by law enforcement officers or correctional officers....

...its employees." Id. at para. 100. [20] Plaintiff, of course, cannot obtain recovery under a theory of supervisory negligence where the underlying harms alleged are statutory in nature and provide Kamenesh with no right to seek damages, see supra as to Count II (§ 112.532), or are not actionable here, see supra as to Count III (fraud) and the greater portion of Count IV (libel and slander)....

...Further, the trial court ruled that a county civil service ordinance afforded the appellant no basis for relief since the sheriff had never certified his department pursuant to that ordinance. Appellant's contentions before this court are now threefold: first, that he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1975); second, that the sheriff improperly denied him a hearing under Chapter 65-2231, Laws of Florida, which created a civil service system for Sarasota County; and third, that his right to hold office as a deputy...

...First, the sheriff, as a constitutional officer, does not come within the purview of Section 112.531(2), Florida Statutes (1975), wherein employing agency is defined "... any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof ..."; hence, Section 112.532 (1975) is inapplicable here....

...actual situation from the "at will" doctrine and contrary to what is alleged on appeal, an individual cannot be wrongfully discharged under an at will doctrine solely because that individual was denied some limited statutory procedural right ( i.e., § 112.532(4), Fla....

...City of Plantation, 407 So.2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). A statutory provision that requires minimal procedural steps prior to termination will not in and of itself create a property interest in continued employment. Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847 (11th Cir.1983). Even assuming that section 112.532(4) affords a law enforcement officer procedural rights, these "reasons" do not invoke the requirement of "just cause" or the requirement of specific grounds for termination. *1165 While it is at least arguable that section 112.532(4) offers at least de minimis procedural rights to a "law enforcement officer," Kelly cannot claim a statutory violation because the benefits of section 112.531, et seq., as they relate to dismissal are not available to him....

...Both parties acknowledge, as does the trial court, that deputy sheriffs are appointees of a constitutional office and as such, are terminable at will and not entitled to the protections of section 112.531, et seq., Florida Statutes. Under the reasoning of the trial court, to allow investigators the benefits of sections 112.532 and 112.534, pursuant to section 27.255(3), would also allow appointed deputy sheriffs, as investigators, those same rights....

...[6] Upon remand the trial court will file an appropriate order of final summary judgment consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. SHARP, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] Part VI, section 112.531(1), (3) defines "Law enforcement officer" and "employing agency." Section 112.532(1) deals with rights of officers while under investigation as the result of an outside complainant. Section 112.532(2) establishes a review board to consider these outside complaints. Section 112.532(3) gives an officer the right to bring a civil suit against another. Section 112.532(4), (5) requires notice of disciplinary action as well as a prohibition against disciplinary action as a result of an officer exercising his rights under Part VI....

...is not available to the deputy sheriff. Compare the definitions of "law enforcement officer" in sections 112.19 and 112.1904. [5] In Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 431 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1983), the Florida Supreme Court held that complaint review boards, as authorized by section 112.532(2), were not created to review disciplinary actions against police officers which arose from an internal source....

...On September 14, 1978, the chief of police of the City of Plantation notified appellant, who was then a lieutenant in the police department, that his services were terminated as of that date. [1] Appellant was given a hearing before a three-member Complaint Review Board pursuant to Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...uary 1978, you have been involved in and with persons using your residence for the purpose of Federal violations: namely, the sale of fully automatic weapons and the observation of narcotics on your permises [sic] at the time of the transaction. [2] Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1977) provides: (2) COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARDS....

...ased on substantial competent evidence. *909 The order of the Public Employees Relations Commission is vacated, and the cause is remanded for entry of a final order consistent herewith. VACATED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 112.532, Fla....

...See City of Hallandale v. Inglima, 346 So.2d 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) which approves the opinion of the Attorney General, 076-38 AGO, that the complaint review board is advisory only. The referenced opinion of the Attorney General also says: Nowhere in that section [112.532(2)] or in any other section of Part VI of Ch....

...Reed, Miami, for appellants/cross-appellees. Stinson, Lyons & Schuette and Thomas B. Bourque, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant. Before HUBBART, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. We conclude that the exclusive remedy for noncompliance with Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1983), is injunctive relief as provided in Section 112.534, Florida Statutes (1983), and accordingly reverse the money judgment for the appellee, Michael M. Cosgrove. Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1983), popularly known as the Policeman's Bill of Rights, gives to law enforcement and correctional officers certain detailed procedural rights and privileges and, pertinent to the present case, provides: "(4) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION....

...on of the provisions of this part and to compel the performance of the duties imposed by this part." Section 112.534 is the only remedy provision of Part VI of Chapter 112, and thus the only express remedy provision applicable to alleged breaches of Section 112.532(4) and (5)....

...ctive relief, he therefore may seek damages. The choice provided by the statute, however, is not between injunctive relief and damages, but between injunctive relief and no relief. Lastly, Cosgrove suggests that his suit for damages is authorized by Section 112.532(3), which, as we read it, has nothing whatsoever to do with the employee's rights vis-a-vis his employer but simply memorializes that a policeman shall have the right to sue other persons for damages suffered by the officer in the performance of his official duties....

...� inference and implication cannot be substituted for clear expression), approved, 512 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1987). In the present case, neither before nor after the enactment of Section 112.534, Florida Statutes, was there a right to recover damages. [3] Section 112.532(3) reads: "(3) CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS....

...of relatives. Rodriguez was taken to jail. On the way the policemen expressed themselves "as if they had arrested a vile criminal." Later, he was released on bail. Rodriguez asked the police chief to open an investigation and to interview Mesa. II. Section 112.532(3), Florida Statutes, the section of the statutes under which Mesa brought suit, is contained in Part VI of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the chapter of general provisions governing public officers and employees....

...rson. If Rodriguez had chosen, he could have lodged a complaint with the investigation system set up, pursuant to the statute, by the Miami Police Department. His complaint could have been reviewed by a Complaint Review Board composed as required by Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes....

...The statute does nothing to add to this common law right. We do not need to discuss, therefore, the constitutional validity of the section's application. On remand Officer Mesa is to be given the opportunity to amend his complaint to bring an action for libel against Rodriguez not founded on Section 112.532(3), Florida Statutes....

...onstitutional and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. KARL, J., concurs in result only. HATCHETT, J., dissents. NOTES [1] Now codified as § 112.532(3), Fla....

...elationship". McMahon v. City of Edgewater, 60 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1284 (M.D.Fla.1999). In their response to the City's summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs suggest two sources of a property interest: (1) the Police Officer Bill of Rights, Fla. Stat. § 112.532 and (2) the contract between the City and UM....

...112, *85 Part VI, Florida Statutes (1975) [1] , known as the Police Officers Bill of Rights, by failing (a) to give appellees notice of impending disciplinary action, and (b) to afford appellees a hearing before a Complaint Review Board, pursuant to Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Appellees sought injunctive relief to prohibit appellants from violating Section 112.532(4) and to require appellants to provide appellees notice and a hearing, pursuant to that section. In addition, appellees sought damages pursuant to Section 112.532(3)....

...and being duly advised in the premises, it is thereupon ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. That the Plaintiffs, ROBERT S. INGLIMA and THEODORE GRANDIS, having been provided with a hearing before a Complaint Review Board pursuant to Florida Statute 112.532(2), and the Complaint Review Board having unanimously found the Plaintiffs not guilty of the alleged charges and recommending immediate reinstatement, the court finds that the Complaint Review Board had before it competent, substantial evidence to support its findings and the Plaintiffs are therefore reinstated....

...s action was commenced to enforce appellees' rights as municipal police officers under Chapter 112, Part VI, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellees contended that they were entitled to notice of the intended disciplinary action prior to being dismissed. Section 112.532(4), clearly mandates such notice, and appellants violated appellees' rights by failing to comply with that mandate....

