Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...er possession of realty based on adverse possession, boundary disputes, and ejectment. See McDonald v. O'Steen, 429 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Moore v. Musa, 198 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Walker v. United States, 428 F.2d 1229 (Ct.Cl. 1970). Section 95.231(2), Fla....

...(1985), on the other hand, provides that "after 20 years from the recording of a deed or the probate of a will purporting to convey real property, no person shall assert any claim to the *601 property against the claimants under the deed or will or their successors in title." Section 95.231 is not a traditional statute of limitation but rather a curative act with a limitation period....

...e form or execution of deeds and wills executed by `the person owning the property' by limiting the time within which such defects can be asserted to a stated time as measured from some event, such as their recording. Id. at 461. Cases falling under § 95.231 include actions to quiet title and to establish resulting trusts, void deeds, dower interest, and defective deeds....

...ese counts appear to allege actions in equity to construe or make the deeds respecting which appellants were grantors as tenants in common speak the truth as between them and the grantees to the deeds, subject to the twenty year limitation period in § 95.231....

...d. Appellants' final argument is directed to the applicability of the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches as a possible ground for dismissal of the complaint. Appellants take the position that the 20-year limitation period set forth in section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes, [2] is applicable to Counts I, II, and III of the complaint....

...Estate of Odom, 500 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). (In Coley the respective claims were time barred because filed seventeen and eighteen months after expiration of the statutory period.) Coley is presently pending consideration by the Florida Supreme Court, Case No. 69,169. [2] s. 95.231(2), Fla....

...Logan of Shinholser, Logan, Moncrief & Barks, Sanford, for appellees J.M. Hattaway, J.R. Hattaway and R.R. Bruce. Marvin E. Rooks of Robison, Rooks & Owen, Casselberry, for appellee Combank/Seminole County. COWART, Judge. This case involves a contest between two land titles and the effect of a curative act (§ 95.231(2), Fla....

...of upon motion for a final summary judgment. The trial judge found that appellees had a "fee simple title" to an easement for road purposes over the northerly 25 feet of Lot 2 because (1) appellants' action was barred by the statute of limitations (§ 95.231(2), Fla....

...or other incorporeal hereditament by immemorial or long-continued enjoyment and use. [1] The first of the three legs under the final judgment is the proposition that appellant's action for quiet title suit was barred by the "statute of limitations," section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes (1981), which reads in part as follows: After 20 years from the recording of a deed ......

...four deeds have been of record over 20 years, the statute prohibits appellants from asserting any claim to the property against claimants under those deeds (which includes the original grantees and their successors in title including the appellees). Section 95.231(2) must be read with section 95.231(1), of which it is a part, and when this is done it is more clear that this statute is not a traditional statute of limitation but is a curative act with a limitation provision....

...tract distinctions between "valid," "void" and "voidable" is not an indispensable or necessary step in considering the effect of this curative statute as applied to a "wild deed." [4] We hold that if a wild deed has defects in its form or execution, section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes (1981), would, after the applicable time limitation, bar one from asserting such defects as against the grantees of the wild deed or their successors in title but that, except insofar as the quality of the title of...

...Statutes of limitations generally bar causes of action after a stated time commencing when the particular cause of action accrued. Usual curative acts purport to immediately validate specific title defects. Curative acts with limitations provisions (such as section 95.231, previously considered) rectify specified title defects by barring attacks on the title based on such specified defects after a stated time running from some described event....

...ppellees from further assertion of such easement. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SHARP, J., concurs specially with opinion. ORFINGER, C.J., dissents with opinion. SHARP, Judge, concurring specially. I concur with Judge Cowart's conclusions in this case: (1) section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes (1981), is not applicable to make appellees' title superior to appellants'; (2) the easement created by the deed in entry number 9 of appellants' chain of title is not the same as appellees' easement and, therefore...

...r section 712.01(2), Fla. Stat.; (5) as being a conveyance to a good faith purchaser for value as may defeat a superior but unrecorded title under recording acts, and, perhaps as having other legal effect. [5] As a matter of interest we note that if section 95.231(2) applied to the four deeds in appellees' title (entries 13-14, 26, 28 and 30) that were recorded for over 20 years prior to this lawsuit, so as to bar appellants from asserting any claim to the exclusive ownership of the northerly 25...

