CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The trial court, sitting without a jury, accepted the Harpster's expert witness' testimony that the correct north-south midsection line ran about 400 feet east of the clay road. In rendering final judgment for the Harpsters, the court noted that: Under the present day reading of Section
95.16, Florida Statutes, there can be no doubt that the Defendant [Seddon] has met every requirement of acquiring title to property by adverse possession save and except for one. The Defendant *411 [Seddon] has not held such property according to the provisions of Section
95.16, Florida Statutes for a period of seven years. Such section of the Florida Statutes only became law on January 1, 1975. Prior to that, Section
95.16 and 95.17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 was the law.
369 So.2d at 664 (emphasis in original). The trial court refused to apply section
95.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...r judgment of a competent court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises included in such instrument, decree, or judgment for seven years, the premises so included shall be deemed to have been held adversely ... Section 95.16, Fla....
...wing cases: ... (2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16 ......
...By combining the two preceding sections, the new statute clearly states that one does not have to have paper title correctly describing the disputed property as long as that area is contiguous to the described land and "protected by a substantial enclosure." § 95.16, Fla....
...ion, but I disagree with the majority's pronouncement that the statutory changes made by chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, affected this Court's decision in Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1973). Sections 11 and 12 of chapter 74-382 amended sections
95.16 and 95.17, Florida Statutes (1973). The two sections were then consolidated when the next codification was published. §
95.16, Fla. Stat. (1974 Supp.). Section
95.16 provides: (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a written instrument as being a conveyance of the proper...
...(d) When a known lot or single farm has been partly improved, the part that has not been cleared or enclosed according to the usual custom of the county is [to be considered as] occupied for the same [length of] time as the part improved or cultivated. An examination of sections 95.16 and 95.17, Florida Statutes (1973), together with the changes made therein by chapter 74-382 reveals that the substance of the law was not changed, but only the style....
...he paper title, but who do not pay any taxes on the additional area, can secure good title by adverse possession only to the portion of land described by the deed, decree, or other written instrument of record."
287 So.2d at 40. This construction of section
95.16 assures all property owners that there will be some notice of adverse claims in the public record....
...Now the payment of taxes is presumptively a more reliable indicia of ownership than possession. When an owner pays taxes on his land, he is publishing to the world, "This is my land." Because of these fundamental changes in our society, I believe that any interpretation of section 95.16 which would bar a record title holder's claim to property that is claimed to be adversely possessed without notice in the public records would be unconstitutional....
...ions which are of public record. Since Seddon's deed did not purport to convey the disputed portion of land, and since she has not paid taxes on that land, she has not fulfilled the requirements of adverse possession under color of title pursuant to section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1974 Supp.), as I interpret that statute....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...2d DCA 1958), fee title may be acquired and private rights of easement extinguished by adverse possession, Bonifay v. Garner, supra . In order to acquire rights by adverse possession, appellees were required to prove seven years of continuous, exclusive, open and notorious, adverse possession under "color of title". Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ssion with color of title based on the destroyed 1924 deed. [2] Therefore, it was argued, Townsend should only be allowed to present evidence in support of that theory and should be further limited to proving such possession before 1946 by virtue of Section 95.16(1), Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, that "......
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1952 Fla. LEXIS 1436
...riving at a decision in this case." While the description in the deed from Mrs. Ferrell to the appellant Shawn could have been more perfect, it would appear to be sufficient upon *744 which to base a claim of "color of title" under the provisions of Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...respondents, and although there had been no return of the encroached lands for taxes or payment thereof by respondents. The foregoing cases, cited for conflict, clearly hold that without color of title or payment of taxes, as prescribed by Sections
95.16, 95.17,
95.18, and 95.19, Florida Statutes, [5] and without seven years of actual, *39 adverse, open, hostile, and continuous enclosure or cultivation, or adverse claim cannot ripen into a valid legal title....
...t, and there has been a continued occupation and possession of the premises, as defined by Section 95.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. (and, of course, including the above criteria of openness, etc.), for a period of seven years. It should be noted that Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that adverse possession *41 commencing after December 31, 1945, shall not be deemed to be adverse possession under color of title unless the instrument purporting to convey the premises is recorded....
...lly ignore the language of Fla. Stat. § 95.17(2), F.S.A., which provides: "All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16." Fla. Stat. § 95.16, F.S.A., deals with adverse possession under color of title, so that, to be given any meaning at all, the language of Fla....
...It is so ordered. ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur. CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1]
109 So.2d 413 (Fla.App.2d 1959). [2]
91 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1956). [3]
75 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1954). [4]
159 Fla. 174,
31 So.2d 706 (1947). [5] Section
95.16, Florida Statutes, 1971, provides: "Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of premises under claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrume...
...or improved; or (2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; or (3) Where [although not enclosed] it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for the ordinary use of the occupant; or (4) Where a known lot or single farm has been partly improved, the...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 24436
...d deed" may have certain legal consequences, such as, (1) being the basis for a cause of action for contractual breach of warranty; (2) as being sufficient to pass an after-acquired title; (3) as color of title under some statutes of limitation (see § 95.16, Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Further, the only land described in the 1908 deed is that specifically designated by lots or blocks. There is no description of the waterfront property in dispute. Adverse Possession In Florida, title to land may be acquired by adverse possession, either "under color of title," Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, or "without color of title," Section 95.17, Florida Statutes....