...otices of dismissal. The court's order found the Board's decision was based upon substantial competent evidence. But as far as we can tell no evidence submitted before the Board was before the trial court. Even more importantly, nothing contained in Section 112.532(2) justified the trial court's entering the July 30th order solely on the basis of a proceeding before a Complaint Review Board. As pointed out by the Attorney General in 076-38 AGO, a decision of a Complaint Review Board established pursuant to Section 112.532(2), is not adjudicatory but advisory only....

...pay and c) other damages alleged in Count II, after disposing of all pending motions. REVERSED AND REMANDED. CROSS and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. APPENDIX Chapter 112, Part VI, Florida Statutes (1975): PART VI LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 112.531 Definitions. 112.532 Law enforcement officers' rights....

...(3)[2] "Board" means the Police Standards Board, or its successor, as created by chapter 23, part IV. History. — s. 1, ch. 74-274; s. 1, ch. 75-41. [1] Note. — As amended, takes effect October 1, 1975. [2] Note. — Ch. 74-386 repealed part IV of ch. 23 and created the Police Standards Training Commission (See s. 943.11). 112.532 Law enforcement officers' rights....

...ssociation, that has been denied by defendants. Fifth, plaintiffs claim that their de jure property interest under the city ordinance and the state statute was taken from them without the procedural due process provided under that statute, Fla.Stat. § 112.532(4) (Supp.1974)....

...In those cases, the Supreme Court found de jure and de facto property interests in employment that were entitled to the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case there is no settled decisional law that the state statute, Fla.Stat. § 112.532(4), notwithstanding its seemingly plain facial meaning, grants no property interest of any kind to the class of persons for whom it defines its application....

...ory rights against any other conduct by an employer or an employer's agents. Although certain subsections of the statute are less clear than others, there are subsections that are unmistakably straightforward in their language. For example, Sections 112.532(1) and (4) provide: All law enforcement officers employed by any employing agency shall have the following rights and privileges: (1) Rights of law enforcement officers while under investigation....

...McRae alleged that not only was he terminated from employment without pre-termination notice or an opportunity to be heard, but he was not reinstated following the verdict in the criminal action. Count I alleged breach of an employment contract. Count II alleged violation of section 112.532, et....

...Under the language in Hullinger, neither count would fall within the two year limitations period found in section 95.11(4)(c). Rather Count IV being an action founded on federal "statutory liability" would fall within the four year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f) [3] (as would Count II alleging a violation of section 112.532 (Police Officers' Bill of Rights))....

...state a cause of action for deprivation of a property interest without due process of law. Police Officers' Bill of Rights — Count II Sections 112.531-112.534, Florida Statutes (1989), referred to as the "Police Officers' Bill of Rights" provides: 112.532 Law enforcement officers' and correctional officers' rights....

...s such as McRae, several district courts of appeal have held that the Police Officers' Bill of Rights does not create a statutory right for damage suits against the employer agency and that the sole remedy against an employer agency for violation of section 112.532 is injunctive relief provided for in section 112.534....

...§ 201 et seq.); Count III a claim for Lost Wages; Count IV violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sutton, Howald, Jones Hansen and Cox; Count V violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hunter, Sutton, Howald, Hansen and Cox; Count VI violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hunter; and Count VII violations of Fla.Stat. § 112.532 against Hunter....

...learly established laws regarding sexual harassment and discrimination. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to overcome the Motion to Dismiss on the issue of Qualified Immunity. 6. Count VII; Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights Under Fla.Stat. § 112.532, [w]henever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, such interrogation shall be conducted in the manner proscribed by statute....

...Following a demotion, Ujcic sued in the circuit court for past wages and reinstatement to *219 his former rank of sergeant. Apopka moved for summary judgment alleging that, in failing to take advantage of the opportunity for a hearing before a police review board under section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1989), Ujcic failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by subsection 112.3187(8) of the Whistle-Blower's Act....

...We are called upon to review the issue of whether, as a prerequisite to seeking redress pursuant to the Whistle-Blower's Act, a police officer aggrieved by disciplinary action must exhaust his administrative remedies by requesting a hearing before a complaint review board as described in section 112.532....

...But the action can be pursued only after administrative remedies are exhausted. Id. The "policeman's bill of rights," found in Part VI of chapter 112, Florida Statutes (1989), prescribes certain rights for law enforcement officers while under investigation. §§ 112.532(1)(a)-(i). Subsection 112.532(2) prescribes the composition of a "complaint review board" and appears abruptly in the statute like an uncharted island in the early morning fog over a vast ocean....

...The statute remains without legislative clarification. This court has implied the irrelevancy of complaint review boards in City of Umatilla v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 422 So.2d 905 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), where we mentioned a hearing under subsection 112.532(2) "only to report the chronology of events" in that case....

...4th DCA 1977), the court adopted the attorney general's conclusion that a decision of a complaint review board is not adjudicatory but advisory only, and in Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 431 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1983), the supreme court held that complaint review boards authorized by section 112.532(2) were not created to review disciplinary action against a police officer....

...hearings were required to establish a record and make findings of fact. In Zaldivar, the hearing officer was required to recommend a penalty, and a departure from the recommendation by the agency had to be supported by citations to the record. Under section 112.532(2), no record, [1] findings of *220 fact, recommendations of penalty, or any other matter is required of proceedings conducted by a review board....

...Department that Grice, while working off duty in an apartment complex, wrongfully entered an apartment and assaulted an occupant thereof. There is no allegation that the internal investigation was not conducted in conformance with the provisions of section 112.532(1), Florida Statutes, and the applicable provisions of the Kissimmee City Charter and ordinances....

...retaining, or firing personnel and setting salaries. Finally, section 112.533 requires the Sheriff to establish and operate a system for receiving and investigating complaints against his deputies that fully complies with the procedures set forth in section 112.532, Florida Statutes....

...ents; have the entire interrogation taped; (5) be informed of constitutional rights; and (6) have an attorney or other representative present at all times whenever the interrogation relates to the officer's continued fitness for law enforcement. See § 112.532(1)(a)-(j), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 112.532 further provides an officer with the right to bring civil suit against complainants for knowingly filing false complaints, and establishes a 180-day limitations period to complete investigations of complaints. §§ 112.532(3) and (6), Fla....

...under Thurston v. Dekle, supra . Second, "The Policeman's Bill of Rights", Fla.Stat. § 112.531, et seq. (1975), mandates certain procedures which must be adhered to before any disciplinary action may be taken against a police officer. For example, Section 112.532(4) provides: Notice of disciplinary action — No dismissal, demotion, transfer, reassignment, or other personnel action which might result in loss of pay or benefits or which might otherwise be considered a punitive measure shall be t...

...12 and 119 of the Florida Statutes." City of Miami Code, art. II, § 11.5-33(e) (2002). Chapter 112 concerns internal investigations conducted by a police department of its own officers. The pertinent portions of Chapter 112 are sections 112.531 and 112.532, Florida Statutes (2007). Section 112.532, known as the "Police Officers' Bill of Rights," describes the rights and privileges of all law enforcement officers and correctional officers, and imposes conditions for investigation, "whenever a law enforcement officer or correctio...

...lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal ..." (emphasis added). That section sets forth the procedures to be followed by the police department for interrogation of a law enforcement officer under investigation by the police department. See § 112.532(1)-(6), Fla....

...vestigation by the CIP. See City of Miami Code, § 11.5-33(e) (2002). Chapter 112 governs the rights of law enforcement officers while under investigation, and it specifically exempts the police chief from internal agency investigation. §§ 112.531-112.532, Fla....

...Plaintiff further asserts that an involuntary resignation is viewed as termination, since as a non-probationary police officer, he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment under the "Police Officer's Bill of Rights" contained in Florida Statutes Section 112.532....

