Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...the beneficiaries must join in any such conveyance thus making them indispensable parties to this action. This deed contains enough reference to the nature and purposes of the underlying trust agreement to take it out of the operation of Fla. Stat. § 689.07, F.S.A....

...Appellant's basic contention is that since the deed in question is not within this statutory provision the trustee does not have fee simple title and thus the beneficiaries must be joined as defendants. We reject this contention and affirm. Fla. Stat. § 689.07, F.S.A. was supplemented in 1963 by passage of Fla. Stat. § 689.071, F.S.A....

...Remedial statutes do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. Cunningham v. State Plant Board of Florida, Fla.App. 1959, 112 So.2d 905. The obvious purpose of the amendment is to extend the remedies of § 689.07 to third parties dealing with trustees under deeds of trust which are taken out from its operation by enough reference to the nature and purposes of the secret trust agreement but which fail to reveal the beneficiaries or terms of the collateral agreement....

...The issue, then, is whether the debtor may obtain jurisdiction pursuant to the Code pursuant to the applicability of the definition of "Corporation" in Section 101(8) as aforementioned. III. THE FACTS Trust No. 71-LT-100 is a land trust organized pursuant to Florida Statute 689.07....

...Thus, even if Callava owns only a beneficial interest in the property, she is entitled to claim a homestead exemption to the forced sale of the property and the trial court erred in foreclosing her interest in the property. Feinberg's alternative argument that the property cannot be Callava's homestead by virtue of Section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1995), also fails. [*] The *432 purpose of Section 689.07 is "to prevent fraud being perpetrated upon persons who might subsequently rely upon the record when dealing with the grantee." Meadows v. Citicorp Leasing, Inc., 511 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)(citing, Arundel Debenture Corp. v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765 (1939)). Section 689.07 would allow Jorge Gaviria, as Trustee to convey or encumber the property, but he did not do so and no party has detrimentally relied on his ownership status in connection with the property....

...records of the county in which the real property is situate at the time of recording of such deed or conveyance, a declaration of trust by the grantee so described declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. Id. § 689.07(1).

...basis for a lis pendens without bond. Since the grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified, the grantee received fee simple title. § 689.07(1), Fla....

...d purpose of the trust, or the trust agreement of record, the grantee receives fee simple title to that property, unless a contrary intention appears in the deed or conveyance. Glusman v. Warren, 413 So.2d 857, 858 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1982); Fla.Stat. § 689.07(1) (1987)....

...ntionally shifted the Spring Valley property among family and friends to keep it away from their creditors. 3. The Third Badge of Fraud: Timing of the Conveyance. Josephine Romano was the fee simple owner of the Spring Valley property. See Fla.Stat. § 689.07(1)....

...plied easement because the equitable arguments raised were not supported by the facts, the record or the law. We agree with the trial court's findings. APPLICATION OF SECTION 687.07, FLORIDA STATUTES In reaching its decision, the trial court applied section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1959). [5] Section 689.07 provides: (1) Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed in which the words "trustee" or "as trustee" are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named, the nature and p...

...rd at the time of recording of such deed or conveyance, a declaration of trust by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. The purpose of section 689.07 is to protect persons who rely upon the public land records to ascertain title to real property when a beneficiary's interest is not disclosed in the grantor/grantee index by either the deed transferring title or a recorded declaration of trust....

...[6] Because the deeds used in the initial conveyance of the parcel to Hoffenberg did not identify either trust, name the trust beneficiaries or state the nature or purpose of either trust, and because a declaration of trust was never recorded under section 689.07, the trial court was correct in finding that Hoffenberg owned each parcel in fee simple absolute....

...Prior to the amendment, the proviso now in section (1) required the declaration of trust to "appear of record." The provision was expanded by the amendment to read "appear of record among the public records of the county in which the real property is situated." [6] § 689.07(4), Fla....

...It was affirmatively shown that the depositor-Trustee in this case had no authority to pledge the trust funds as security for his personal debt; and there is no statute of this state conferring such authority upon the trustees of a dry or passive trust of personal property like that with which we are here concerned. Section 689.07, Fla....