...le, exercised sufficient dominion and control over the waterfront property by fencing, improving, and maintaining it for the requisite time period, but the question remains as to whether this possession was "under color of title" in conformance with Section 95.16....
...uted property until a decade after the 1939 amendment, and, admittedly, did not pay taxes on the subject waterfront property. As a result, any claim of fee simple title based on adverse possession must depend upon satisfaction of the requirements of Section 95.16 governing adverse possession under color of title....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...so as to bring appellants within the purview of F.S. §
95.18, F.S.A., dealing with adverse possession without color of title, it is contended that F.S. § 95.17(2), F.S.A., defining possession and occupation under color of title, brings them within section
95.16, and they are therefore adverse possessors with color of title....
...r improved; or "(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; or * * *"....
...The result of appellants' construction of the statutes relating to adverse possession would seem to circumvent the legislative intent in this area. Under the present state of the law a diligent owner has notice that an adverse possessor has arrived, by reason of the recording requirement under F.S. §
95.16, F.S.A., with color of title, and the payment of taxes required under §
95.18, where there is no color of title....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...ears by a substantial enclosure with land to which defendant had acquired valid title by its 1947 deed, defendant had acquired fee simple title to the disputed tract by adverse possession. This determination involved the application of F.S. Sections 95.16 and 95.17, F.S.A....
...ant's business under claim the defendant was the owner thereof was sufficient to establish corporate intent to occupy the disputed property under claim of title. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. WALDEN, C.J., and CROSS, J., concur. NOTES [1] "§ 95.16 Real actions; adverse possession under color of title; requirements....
...cases: "* * * "(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; * * *" (Emphasis added.) [2] F.S....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1949 Fla. LEXIS 745
...Counsel for appellees contend that the appellant is not entitled on the record to the benefits and protection of the several provisions of Section 196.06, F.S.A., because of: (1) our ruling in Salls v. Martin,
156 Fla. 624 ,
24 So.2d 41 ; (2) Section 1 of Chapter 19253, Acts of 1939, Laws of Florida, Section
95.16 , F.S.A., viz.: "
95.16 ....
...ens theretofore or thereafter levied and assessed against the same by the state and county and by any city or town, if such property be situated within any incorporated city or town, before such taxes become delinquent." It is conceded that Sections
95.16 , 95.17 and
95.21 , supra, were amended by Chapter 22897, Acts of 1945, Laws of Florida and a new Section added, viz.: Section 95.27. It was not the intention of the Legislature, in the enactment of Chapter 19253, Acts of 1939, Sections
95.16 , 95.17 and
95.21 , supra, and the subsequent amendment thereof by the enactment of Chapter 22897, Acts of 1945, to repeal by implication or otherwise Section 196.06, F.S.A., which prescribed a limitation of four years for a tax deed holder to...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ly believed would be an unopposed formality against his four sisters to quiet title to the property in question. The complaint alleged that Harold had acquired ownership of the entire half-interest by adverse possession under color of title. See, § 95.16, Fla....
...[6] The appellees point out, however, that Harold was the personal representative of both estates. [7] We find no error in this ruling since the 1958 dissolution of partnership agreement, see note 4 supra, could not be effective as conferring "color of title" because it was not recorded, see § 95.16(1); 2 Fla.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 8 (1977), and contained no description of the property at all....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 567
...On appeal, there was no dispute as to Garner's title to the lots themselves. [1] This court found the chain of title did not support Garner's claim to the property in the strip opposite the six lots. As to a claim of title by adverse possession under color of title, section 95.16, Florida Statutes, this court found a 1961 deed from Ruby Garner to appellee Robert Garner was insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession under color of title as to that portion of the waterfront strip lying opposite Lots 10, 11, and 12....
...Adverse possession under color of title occurs "[w]hen the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property ..." and remained in possession for seven years. § 95.16 Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Plaintiff next contends that her evidence was sufficient to warrant judgment against the defendant-Liles and withstand a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues that her evidence fully satisfies the statutory requirements for *847 adverse possession under color of title, §§ 95.16, 95.17, Fla....
...r improved; or "(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; or *848 "(3) Where (although not enclosed) it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for the ordinary use of the occupant." Plaintiff's evidence revealed that prior to 1930 her father pla...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 291945
...le Distribution. Adverse possession under color of title involves a two-step process. First, the property must be described in a written instrument recorded in official county records, and the property must be possessed continuously for seven years. §
95.16(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); Seton v. Swann,
650 So.2d 35, 37 (Fla.1995). The second step is concerned with the methods listed in section
95.16(2), by which a claimant may show the property was possessed adversely....
...In 1989, the trustees executed and recorded corrective warranty deeds with respect to each parcel in an effort to remedy this defect. [8] The corrective deed was filed seven days after entry of the Order of Equitable Distribution. [9] Appellants in this case predicated their adverse possession claim under color of title on section 95.16(2)(c), Fla.Stat., which states that "property is deemed possessed ......