...The fact that the remedy sought by the Association for the alleged breach was the “equitable reformation” of the Restrictive Covenants through the invalidation of the amendment does not change the nature of the underlying claim. It also does not implicate section 95.231(2) because that statute applies “only to correct technical defects in an otherwise valid deed.” Davis v....

...ve a cloud therefrom. But the telling point on this issue is our own case of Holland v. Hattaway, 438 So.2d 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). In that case, Judge Cowart carefully analyzed the law and concluded that even the twenty year statute of limitation [section 95.231(2), Fla....

...There are many issues of fact appearing from the pleadings and affidavits before the trial court. The court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact because, under the facts presented, the plaintiffs' claim was actually for the imposition of a constructive trust, which imposition is barred by Section 95.231, Florida Statutes (1975). "95.231 Limitations where deed or will on record....

...Inglis, on her claim for partition of the same parcel of real property. We conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Georgette Colson's claim for reformation of the deed was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes....

...ermination that after reformation of the deed appellant had no ownership interest in the real property. There is no dispute in this case that the deed sought to be reformed was recorded in the official records of Duval County in 1975. The version of section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes, in effect at the time of the recordation of the deed, stated as follows: After 20 years from the recording of a deed or the probate of a will purporting to convey real property, no person shall assert any claim to the property against the claimants under the deed or will or their successors in title. § 95.231(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). The language of this statute has not been changed over the years and remains the same today. See § 95.231(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). This court has held that claims for reformation of a deed, such as appellee Colson's claim here, are subject to the twenty-year limitation period set forth in section 95.231, Florida Statutes....

...perty was any different than the counterclaimant's request for delivery of the entire parcel of real estate at issue in Rybovich. We, therefore, conclude that the claim for reformation was barred by the running of the limitations period set forth in section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes....

...The court went on to state that because the September 1989 deed had been recorded in August 1990, and therefore had been in the records for over twenty years, no claim could be brought to challenge its validity. As authority for this proposition, the court cited section 95.231, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...r eleven acres to the Hinsons. It does not appear that anyone resigned the deed after the survey was attached. Without evidence of such mutual agreement, the fact that the survey was later attached to the deed does not correct its omission. Nor does section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes (2010), cure the deed’s defects....

...The trial court found that because the September 1989 deed was recorded in August 1990, and over twenty years had passed since its recording date, Davis was prohibited from contesting its validity. The trial court misjudged this provision’s intended effect. Section 95.231(2) is a curative provision....

...1st DCA 1958). It cannot validate conveyances made by persons who have no possessory interest in the property. See Holland, 438 So.2d at 461-62 . In other words, it cannot be used to create a title where none existed before. Id. Here, it seems that section 95.231(2) could cure the deed’s failure to adequately describe the specific eleven acres being conveyed....

...This was a mere “technical” defect. But the provision cannot cure the deed’s failure to include Rashunn Lewis’ signature on the list of grantors. This was not a “technical” defect, but a failure in the chain of title. To find otherwise would mean section 95.231(2) could validate titles in every case where property is conveyed without the full cooperation and agreement of the actual owner....

...Padron committed fraud individually, and that as a result title did not pass to Realty. [8] Specifically, PWC argues that Mr. Padron committed forgery by signing the corrected deed on behalf of PWC, and says that its quiet title claim is governed by a 20-year statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 95.231 (quiet title), or a seven-year statute of limitations, see Fla....

...occurrit regi, or, as the parties here call it, the “Summerlin” principle, after United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940)—interacts with a Florida law designed to correct technical flaws in property-conveyance deeds. At issue in this case is whether Fla. Stat. § 95.231, which operates to cure certain defective deeds after the passage of five years, applies to a parcel on which the United States has asserted a federal estate-tax lien....

...Following the appellant’s father’s death in 2005, the United States assessed an estate tax on the property—which it said remained in the estate despite the attempted conveyance—and, when the tax remained unpaid, imposed a series of liens. The question here is whether Summerlin forestalls enforcement of § 95.231’s five-year-cure provision to defeat the United States’ estate-tax claim. We hold that it does not. Section 95.231 cured the deed in question, thereby effectuating the intended conveyance and transferring 2  Case: 17-14546 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 3 of 15 the property out of the father’s estate, well before the United States’ claim could have vested....