...In the second count, Plaintiff alleges the City of Tampa denied him his right to free speech under the First Amendment by terminating for his use of the term "nigger" in reference to a baseball league. Finally, in the third count, Plaintiff alleges that the City of Tampa denied him his rights under Florida Statutes Section 112.532 to a proper investigation of the charges prior to dismissal and the right to be informed of the complainants. Plaintiff alleges that the City Of Tampa violated Florida Statutes Section 112.532 by making threats of dismissal during questioning and offers of reward for Plaintiff's resignation....

...Plaintiff had worked with the Tampa Police Department for 26 years, advancing from a patrolman to become a major, making it probable that he knew what his rights were under the policy of the Tampa Code as well as those in the "Police Bill of Rights" contained Florida Statutes Section 112.532....

...of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the alleged facts of his complaint, Plaintiff's termination of employment must be presumed voluntary and not caused by state action. Count III states a claim under Florida Statutes Section 112.532(f) since this provision prohibits threats and offers of rewards as inducements to answer questions....

...Three weeks later the Department terminated petitioner as of September 17, 1977, relying on the first charge but withdrawing the second charge concerning the watch. Further efforts to obtain a hearing were denied. Petitioner thereupon sought relief in this court. Petitioner contends that the provisions of F.S. 112.532 require that law enforcement officers be notified of the reason for their suspension and/or termination and be afforded a hearing prior to the effective date of such action. He further contends that under subsection 2 of that statute, he is entitled to a hearing before a Complaint Review Board. The Department admits that F.S. 112.532 is applicable but claims *109 that the request for a hearing under that statute was untimely in that it was not made during the time that petitioner was "under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency." Further, the Department argues that F.S. 112.532(2) is invalid in that it does not recite the authority and procedures for a Complaint Review Board....

...West was clearly entitled to the procedural protection of the statute. The record reveals that the request was timely and no valid reason has been proffered for refusal. As to the authority and procedures of the Complaint Review Board provided by F.S. 112.532(2) it is apparent that hearings before the board must be conducted in such manner as to afford constitutional due process of law. Aside from the right of hearing afforded under the provisions of F.S. 112.532, petitioner urges that the right of due process requires that a hearing be allowed upon request when a public employee is terminated from his position under public allegations which would tend to damage his reputation, citing Board of Regents v....

...Although both parties referred to that order during oral argument before the court we find that it has not been made a part of the record before us. In any event, it can have no affect upon our decision because, as above recited, we find that both F.S. 112.532 and the " Roth doctrine" entitled petitioner to the relief sought, a hearing....

...The trial court held that if the plaintiff prevails on the issue of statutory liability for retaliation, he is only entitled to injunctive relief and not damages. The trial court reasoned that "there exists no cause of action for damages for any alleged retaliation in violation of Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1987). City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Kelly v. Gill, 544 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)." We affirm. Appellant claims damages pursuant to section 112.532, Florida Statutes, known as the "Policeman's Bill of Rights." That statute, and the part of the chapter in which it is located, delineates specific rights of police and corrections officers facing charges. Subsections (3) and (5) provide: 112.532 Law enforcement officers' and correctional officers' rights....

...Rather, we agree with the Third District's conclusion that the exclusive remedy provided for a violation of the statute is injunctive relief. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d at 1125. In Cosgrove, the court recognized that the sole remedy against an employer agency for violation of section 112.532 is the injunction provision of section 112.534, stating *216 Cosgrove suggests that his suit for damages is authorized by Section 112.532(3), which, as we read it, has nothing whatsoever to do with the employee's rights vis-a-vis his employer but simply memorializes that a policeman shall have the right to sue other persons for damages suffered by the officer in the performance of his official duties....

...City of Lauderhill, 415 So.2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), decision approved, 431 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1983), this court recognized that section 112.534 does not create a new substantive right to injunctive relief, but was enacted solely for the purpose of enforcing section 112.532. Whatever common law causes of action appellant may have, if any, for the city's alleged acts of retaliation, arise independently of the statute. Subsection (3) of 112.532 does not create a new civil action....

...gh the City's existing civil service procedures. At one point, the City, as an alternative to its preferred position, offered to submit grievances regarding discharge or demotion to a panel of law enforcement officers similar to that provided for by Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...proceedings to determine whether actual malice existed, which would have to be proved in order to vitiate the qualified privilege. [5] Appellant's second point on appeal dealing with the rights of law enforcement officers while under investigation, § 112.532, Florida Statutes (1974), has been considered and determined to be without merit....

...gh termination only for cause." However, Plaintiff does not point to a specific part of the statute that indicates that a private cause of action for negligence for failure to follow the statute was intended. Any reliance Plaintiff has on Fla. Stat. § 112.532 is entirely erroneous as Fla. Stat. § 112.534 makes it clear that injunctive relief is the only remedy for violations of § 112.532....

...Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief against the City of Palatka for violations of his freedom of speech and right of association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violations of his rights under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights contained in Section 112.532, Florida Statutes. Id. The City of Palatka moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claim asserted under Florida Statutes § 112.532 and that motion was granted on May 16, 2006 (Doc....

...e him for failing to complete its investigation of his violation of the Department's rules within 180 days of the date another correctional officer reported Appellant's infraction to the warden. Appellant claims that reinstatement was required under section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), a provision of the Law Enforcement Officers' ("LEO") Bill of Rights....

...l Officer's [sic] Bill of Rights" and indicated that he would present additional arguments on this point at a later time. Appellant expounded on this point in his proposed recommended order in which he proposed, among other things, a conclusion that section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), barred the Department from proceeding with discipline for the charge because more than 180 days had passed between the day the warden signed the incident report and the time the Department took disciplinary action....

...The hearing officer issued a recommended order concluding that the Department had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had cause to discipline Appellant and that Appellant had failed to prove that mitigation of the Department's discipline decision was justified. In response to Appellant's concern about section 112.532(6)(a), the hearing officer noted that Appellant was correct that more than 180 days elapsed between the time the warden learned of Appellant's alleged infraction and the time the Department gave Appellant a predetermination notice of disciplinary action....

...by a private citizen. Appellant's exception to this conclusion was denied, and his appeal was dismissed. In his appeal from the order of dismissal, Appellant argues that we should reverse because the Commission failed to apply the plain language of section 112.532(6)(a), which provides as follows: Except as provided in this subsection, no disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal shall be undertaken by an agency against a law enforcement officer or correctional officer for any act, omission,...

...In contrast, if the statute is outside the agency's area of expertise, the standard of review is simply de novo. Id. In this case, under either standard of review, the Commission reached the result that was required by controlling precedent. The Commission concluded that section 112.532(6)(a) did not apply to Appellant's case because the complaint leading to his discipline was generated internally, rather than received from a person outside the Department....

...Department of Corrections, 24 F.C.S.R. 200 (2009), James v. Department of Corrections, 23 F.C.S.R. 41, 42 (2008), and Abbott v. Department of Corrections, 6 F.C.S.R. 190, 190 (1991). Those cases reveal that the basis for the Commission's decision to interpret section 112.532(6)(a) results from its application of Migliore v....

...City of Lauderhill, 415 So.2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), which was adopted as the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 431 So.2d 986, 987 (Fla.1983). See, e.g., James v. Dep't of Corr., 23 F.C.S.R. 41, 42 (2008) (citing Migliore to support the holding that section 112.532(6)(a), Fla....

...During the internal investigation of the complaints, the officers were ordered to submit to a polygraph test, and they refused. Id. As a result of this refusal, they were dismissed from employment. Id. After their dismissal, the officers sought to have a "complaint review board" empaneled pursuant to section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981). Id. In 1981, section 112.532(2) read as follows: COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARDS.—A complaint review board shall be composed of three members: One member *493 selected by the chief administrator of the agency; one member selected by the aggrieved officer; and a third member to be selected by the other two members....

