Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

..., she owned the property up to the fence adjacent to the road by virtue of adverse possession. Initially we note that the district court correctly affirmed the trial court's rejection of Seddon's claim of adverse possession "without color of title." § 95.18, Fla....

...Seddon had paid taxes based on the legal description in her deed which used the correct north-south midsection line as a guide. The disputed property beyond that line and up to the fence would not have been covered. Failure to pay taxes necessarily defeats a claim of adverse possession "without color of title." § 95.18, Fla....

...The purchase of this assignment was approved by the probate court. This suit having been instituted on November 12, 1957, twenty years had not elapsed since the original clearing of the 100 foot right of way by the power corporation in 1939. Commenting upon the requirements of sections 95.18 and 95.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., [1] for acquiring title *314 by adverse possession without color of title, the lower court refused to apply the seven year limitation period specified by section 95.18 as the prescriptive period and held that the prescriptive period for acquisition of a right of way is the common law period of twenty years....

...executed and delivered; (2) that the requisite period for acquisition by adverse possession of an easement for right of way upon which to erect and maintain a transmission line is not twenty years but instead is seven years; (3) that the proviso of section 95.18 is not applicable to an easement; (4) that the plaintiffs' right was lost or abandoned through acquiescence, or that it was barred by laches; and (5) that the chancellor authorized a jury to be empanelled to fix the compensation instead...

...There is nothing to show that the owner was prevented from using or having possession of the land or that the owner was ousted from possession. That which has been done by the corporation does not fulfill the requirements for adverse possession without color of title as required by sections 95.18 and 95.19....

...adverse possession does not apply. Thus general authorities and those from other jurisdictions relied upon by the power corporation as to this question are of no avail in Florida. The third point here argued advances the query whether the proviso of section 95.18 is applicable to an easement....

...The decree should be revised so as to require an independent eminent domain proceeding, and the cause is remanded for that purpose. Otherwise the decree is affirmed. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. ALLEN, C.J., and CARLTON, VASSAR B., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.18....

Laws of Florida, Acts of 1939, same being Section 95.18 and Section 95.19, Florida Statutes 1941. The

...and although there had been no return of the encroached lands for taxes or payment thereof by respondents. The foregoing cases, cited for conflict, clearly hold that without color of title or payment of taxes, as prescribed by Sections 95.16, 95.17, 95.18, and 95.19, Florida Statutes, [5] and without seven years of actual, *39 adverse, open, hostile, and continuous enclosure or cultivation, or adverse claim cannot ripen into a valid legal title....

...ld under color of title. 1 Fla.Jur., Adverse Possession, § 9. In 1939, the Legislature revised the adverse possession statutes of the State so that the requirement of payment of taxes in order to claim adversely without color of title (Fla. Stat. §§ 95.18, 95.19, F.S.A.) was to be applied as well to adverse possession with color of title....

...portion of such farm or lot which may have been left not cleared or not enclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county shall be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or cultivated." Section 95.18, Florida Statutes, 1971, provides: "Where it shall appear that there has been an actual continued occupation for seven years of premises under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written instrument, or...

necessary for defendant to show compliance with Section 95.18, Florida Statutes of 1941, by returning the

...rantor herein, including the riparian rights to the latter described property being conveyed. [6] See, e.g., Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So.2d 311, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960): The third point here argued advances the query whether the proviso of section 95.18 is applicable to an easement....

...s of disputed strip north of the highway, which was actually fenced in with land to which they held good title. While it is admitted that no taxes were paid upon land lying east of the range line, so as to bring appellants within the purview of F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A., dealing with adverse possession without color of title, it is contended that F.S....

...tent in this area. Under the present state of the law a diligent owner has notice that an adverse possessor has arrived, by reason of the recording requirement under F.S. § 95.16, F.S.A., with color of title, and the payment of taxes required under § 95.18, where there is no color of title....