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...in the second deed which, under §
689.07, Florida Statutes (1977), deems it a mortgage due to the apparent lack of intention by Morris Siegel to retain an individual interest in the property; (d) adverse possession under color of title, pursuant to §
95.16, Florida Statutes (1977), upon the actions of Marge Smith as the holder of the property during her lifetime adversely to all others; and (3) the doctrine of laches....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 7104
...One claiming title by virtue of adverse possession under color of title "does not have to have paper title accurately describing the disputed property as long as that area is contiguous to the described land and [meets one of the criteria enumerated at section 95.16(2)(a)-(d)]." [1] Seddon v....
...n the Bailey and Hagler properties, but that portion of the final judgment which purports to establish a section line between Sections 28 and 33 for purposes of future transactions is stricken as surplusage. BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (1985), provides: 95.16 Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a writte...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 60810
...Harpster,
403 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1981), and Turner v. Valentine,
570 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review denied,
576 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1991). We have jurisdiction based on article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. This case concerns the interpretation of section
95.16, Florida Statutes (1991). We approve the district court's opinion because we find that the Setons did not establish adverse possession by color of title under this statute. Under section
95.16, the title to property possessed but not described in a recorded instrument cannot be used to show color of title....
...Swann sued the Setons in ejectment in 1992, seeking a court order compelling the Setons to remove all the permanent improvements they had made to the disputed strip of land. The trial court ruled for the Setons, finding that they had adversely possessed the disputed land for the seven-year period required by section 95.16. The district court reversed. The court found that a party must meet two requirements to acquire title through adverse possession by color of title under section 95.16: *37 First, the property must be described in a written instrument recorded in official county records, and, second, the property must be possessed continuously for seven years....
...cribe any part of Swann's lot. Id. at 938. Because the Setons did not meet the first requirement, the court found no need to decide whether the Setons had possession. Id. at 937. In reaching its conclusion, the district court reviewed the history of section 95.16....
...ll be deemed possessed [W]here it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included in the written instrument, judgment, or decree within the purview of section 95.16......
...ces or cultivates. Meyer,
287 So.2d at 40. Thus, the Court held that color of title was limited to property shown in the public record. Id. In 1974, after Meyer, the Legislature amended adverse possession statutes by combining and rewording sections
95.16 and 95.17. The amendment took effect on January 1, 1975. In Seddon this Court, answering a certified question, held that the statute could not be applied retroactively.
403 So.2d at 411. The Court also said that: By combining sections [
95.16 and 95.17] the new statute clearly states that one does not have to have paper title describing the disputed property as long as that area is contiguous to the described land and "protected by a substantial enclosure." Id....
...The amended statute, which applies to the Swann-Seton dispute, says: If only a portion of the land protected by the enclosure is included within the description of the property in the written instrument, judgment, or decree, only that portion is deemed possessed. § 95.16(2)(b), Fla....
...nt of taxes on the lands. See Swann,
629 So.2d at 937-38. We agree with the district court that the *38 1987 amendment embodies the result of the predecessor statutes analyzed in Meyer. We approve the district court's decision in Swann and hold that section
95.16(1) requires, as a first step, that the instrument upon which the claim of title is founded must be recorded in the official county records and describe the disputed property. Only then can a court consider under section
95.16(2) whether a party adversely possessed certain property....
...gislature's 1987 amendment. We also disapprove Turner and Bailey v. Hagler,
575 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), review denied,
587 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 1991), because they were decided on the basis of Seddon, but after the Legislature's 1987 amendment to section
95.16. Seddon was no longer valid when Turner and Bailey were decided. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
95.16(1), Florida Statutes (1991), says in relevant part that: Adverse possession commencing after December 31, 1945 shall not be deemed adverse possession under color of title until the instrument upon which the claim of title is founded is recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county where the property is located. Subsection (2) then describes different ways in which property can be deemed possessed. [2] This statute was a predecessor to section
95.16(2), Florida Statutes (1991), which is at issue in the instant case. [3] We note, parenthetically, that the Setons did not "enclose" the disputed property. Rather, the Setons asserted possession by "ordinary use." See §
95.16(2)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Seddon answered, asserting several affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed. She contended, inter alia, that even if the north-south midsection line was somewhere east of the clay road she nevertheless owned up to the road through adverse possession. See §§ 95.16-.18, Fla....
...In rejecting this defense, the court said: It is perhaps this defense that comes closest to merit inasmuch as the disputed property is, in fact, under fence with the property of the Defendant Seddon thereby giving rise to a claim of adverse possession pursuant to Florida Statute
95.16(2)(b) which states that when the occupant entered into possession of real property under a claim of title founded upon a written instrument (which the Seddons did) and has for seven years been in continued possession of the property included in the instrument (which the Seddons have) the property is held adversely. Under the present day reading of Section
95.16, Florida Statutes, there can be no doubt that the Defendant has met every requirement of acquiring title to property by adverse possession save and except for one. The Defendant has not held such property according to the provisions of Section
95.16, Florida Statutes for a period of seven years. Such section of the Florida Statutes only became law on January 1, 1975. Prior to that, Section
95.16 and 95.17 as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 was the law. To fully comprehend the trial court's holding, a review of the law in this area is necessary. In Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1973) the supreme court had occasion to interpret Sections
95.16 and .17, Florida Statutes (1971), which dealt with adverse possession under color of title. At that time Section
95.16 read: Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of premises under claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of th...