...tute "provid[ed] a law enforcement officer with a means of vindicating his actions and his reputation against unjust and unjustifiable claims made against him by persons outside the agency which employ[ed] him." Id. The court explained that sections 112.532(2) and 112.533, Florida Statutes (1981), were "to be utilized for disposition of complaints made by outside persons and [were] not intended to provide a forum for any issue other than whether a complaint has a basis in fact." Id....

...investigations, complaints, and disciplinary action as a result of claims made against an officer by persons outside the agency [that] employs him"). In the absence of Migliore, we would be inclined to agree with Appellant that the plain language of section 112.532(6)(a) indicates that the 180-day rule for completing an investigation applies to the investigation of any allegation regardless of where it originates....

....2d at 63-64. The Migliore court concluded that a law enforcement agency's "receipt" of a complaint, as that language was used in section 112.534, Florida Statutes (1981), *494 meant its receipt of a complaint from a person outside the agency. Under section 112.532(6)(a), the 180-day period for completing an investigation begins when the agency "receives notice of the allegation." Thus, the concept of the agency's receipt of an allegation or complaint is as vital to an interpretation of section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), as it was to the Fourth District's interpretation of section 112.534, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...the Commission are bound by that interpretation. Regarding the pertinent statutory language, Migliore is not materially distinguishable. Accordingly, based on the Migliore court's interpretation of the term "receipt," we are constrained to hold that section 112.532(6)(a)'s 180-day rule did not apply to the instant case, where Appellant's violation of Department rules was discovered internally. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Migliore left room for an different interpretation of the term "receives" as used in section 112.532(6)(a), we would affirm because the Commission lacked authority to provide Appellant relief for a violation of the LEO Bill of Rights....

...e only one available to Appellant, per the decisions in Cosgrove and Migliore. We recognize that the statutory remedy provided for violation of the LEO Bill of Rights gave Appellant a short window of opportunity for an officer to assert rights under section 112.532(6)(a)....

...For these reasons, the Commission's final order dismissing Appellant's career service appeal is AFFIRMED. KAHN, J., CONCURS, and CLARK, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION. CLARK, J., dissenting. I would reverse the PERC's affirmance of the disciplinary action because section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes is not limited to actions stemming from complaints from persons outside the agency....

...'s affirmance of this decision was likewise erroneous. There was no dispute of fact and all parties agreed that more than 180 days elapsed between the filing of the "incident report" and the date of the notice to the employee of disciplinary action. Section 112.532(6), Florida Statutes clearly states: (6) LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS.— (a) Except as provided in this subsection, disciplinary action, suspension, demotion, or dismissal may not be undertaken by an agency against a la...

...of the alleged misconduct ... [with exceptions not applicable here]. The statute does not require a correctional officer to defend against untimely disciplinary action by filing an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court. The provision in section 112.532(3) recognizing that correctional officers may bring suit for damages for violation of the officer's civil rights has no effect on the limitations period for agency disciplinary action in section 112.532(6)....

...The absence of a pending civil lawsuit for damages by the correctional officer to vindicate his or her civil rights does not extend the limitations period or otherwise make untimely agency disciplinary action timely. There is no uncertainty in the language of section 112.532(6) which needs interpretation, and no language which restricts the application of the limitations period to those disciplinary actions resulting from complaints from outside the agency. The case of Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 431 So.2d 986 (Fla.1983), upon which the PERC relied in this case, did not pertain to the limitations period for state agency disciplinary actions set out in section 112.532(6), Florida Statutes. In Migliore, city police officers who had been discharged sought the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the City of Lauderhill to reinstate them, award them back pay, and to empanel a complaint review board as provided for in section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981). The Florida Supreme Court held that complaint review boards under section 112.532(2) were not created to review agency disciplinary action taken against city police officers....

...exhaust their City of Lauderhill administrative remedies available from the city's civil service board prior to seeking the extraordinary writ of mandamus or injunctive relief to compel official action. Nothing in the Migliore opinion indicates that section 112.532, Florida Statutes applies only in situations where members of the public file complaints against employed law enforcement or correctional officers, and not to investigations initiated by an incident report from within the agency....

...The "outside complaint" limitation for complaint review board proceedings was suggested in the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415 So.2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). There, when speculating as to the function of a complaint review board as described in section 112.532(2), the District Court of Appeal looked to the phrase "receipt, investigation, and determination of complaints received by such employing agency from any person." § 112.533(1)(a), Fla....

...officer. Had the legislature intended to place a time limit only upon disciplinary actions resulting from external complaints and not upon disciplinary actions originating within the employing agency, it would have specified such differentiation in section 112.532. Because there is no language in the statute indicating any such division based upon the source of the allegation of wrongdoing by the correctional officer, the Department of Corrections' refusal to apply section 112.532(6) in this case was an erroneous interpretation of the law and should have been reversed by the PERC....

...The 2009 amendments to chapter 112, Florida Statutes, were not effective until July 1, 2009, which was after the date Appellant claims his right to reinstatement was perfected under chapter 112. Therefore, the 2008 version of chapter 112 applies to the issue raised in this appeal. [2] Section 112.532(6)(a) then sets forth exceptions not applicable to this case.

...§ 1983 (Count I), and his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association (Count II). Plaintiff also raises pendent and supplemental claims alleging that Defendants' actions and failures defamed his personal and business reputation (Count III), and violated his rights under Florida Statute 112.532, Policemen's Bill of Rights (Count IV)....

...thus, finds that Plaintiff falls short of stating a claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motions to dismiss Count III will be granted. COUNT IV: POLICEMEN'S BILL OF RIGHTS Defendant, Key West, argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under § 112.532....

...The arbitrator arguably may have construed Article 9.1 of the CBA to require the employer to make a thorough and impartial evaluation of the seriousness of the offense. And application of the double jeopardy concept ultimately "draw[s] its essence from the contract" because the CBA incorporates by reference section 112.532(4)(a), Florida Statutes, requiring written notice of disciplinary action....

...§ 1983, for denial of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. Hunt argues that "Mulberry, Satchel, and Smith violated Hunt's rights by failing to follow appropriate procedures when terminating him, including but not limited to, the procedures set forth in the Police Officers' Bill of Rights, Section 112.532, et seq., Florida Statutes, and Mulberry's own Employee Handbook." ( See Complaint, Dkt....

...ndividual capacities. Immunity from liability under these counts was denied for Hindery as sheriff, the County, and the City. Pertinent to the present appeal, with regard to Bailey's attempt to state a cause of action in Counts VII and VIII based on section 112.532, Florida Statutes, the Police *301 Officers' Bill of Rights, the district court stated: It provides certain protections to officers under investigation or subject to disciplinary action by their employer....

...ourt for an injunction to restrain and enjoin the violations and to compel performance in keeping with the Officers' Bill of Rights. Fla. Stat. § 112.534. Defendants correctly point out that section 112.534 is the exclusive remedy for violations of section 112.532. See City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App. 1987). In Cosgrove, the officer sued the City for violations of subsections 112.532(4) and (5), which deal with notice of disciplinary action and retaliation for exercise of rights. The court held that the officer's sole remedy was through section 112.534 and, therefore, ordered that the claims for damages pursuant to section 112.532(3) be dismissed. Florida Statutes, section 112.532(3) provides: Every law enforcement officer or correctional officer shall have the right to bring civil suit against any person, group of persons, or organization or corporation, or the head of such organization or corporation, for dam...

...ng the performance of the officer's official duties or for abridgment of the officer's civil rights arising out of the officer's performance of official duties. The Third District Court of Appeal noted that Cosgrove's claim focused on a violation of section 112.532 alone....