...nterest stemming from the 1956 deed, deraigned from Sam through their mother, Frances. In the skirmishes over the pleadings which followed, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a count based on adverse possession without color of title, Section 95.18, Florida Statutes (1975), and the court dismissed the original "with color of title" claim for failure to state a cause of action....

...ained no description of the property at all. See, Moore v. Musa, 198 So.2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); 2 Fla.Jur.2d, supra, § 11. [8] If only because there was no showing that Harold or his estate had returned the property for taxes as required by Sec. 95.18(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1987). To establish adverse possession without color of title, the claimant must show actual, continued, open, and hostile possession of the property for seven years, and payment of all taxes by proper legal description for the statutory period. § 95.18(1), Fla. Stat. (1989); Porter v. Lorene Investment Co., 297 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Subsection (2) of section 95.18 provides that property is deemed possessed only: (a) When it has been protected by substantial enclosure....

...ecord does not support appellants' claim to title by adverse possession without color of title, particularly with regard to Parcel 3, the Sunnywood parcel. Appellants did not present evidence of improvements or a substantial enclosure as required by section 95.18(2), Florida Statutes, and returns for taxes for Parcel 3 were made in the names of Klenton and Penny McLemore, not McLemore's Trust or trustees of McLemore's Trust....

...The rule has been stated thusly: "Adverse possession is established by the occupant's taking possession with the belief that the land is his up to the mistaken line and so holding under a claim of title to the line." Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. v. California Chemical Co., 210 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). Under section 95.18, one claiming without color of title must show open, continuous, actual hostile possession, and payment of all taxes for a period of seven years with a return of the land for taxes during the first year of occupation, and the enclosure or cultivation of the land for seven years....

...(d) When a known lot or single farm has been partly improved, the part that has not been cleared or enclosed according to the usual custom of the county is to be considered as occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or cultivated. [2] § 95.18, Fla. Stat. (1985), provides: 95.18 Real property actions; adverse possession without color of title....

...As noted, Seddon argues that she was the owner of the disputed property through adverse possession. She first contends that the evidence was sufficient to show that she adversely possessed the disputed property "without color of title" as described in Section 95.18, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...In support of the judgment appealed appellee asserts that he acquired fee-simple title to the disputed strip by adverse possession under color of title subsequent to the issuance of the tax deed and prior to the institution of this suit, and therefore F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A., which requires the payment of taxes in order to acquire title by adverse possession without color of title is not applicable....

...quist. [11] The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed. CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Stuart v. Stephanus, 94 Fla. 1087, 114 So. 767. [2] Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Brautcheck, Fla. App. 1958, 106 So.2d 582. [3] F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A....

...s of special improvements liens theretofore or thereafter levied and assessed against the same by the state and county and by city or town, if such property be situated within any incorporated city or town, before such taxes become delinquent." F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A. [8] Blackburn v. Florida West Coast Land and Development Co., see footnote 5. [9] F.S. § 95.16, F.S.A. [10] F.S. § 95.18, F.S.A....

...ed boundary strip on the northern perimeter of the tract. Equally unacceptable is the alternative proposed of fencing "on all four sides" of the disputed boundary strip. There is no law in Florida supporting these interpretations of Florida Statutes § 95.18....

...ine. Under these circumstances, the law of adverse possession operates, not as a punishment to the legal title owner but to protect the long-standing and, in this case, good faith, actual possession of the disputed property. [6] I dissent. NOTES [1] Section 95.18(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). [2] Hyer v. Griffin, 55 Fla. 560, 46 So. 635 (1908). [3] Section 95.18(2), and see § 95.16(2)....

...California Chemical Co., 210 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Kerrigan v. Thomas, 281 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Meyer v. Law, 287 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1973); 1974 Laws of Florida, § 74-382; Seddon v. Harpster, 369 So.2d 662, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Surely proof requirements under § 95.18 are no less exacting....

...[12] Baugher v. Boley, supra, at 984. [13] The question of whether a fence constitutes a substantial enclosure is normally one for the jury. Wilson v. Tanner, 346 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). [14] Section 95.13. [1] Florida Statutes § 95.19 (now § 95.18), as it provided at all times pertinent here: For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupie...

...McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., Sec. 28.15. The cases are legion to the effect that to justify the conclusion that a title has been acquired by adverse user, such user must be open, notorious, hostile and adverse. Our own statute requires this. Section 95.18, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...There are two methods of acquiring title by adverse possession: a claimant with color of title can qualify under section 95.16, Florida Statutes, by continuous possession for a period of seven years; a claimant without color of title can qualify under section 95.18, Florida Statutes, by showing open, continuous, actual hostile possession, and payment of all taxes, for a period of seven years, with a return of said land for taxes during the first year of occupation and the enclosure or cultivation of the land for the seven-year period....

...ey are different statutory claims occupying separate sections in the Florida Statutes, distinguished mainly by the presence or absence of the color of title element. Compare § 95.16, Fla. Stat. (2003) (adverse possession under color of title), with § 95.18, Fla....

...The cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith and for the entry of judgment establishing title by adverse possession to the lands claimed by appellant herein. GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] By ch. 19254 (Laws 1939) (now § 95.18 F.S....

...the subsequent Murphy deeds could not be construed to have included the streets. Therefore, Sarah Walker contends that McQuaters’ claim of adverse possession of the streets, if valid at all must be valid without color of title, and that since F.S. Section 95.18 F.S.A....

...NOTES [1] There is no evidence in the record that Appellee returned the land for taxes to support a claim for adverse possession without color of title. See Lawson v. Murray, 365 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)(ruling that appellees did not state a claim for adverse possession without color of title under section 95.18 because they did not return any lands in dispute for taxes).

...7 deed, the court below struck all of Klein's pleadings and entered a default against Klein. The court then entered final judgment invalidating both the 1997 and 2004 deeds and quieting title in Meza against both Klein and Isserlis' estate on Meza's section 95.18 adverse possession claim. See § 95.18, Fla. Stat. (2000). We reverse this judgment in its entirety because, as a matter of law, the facts alleged, even if admitted, do not support quieting title in Meza on her section 95.18 adverse possession claim....

...Reduced to its essence, Meza's claim is that her failure to comply with the contract for deed should be forgiven because she relied on representations made by Klein and thus she should be allowed to complete the sale. Alternatively, Meza claims that by virtue of the adverse possession statutes, sections 95.16 and 95.18 of the Florida Statutes, she is entitled to ownership outright without paying the remainder of the contract price. The trial court decided that Meza is entitled to title outright under section 95.18, the adverse possession without color of title provision. We disagree. Section 95.18(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that where no written instrument exists, continued occupancy for seven *54 years under a claim of exclusive title constitutes adverse possession if the person in possession has made a return of the pr...

...ty appraiser of the county where it is located within 1 year after entering into possession and has subsequently paid all taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens levied against the property by the state, county, and municipality. § 95.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The complaint in this case alleges facts that establish that Meza enjoyed possession of unit G-5 from January 1991 through February 2000 pursuant to a written contract for deed. As both section 95.18 and the Florida Supreme Court make clear, "possession under an executory contract is not adverse as to the vendor and his privies." Wright Estates v....

...Adverse possession during this period of time could not, therefore, exist. Meza's continued occupancy following her conceded failure in February 2000 to make the balloon payment called for in the contract for deed also does not constitute adverse possession under section 95.18....

...years prior to June 5, 1939. We disagree. The record does not eliminate all issues of material fact regarding whether the appellees’ predecessors adversely possessed the disputed strip for seven years prior to 1939 or whether the 1974 amendment of section 95.18, Florida Statutes (Supp.1974), applies to this case....

...tes or Okaloosa County as right-of-way lands adjoining Calhoun Avenue, the Mettees fenced and returned such property for taxes in 1978, the year that Okaloosa County vacated its interest in the right-of-way, and every year thereafter, as required by section 95.18 Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ssion of additional evidence, it may, in its discretion, so order. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BOOTH and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. . As the Mettees did not return the property for taxes within one year after they went into possession in 1959, as required by section 95.18, Florida Statutes, they recognize they have no valid claim to adverse possession without color of title to this piece of property....