...As we read the amended complaint and the copied documents between the parties thereto attached, we do not see that Ferraro had any justiciable cause for relief. The amended trust was clearly an active trust, as distinguished from a dry or passive trust, and was in the category of an "Illinois Land Trust" contemplated by F.S. § 689.071, F.S.A., which inter alia provides as follows: "Every * * * instrument heretofore or hereafter made, hereinafter referred to as the recorded instrument, transferring any interests in real property in this state * * * to any person * * * in...

...uch determination shall become an issue under the laws or in the courts of this state. (5) This act is remedial in nature and shall be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate the intent and purposes hereinabove expressed." The enactment of F.S. § 689.071, F.S.A., was forecast in an article some 3 years prior thereto in 13 Florida Law Review, 173, wherein were cited authorities indicating that Florida would follow Illinois in finding and construing such trusts to be active. This 2nd District Court had occasion in Grammer v. Roman, Fla.App. 1965, 174 So.2d 443, to recognize the applicability in a proper case of F.S. § 689.071, F.S.A., in the course of which opinion is the following: "Fla. Stat. § 689.07, F.S.A. was supplemented in 1963 by passage of Fla. Stat. § 689.071, F.S.A....

...The interest of Ferraro in the trust was not an interest in real estate nor would a pledge of that interest be rendered a mortgage, as urged by Ferraro. By executing the amended trust agreement all parties agreed that Ferraro's interest would be deemed to be personal property. § 689.071(4) provides that such provision in a recorded instrument "shall be controlling for all purposes where such determination shall become an issue under the laws or in the courts of this state"....

...said on the merits of the case, it is unnecessary to rule upon the point. The interlocutory order appealed is affirmed. HOBSON, C.J., concurs. McNULTY, J., dissents with opinion. McNULTY, Judge (dissenting). I would agree with the majority that F.S. § 689.071, F.S.A., is applicable in this case to the extent that pursuant thereto the land trust agreement herein created a personal property interest in appellant....

...tors and that it could be conveyed in trust for the benefit of their grandchildren and still remain free of the judgment liens. The deed was made to "David Meadows as trustee" but there was no declaration of trust and no trust document was recorded. Section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1977) provides that where a grantee in a deed is named as trustee without identifying either the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record is identified, the grantee receives fee simple title....

...CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150(a). TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES: This case involves the interpretation of Florida Statutes section 689.07(1), application of that statute in federal bankruptcy proceedings, and, potentially, the constitutionality of retroactively applying an amendment to that statute....

...On 24 August 2001, Douglas Raborn filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the Beneficiaries of the trust, alleging that the farm was part of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Trustee argued that, under Florida Statutes section 689.07(1), the 1991 Deed actually conveyed fee simple title to Douglas individually, rather than conveying 3 mere legal title to Douglas in his capacity as Trustee of the trust. Florida Statutes section 689.07(1), as it existed in 1991 and at the time of the bankruptcy filing, provided that [e]very deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed in which the words “trustee” or “as trustee” are...

...time of recording of such deed or conveyance, a declaration of trust by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. FLA. STAT. § 689.07(1) (2001)....

...ad not issued a final order. On remand, the bankruptcy court followed the district court’s earlier order and granted the Bankruptcy Trustee’s motion for summary judgment. In 2004, the Florida Legislature, however, added an amendment to section 689.07(1)....

...the property had vested when the bankruptcy was filed in 2001 and that retroactive application of the 2004 statutory amendment would be unconstitutional. This appeal followed. The Beneficiaries contend that, even under the unamended version of section 689.07(1), the Deed validly conveyed the farm in trust to Douglas Raborn as Trustee because (1) the Deed refers to the nature and purposes of the trust; and (2) the Deed’s language clearly demonstrates the intention of the Settlors to co...

...ective manifestation of that intent appears in the body of the deed or conveyance itself.” 3 The Beneficiaries also contend that the Deed and Trust Agreement together created a typical “Illinois Land Trust” covered by Florida Statutes section 689.071 rather than section 689.07(1). 6 689.07(1) only clarified the statute’s meaning and can apply retroactively to the Deed....