...or improved; or (2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16....
...In 1974 the legislature enacted Chapter 74-382, Sections 11 and 12, Laws of Florida, amending the statutes dealing with adverse possession under color of title. Section 95.17 was eliminated, but its language was changed slightly and incorporated into Section 95.16. Section 95.16 now reads in pertinent part as follows: (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a written instrument as be...
...(b) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by the enclosure shall be property included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of this section. ... (Emphasis added.) The new version of Section 95.16 eliminates some of the statutory language relied upon by the supreme court in Meyer v....
...d not clearly expressed that it so intended. See Foley v. Morris,
339 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1976). Seddon argues that Chapter 74-382 did not substantially change the law of adverse possession. She contends that the Meyer v. Law decision construed Sections
95.16 and .17 contrary to the legislative intent with which these statutes were enacted, and that Chapter 74-382 was meant to clarify not change the law of adverse possession under color of title....
...Blodgett,
287 U.S. 509,
53 S.Ct. 244,
77 L.Ed. 463 (1933); Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc. v. Cummins, 12 Ill.2d 376, 146 N.E.2d 42 (1957); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 143 (2d ed. 1974). Thus Meyer v. Law must be considered the definitive interpretation of Sections
95.16 and .17 prior to the enactment of Chapter 74-382. Sections
95.16 and .17 as interpreted by Meyer v. Law required a claimant to have paper title to the disputed property in order to establish adverse possession under color of title, even if the disputed property was "protected by a substantial enclosure"; however, under Section
95.16 as amended by Chapter 74-382, it appears that paper title under such circumstances is no longer necessary....
...Under the decision we feel mandated to make, no claimant could establish adverse possession under color of title until 1982 without having paper title to the disputed property, even if the disputed property had been fenced-in for many years prior to 1975. It is significant, we think, that the legislature altered Sections 95.16 and .17 at its next session after the Meyer v....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...[10] Inferentially the decision appears to repeal by judicial decree that part of F.S. § 95.17(2), F.S.A., which provides that "All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; * * *." A careful examination of the opinion rendered in Blackburn convinces us that the above-stated views of the court were not intended to be a definitive construction of § 95.17(1) (2) of the statutes....
...or improved; or (2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; * * *." F.S....
...ate and county and by city or town, if such property be situated within any incorporated city or town, before such taxes become delinquent." F.S. §
95.18, F.S.A. [8] Blackburn v. Florida West Coast Land and Development Co., see footnote 5. [9] F.S. §
95.16, F.S.A....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...to protect the long-standing and, in this case, good faith, actual possession of the disputed property. [6] I dissent. NOTES [1] Section
95.18(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). [2] Hyer v. Griffin,
55 Fla. 560,
46 So. 635 (1908). [3] Section
95.18(2), and see §
95.16(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Appellants are quite correct in their contention that those facts do not support the finding that appellees acquired title to their driveway by adverse possession. There are two methods of acquiring title by adverse possession: a claimant with color of title can qualify under section
95.16, Florida Statutes, by continuous possession for a period of seven years; a claimant without color of title can qualify under section
95.18, Florida Statutes, by showing open, continuous, actual hostile possession, and payment of all tax...
...h a return of said land for taxes during the first year of occupation and the enclosure or cultivation of the land for the seven-year period. Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1973). The instrument relied upon to show color of title must be recorded (§
95.16, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
...After the taking and recording of the Ware deed, the Lind-grens cleared four of the approximately ten acres included and gave Ware permis•sion to continue to farm the property. The amended complaint claims, ■and the final decree awards title to the Lindgrens upon the basis of Section 95.16, .Fla.Stat., F.S.A., which is as follows: “Real actions; adverse possession under color of title; requirements....
...office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the premises are situated.” From the foregoing facts it appears that the deed from the Wares to the Lindgrens did not constitute color of title essential for adverse possession under Section 95.16, supra....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 15815, 2014 WL 5039679
...t title to his property. The Fraziers filed a counterclaim for quiet title, claiming that they adversely held possession of the property in excess of seven years under color of title (the wild deed) and that the property belonged to them pursuant to section 95.16, Florida Statutes (2003)....
...on under color of title and without color of title other than to say that they are different statutory claims occupying separate sections in the Florida Statutes, distinguished mainly by the presence or absence of the color of title element. Compare § 95.16, Fla....
...We also note that the law of adverse possession is wrapped in its own array of terminology utilized by the courts and the Legislature that must be deciphered — the terminology, for example, of notorious, adverse, hostile, and color of title. We focus on the latter because the Fraziers make their claim under section 95.16....
...Garner,
503 So.2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), and Goszczynski argues that they did not meet that burden. There is no specific statutory definition of “color of title,” and there are few Florida cases that say what it is or *545 what it means. From the text of section
95.16(1), we see that color of title references “a claim of title exclusive of any other right” founded on a written instrument of conveyance. §
95.16(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 103919
...claim of title founded upon a written instrument; (2) that the property was protected by a substantial enclosure; and (3) that the protected property was so held by her for seven consecutive years between *570 January 1, 1975, and December 31, 1987. § 95.16, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 84419
...[*] The trial court entered final judgment in favor of the appellees. The issue we must decide is whether the trial court correctly extended the law of adverse possession as interpreted in Seddon v. Harpster,
403 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1981), which dealt with subsection 2(b) of section
95.16, Florida Statutes (1987), to this case where the appellees were claiming adverse possession under subsection 2(c)....