...nd possession of said strip of land by the planting and cultivation of a citrus grove, did not comply with the statutory requisites of adverse possession without color of title subsequent to 1939.” The statute referred to in the above quotation is § 95.18, Fla.Stat., 1957, F.S.A., which reads as follows: “Where it shall appear that there had been an actual continued occupation for seven years of premises under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a written ins...

...ch taxes become delinquent.” It will be seen from the chancellor’s decree that the plaintiff, or its predecessors, had acquired title by adverse possession by more than seven years’ possession prior to 1939, the year that the requirements of F.S. 95.18, F.S.A., became effective....

...he real estate involved in the dispute. The defendant was claiming under the title based upon the adverse possession prior to the year 1939, but they had failed to return the same to the tax assessor and pay the taxes thereon as required by Sections 95.18 and 95.19, Fla....

...Meyer, supra, holds that a claimant’s color of title is limited to the property shown in the public records and no color of title extends from that *746 ownership to the contiguous lands of his neighbor. Thus, the decision in Kiser, supra, remains only as a relic of the past. Turning next to Section 95.18, Florida Statutes, Adverse Possession Without Color of Title, there must be actual continued occupation for seven years of the premises under a claim of title exclusive of any other right but not founded upon a written instrument and a return of the land for taxes....

...ie McCoy under the statute in effect prior to June 5, 1939, and that nothing has since occurred to divest plaintiffs of title. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. HOBSON, C. J., and MANN, J., concur. . Florida Statute § 95.18 (1967), F.S.A....

...any interest in the property until 1990. The city brought this action to quiet title to the property. The trial court concluded on these undisputed facts that the city now owned the property by adverse possession without color of title, pursuant to section 95.18, Florida Statutes (1991)....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the final judgment against the plaintiff seeking to quiet title by adverse possession on a holding that he failed to establish the requisite element of making a return of the property to the county appraiser pursuant to section 95.18, Florida Statutes (1955)....

prior to June 5, 1939, the effective date of F.S. 95.18 and F.S. 95.19.2 It is readily apparent that

..., L.P. (Watch Omega) on Watch Omega’s claim of adverse possession with respect to a parcel of real property in Leon County which vested title to that property in Watch Omega. We reverse because the record evidence does not meet the requirements of section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2003), 1 governing adverse possession without color of title....

...ention pond was so small, no tax bill had been sent regarding that parcel. Candler Holdings did not introduce any public records in support of Candler’s statements. At the summary judgment hearing, Candler argued that, to obtain relief pursuant to section 95.18, it was Watch Omega’s affirmative duty to prove it had filed “a return of the property by proper legal description to the property appraiser of [Leon County] within one year after entering into possession and ... subsequently *1234 paid all taxes ... levied against the property ...” as required by section 95.18(1)....

...pation and possession of the premises ... [[Image here]] Public policy and stability of our society, ..., requires strict compliance with the appropriate statutes by those seeking ownership through adverse possession. Under either section 95.16 5 or section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2003) “the possession of the real property by the one asserting the right must be continuous, adverse, and exclusive of any other right.” Mullins v....

...Ass’n, 661 So.2d 1230 , 1232 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(citing Nour v. All State Pipe Supply Co., 487 So.2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BARFIELD, VAN NORTWICK, and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Section 95.18, which has remained substantively the same throughout the period of the parties’ transactions, with one very minor technical change, see chapter 95-147, § 523, at 394, Laws of Florida, provides: (1) When the occupant or those under w...

...We note that the legal description in the complaint is not identical to the legal description contained within the final summary judgment. . See Forman v. Ward, 219 So.2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)(suggesting that compliance with this requirement of section 95.18 may be achieved by delivering a return based upon a legal description "having reference to a book and page number in the records of the circuit court clerk where a recorded deed may be found.")....