...the Palm Beach County real estate records would have no notice that the Deed might have conveyed the Raborn Farm in trust to Douglas Raborn as Trustee. We are also unable to determine whether the district court correctly applied Florida Statutes section 689.07(1) to the Deed in this case, especially the district court’s determination that the Deed failed to express a “contrary intention” on the part of the Grantors to convey the property in trust. We have said that “[s]ubst...

...controlling precedent of the supreme court of Florida.” FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6). Because we have found no such controlling precedent, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: Whether, under Florida Statutes section 689.07(1) as it existed before its 2004 amendment, this Deed -- which is a recorded real estate conveyance deed to a named trustee of a private express trust identified in the deed by name and date, and contains other...

...s that the Deed -- viewed in the light of the unamended statute -- did not convey the property in trust, we also certify the following question: Whether, as a matter of Florida law, the 2004 statutory amendment to Florida Statutes section 689.07(1) applies retroactively to the Deed in this particular case and causes the Deed -- in the light of the amendment5 -- to convey only legal title to the grantee in trust.6 5 Although the 2004 bill expressly...

... In certifying these questions, our intent is not to restrict the issues considered by the state court, including whether the Deed and Trust Agreement were effective to create a valid “Illinois Land Trust” covered under Florida Statutes section 689.071 rather than section 689.07(1).7 Discretion to examine this issue and other relevant issues lies with the state court....

...1968)). To assist the state court’s inquiry, the entire record in this case and the briefs of the parties are transmitted herewith. QUESTION CERTIFIED. 7 We are aware that the Florida Legislature extensively amended Florida Statutes section 689.071, effective 1 October 2006....

...vered. Since Morris Siegel and Nina Siegel had predeceased Marge Smith, their estates, rather than they themselves, claimed title by virtue of the said second deed based upon allegations of lack of evidence of any type of trust and the provisions of § 689.07, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...s niece and the apparent intent of the parties at that time; (b) a constructive trust to be imposed due to the "artifice and concealment" by which the second deed was executed; (c) construction of the quoted paragraph in the second deed which, under § 689.07, Florida Statutes (1977), deems it a mortgage due to the apparent lack of intention by Morris Siegel to retain an individual interest in the property; (d) adverse possession under color of title, pursuant to § 95.16, Florida Statutes (1977...

...ved, a life estate, was a "gift." It was entirely financed by the money and efforts of the donor, Morris Siegel, and no consideration whatsoever was provided by Mrs. Smith. With regard to the previously-quoted paragraph contained in the second deed, § 689.07, Florida Statutes (1977) provides that if the word "trustee" is added to the name of the grantee, and there is no apparent trust purpose and no named beneficiary of the trust, the grantor is deemed to have granted a fee simple estate to the grantee....

...Melville, Miami, for appellees. Before SCHWARTZ, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. SCHWARTZ, Judge. The trial judge entered summary judgment to the effect that certain interests in real property titled in the name of Oscar J. Mannen, as trustee, were, contrary to Section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1979) [1] not owned by Mr....

...denied, 219 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1968); Mead v. Mead, 193 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 201 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967); Benson v. Atwood, 177 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Owens v. MacKenzie, 103 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). Reversed. NOTES [1] 689.07: `Trustee' or `as trustee' added to name of grantee, transferee, assignee or mortgagee transfers interest or creates lien as if additional word or words not used....

...yment under such a contract is properly brought in equity where to aid recovery a lien may be claimed and imposed on the property involved. [2] The chancellor correctly recognized that the bank held the property in trust, and not in fee simple under § 689.07, Fla....

...Stern, Trustee", was so designated in the mortgage upon which his apparent interest depends. Mr. Stern, who is a practicing attorney of this court, appears herein in the guise of "Attorney for the Appellant, Paul R. Stern, Trustee." His brief aptly cites Section 689.07(3), Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., in support of the argument that he is sued in his individual capacity and not in a representative capacity....

...o remove the cloud on the title: count I sought to quiet title and count II sought damages for slander of title. Rinker answered asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because Edelman owned a fee simple estate pursuant to section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Rinker had performed a credit check on Edelman and knew that he was a developer who owned real property. It had no specific knowledge of the property at issue. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the judgment liens attached to the property. Section 689.07(1) states: Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed, in which the words "trustee" or "as trustee" are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named nor the nature and...