...`paper' title accurately describing the disputed property." Seddon,
403 So.2d at 411 (emphasis in original). Explaining the change in the law that the legislative amendment had worked, the court said: By combining the two preceding sections, [former
95.16 and 95.17] the new statute clearly states that one does not have to have paper title correctly describing the disputed property as long as that area is contiguous to the described land and "protected by a substantial enclosure." §
95.16, Fla....
...ess of the subsection under which the adverse possession claim is made. The appellees have at least as colorable a title as that found sufficient in Seddon. Also, like Ms. Seddon, they have additionally fulfilled one of the four possible criteria of 95.16(2), in this case subsection 2(c), because the evidence is clear that they have used the disputed strip for their own ordinary use as a backyard in their good faith belief that they owned the land....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 13450, 2015 WL 5245138
...In 2010, as Dadd undertook improvements on the fence, Houde contested
the placement of the fence and the location of the property line. Dadd then filed
suit to quiet title of the disputed strip by adverse possession up to the fence line,
pursuant to the 1974 version of section 95.16 of the Florida Statutes....
...After a bench trial,
the court held in favor of Houde on the strength of his long-standing title, and
entered an order of ejectment of Dadd from the disputed property. We find the
trial court misapplied the statute.
ANALYSIS
2
Section 95.16, as it appears today in the Florida Statutes, would compel
affirmance....
...of taxes on the land is “an instrument upon which the claim of title is founded . . .
recorded in the official county records [which] describe[s] the disputed property.”).
Dadd does not dispute that principle. Rather, she redirects us to the earlier version
of section 95.16, pursuant to which she contended below and continues to contend
here that title to the disputed strip vested in Wood and subsequently passed to her.
That version, adopted by the state legislature as Chapter 74-382, §§ 11-12, at 1212-
13, Laws of Florida (1974), effective January 1, 1975, appeared in consolidated
form in the 1974 Supplement to the Florida Statutes.1 The chapter law, as
consolidated in 1974, read as follows:
95.16 Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title....
...seven years been in continued possession of the property included in
the instrument, decree, or judgment, the property is held adversely. If
1 Section 95.17, Florida Statutes (1974 Supplement), states that the section was
“Transferred to s. 95.16 and amended by s....
...e
does not have to have paper title correctly describing the disputed property as long
as that area is contiguous to the described land and ‘protected by a substantial
enclosure.’” Seddon v. Harpster,
403 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1981) (citing §
95.16,
Fla....
...(Supp. 1974)).
Unrebutted testimony shows that the fence enclosed the disputed strip of
land as far back as 1976, during Richard Wood’s ownership of 701 Catherine
Street. The fence continued in place after Dadd acquired her title in 1989. Section
95.16 did not require a written instrument describing the disputed property to
establish color of title until 1987. See Ch. 87-194, § 1, at 1255, Laws of Fla.
(1974); Seton,
650 So. 2d at 37-38. By 1983, and certainly well before 1987,
4
Richard Wood had met all of the requirements of section
95.16 as construed by the
Florida Supreme Court....
...5
successors.” .) (emphasis added). Being the lawful successor to Wood by
warranty deed in 1989, Dadd succeeded to Wood’s title in the disputed property as
of the date of delivery of that deed as a matter of law. The 1987 amendment to
section 95.16 of the Florida Statutes does not change this result....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31641558
...I am compelled to follow Seton, but it seems to me that it should not control this case's disposition, and that the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Sapp, decided after Seton, is correct. In Seton the court considered a title claim based on adverse possession under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991) and (1975). The Setons' adverse claim commenced in 1984 under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), which provided that a written instrument describing property contiguous to the disputed property that is protected by a substantial enclosure constitutes color of title to the disputed property for adverse possession purposes. However, in 1987 the Legislature amended section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), and eliminated the provision that color of title extended to contiguous lands protected by a substantial enclosure. See Ch. 87-194, § 1, at 1255, Laws of Fla. Accordingly, as the Setons' claim had not been perfected by adverse possession of seven years before the amendment of section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), in 1987 their claim was correctly denied....
...compels this court to affirm an incorrect judgment for Appellees here. In Bailey, disputed property lying contiguous to property described by written instrument and protected by a substantial enclosure had been adversely possessed since 1975. Under section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), Mrs. Bailey perfected title to the disputed property by adverse possession of seven years' duration. The amendment of section 95.16 in 1987 had no effect on her title so perfected, a vested right....
...three years of adverse possession only, and not seven years as required to perfect title. Here, Appellants, like Mrs. Bailey, claim title based upon seven years of adverse possession that resulted in their perfection of title prior to the repeal of section 95.16 in 1987....