PER CURIAM. See section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...In 1953, Gladys Lane recorded a deed to the property to her from the other heirs of her father, Smith Lane. For reversal, appellant urges that the trial court erroneously held that appellee had established his title by adverse possession without color of title in accordance with the requirements set out in Section 95.18, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...ving the book and page as appears in the office of the clerk of the circuit court. Apparently, it is appellant’s contention that such a description of the land in the return is insufficient as a matter of law and hence the statutory requirement of Section 95.18, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., that anyone claiming thereunder must return the property by proper legal description has not been complied with....

The 1939 legislature added to what is now section 95.18(1) a provision which required that an adverse

...For purposes of the section, property is deemed possessed when it has been cultivated or improved, when it has been protected by a substantial enclosure, or when, absent an enclosure, it has been used for the supply of fuel or fencing timber for husbandry or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 8 Section 95.18 , Florida Statutes, provides for adverse possession when an occupant has been in actual continuous occupation of real property for seven years under a claim of title "exclusive of any other right," but not founded on a written instrument, judgment or decree....

...above sections would have to be met before an individual may be able to claim adverse possession of the common elements of a subdivision. The circumstances under which a parcel of real property is deemed to be "possessed" for both sections 95.16 and 95.18 , Florida Statutes, do not appear probable where assessments for common elements of a subdivision are prorated among subdivision lot owners under section 193.0235 , Florida Statutes....

...be made by referring to the declaration of condominium and other documents creating the condominium and delineating the rights of the parties involved). 7 Department of Revenue Bulletin PTA-03-01 (House Bill 1721). 8 Section 95.16 (2), Fla. Stat. 9 Section 95.18 (1), Fla. Stat. 10 Section 95.18 (2), Fla....

power poles and lines on appellants’ land. Section 95.18, Florida Statutes (1975); Downing v. Bird, 100

...Internal Improvement Trust Fund. We thus find that Ferro does not hold title pursuant to section 253.12(9). L.A.M.A. contends that Ferro did not present clear and convincing evidence to establish adverse possession without color of title. We agree. Section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2006), governs the ownership of property through adverse possession. Section 95.18(1) states: *701 When the occupant or those under whom the occupant claims have been in actual continued occupation of real property for seven years under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded on a written instru...

...aiser of the county where it is located within one year after entering into possession and has subsequently paid all taxes and matured installments of special improvements liens levied against the property by state, and municipality. The language of section 95.18(1) makes it unequivocally clear that an adverse possession claim fails in the absence of a return of the property within one year of entering into possession....

...See Pasekoff v. Kaufman, 392 So.2d 971, 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (where this Court determined that the trial court correctly dismissed the adverse possessor’s claim because the adverse possessor failed to show a return of property for taxes, in accordance-with section 95.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975))....

...that extinguished BOA’s mortgage and title to the subject property and awarded unencumbered title to Appellees, James and Jennifer Eastridge, based on their convincing, but incorrect, assertion that seven years of actual and continuous adverse possession is no longer required by section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2016). We find that the trial court erred by: (1) ruling that because a clerk’s default had been entered, BOA could not oppose entry of judgment by asserting failure to state a cause of action, (2) finding that section 95.18 no longer required seven continuous years of adverse possession, (3) concluding that Appellees met the requirements of section 95.18, and (4) denying BOA’s motion for rehearing....

...to timely respond. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. 3 Given Appellees’ previous statements of when their possession commenced, they may find themselves unable to plead compliance with section 95.18(1) without subjecting themselves to sanctions. 10 18, 2017)....

...5th DCA 1984) (finding that “tacking can be used to establish a prescriptive easement” to meet the full prescriptive period). Although tacking was not involved here, the statutory provisions regarding tacking were used to create confusion in this case. Section 95.18(1) speaks to the possessory accomplishments of both the claimant and the claimant’s predecessors....

...subsequently paid, subject to s. 197.3335, all taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens levied against the property by the state, county, and municipality. 4 § 95.18(1), Fla....