...The judgment in favor of appellee is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that judgment be entered, as a matter of law, in favor of appellant. REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER and SCHWARTZ, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Even if the conveyance to Michael A. Taylor had described him as trustee, by virtue of section 689.07, Florida Statutes, the result would be the same....

...iae. BELL, J. We have for review two questions of Florida law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. The first question is: Whether, under Florida. Statutes section 689.07(1) as it existed before its 2004 amendment, this Deed—which is a recorded real estate conveyance deed to a named trustee of a private express trust identified in the deed by name and date, and contains other language referring to the...

...In re Raborn, 470 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2006). We answer this question in the affirmative. The Eleventh Circuit also certified a second question should we determine that the deed conveys fee simple title: Whether, as a matter of Florida law, the 2004 statutory amendment to Florida Statutes section 689.07(1) applies retroactively to the Deed in this particular case and causes the Deed—in the light of the amendment—to convey only legal title to the grantee in trust....

...Raborn filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the Beneficiaries of the trust, alleging that the farm was part of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Trustee argued that, under Florida Statutes section 689.07(1), the 1991 Deed actually conveyed fee simple title to Douglas individually, rather than conveying mere legal title to Douglas in his capacity as Trustee of the trust....

...We then dismissed the Beneficiaries' appeal to this Court because the bankruptcy court had not issued a final order. On remand, the bankruptcy court followed the district court's earlier order and granted the Bankruptcy Trustee's motion for summary judgment. In 2004, the Florida Legislature, however, added an amendment to section 689.07(1)....

...n holds fee simple title or mere *331 legal title to the Raborn family farm. See id. at 1324. Thus, as stated earlier, it certified two questions to this Court. II. DISCUSSION Again, the first certified question asks: Whether, under Florida Statutes section 689.07(1) as it existed before its 2004 amendment, this Deed — which is a recorded real estate conveyance deed to a named trustee of a private express trust identified in the deed by name and date, and contains other language referring to the unrecorded trust agreement, the settlors, and the beneficiaries — conveys only legal title to the property in trust to the grantee as trustee. In re Raborn, 470 F.3d at 1324. To answer this question, we first must construe section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (2001), as it existed prior to its 2004 amendment. [1] Section 689.07(1) reads: Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed, in which the words "trustee" or "as trustee" are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named nor the nature and p...

...operty is situate at the time of recording of such deed or conveyance, a declaration of trust by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. 689.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). Though inartfully drafted, section 689.07(1) is unambiguous....

...t is of record. See id. In this case, the deed itself clearly expresses that the grantors, Robert and Lenore Raborn, intended to deed the Raborn family farm to Douglas Raborn in trust. Thus, the deed falls under the "contrary intention" exception in section 689.07(1)....

...In light of these facts, though no beneficiaries are named and the nature and purpose of the trust is not stated, this deed expresses the grantor's clear intent to deed the Raborn family farm to Douglas Raborn to be held in trust in accordance with the Raborn Farm Trust, Agreement dated January 25, 1991. Accordingly, section 689.07(1) does not operate to declare that this deed conveyed a fee simple estate to the grantee. [2] Instead, Douglas Raborn holds mere legal title as trustee. This interpretation is consistent with the long-understood purpose of section 689.07(1). As this Court has explained, the Legislature enacted section 689.07(1) for the purpose of preventing secret trusts to protect those "who might subsequently rely upon the record when dealing with the grantee." Arundel Debenture Corp. v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765, 767 (1939) (construing the predecessor statute to section 689.07(1)); see also One Harbor, 884 So.2d at 1043 ("The purpose of section 689.07 is `to protect persons who rely upon the public land records to ascertain title to real property when a beneficiary's interest is not disclosed in the grantor/grantee index by either the deed transferring title or a recorded declaration of trust.")....

...the grantor's intent was only to convey mere legal title. In such a case, a third party is on notice that the grantee only holds the property in trust. III. CONCLUSION Given the above, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative. Under section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the deed in question, which conveys real property to a grantee as trustee of a private express trust identified by its name and date and which also bears numerous references to the trust agreement, the settlors, and the beneficiaries, conveys mere legal title to that grantee....