...The district court rejected that argument, and the government does not repeat it here. 4  Case: 17-14546 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 5 of 15 government’s motion, Mark relied on Fla. Stat. § 95.231, which, in relevant part, states that [f]ive years after the recording of an instrument required to be executed in accordance with s....

...the instrument . . . shall be held to have its purported effect to convey [the property] . . . as if there had been no lack of . . . witness or witnesses . . . in the absence of fraud, adverse possession, or pending litigation. Fla. Stat. § 95.231(1)....

...By dint of that provision, Mark said, “the deed would have had any defects cured . . . by operation of law” in December 2003, five years after the deed’s initial recording. The district court granted the government’s summary-judgment motion, holding that despite § 95.231(1) the Property remained in the estate and that the IRS could therefore foreclose on its liens. First, the court concluded that § 95.231(1) did not create good title in the trust because the deed’s missing second witness was not among the technical defects that the statute operates to cure. Second, and in any event, the court held that § 95.231(1) is essentially a statute of limitations, which, under Summerlin, does not bind the United States. Accordingly, the district court ordered foreclosure and sale of the Property and required Mark to vacate within 30 days....

...This appeal followed.3 Although we initially denied Mark’s motion to stay the order of sale pending our review, we later granted his renewed stay motion and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the question whether Fla. Stat. § 95.231 “is an ordinary statute of limitations that should be subject to the rule set forth in United States v....

...414 (1940).” II Before diving too deeply into Summerlin, we need to establish a state-law baseline: As a matter of Florida property law, who owned what, and when? To answer that question, we look first to the text of § 95.231....

...from which it appears that the person owning the property attempted to convey [the property], . . . the instrument . . . shall be held to have its purported effect to convey [the property] . . . as if there had been no lack of . . . witness or witnesses.” Fla. Stat. § 95.231(1). The statute goes on, in a separate section, to state that “no person shall assert any claim to the property against the claimants under the deed or will or their successors in title” after 20 years. Id. § 95.231(2). 3 Because this appeal comes to us on summary judgment, we review the district court’s decision de novo. United States v. Spoor Tr. Of Louise Paxton Gallagher Revocable Tr., 838 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2016). 6  Case: 17-14546 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 7 of 15 Section 95.231’s second clause—which cuts off claims after 20 years— plainly falls within Summerlin’s ambit, as it is “clearly a limitations statute.” Earp & Shriver, Inc....

...But this case isn’t about the second clause—we are, after all, just now passing the 20- year mark following the 1998 deed’s initial recording. Rather, this case turns on the statute’s first clause, which, when read in conjunction with the second, makes clear that § 95.231 “is not a traditional statute of limitation but is a curative act with a limitation provision.” Holland v....

...The question we must answer is whether Summerlin nonetheless applies. A First, a threshold issue: Setting aside the United States’ involvement—and for the moment, Summerlin—is the witness-related defect here the kind of technicality that § 95.231(1) operates to rectify? The district court held that it isn’t....

...deed statutorily incurable. That is incorrect, as both parties agree. In its brief to us, the government concedes that “the absence of a required witness signature” did not “invalidate[] the 1998 deed beyond the reach of [the] statute.” Section 95.231(1) expressly 7  Case: 17-14546 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 8 of 15 states that after the requisite five-year period a recorded deed “shall be held to have its purported effect” despite the “lack of ....

...witness or witnesses.” Thus, at least in the ordinary case, a missing witness is precisely the kind of defect that the statute was designed to cure. B The parties’ agreement ends there. They diverge over § 95.231(1)’s operation—in particular when, and how, the statute cures defective deeds. The dispute here turns on § 95.231(1)’s statement that an otherwise-defective deed “shall be held to have its purported effect” five years after it is recorded—and, in particular, how to understand the phrase “shall be held.” Fla. Stat. § 95.231(1). Mark contends that the statute’s curative properties are automatic and self- executing—and, therefore, that the once-defective 1998 deed was rendered “valid by operation of state law in 2003,” five years after the deed was originally recorded. The government, in contrast, asserts that under § 95.231(1)’s language a valid cure requires some form of formal adjudication—either judicial or administrative—before marketable title transfers....