...197.3335, all taxes and matured installments of special improvement liens levied against the property by the state, county, and municipality for all remaining years necessary to establish a claim of adverse possession. § 95.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). Appellees argued and the trial court determined that the 2016 version of section 95.18(1) required either actual, continuous possession for seven years or, in the alternative, compliance with the requirements listed in subsections 95.18(1)(a)–(c) without seven years of possession....

...the occupant has, or those under whom the occupant claims have, been in actual continued occupation of real property for 7 years under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded on a written instrument, judgment, or decree.” § 95.18(1), Fla....

...tual continued possession of real property for 7 years under a claim of title exclusive of any other right, but not founded on a written instrument, judgment, or decree, or when those under whom the possessor claims meet these criteria . . . .” § 95.18(1), Fla....

...or “possessed” which only the claimant can accomplish, such as filing a return and paying outstanding taxes and liens. Thus, the tacking phrase applies only to the possessory requirement and not to the additional adverse qualities of the possession required to perfect a claim for section 95.18(1)....

...statute meaningless, which courts should avoid doing. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1992). Here, the trial court presumably reached its conclusion by ignoring the following statutory language found in section 95.18(1): “the property actually possessed is held adversely if the person claiming adverse possession ....

...retation would lead to absurd results. If one employed the trial court’s interpretation, a person claiming adverse possession of a property with six years’ outstanding taxes could successfully obtain ownership through adverse possession under section 95.18 simply by paying the outstanding taxes, filing the return, and then paying the current year’s taxes without ever entering into possession of the property....

...As courts should avoid interpretations rendering the result absurd, the court’s interpretation was in error. See M.M. v. State, 187 So. 3d 300, 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Third, the trial court erred by concluding that Appellees met the requirements of section 95.18, as it should have considered whether Appellees’ complaint contained well- pled allegations that Appellees were in actual, continuous possession of the subject property for seven years as required by section 95.18(1), Florida Statutes (2016). Appellees’ complaint generally asserts compliance with the statute....

...s with the allegations of the complaint, the variance is fatal and the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.” Appel, 29 So. 3d at 379. Given that Appellees’ complaint failed to state a cause of action under section 95.18, under both the 2012 and 2016 versions, the lower court erred both by ignoring BOA’s efforts to raise that defense and by entering the default final judgment.2 Fourth, the trial court erred by denying BOA’s motion for rehearing....

...ssion of the subject property commenced one month later, on October 24, 2012, which is even less time than reported in their Return. 2 BOA argues that the Return and complaint disclose that Appellees failed in other ways to comply with section 95.18; however, because of the remand, we need not address those issues at this time. 9  Accordingly, the final default judgment is reversed in its entirety and the case is remanded to...

...to timely respond. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. SAWAYA and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. 3 Given Appellees’ previous statements of when their possession commenced, they may find themselves unable to plead compliance with section 95.18(1) without subjecting themselves to sanctions. 10 

...ttempt to Establish Adverse Possession Without Col- or of Title. The Herrons paid taxes on the land in 1990 and every year thereafter, through 1996. The Herrons’ goal was to acquire the land by adverse possession without color of title pursuant to Section 95.18, Florida Statutes....

...The Wilkinsons and Dastics sued the Herrons and the city of Edgewater, seeking to’ quiet title to the property in their favor and recover damages. The Herrons filed their answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim; in their counterclaim, they sought to quiet title in themselves pursuant to Section 95.18, Florida Statutes....

...roperty taxes before the Herrons “attempted to pay those taxes.” The Herrons opposed the motion, filing affidavits of Mr. Herron and his attorney which stated that Mr. Herron paid the 1996 taxes and had paid the taxes for seven years pursuant to Section 95.18, Florida Statutes....

...precluding summary judgment in favor of quieting title in the Wilkinsons and Da sties, even if the Herrons’ attempt at adverse possession ultimately fails. .We express no opinion about whether the Herrons can legally meet the other requirements of Section 95.18, because those issues have not been addressed by the trial court.