...Having answered this first question, we decline to answer the second certified question as it is moot. It is so ordered. *333 LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and CANTER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In 2004, the Florida Legislature amended section 689.07(1.) in response to the U.S....

...Florida lawyers and their clients have long understood and relied on the fact that specifically identifying the trust by its name or date in a deed is sufficient to indicate the grantor's intention to convey real property in trust and thus avoid any contrary dictate of section 689.07(1)....

...The Trustee contends that the Debtor holds fee simple title to the Property, as Dye's grantee, because Dye failed to identify either the Trust's beneficiaries or its purpose in the deed and because she also failed to record a declaration of trust in the public records. The Trustee's claim is predicated upon Fla. Stat. § 689.07(i), which provides: Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed, in which the words "trustee" or "as trustee" are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are named nor the nature...

...ituate at the time of recording of such deed or conveyance, a declaration of trust by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. Fla. Stat. § 689.07(1) (1996). Florida statute § 689.07 was enacted to protect persons who rely upon the public land records to obtain title to real property when a beneficiary's interest is not disclosed in the grantor/grantee index by either the deed transferring title or a recorded declaration of trust....

...5th DCA 1987); Craig v. Seymour (In re Crabtree), 871 F.2d 36 (6th Cir.1989); In re Ocean Beach Properties, 148 B.R. 494 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992). The statute also allows a declaration of trust to be recorded either before or after the deed transferring title. Fla. Stat. § 689.07(4)....

...shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law . . .". Fla. Stat. ch. 695.01 (1995). Where a land trust is concerned, Fla.Stat. ch. 689.07(4) permits a declaration of trust to be recorded either before or after the deed transferring title to the land trustee/grantee is recorded....

...on of a declaration of trust, then the new grantee would take title to the "property free and clear of the claims of the beneficiaries of such declaration of trust and of anyone claiming by, through or under such beneficiaries . . .". Fla. Stat. ch. 689.07(4)....

...ition beneficial interest and her rights as beneficiary of the Trust should prevail over the Trustee's strong-arm powers as lien creditor. In support of her argument Dye relies upon a Florida common law exception to the result required by Fla. Stat. § 689.07....

...Bass, 111 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). In accordance with Florida law, this Court also finds that Dye, through reasonable diligence or care, could have protected herself by properly recording evidence of the Trust prior to the petition date. Fla. Stat. § 689.07(4)....

...cannot bring and maintain an action, let alone for specific performance. Notwithstanding that seller waived this argument by failing to address it at trial, see Trinchitella v. D.R.F., Inc., 584 So.2d 35, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), it still fails under section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...state with full power and authority in and to the grantee in such deed to sell, convey, and grant and encumber both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate conveyed, unless a contrary intention shall appear in the deed or conveyance.... § 689.07(1), Fla....

...ied. The trial court's conclusion is AFFIRMED. SHARP, J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially in conclusion only, without opinion. NOTES [1] Actually A and B each took title as "trustee" but that fact has no bearing here because of the effect of section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes....

relying on Florida Statute section 689.071, or section 689.07(1). Florida Statute section 689.071, which

...Giller (“Personal Representatives”), appeal from an order granting the appellee, Brian J. Giller’s (“Brian”), motion to dismiss the first amended complaint with prejudice. Because the Personal Representatives’ First Amended Complaint states a legally sufficient cause of action under section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I....

...The probate proceeding is pending in the Eleventh Circuit's Probate Division, and is styled In Re Estate of Norman M. Giller, Case No. 08-1878 CP 05. The Personal Representatives filed a Complaint for declaratory relief on September 28, 2011, which sought a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), six2 parcels of real property (the “properties”) 1 Brian’s children, Jason and Jamie Giller, are also named as respondents below as interested parties by virtue of their beneficiary status in the Brian J....