...pplied in my view the correct rule and stated: Without reciting the history of how each party acquired their purported interest in the property in dispute, we note that [the] issue before us is whether the trial court properly applied the version of section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), that was in effect from January 1, 1975, to January 1, 1988....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12572
...Sarah Walker claims to have an interest of redemption as successor to the former owner of the subject property, and whatever cloud upon title this interest may have represented prior to the expiration of seven years adverse possession was extinguished at the end of those seven years. F.S.. 95.16, F.S.A.; F.S....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 1724043
...rgument by Appellee that the failure to do so was error. [1] However, the trial court ruled that Appellee proved by clear and convincing evidence that she is the owner of the disputed land through adverse possession under color of title, pursuant to section 95.16, Florida Statutes....
...Moreover, Appellee does not have a written instrument containing a legally sufficient description of the property to establish a claim for adverse possession under color of title. See Seton v. Swann,
650 So.2d 35 (Fla.1995)(holding that defendants did not establish adverse possession by color of title because, under section
95.16, the title to property possessed but not described in a recorded instrument cannot be used to show color of title)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 735601
...prior to the filing of this action and the [appellees] have exercised no such occupation, possession or dominion over the lots." In Florida, one may acquire property by adverse possession either under color of title or without color of title. See §§
95.16;
95.18, Fla....
...It is settled law that a tax deed, whether valid or invalid, is color of title under the adverse possession statutes. Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co.,
310 So.2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Under color of title, a property is deemed possessed under the following circumstances:
95.16 Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title....
...(d) When a known lot or single farm has been partly improved, the part that has not been cleared or enclosed according to the usual custom of the county is to be considered as occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or cultivated. § 95.16(2) Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5023
...ce 1953 and that on several occasions appellant had asked appellee to remove the fence. One of the witnesses produced by appellant corroborated the existence of the fence on appellant’s property as well as appellee’s refusal to remove the fence. Section 95.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that when an occupant of premises enters into possession thereof under claim of title based upon an instrument of conveyance or judgment and such possession is continued for seven years, the premises so occupied shall be deemed to have been held adversely....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1173, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 14160
...The property in dispute is a strip of land approximately 26 feet by 492 feet on the border between the property of plaintiff and defendant. Defendant has record title to the property, but plaintiff claims adverse possession by substantial enclosure pursuant to the interpretation of section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1983), in Seddon v....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
the operative statute, section
95.16, Florida Statutes.1 The 1 Section
95.16(1), Florida Statutes [effective
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 5446, 1996 WL 271558
...Smith counterclaimed to quiet title, claiming the disputed property was her land. Without reciting the history of how each party acquired their purported interest in the property in dispute, we note that issue before us is whether the trial court properly applied the version of section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1975), that was in effect from January 1, 1975, to January 1, 1988....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1221, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8277
...stablished as the boundary between the two landowners by acquiescence. In the interim Mr. Franklin died and Mrs. Franklin continued the suit as sole plaintiff. Although the appellees’ claim of adverse possession was with color of title pursuant to § 95.16, Fla.Stat., appellees presented only one deed purporting to convey the disputed parcel to them....
...1st DCA 1984); Moore v. Musa,
198 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). In the instant case only the Minchews have color of title by virtue of their 1983 deed. Since the case proceeded to trial in 1986, the Minchews cannot prevail on their claim of adverse possession under §
95.16, Fla.Stat. because the statute’s requirement of seven years of continuous possession could not commence until the Minchews acquired color of title in 1983, and only three years have since elapsed. None of the elements of §
95.16, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1954 Fla. LEXIS 1424
...eld, not applicable to the question before the Court for the obvious reason that, at the time of the death of Dock Byrd the period within which an action could be brought was twenty years. The statute governing the question before the lower court is Section 95.16, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....
...ject and under the circumstances here presented” is a misinterpretation of the legal effect of the evidence. We hold that such evidence established title by adverse possession under color of title in the appellant within the provisions of Sections 95.16, 95.-17, supra....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1957 Fla. LEXIS 3390
as a written instrument as contemplated by F.S. §
95.16, F.S.A. The nature of the instrument required under
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13993
” [Emphasis Supplied] ****** With respect to §
95.16, Fla.Stat., it is undisputed that the will of Dallas
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 5824, 1992 WL 118462
...legal description, and had paid all taxes and installments due under any special improvement liens. While the complaint contains no citation to a specific statutory authority, the final judgment indicates that the trial court based its decision upon section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991), the statute setting forth the requirements for establishing adverse possession under color of title....
...Krieger v. Ocean Properties, Ltd.,
387 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Clearly, she is not. Steputat’s answer raised issues of fact as to Bidwell’s claim of possession, and those issues precluded entry of a judgment on only the pleadings. Under section
95.16(1), Florida Statutes (1991), at least two elements must be proved in the instant case: first, that Bidwell has color of title, and, second, that she has been in continuous possession of the property for at least seven years....
...n the unbroken chain of title from the earliest conveyance from the United States. Bidwell’s claim under color of title merely invokes the provisions of the applicable statutory prescription for acquiring title by adverse possession, in this case, section 95.16, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...317, 323–25 (1986). The trial court agreed and entered
final summary judgment for Legacy Rental. This appeal followed.