...by the constitution and laws of Florida. Thus, to the extent that Bailey seeks damages for violation of his rights under Florida's constitution, summary judgment is DENIED. To the extent that Bailey seeks damages for violations of Florida Statutes, section 112.532, summary judgment is GRANTED....

...on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their state suit, as they had done in their federal suit, the Baileys contended that Bailey's arrest, without probable cause and without due process, violated his rights under the Police Officers' Bill of Rights set forth in section 112.532, Florida Statutes....

...The appellate court noted, Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1119, that none of these directed verdicts were at issue in the appeal. Included within the rulings of the district court, not appealed, was the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on Bailey's claim that he was entitled to damages for violations of section 112.532, Florida Statutes....

...Turning to Count IV, the claim against the City, County, Hindery, Allison, Cole and Tobin for damages arising out of abridgment of Bailey's civil rights, the circuit court noted that the federal district court had considered the charge of an alleged violation of the Policemen's Bill of Rights, section 112.532, and dismissed the claim. [10] The circuit court agreed with the district court's interpretation of Cosgrove and therefore all claims based on *305 a violation of section 112.532 were dismissed with prejudice....

...false arrest or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or conspiracy. [14] Regarding Counts IV and V, Bailey's principal assertion is that he should be permitted to litigate his claim for damages for violations of the Police Officers' Bill of Rights, section 112.532(1) and (3), Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 1987) is erroneous, and that this court is not bound to follow this erroneous decision. However, even if this court does not wish to reject the reasoning of the Cosgrove decision, Bailey contends that the decision is distinguishable since that decision involved application of section 112.532(4) and (5) of the Police Officers' Bill of Rights, whereas he is seeking a remedy for violations of section 112.532(1)....

...Bailey urges that the Cosgrove holding should be restricted to mean only that the proper remedy for violations of subsections (4) and (5) — (but not 1) — is an injunction rather than damages. Appellees respond that the federal district court adjudicated Bailey's claim under section 112.532 against him, an appeal was taken in which the federal district court's order on this point was not challenged, and therefore this issue, whether correctly decided or not, has been adjudicated against Bailey and the doctrine of res judicata applies. We agree. 32 Fla.Jur.2d Judgments and Decrees, § 98. In any event, case law interpreting section 112.532 uniformly holds that this section creates no cause of action for damages....

...George Smith was a probationary police officer employed by the town of Golden Beach when he was discharged from his position without prior written notice on June 28,1978. When the town failed to act on Smith’s request for review by a Complaint Review Board pursuant to Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1979), Smith *1347 filed suit against the town of Golden Beach, Richard Granata and James Roden as police chief of the town of Golden Beach....

...Smith alleged violation of his right to due process under the Florida Constitution and the Constitution of the United States claiming that he was entitled to the process of review offered by the statute because he had been interrogated within the meaning of Section 112.532(1), Florida Statutes (1979) and had not been afforded his right to pre-termination notice under Section 112.532(4)....

...In determining whether there are any conceivable sets of facts which would support Smith’s claims under Section 112.531, et. seq. and the Constitutions of the United States and Florida against a motion to dismiss, we must first determine whether Smith as a probationary police officer is entitled under Section 112.532 to the rights of the law enforcement officers enumerated in subsections one through five of that Section, and second, whether Smith had either a property or liberty interest which required procedural protection....

...Section 112.531(1), Florida Statutes (1979) 2 in holding that a probationary policeman was not entitled to a pre-termi-nation hearing. Though Smith argues with some force that the provision granting rights to “all law enforcement officers” under Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1979) includes probationary employees, we disagree....

...expectation of continuing employment for probationary employees. Accordingly, we hold that a probationary police officer is not “employed full time” within the meaning of Section 112.531(1) and is not entitled to the rights and privileges under Section 112.532....

...Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution. Cf. West v. State Department of Criminal Law Enforcement, 371 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (finding a permanent employee entitled to the procedure of § 112.532(2) both under the statute itself and under the constitutional requirements of due process)....

...See also Wardlow v. City of Miami, 372 So.2d 976 (Fla.3d DCA 1979) (no stigma where statement privileged), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 414 (Fla.1981). Because there are no grounds which support Smith’s claim to a review board under Section 112.532 or under the United States and Florida Constitutions, the trial court correctly granted appellees’ motion to dismiss....

requirements of s.112.532(1)(i), F.S., is offered. Section 112.532, F.S., also known as the Florida Law Enforcement

following question: Does the requirement in section 112.532(1)(h), Florida Statutes, that a law enforcement

...to whether it was necessary or appropriate to refer to the officers by pseudonyms under the circumstances of this case because that issue is not before us. 3 112.534” to the police chief. The notice alleged that, in violation of sections 112.532 and 112.533, Officer A was not provided a complete copy of the investigative file and that non-law enforcement personnel (namely the HR department employee) participated in the internal affairs investigation....

...The police chief denied the request for a compliance review hearing based upon Officer A’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements in section 112.534. Officer A was subsequently afforded a so-called “Bill of Rights Conference” pursuant to section 112.532(4)(b) at which he was given an opportunity to address the findings in the investigative report....

...The notice also advised Officer B of his right to another Bill of Rights Conference. On the morning of the second Bill of Rights Conference, Officer B submitted a “notice to come into compliance” to the investigator. The notice alleged the investigation had exceeded the 180-day period provided in section 112.532(6)(a) and that the police department violated Officer B’s rights under the LEO Bill of Rights by not providing him with the results of the polygraph examination. Officer B was provided a copy of the polygraph examination results that same day....

...5  Several days later, Officer B submitted a written “Notice of Intentional Violation and Demand for Compliance Review Hearing Pursuant to Florida Statute 112.534” to the police chief. The notice alleged that, in violation of sections 112.532 and 112.533, Officer B was not provided a complete copy of the investigative file (namely, the polygraph examination results) and that the investigation exceeded 180 days....

...2d 638, 644-45 (Fla. 1999). The LEO Bill of Rights affords law enforcement officers and correctional officers various rights when the officer is subject to an investigation by his or her agency that could result in disciplinary action. See § 112.532, Fla....

...before it is imposed; the right to a transcript of any interrogation; the right to a complete copy of the investigatory file; and the right to address the findings in the investigatory report with the agency before the disciplinary action is imposed. See §§ 112.532(1)(d), (1)(g), (1)(i), (4)(a), (4)(b), Fla....

...Additionally, the LEO Bill of Rights prescribes the conditions under which any interrogation of the officer must be conducted, including limitations on the time, place, manner, and length of the interrogation, and restrictions on the interrogation techniques. See §§ 112.532(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(f), Fla....

...forded a compliance review hearing to “clear his name.” We are not persuaded, however, that the Legislature intended the compliance review hearing to be a name-clearing hearing (as appears to be the case with the complaint review boards under section 112.532(2)); rather, as explained above, it is clear from an in toto reading of section 112.534 that the exclusive purpose of the compliance review hearing is to remedy violations of the LEO Bill of Rights occurring during the investigatio...

...ings are available to review alleged intentional violations of the LEO Bill of Rights arising in an investigation of complaint made by a person within the officer’s agency. Our resolution of this issue begins with statutory language in sections 112.532 and 112.534, but also requires us to consider the McQuade decision relied on by the trial court. Section 112.532 broadly provides, without qualification or exemption,4 that the rights listed in that statute are available “whenever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer is under investigation . . . for any reason.” § 112.532(1), Fla. Stat....

...ailability of a compliance review hearing to the source of the complaint. Instead, the statute provides a remedy when an agency or investigator “fails to comply with the requirements of 4 See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 90-65 (1990) (observing that section 112.532(1) “contains no qualifications or exemptions from the requirement that the rights contained in s. 112.532, F.S....