...Norman’s Estate until it is determined whether the properties are assets of the Estate. Brian filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses. As his Third Affirmative Defense, Brian asserted that the Personal Representatives “lack standing to sue under section 689.07(1) because they are not a subsequent purchaser of one of the subject Properties[,] a mortgagee or lienholder[,] or creditor of the Estate, who are the only classes of persons to which 689.07(1) is available.” He also raised failure to state a cause of action as his Seventh Affirmative Defense, asserting that section described in deed number 6 (“lot 6”), apparently because they became aware of the fact that on June 13, 2005, Norman recorded in the public records of Brevard County an Affidavit of Trust with respect to that property. The Affidavit of Trust stated that Norman was the trustee under the Norman M. Giller Trust. 3 689.07(1) “does not apply until after a subsequent conveyance of the property from the grantee who ‘as Trustee’ takes title.” At the June 25, 2012, hearing, Brian argued that he is the owner of the properties in his capacity as successor trustee of the Norman M....

...upon Brian accepted the responsibilities of serving as the sole successor trustee. The Personal Representatives subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that because the deeds, on their face and when read in conformity with section 689.07(1), conveyed title to Norman in fee simple, the properties were part of Norman’s estate at the time of his death....

...2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the probate court held that “[t]he Personal Representatives are not ‘subsequent parties’ dealing with the properties which are the subject of the Action, and as a result are not entitled to the relief they seek under § 689.07(1), Fla....

...iled to state a 4 The First Amended Complaint incorporated by reference the allegations contained in the Complaint for declaratory relief as count I. 5 cause of action for declaratory relief pursuant to section 689.07(1) because they are not parties who relied on the public records in acquiring an interest in the properties. On February 5, 2014, the probate court entered an order dismissing count I (declaratory relief) of the First Amended Complaint with prejudice, but denied the motion as to count II (quiet title)....

...5th DCA 2000) (“[W]e note that the standard of review for the dismissal of a complaint for failure to allege facts establishing the plaintiff’s standing is de novo review.”). III. ANALYSIS On appeal, the Personal Representatives argue that they are entitled to seek relief under section 689.07(1) and that the trial court erred in granting Brian’s Motion to Dismiss....

...(holding that trial court properly dismissed estate’s complaint for declaratory relief where outcome would be of no financial benefit to estate). To that end, the Personal Representatives sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court that under the provisions of section 689.07(1), the properties are assets of the Estate subject to probate administration. As such, the issue here is whether the Personal Representatives stated a claim for a declaratory judgment sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Section 689.07(1) states: (1) Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed in which the words “trustee” or “as trustee” are added to the name of the grantee, and...

...aration of trust by the grantee so described declaring the purposes of such trust, if any, declaring that the real estate is held other than for the benefit of the grantee. “Though inartfully drafted, section 689.07(1) is unambiguous.” Raborn, 974 So....

...They further allege that the public records do not contain any separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So. 2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as “trustee” conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under “contrary intention” exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin. Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that trial court correctly applied section 689.07(1) to find that grantee who held title “as trustee” owned property in fee simple absolute); Heiskell v. Morris, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2809, D2811 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 18, 2015) (summarizing section 689.07(1) to stand for the proposition that “if the only hint in a deed that the 9 underlying property might be held in trust is the addition of the words ‘trustee’ or ‘as trustee’ to the grantee’s name, the deed is deemed to have granted a fee simple estate”). Significantly, section 689.07(1) does not state that its application is limited to the benefit of “subsequent parties” or instances where a third-party has relied on the deed in the public record, and it certainly does not preclude an action by the personal representatives of the grantee’s estate to determine ownership of properties to which the grantee purportedly took title as trustee. Brian asserted in his Motion to Dismiss that section 689.07(1) has no application to this case, and the Personal Representatives are not “entitled” to relief under section 689.07(1), because they are not parties who relied on the public records in acquiring an interest in the properties. In support of his argument, Brian cites to language in various cases addressing the purpose of section 689.07(1). See Raborn, 974 So. 2d at 328 (explaining that the legislature enacted section 689.07(1) for the purpose of preventing secret trusts to protect those who might subsequently rely upon the record in dealing with grantee); One Harbor, 884 So. 2d at 1043 (“The purpose of section 689.07 is to protect persons who rely upon the public land records to ascertain title to real property when a beneficiary's interest is not disclosed in the grantor/grantee index by either the deed transferring title or a recorded declaration of trust.”); Callava, 864 So. 2d at 431-32 (“The purpose of Section 689.07 is ‘to prevent fraud being perpetrated upon persons who might subsequently rely upon the record when dealing with the grantee.’” (quoting 10 Meadows v....