...think, consider, esteem, regard as,” and, alternatively, to mean “[o]f a judge or court: [t]o state as an authoritative opinion [or] to law down as a point of law [or] decide”). Happily, it’s not up to us to pick and choose between these competing constructions of § 95.231(1)....

...�� Id. at 1227. Glanville v. Glanville, 856 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003), is to the same effect. There, when a grantor sought to invalidate a deed on the ground that it was not properly witnessed and acknowledged, the grantee raised § 95.231(1) as an affirmative defense....

...Taken together, these cases show that, after five years, the statute not only shields a once-defective deed from judicial attack, but also—of its own force—affirmatively mends it back to health. We hold, then, that Mark didn’t have to go to court to enforce § 95.231(1)’s curative provision....

...right, the rule of Summerlin will not operate to revive the claim.” Id. In short, the Summerlin principle can’t create rights that do not otherwise exist. B What, then, of this case? Does Summerlin forestall the operation of § 95.231(1) or not? Because, following Florida’s lead, we have held that the statute is self-executing, the question admits of an easy answer. We hold that Summerlin is inapplicable here because, by operation of § 95.231(1), the Property dropped out of the estate in December 2003, five years after the deed was originally recorded—and, importantly, roughly two years before Anthony died, and thus before any claim asserted by the United States could have...

...If a valid claim never materializes—or, as in Guaranty Trust, comes with a “pre-existing infirmity”—then Summerlin doesn’t come into play. 304 U.S. at 142. Just so here. The United States’ claim to Anthony’s estate accrued, at the earliest, when he died in December 2005. But by operation of § 95.231(1), Mark had acquired good title to the Property two years earlier, in December 2003—five years after the defective deed was recorded. Accordingly, we do not have here “a situation in which a valid cause of action had accrued to the United States only to perish later through the passage of time.” Bresson, 213 F.3d at 1178. Rather, § 95.231(1) prevented the Property from becoming part of the United States’ “claim” in the first place. Not only is this case not within the letter of the Summerlin rule, it is not within its spirit, either....

... Case: 17-14546 Date Filed: 01/11/2019 Page: 15 of 15 neglect or delay by the United States or its agents, and it has lost no rights by any lapse of time.” 304 U.S. at 141. IV In sum, we hold that Fla. Stat. § 95.231(1) cured the deed by operation of law in December 2003, that the Property was at that point validly transferred to the trust, and that Summerlin is inapplicable here because by the time the United States asserted its tax lien the Property no longer remained in the estate....

...essed and acknowledged, in and of itself, gives rise to the legal conclusion contained in the judgment that the deed must be invalidated, even in the face of Appellants’ assertion that the action is time-barred. The applicable limitations statute, section 95.231, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: (1) Five years after the recording of a deed or the probate of a will purporting to convey real property, from which it appears that the person owning the property attempted to convey or devise i...

...Under these circumstances, entry of judgment for Appellee was erroneous. REVERSED and REMANDED. PETERSON and PALMER, JJ., concur. . We have considered Appellee’s argument that, because the property is "homestead,” the deed is "void.” Relying on Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla.1962), Appellee argues that section 95.231 does not apply to a "void” deed....

...ons of a confidential relationship were insufficient, and that the Bowmans were barred from recovering because 20 years had elapsed from the recording of the deeds conveying the lands to Daniel Bowman, the deceased. This latter ground was based upon section 95.231, Florida Statutes (1987). The trial court eventually denied the estate’s motion, relying, in part, upon Holland v. Hattaway, 438 So.2d 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (section 95.231 is a curative statute not a traditional statute of limitations)....

...s. 1 With regard to the imposition of laches, the court relied upon Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla.1957) and Hallam v. Gladman, 132 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961), cases which were decided in part based upon section 95.23, the predecessor to section 95.231....

...2 Pettis sought to reform the deeds, quiet his title, and, if necessary, partition the property between himself and Appellees. The trial court denied the reformation claim, concluding that it was barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes....

...like the plaintiffs in the cases relied on by the trial court and Appellees, 3 Pettis is seeking relief in conformance with— and not adverse to—the interests of the claimants under the deeds. Thus, Pettis’ reformation claim is not barred by section 95.231(2)....

...ate the other claims— and the impact of the Marketable Record Title Act—on remand. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. LEWIS, WETHERELL, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR. 4 The substance of section 95.23 was later transferred to section 95.231(2), Florida Statutes....