...provide for compliance review hearings only to remedy alleged violations arising out of investigations of external complaints because the source of the complaint has no bearing on most of the rights afforded by the LEO Bill of Rights. See, e.g., § 112.532(1) (rights during interrogation), (4) (right to advance notice of disciplinary action), (5) (protection against retaliation), Fla....

...w enforcement agency,” our analysis would not be complete without considering that decision. McQuade was an appeal of a final order of the Public Employees Relations 5 See McQuade, 51 So. 3d at 494 (holding that the 180-day period in section 112.532(6)(a) does not apply to internal complaints); Migliore, 415 So. 2d at 64 (holding that the purpose of the complaint review boards in section 112.532(2) is to provide the officer a means to vindicate his actions and reputations against claims made by persons outside the officer’s agency). 6 See Op....

...was fired by the Department of Corrections as a result of a complaint made by another correctional officer. See 51 So. 3d at 491. The officer argued that the Department was barred from taking disciplinary action against him because, in violation of section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), more than 180 days passed between the date of the complaint and his firing. Id. PERC rejected this argument and dismissed the officer’s appeal. Id. Upon review of the dismissal order, this court affirmed PERC’s conclusion that the 180-day period in section 112.532(6)(a) does not apply to internal complaints....

...This holding was based largely on the Fourth District’s decision Migliore, which was adopted verbatim by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 493-94. The issue in Migliore was whether the purpose of the complaint review boards provided for in section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981), was to review disciplinary action against a law enforcement officer....

...for the disposition of complaints made by persons outside of the law enforcement or correctional officer’s agency and not for review of disciplinary action against law enforcement officers”). McQuade reasoned that the 180-day period in section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), does not apply to internal complaints because the period is triggered by the receipt of a complaint and “[t]he Migliore court concluded that a law enforcement’s ‘receipt’ of a complaint, as t...

...(2008)] through the circuit court, rather than [PERC].” Id. at 494. Contrary to the City’s argument in this appeal, McQuade did not hold that the entire LEO Bill of Rights is inapplicable to internal complaints. It merely held that the 180-day period in section 112.532(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), does not apply to internal complaints....

...Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)). That, however, was not the holding of Migliore or the Kelly case cited in McQuade for this proposition. 9 As discussed above, the narrow issue decided in Migliore was whether the complaint review boards provided for in section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1981), had authority to review disciplinary action taken against an officer....

...In sum, neither McQuade, Migliore, nor Kelly stand for the broad proposition that the LEO Bill of Rights only applies when the officer is under investigation based upon an external complaint, and to the contrary, the plain language of sections 112.532 and 112.534 do not limit compliance review hearings based upon the source of the complaint....

...possible investigative misconduct in such a report, from seeking a compliance review hearing even though the investigative work is deemed complete at that 26 point. Because investigations may be continued or reopened under section 112.532(6)(b) if new evidence is discovered, drawing a judicial line at too early a point could have the unintended effect of depriving officers of remedies prematurely in some instances. Given the statute’s remedial nature, the b...

...City of Hallandale , 4 Part VI of Chapter 112 , Florida Statutes, applies only to " intra departmental interrogation and investigation, and [has] as its purpose the protection of subordinate officers from `third degree' tactics by superior officers. . . ." 5 (emphasis supplied by the court.) Section 112.532 (1), Florida Statutes, requires that whenever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer, as defined in section 112.531 (1) and (2), Florida Statutes, is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of the employing agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, the interrogation shall be conducted under the conditions prescribed by the statute. 6 Section 112.532 , Florida Statutes, also sets forth other rights and privileges possessed by law enforcement officers and correctional officers, including the establishment of complaint review boards; 7 the right of law enforcement officers and corre...

...nd a determination of whether to proceed with disciplinary action or file charges. Although section 112.533 (2), Florida Statutes, establishes the composition of complaint review boards, it does not state when and how such boards should function. 13 Section 112.532 (2), Florida Statutes, provides that: "A complaint review board shall be composed of three members: One member selected by the chief administrator of the agency or unit; one member selected by the aggrieved officer; and a third member to be selected by the other two members....

...e review. Sincerely, Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tgk 1 Sections 112.531 through 112.534 , Fla. Stat. 2 See, e.g., Mesa v. Rodriguez , 357 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1978); Ragucci v. City of Plantation, 407 So.2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). 3 See , s. 112.532 , Fla....

...." 4 42 Fla. Supp. 53, 57 (17th Cir. Broward Co., 1975), affirmed , 331 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied , 341 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1976). 5 Cf ., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 86-26 (1986). 6 See , Ops. Att'y Gen. Fla. 86-91 (1986) and 75-41 (1975). 7 Section 112.532 (2), Fla. Stat. 8 Section 112.532 (3), Fla. Stat. 9 Section 112.532 (4), Fla. Stat. 10 Section 112.532 (5), Fla....

no rights under ss. 112.531-112.534, F.S.). Section 112.532(1), F.S., requires that whenever a law enforcement

...(stating that in determining whether the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, a court “must look ‘to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy’” (quoting State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480, 486 (Fla. 2006))); see, e.g., § 112.532(1)(a), Fla....

...(2012) (stating “[w]henever a law enforcement officer . . . is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, suspension, demotion or dismissal, the interrogation must be under the following conditions”); § 112.532(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (titled “Notice of disciplinary action”); § 112.532(5), Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that no law enforcement officer may be “discharged; disciplined; demoted; denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment” in retaliation for exercising his or her rights under the PBR); § 112.532(6), Fla....

...Daragjati, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Howard M. Maltz, Deputy General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), appeals a final judgment determining that the confidentiality requirements in sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), commonly referred to as the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights, are inapplicable to investigations conducted by the Response to Resistance Board (Board) within the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office's (JSO). Because we conclude that the Board's investigations are subject to the confidentiality provisions in sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a), we reverse....

...n the review of an officer's use of force. FOP petitioned the Circuit Court of Duval County for declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to declare that the Board's open meeting format violates the confidentiality requirements of sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 112.532(4)(b) provides for confidentiality during an ongoing disciplinary investigation "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s....

...ritten complaint and commences an investigation based on that written complaint, not when a law enforcement agency conducts an investigation pursuant to its internal operating procedures. The circuit court also found the confidentiality provision in section 112.532(4)(b) inapplicable to Board investigations because that section states that the "contents of the complaint and investigation" must be kept confidential, yet the Board can commence an investigation without a complaint. Based on the plain language of section 112.532(4)(b), however, we disagree with the circuit court's construction of the statute. We conclude that an investigation within the meaning of section 112.532(4)(b) occurs whenever a law enforcement or correctional officer faces possible dismissal, demotion, or suspension without pay, and because the Board's investigation may result in such discipline, the investigation triggers the confidentiality protections in section 112.532(4)(b). Appellees, Sheriff John Rutherford and the City of Jacksonville, argue that because both sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a) use the term "complaint" and the Board convenes based on a standing general order, not a complaint, confidentiality need not be afforded to Board investigations....

...aint filed with a law enforcement agency. Id. at 317-18. We conclude that the rationale of Barfield inapplicable here. At the time the Fourth District decided Barfield, it construed only section 112.533(2)(a) because the confidentiality provision in section 112.532 had not been enacted yet. [2] When the two sections are read in pari materia, *488 as emphasized by the clause "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of s. 112.533(2)" at the beginning of section 112.532(4)(b), we conclude that the confidentiality rights afforded by section 112.532(4)(b) are broader than those provided by section 112.533(2)(a), and apply to ongoing investigations whenever a law enforcement or correctional officer faces possible dismissal, demotion, or suspension without pay. Because we conclude that section 112.532(4)(b) requires confidentiality of ongoing Board investigations, we do not reach the issue of whether a written complaint is required in order to trigger confidentiality under section 112.533(2)(a). We recognize that the confidentiality provisions in sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a) are exemptions from the public's general right to access public records and meetings, see Art. I, § 24, Fla. Const.; § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat., and must be narrowly construed in favor of disclosure. Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So.2d 326, 332-33 (Fla.2007). However, we conclude that under the plain language of sections 112.532(4)(b) and 112.533(2)(a), the confidentiality of those sections applies only during the period of investigation, and public scrutiny is afforded as soon as "the employing law enforcement agency makes a final determination whether or not to issue a notice of disciplinary action," § 112.532(4)(b), Fla....