...2d at 8 (“The purpose of the statute was to prevent fraud on persons who might rely on the record title when dealing with the grantee.”). Notably, none of these cases address the issue of standing or “entitlement” of the personal representatives of a decedent-grantee to seek relief based on the operation of section 689.07(1), and none limit the class of parties entitled to relief under subsection (1) to “subsequent parties.” Moreover, this Court’s precedent supports our conclusion that a grantee’s personal representative may seek a determination regarding ownership under section 689.07(1). In Turturro v. Schmier, 374 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the personal representative of the decedent’s estate claimed title to the property under section 689.07 by virtue of a deed5 conveying a remainder to the decedent, “Morris Siegel, as Trustee,” and specifically alleged that the estate was the fee simple title holder to which the property reverted upon the demise of the holder of the life estate. This Court held that the trial court properly entered summary final judgment in favor of the personal representative, reasoning that [section] 689.07, Florida Statutes (1977) provides that if the word “trustee” is added to the name of the grantee, 5 The deed at issue read: To have and to hold all and singular the above described premises,...

...�� Id. The fact of whether a subsequent transferee did or did not rely on the deed, however, did not contribute to this Court’s analysis—the personal representative was not required to be a “subsequent party” in order to seek relief under section 689.07(1). Brian’s contention that the Personal Representatives cannot claim fee simple title on behalf of the Estate because he invoked the “cure” provision contained in section 689.07(4), Fla. Stat. (2011),6 by filing his declarations of trust does not help 6 Section 689.07(4) states as follows: (4) Nothing herein contained shall prevent any person from causing any declaration of trust to be recorded before or after the recordation of the instrument...

...2d at 590 (finding that trial court erred by relying on copy of release which was not attached to complaint when ruling on motion to dismiss). Moreover, under the facts of this case, the legal import, if any, of Brian’s declarations of trust within the context of section 689.07 was not appropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss....

...furnished to obtain such transfer of interest in property or assignment or release or satisfaction of mortgage thereon. 13 Representatives stated a legally sufficient cause of action under section 689.07(1). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the Personal Representatives’ claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s opinion. Reversed and Remanded....

...It is equally evident that at no time did they acquire a cognizable ownership interest, in any of the farms composing the “Properties” acquired by FPCAID. This is so because of Article 1583 cited above and also by virtue of the specific provisions of the Florida Statute which provides as follows: § 689.07(1) Fla.Stat....

...her transferred sizable property holdings contemporaneously with the creation of a family trust agreement in the early 1980s. Three decades later, a spat over ownership of the property resulted in the trial court concluding,. under, the authority of section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes (2004), that two of the siblings, named on the property’s deeds as co-trustees and listed as beneficiaries in the trust agreement, owned the property outright in fee simple rather than as trustees for the benefit of all siblings....

...alleged the property was indivisible and that the two brothers owned the property, .each having a. 50% interest. It also alleged, important .for this litigation, the following: ■While title was conveyed to Plaintiff and Defendant “as Trustees,”, pursuant to Florida Statute § 689.07, such conveyance grants fee simple estate interest to Plaintiff and Defendant since the warranty deed does not name any beneficiaries, does not state the nature and purposes .of....

...Though Robert would; personally benefit from the relief that John, sought, he was not enamored by .his brother’s legal maneuver. He moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the property was held in trust for all siblings and not subject to a partition action. Also citing section 689.07, he pointed out that the Trust Agreement had been recorded on June 11, 2013, which was sufficient to identify the trust and preclude the relief that John sought, even though the deeds had been recorded almost thirty years earlier. John responded with a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the deeds granted fee simple ownership to Robert- and himself. He claimed that re-cordation of-the Trust Agreement was untimely as well as unauthorized. 1 As for section 689.07, he relied on subsection (1),....