...Padrón committed fraud individually, and that as a result title did not pass to Realty. 8 Specifically, PWC argues that Mr. Padrón committed forgery by signing the corrected deed on behalf of PWC, and says that its quiet title claim is governed by a 20-year statute of limitations, see Fla. Stat. § 95.231 (quiet title), or a seven-year statute of limitations, see Fla....

...on their complaint filed against their neighbors, Robert and Kay Shell. On appeal, the Hardeys argue that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on their count for declaratory relief on the basis that it is barred by the statutes of limitations in sections 95.11 and 95.231, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...In June 2011, the Shells filed a motion for summary -4- judgment, claiming that the remaining counts for declaratory relief and for reformation of the Shells' deed are barred by the statute of limitations in sections 95.11 and 95.231....

...In a written order filed on February 9, 2012, the trial court granted the Shells' motion for summary judgment: The Court finds that the [Hardeys] are precluded from proceeding pursuant to Florida Statutes 95.231 and 95.11. The Court finds that the same issue raised in this proceeding was litigated in [the earlier case against Mrs....

...11. Likewise, it appears that the property description being disputed by the [Hardeys] has been in place since at least 1971. Pursuant to the twenty[-]year restriction under Florida Statute 95.231[,] this cause of action is also barred. In March 2012, the Shells filed a motion for attorneys' fees on the basis of section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...-6- applicable to the present controversy. Based on these undisputed facts, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of section 95.11. Moreover, the twenty-year limitation in section 95.231 does not bar the Hardeys' count for declaratory relief. Section 95.231(2) provides: "After 20 years from the recording of a deed or the probate of a will purporting to convey real property, no person shall assert any claim to the property against the claimants under the deed or will or their successors...

...such as their recording. Id. However, "its curative effect extends only to correct technical defects in an otherwise valid deed executed by the person(s) owning the property in question." Davis v. Hinson, 67 So. 3d 1107, 1111-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Section 95.231(2) "cannot validate conveyances made by persons who have no possessory interest in the property. In other words, it cannot be used to create a title where none existed before." Davis, 67 So. 3d at 1112 (citation omitted) (citing Holland, 438 So. 2d at 461-62). The trial court concluded that the Hardeys' claim is barred by section 95.231 because the "the property description being disputed by the [Hardeys] has been in place since at least 1971." However, the dispute in this case specifically involves the waterfront strip, and in order for section 95.231 to bar the Hardeys' claim, the 1971 deed -7- would have to convey the waterfront strip....

...The Shells have failed to show that there is no disputed issue regarding whether the 1971 deed includes the waterfront strip. To the contrary, one surveyor opined that the waterfront strip is not included in the Shells' lot, while a second surveyor was unable to conclude which lot included the waterfront strip.1 Section 95.231 cannot be used to grant the Shells title in the waterfront strip where none existed under the 1971 deed. Because the Shells have not demonstrated that the 1971 deed in their chain of title indisputably conveys the waterfront strip at issue here, the trial court erred in ruling that section 95.231 operates as a matter of law to bar the Hardeys' claim for declaratory relief....

...The court found, however, that laches and estoppel existed against Mrs. Earp with respect to Ms. Pope and held that the transaction was valid insofar as it pertained to Ms. Pope’s property. The fi *1227 nal judgment recited that the corporation had waived reliance on section 95.231(1). Section 95.231(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which first became effective January 1, 1975, reads as follows: (1) Five years after the recording of a deed or the probate of a will purporting to convey real property, from which it appears that the perso...

...On this appeal Mrs. Earp does not even argue against the applicability of the statute. She argues only that the corporation waived reliance upon the statute by failing to raise it in its pleadings. Thus, the parties focus much of their attention on whether section 95.231(1) is a statute of limitations which must be pleaded as an affirmative defense under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(d). The failure to plead the statute of limitations constitutes a waiver of that defense. Hood v. Hood, 392 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The corporation admits that subsection (2) of section 95.231 which was carried forward from section 95.23, Florida Statutes (1973), when the statute was amended in 1974, is clearly a limitations statute. The corporation asserts, however, that subsection (1) is a curative statute which is simply designed to correct certain deficiencies in title after the passage of time. One court has characterized section 95.231 as a curative act with a limitation provision....