...In enacting the statutes, the Legislature created a narrowly-tailored exemption from public disclosure. The statutes do not prohibit public access but merely delay it until the Board completes or abandons its investigation. Because the plain language of section 112.532(4)(b) affords confidentiality to law enforcement officers who face potential discipline as a result of a Board investigation and the infringement on the public's general right to access is limited, we hold that the Board must keep inf...

...is warranted." We find this change inconsequential, as the officer being investigated is still subject to potential discipline as a result of the Board's recommendation to the sheriff. [2] The legislature did not add the confidentiality language to section 112.532 until 2003....

...According to information received from your office, the current policy is to treat these inactive files as public records. Part VI, Chapter 112 , Florida Statutes, contains what is commonly referred to as the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights. 2 Section 112.532 , Florida Statutes, sets forth the rights and privileges of law enforcement and correctional officers while they are under investigation, establishes the composition of complaint review boards, requires that officers receive notice of...

...s, were applicable to any complaint against a law enforcement officer filed with the employing agency by any person, whether within or outside the agency. 10 You also refer to Attorney General Opinion 86-91. That opinion considered the provisions of section 112.532 , Florida Statutes, which addressed the convening of complaint review boards....

...Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tjw 1 See , Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 95-41 (1995). 2 Id . 3 Section 2, Ch. 00-184, Laws of Florida. The act became effective July 1, 2000. See, s. 5, Ch. 00-184, Laws of Florida. 4 See, s. 2, Ch. 89-223, Laws of Florida. 5 Cf., 112.532 (1)(d), Fla. Stat., requiring that the officer under investigation be informed of the nature, i.e., the type or general character, of the investigation and the name of the complainant prior to interrogation; Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 86-26 (1986) (s. 112.532 (1)(d) does not require affirmative disclosure of specific items of evidence or specific statements of complainants and officer's right to be informed of the name of all complainants requires nothing more than that he or she be furnished with such names)....

Ms. Jerri A. Blair Wildwood City Attorney Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Dear Ms. Blair: On behalf of the City of Wildwood, you ask substantially the following question: Does section 112.532 (1), Florida Statutes, apply to a situation where a police officer, as defined in section 112.531 (1), Florida Statutes, is accused of violating the agency's rules and regulations? In sum: Section 112.532 (1), Florida Statutes, applies to any situation in which a law enforcement agency is conducting an internal investigation of a law enforcement officer, as defined in section 112.531 , Florida Statutes, and the officer is subject to interrogation by members of the law enforcement agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal. Thus, the rights and privileges afforded by section 112.532 (1) would be applicable to situations in which the officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by his or her agency based upon an alleged violation of the agency's rules and regulations....

...whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state; and includes any person who is appointed by the sheriff as a deputy sheriff pursuant to s. 30.07 ." (e.s.) Section 112.532 , Florida Statutes, provides that all law enforcement officers employed by an employing agency shall have certain specified rights and privileges....

...t review boards; 3 the right to bring civil suits; 4 the right to have notice of disciplinary action; 5 and the prohibition against retaliatory action being taken against law enforcement officers or correctional officers who exercise their rights. 6 Section 112.532 (1), Florida Statutes, specifically requires that "[w]henever a law enforcement officer or correctional officer 7 is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his or her agency for any reason which could lead to d...

...ceives a complaint from outside the agency. In Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 8 the district court, in an opinion subsequently adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, considered the scope and purpose of complaint review boards established pursuant to section 112.532 (2), Florida Statutes. The court noted that neither section 112.532 (2) nor any other applicable law explicates the function of the complaint review board: "[T]here is nothing to indicate that a policeman [law enforcement officer or correctional officer] has a right to have his dismissal reviewed by the board....

..."providing a law enforcement officer with a means of vindicating his actions and his reputation against unjust and unjustifiable claims made against him by persons outside the agency which employs him." 10 The court concluded: "Sections 112.533 and 112.532 (2) are to be utilized for disposition of complaints made by outside persons and are not intended to provide a forum for any issue other than whether a particular complaint has a basis in fact." 11 Since the appellants in Migliore were dismis...

...an outside complaint, but for their refusal to obey the order of a superior officer, the court held that a complaint review board was not available to test the validity of their dismissal. The Migliore court, however, recognized the broader scope of section 112.532 (4), Florida Statutes, which required notice for dismissal, demotion, transfer, reassignment, or other personnel action that might result in a loss of pay or benefits....

...f outside complaints, the court stated that if the Legislature had intended complaint review boards to consider situations such as those set forth in subsection (4), it clearly could have referenced that subsection. The language of subsection (1) of section 112.532 , Florida Statutes, is equally broad....

...Based upon the statutory changes, 14 this office concluded that the provisions of section 112.533 , Florida Statutes, were applicable to any complaint against a law enforcement officer filed with the employing agency by any person, whether within or outside the agency. 15 Accordingly, I am of the opinion that section 112.532 (1), Florida Statutes, applies to any situation in which a law enforcement agency is conducting an internal investigation of a law enforcement officer, as defined in section 112.531 (1), Florida Statutes, and the officer is subject to interrogation by members of the law enforcement agency for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal. Thus, the rights and privileges afforded by section 112.532 (1) would be applicable to situations in which the officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by his or her agency based upon a violation of the agency's rules and regulations. Sincerely, Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tjw 1 Sections 112.531 - 112.534 , Fla. Stat. 2 42 Fla. Supp. 53, 57 (17th Cir. Broward Co., 1975), affirmed , 331 So.2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. den ., 341 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1976). 3 Section 112.532 (2), Fla. Stat. 4 Section 112.532 (3), Fla. Stat. 5 Section 112.532 (4), Fla. Stat. 6 Section 112.532 (5), Fla....

...4th DCA 1982), approved , 431 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1983). 9 415 So.2d at 64 . 10 Id . 11 415 So.2d at 64 . 12 See, Black's Law Dictionary Any p. 86 (5th ed. 1979); Webster's Third New International Dictionary Any p. 97 (unabridged ed. 1981) ("one, no matter what one: every"). 13 Cf., s. 112.532 (1)(j), Fla....

...The Police Department has notified the Plaintiffs that it is considering discharging them. The Plaintiffs contend they did not receive notice of the possibility of discharge within 180 days after the date the Department received notice of their misconduct, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 112.532(6)....

...e was serving overseas in the military at the time and was unavailable. Defendant's Exhibit 5. He was served upon his return on September 3, 2007. Defendant's Exhibit 6. LEGAL ISSUES The statute governing the issues raised in this case is Fla. Stat. § 112.532, which provides: All law enforcement officers and correctional officers employed by or appointed to a law enforcement agency or a correctional agency shall have the following rights and privileges: (6) Limitations period for disciplinary a...

...§ 112.533(2)(b) for the proposition that an "investigation will be presumed to be inactive if no finding is made within 45 days after the complaint is filed." [2] This provision is inapplicable to this case for two reasons. First, this case is governed by Fla. Stat. § 112.532(6)(a)(2), dealing with the tolling of the 180-day time limitation, not by § 112.533(2)(b), which deals with the exemption of internal affairs investigative information from the public records laws. Subsection 112.532(6)(a)(2) does not use the term "active" and instead provides for the tolling of the limitations period "during the time that any criminal investigation or prosecution is pending in connection with the act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct" (emphasis added)....