...Whether the trial court correctly held that the deeds and conveyances of the Morris Grove Plantation to siblings, John and Robert, granted them the right to sell the property and share the proceeds between themselves, despite the existence of the Trust Agreement, hinges on how section 689.07 and its history are interpreted....

...rustee and the Words as Trustees When Added to the Name of the Grantee in Any Deed or Conveyance of Real Estate.” Ch. 6925, Laws of Fla. (1915). The language of that law, which has remained essentially the same since its enactment, is set forth in section 689.07(1), Florida Statutes: (1) Every deed or conveyance of real estate heretofore or hereafter made or executed in which the words “trustee” or “as trustee” are added to the name of the grantee, and in which no beneficiaries are nam...

...ecordation of the instrument evidencing title or ownership of property in a trustee; nor shall this section be construed as preventing any beneficiary under an unrecorded declaration of trust from enforcing the* terms thereof against the trustee ... § 689.07(4), Fla....

...purpose of preventing secret trusts to protect those “who might subsequently rely upon the record when dealing with the grantee.” Arundel Debenture Corp. v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668 , 190 So. 765, 767 (1939) (construing the predecessor statute to section 689.07(1)); see also One Harbor, [Fin....

...tanding of beneficiaries, such as Connie, to . bring or intervene in proceedings affecting their interests. In short, the trial court’s order, which paralleled the statutory' misconstruction that co-trustee John advocated, erred by failing to read section 689.07 as a whole....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the final judgment of dissolution but qualify the court’s treatment of a lot appellant held as trustee. The trial court held that pursuant to section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1987), the appellant was the fee simple owner of the lot, and therefore it could be treated as marital property and granted to the wife as part of equitable distribution....

...3. That there was no recorded declaration of trust showing how or by virtue of what authority Whiteside had purchased the lease “as trustee.” 4. That none of the parties had informed the plaintiff that the rent was not being paid. 5. That under section 689.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., since Whiteside was holding both estates “as trustee * * * it would appear that no unpaid rental was accumulating.” 6....

...elevant. After a review of the law and the evidence, I find that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even if the trust were not registered and were deemed to be deficient, Fla. Stat. § 689.07 (2006) specifically provides that the conveyance would have been declared to have granted a fee simple estate....

...l grant and is hereby declared to have granted a fee simple estate with full power and authority in and to the grantee in such deed to sell, convey, and grant and encumber both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate conveyed Fla. Stat. § 689.07(1) (2006)....

...for Schif-fer’s attorney’s fees. We agree with this alternative argument. The “shell” contract stated payment would be made upon sale of the land. Technically, what happened here was a sale of the land'—as evidenced by the quit-claim deed. Section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1995) provides: “Trustee” or “as trustee” added to name of grantee, transferee, assignee, or mortgagee transfers interest or creates lien as if additional word or words not used (1) Every deed or conveyance o...

...d that the trust deed from Richards Land Development Corporation to Di Costanzo was, in fact, a mortgage. Neither party to this .appeal has contended that a valid trust was intended. Moreover, we conclude that a mortgage was intended notwithstanding 689.07 F.S.A....

...appears to provide to the contrary. In Arundel Debenture Corporation v. Le Blond, 139 Fla. 668 , 190 So. 765, 767 (1939), the Florida Supreme Court said; “While it is true that by virtue of section 5666, Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927 [subsequently renumbered 689.07 F.S.] * * *, the conveyances under which Schultz acquired the property involved, vested in him a fee simple title, with full power and authority to sell, convey and grant both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate, Willys-Overland, Inc....

...This section * * * was intended to prevent secret trusts, to convey the beneficial title to the grantee along with the legal title, in order to prevent any fraud being perpetrated upon all who might subsequently rely upon the record when dealing with the grantee.” Though 689.07 F.S.A....

...So by analogy to the reasoning in Arundel, supra, and the principles of law heretofore stated we must arrive at the conclusion that a Court of Equity is not precluded from declaring the conveyance to Di Costanzo, as trustee, ostensibly within the ambit of 689.07 F.S....

...Following the purchase of the home with the husband’s separate funds which had been owned by him at the time of the marriage, the home was renovated with such funds, principally through his labor. Both parties apparently agree that fee simple title was in the husband. See § 689.07, Fla.Stat....