Because we similarly find that the Stallworths did not establish all
necessary elements to prove adverse possession, we affirm. See § 95.16,
Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 6012, 1994 WL 275376
...The court rejected the city’s claim of title pursuant to Chapter 712, Florida Statutes (1991), Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA) because the deed did not purport to transfer full title to the property to the city. The court denied the city’s claim for adverse possession under color of title pursuant to section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991), for the same reason....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14850
under color of title to give them title under Section
95.16, Florida Statutes (1977). In Downing v. Bird
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
...The statute of limitation begins to run at the termination of the estate with right of entry vested in the grantors or their heirs. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 112. Upon the expiration of seven years the board took a brand-new title by adverse possession not connected in any way with the grantors or their heirs. F.S.A. § 95.16....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6564
its apportioned dimensions of 50' X 70'. See F.S.
95.16 and 95.17, F.S.A., Laws of 1969. Also, since
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1961 Fla. App. LEXIS 3104
...Not only have the defendants and their predecessors in title established adverse possession for the statutory period of seven years to the contested lands, but the evidence also discloses that a boundary by acquiescence has been established. F.S.A. § 95.16....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 987, 2007 WL 216304
...en a continued occupation and possession of the premises ... [[Image here]] Public policy and stability of our society, ..., requires strict compliance with the appropriate statutes by those seeking ownership through adverse possession. Under either section
95.16 5 or section
95.18, Florida Statutes (2003) “the possession of the real property by the one asserting the right must be continuous, adverse, and exclusive of any other right.” Mullins v....
...1st DCA 1969)(suggesting that compliance with this requirement of section
95.18 may be achieved by delivering a return based upon a legal description "having reference to a book and page number in the records of the circuit court clerk where a recorded deed may be found."). . Section
95.16, Florida Statutes (2003), addressing adverse possession under color of title, has not been invoked in this case.
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14492
...dependent equity in favor of the purchaser who claims under a conveyance from the life tenant. * * Defendant’s case for adverse possession may have become stronger when the property was foreclosed and Charles was dispossessed. Yet, for purposes of § 95.16, we cannot tell whether this status existed for more than seven years prior to the time this suit was filed....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19286
...-pellees here, established an adverse possession to the three-foot strip of land in question or, alternatively, established a boundary by acquiescence. Appellant suggests that the Spencers failed to carry their burden on the issue of color of title. Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2701, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17215
...they did not pay taxes on that land. See Seddon v. Harpster,
403 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla.1981). Defendant contends that plaintiffs also did not acquire title by adverse possession “with color of title.” However, under the interpretation placed upon section
95.16, Florida Statutes (1988), in Seddon plaintiffs acquired title by adverse possession “with color of title” even though they did not have record title to the disputed land because “the disputed property ......
...y plaintiffs’ predecessor in title which did not interrupt plaintiffs’ physical possession interrupted the statutory adverse possession period, that the chain link fence described above was not a “substantial enclosure” within the meaning of section 95.16, and that the possession by plaintiffs was not open and notorious because the fence became covered by vegetation....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2003).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...Thus, the prorating of assessments against common elements does not appear in any way to affect the ownership or fee title of such property, nor does it appear that after the effective date of the act such property would be subject to a tax certificate. 7 Question Six Section 95.16 , Florida Statutes, provides a means for obtaining ownership of property through adverse possession when an occupant enters into possession of real property under a claim of title "exclusive of any other right" based on a written instru...
...ms of the above sections would have to be met before an individual may be able to claim adverse possession of the common elements of a subdivision. The circumstances under which a parcel of real property is deemed to be "possessed" for both sections
95.16 and
95.18 , Florida Statutes, do not appear probable where assessments for common elements of a subdivision are prorated among subdivision lot owners under section
193.0235 , Florida Statutes....
...99-12 (1999) (determination of legal status of real property held by a condominium association must be made by referring to the declaration of condominium and other documents creating the condominium and delineating the rights of the parties involved). 7 Department of Revenue Bulletin PTA-03-01 (House Bill 1721). 8 Section 95.16 (2), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 12142, 1993 WL 504383
...nstituting *936 part of Lot 25, record title to which was owned by Swann. The judgment further states that Swann was not entitled to relief because the Setons adversely possessed the lands for the requisite period of time and met the requirements of section 95.16, Florida Statutes....
...The parties stipulated that this new survey, and a 1951 survey that apparently had been rediscovered, were accurate and ■ conformed to the subdivision plat. The trial court’s ruling that the Setons had established adverse possession of the disputed lands pursuant to section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991), is erroneous and we reverse. Section 95.16, Florida Statutes (1991), the version of the statute applicable to the facts of this case, provides: 95.16 Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title.— (1) When the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession of real property under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, founding the claim on a writt...
...The Setons’ acquiring deed describes no portion of Swann’s Lot 25; it describes only the adjoining lot 24. The Setons argue that their claim of adverse possession by color of title is supported by Seddon v. Harpster,
403 So.2d 409 (Fla.1981). Earlier versions of section
95.16 were reviewed by the Florida supreme court in Meyer v. Law,
287 So.2d 37 (Fla.1973) and in Seddon . In both Meyer and Seddon , the contested lands were protected by a substantial enclosure, a fence. In Meyer , a 1973 case, the predecessor of section
95.16(2)(a) was set forth in a separate statute, section 95.17, Florida Statutes (1971)....
...Subsection (2) of section 95.17 provided that land is deemed possessed and occupied, inter alia: Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of §
95.16_ The supreme court read the above subsection in pari materia with former sections
95.16,
95.18 and 95.19 to provide that: [Pjersons who claim land adversely under a paper title relating to a certain area, and who fence in or cultivate an area beyond that which is described in the paper title, but who do not pay taxes on the additi...
...of land shown on the paper title which he actually fences or cultivates.”
287 So.2d at 40 . Shortly after Meyer , the legislature revised the adverse possession statutes. Ch. 74-382, §§ 11 and 12, Laws of Florida. This revision combined sections
95.16 and 95.17 and renumbered and reworded section 95.-17(2) as section
95.16(2)(b)....
...All contiguous land protected by the enclosure shall be property included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of this section. In Seddon , a 1981 case, the supreme court interpreted this revision to be a substantive change in the law: By combining ... sections [
95.16 and 95.17 (1973) ], the new statute clearly states that one does not have to have paper title correctly describing the disputed property as long as the area is contiguous to the described land and “protected by a substantial enclosure.” §
95.16, Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1974).
403 So.2d at 411 (emphasis in original). After Seddon , the current version of section
95.16(2)(b) was enacted by Chapter 87-194, Section 1, Laws of Florida....
...The current version specifically notes that “[i]f only a portion of the land protected by the enclosure is included within the description of the property in the written instrument, judgment, or decree, only that portion is deemed possessed.” One has only to compare the pre-1974 language with the current version of section 95.16(2)(b) to reach the conclusion that the legislature preferred the result in Meyer and embodied it in the current version of the statute....
...In Seddon the court specifically referred only to lands “protected by a substantial enclosure.” Seddon at 411 . We are not unmindful of Turner v. Valentine,
570 So.2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), upon which the Setons rely. In Turner the district court affirmed the trial court’s application of the Seddon interpretation of section
95.16(2)(b) to section
95.16(2)(c). We disagree with Turner for the reasons stated above and note that the Seddon court was guided by its understanding of the legislature’s intent in enacting the 1974 version of subsection
95.16(2)(b). 1 Seddon neither holds, nor does subsection
95.16(2)(c) evince a legislative intent, that adverse possession by color of title can be accomplished by ordinary and continuous use of contiguous property. The current version of section
95.16(2)(b) is more in line with the realities of ownership of subdivision lots where fences or other improvements are regularly constructed to promote security and privacy....
...surveyors. Each intended to occupy only the land conveyed by their respective deeds. The continuing errors of the surveyors should not result in the loss or gain of property by either neighbor. We hold that adverse possession by color of title under section 95.16 (1991) requires not only possession in a manner described in subsection (2), but also that the property claimed be described in the recorded instrument upon which the claim of title is founded. The title to property possessed but not described in the recorded instrument relied upon for color of title cannot be perfected pursuant to section 95.16....
...The judgment finding that the Setons have gained title to a portion of Lot 25 owned by Swann is vacated and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS, C.J., and W. SHARP, J., concur. . Section 95.16(2)(b), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17833
...However, where an occupant of property under color of title openly and notoriously is in continuous actual possession of property in opposition to the rights of the true owner for a period greater than seven years, then he is holding the property adversely. Section 95.16, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...She continued to occupy the property
-2-
until later that year, when she died. Upon Suzann's death, her interest in the property
passed to her brothers, Michael and Dennis Batterbee. Dennis then conveyed his
interest to Michael, the appellant here.
Section 95.16(1), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that
[w]hen the occupant, or those under whom the occupant
claims, entered into possession of real property under a
claim of title exclusive of any other r...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 4280
...n. Appellant’s further contention that the entry of the summary final decree was error because based upon an erroneous finding of fact, is without merit. We cannot agree that he acquired title to the land he claims by adverse possession under F.S. § 95.16, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 4809
...nes Sanborn to the Plaintiff on January 12, 1957, and recorded December 30, 1959.” Finding the equities with the defendants, the cause was dismissed. Plaintiff’s first point on appeal is stated as whether or not the defendants are barred by F.S. § 95.16 or § 95.23, F.S.A., from now asserting their claim against the property....
...Clark, et al. Fla., 1954,
72 So.2d 905 , which might be considered as a re-affirmance of our decision in Thompson.” Thus, the court also receded from the decision in Barnott, supra, as the decision in Thompson was grounded upon the holding in Barnott. F.S. Section
95.16, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 6461
...improved; or “(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial enclosure. All contiguous land protected by such substantial enclosure shall be deemed to be premises included within the written instrument, judgment, or decree, within the purview of § 95.16; or ....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10908, 2002 WL 1769061
...Thus, the trial court found that the Johnson survey established the correct property line by the greater weight of the evidence, but that Mr. Dunbar was entitled to have the strip' of land titled in his name by virtue of adverse possession. Adverse possession under color of title is a statutory claim. See § 95.16, Fla....
...He never provided positive proof of open, exclusive, and notorious possession for a continuous period of seven years from his chosen commencement date. Most adverse possession claims involve evidence of a fence, a substantial enclosure, or cultivation. See § 95.16(2), Fla....