...Bank, 692 So.2d 146, 152 (Fla.1997) (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995). Because the legislature used the term "active" and included a 45-day presumption of inactivity in § 112.533(2)(b), but not in § 112.532(6)(a), the court cannot insert the term or the presumption by implication into the latter section....

...inal investigations in subsection 119.011(3)(d)(2). Because the investigation in this case was criminal in nature, subsection 112.533(2)(b) by its express terms does not apply. Even if the presumption on inactivity did generally apply to cases under § 112.532, it has been outweighed by the evidence presented in this case....

...IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER UNDER INVESTIGATION BY MEMBERS OF HIS AGENCY LEGALLY ENTITLED TO REVIEW EVIDENCE OR SPECIFIC STATEMENTS OF COMPLAINANTS PRIOR TO INTERROGATION? Your inquiry states that the above questions arise in the context of Part VI of Ch. 112 , F.S., and more specifically under s. 112.532 , F.S., granting certain "rights and privileges" to law enforcement officers employed by an employing agency....

...and whose primary responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state;" and see s. 112.531 (3), F.S., defining "employing agency" as, inter alia, "any municipality . . . which employs law enforcement officers" as therein defined. Section 112.532 (1), F.S., provides in part pertinent to your questions as follows: Whenever a law enforcement officer ....

...k and honest replies to questions relevant to his fitness to hold public office" (citing to Beilan v. Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 399 [1958]. Cf., Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1983). Section 112.532 (1)(f), F.S., plainly provides that a law enforcement officer under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal "shall not ....

...ction if he fails to obey an order to give an administrative statement for departmental internal review. Rather, I am of the view that such course of conduct constitutes the type of threatening action prohibited by the terms of the first sentence of s. 112.532 (1)(f), F.S. An examination of the second sentence of s. 112.532 (1)(f) indicates that the subsection relates to prohibited means of inducing an officer to answer questions during interrogation, whether by threats or rewards....

...fectuated and that intent must be gathered from consideration of the statute as a whole. Paskind v. State ex rel. Salcines, 390 So.2d 1198 (2 D.C.A.Fla., 1980); State ex rel. Register v. Safer, 368 So.2d 620 (1 D.C.A. Fla., 1979). A consideration of s. 112.532 (1)(f) as a whole compels the conclusion that the subsection operates to prohibit investigators from inducing a law enforcement officer under investigation by his agency to make a statement by threatening disciplinary action if he fails to obey an order to make such a statement. Accordingly, your first question is answered in the negative. QUESTION TWO Section 112.532 (1)(d), F.S., grants a law enforcement officer under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal the right to "be informed of the n...

...igation." Therefore, such phrase must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. Southeastern Fisheries Association, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, supra; Milazzo v. State, supra; State v. Stewart, supra. "Nature" in the sense employed in s. 112.532 (1)(d) would appear to mean "kind, sort, type, or . . . general character." See, 65 C.J.S. Nature, p. 55. Thus, the officer's right pursuant to s. 112.532 (1)(d), F.S., to be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to interrogation requires only that he be informed of the kind, sort, type, or general character of the investigation; it does not require affirmative disclosure of specific items of evidence or specific statements of complainants....

...t or correctional officers applies to complaints filed by anyone). Accordingly, your second question is answered in the negative. In sum, then, and unless and until legislatively or judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that, pursuant to s. 112.532 , F.S., 1....

Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights. Section 112.532 identifies the rights granted to law enforcement

officer's representative, chosen pursuant to section 112.532(1)(i), Florida Statutes, authorized to review

"Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights." Section 112.532, Florida Statutes, grants a law enforcement

is being investigated may be interviewed. Section 112.532, prescribing law enforcement officers' and

hearing, and (2) certain rights guaranteed by Section 112.532(1) et seq., Florida Statutes (1977), had been

QUESTION: Are the complaint review boards provided for by s. 112.532 (2), F. S., quasi-judicial bodies possessing adjudicatory powers? SUMMARY: Complaint review boards provided for by s. 112.532 (2), F....

...In either case, a municipality may not provide for any type of judicial review of the action of any such board or confer or require any appellate jurisdiction on or of any court, for such a power is reserved to the state, which has not by statute made a provision therefor. Your question as stated is answered in the negative. Section 112.532 (2), F....

...S., deprive the affected police officer of any rights provided employees by the municipality's charter, or violate the provisions of s. 286.011 , F. S., the Government in the Sunshine Law. As I further concluded in AGO 075-41, the board provided for in s. 2(2) of Ch. 74-274, supra (s. 112.532 (2), F....

...sociation provides that law enforcement employees subject to investigation shall be informed of each complaint and be permitted to review all written statements made by the complainant and witnesses immediately prior to an investigative interview. 1 Section 112.532 (1)(d), F.S., grants a law enforcement officer under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency the right to "be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation" and the right to "be inf...

...2 Attorney General Opinion 86-26 concludes that an officer under investigation is not legally entitled to review evidence or specific statements of complainants prior to interrogation. 3 Section 112.533 (2)(a), F.S. 4 Section 112.533 (2)(c), F.S. 5 Section 112.532 (1)(d), F.S....

. . ."5 (emphasis supplied by the court) Section 112.532(1), Florida Statutes, requires that whenever

the following rights and privileges[.]" 2 Section 112.532(1), Fla. Stat., sets forth the conditions under

question: In conducting an investigation under section 112.532, Florida Statutes, which may result in discipline

her in a subsequent criminal proceeding.1 Section 112.532, F.S., provides that all law enforcement officers

George C. Karcher Chief of Police Casselberry QUESTION: When a complaint review board is convened in accordance with s. 112.532 ....

...This office has previously stated in informal opinions that the Sunshine Law is applicable to complaint review boards established pursuant to part VI, Ch. 112, F. S. E.g ., Informal Opinion to Mr. Ben Bolar, January 23, 1975. There have been no legislative amendments to s. 112.532 , F. S., since the issuance of such informal opinions. Section 112.532 (2), F....

"[c]orrectional officer," and "[e]mploying agency." Section 112.532 makes provision for the conditions under which

PER CURIAM. The following certified question has been presented for our determination: DOES SECTION 112.532(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1975), REQUIRE A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY TO CONVENE A COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD UPON THE DEMAND OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION, WHEN THE OFFICER HAS AVAILED HIMSELF OF TH...

...Thereafter, the hearing examiner submitted his findings of fact and recommendation that Waters be terminated to the county manager. On August 12 the county manager notified Waters of his confirmation of Waters’ dismissal. In January 1976 Waters demanded the convening of a complaint review board pursuant to Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1975): “112.532 Law Enforcement officers’ rights “All law enforcement officers employed by an employing agency shall have the following rights and privileges: ****** “(2) Complaint review boards.- — A complaint review board shall be composed of three...

...Thereupon, Waters filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Dade County and its sheriff, E. Wilson Purdy, wherein he sought to compel respondents to convene a complaint review board. Thereafter the trial judge certified the above question. After scrutinizing Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1975) in its entirety, we find that subsection (2) set out above must be read in pari materia with subsection (1) which provides in part: “112.532 Law Enforcement officers’ rights ****** “(1) Rights of law enforcement officers while under investigation....

...” [Emphasis Supplied] The record presented to this court demonstrates that Russell Waters was not under investigation, but rather was terminated for violation of the public safety department’s personnel rules which he admitted violating. We, therefore, answer the certified question in the negative as Section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1975) is not applicable to the instant situation; and, accordingly, we find Waters is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus....