Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC)-Southern Region to handle Lugo’s 3  Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 4 of 53 postconviction proceedings.2 See Fla. Stat. § 27.7001, et seq....

...ngs to challenge such conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner and so as to assure the people of this state that the judgments of its courts may be regarded with the finality to which they are entitled in the interests of justice. § 27.7001, Fla. Stat. (1991). To that end, section 27.702, Florida Statutes (1991), sets out the duty of CCR to represent indigent death row inmates. The rights set out in sections 27.7001 through 27.7008, Florida Statutes (1991), however, are the rights of indigent death row inmates to representation, not the right of CCR to represent those inmates....

...dence. Hamblen, 527 So.2d at 806; see also Hamblen v. Dugger, 546 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. 1989) (Barkett, J., dissenting). NOTES [1] More facts are included in this opinion and in Durocher v. State, 596 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1992). [2] Codified as sections 27.7001 through 27.708, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed against such person in the state courts, federal courts in this state, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. § 27.702(1)(emphasis added). Section 27.7001 sets forth the legislative intent in carrying forth that representation, providing: It is the intent of the Legislature to create part IV of this chapter, consisting of ss. 27.7001-27.708, inclusive, to provide for *407 the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenc...

...d its intent that such representation is for the sole purpose of "challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed," and that such representation is not to include "civil litigation." CCRC argues that the legislative intent expressed in section 27.7001 to restrict CCRC from representing capital defendants in civil litigation has no legal effect....

...CCRC contends that a finding that it cannot engage in any civil litigation on behalf of its clients would prevent it from filing and litigating petitions for writs of habeas corpus because such actions are civil in nature. CCRC also argues that any application of section 27.7001 to bar it from engaging in any civil litigation would violate its clients' rights to due process and equal protection because it would constitute an arbitrary application of the law and would prevent it from filing claims that other inmates, if represented by non-CCRC attorneys, could pursue....

...s and the allocation of scare legal resources," to limit the representation of CCRC by (1) prohibiting that representation from extending to representation "during trials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation," § 27.7001 (emphasis added); and (2) providing that such representation shall be "for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed." § 27.702(1)(emphasis added)....

...specifically provides for "the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenced...." Fla.Stat. ง 27.7001 (1996) (emphasis added)....

...In its last session, the Florida Legislature made several changes to Florida Statutes Chapter 27, in an apparent attempt to conform the language of its post-conviction procedures to that of the Act. See 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 96-290 (West). [20] Section 27.7001 was amended by taking out language that collateral counsel was to be offered to only indigent capital prisoners, and making such counsel available to "any" capital prisoner seeking collateral review. Fla.Stat. ง 27.7001....

...to challenge such conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner and so as to assure the people of this state that the judgments of its courts may be regarded with the finality to which they are entitled in the interests of justice. ง 27.7001, Fla.Stat....

...See State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404, 409 (Fla.1998). Section 27.702(1), Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part, that CCRC and registry attorneys "shall file only those postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute." Section 27.7001, Florida Statutes, provides that such "collateral representation shall not include representation during retrials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation. " (Emphasis *450 supplied.) In Kenny, however, we clarified that habeas petitions, although technically civil in nature, were not included within the purview of section 27.7001: Technically, habeas corpus and other postconviction relief proceedings are classified as civil proceedings....

...tuting and prosecuting the traditional collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed. Id. at 409-10 (emphasis supplied). Although we held in Kenny that habeas petitions are quasi-criminal and thus not restricted by section 27.7001, we also held at that time that section 1983 claims are not quasi-criminal and are therefore considered "civil litigation" pursuant to section 27.7001....

...This view was clearly articulated in Justice Lewis's dissenting opinion in Cox v. State, 5 So.3d 659 (Fla.2009): In relevant part, section 27.702(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that CCRC and registry counsel "shall file only those postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute." In turn, section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that such "collateral representation shall not include representation during retrials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940 [i.e., executive-clemency proceedings], or civil litigation....

...This limitation does not apply to section 1983 actions. Under these circumstances, the rule and rationale expressed in State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404 (Fla.1998), are founded upon an untenable legal fiction. In that decision, we held that sections 27.7001 and 27.702, Florida Statutes (1997), prohibit CCRC from representing capital inmates during section 1983 actions, but not habeas proceedings....

...Today, we hold that section 1983 actions that challenge Florida's intended method of execution as set forth in the judgment and as part of the sentence seeking injunctive relief are, like habeas petitions, quasi-criminal in nature and are therefore not included under section 27.7001's restriction on civil litigation. Our interpretation and holding today is consistent with the Legislature's intent. In Kenny, we held that quasi-criminal claims, although technically civil in nature, were not included within the restriction of section 27.7001 because they are "collateral actions." 714 So.2d at 409-10....

...I would deny all relief sought by Darling. In reaching its conclusion regarding the scope of CCRC representation, the majority rejects our well-reasoned precedent in State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404 (Fla.1998)—precedent which is solidly grounded in the text of sections 27.7001 and 27.702(1), Florida Statutes (2007). Section 27.7001 sets forth the legislative intent to provide "collateral representation" for "collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence." Section 27.702(1) provides that CCRC representation is "for the sole...

...KENNY CORRECTLY HELD THAT CCRC IS PROHIBITED FROM LITIGATING SECTION 1983 METHOD-OF-EXECUTION CLAIMS BECAUSE SUCH CLAIMS DO NOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES The majority asserts that Kenny held habeas proceedings to be outside the scope of the proscription on "civil litigation" under section 27.7001 and to be within CCRC's scope because habeas proceedings are "collateral actions." Majority op....

...The reasoning underlying the majority's conclusion regarding the "mandatory" nature of the federal statute necessarily has implications beyond the context of section 1983 method-of-execution claims. Most saliently, the majority's reasoning on this point would require that CCRC participate in clemency proceedings, even though section 27.7001 expressly provides that the "intent of the Legislature" is that "collateral representation shall not include representation during ......

...Under the doctrine of the separation of powers, this Court is obligated to take the text of statutes seriously. We should not impose an interpretation on a statute that cannot be reconciled with the statutory text. But here the interpretation of sections 27.702(1) and 27.7001 adopted by the majority is at odds with the clear meaning of the statutory text....

...and the allocation of scarce legal resources," to limit the representation of CCRC by (1) prohibiting that representation from extending to representation "during trials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation, " § 27.7001 (emphasis added); and (2) providing that such representation shall be "for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed....

...th-sentenced inmates represented by state-appointed collateral counsel and capital inmates represented by their own counsel. The statute does provide that the work product exemption applies to "capital collateral litigation as set forth in [section] 27.7001." § 119.07(3)( l )1. Section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (1995), provides that it is the intent of the legislature that all indigent death-sentenced persons be represented by CCR in collateral legal proceedings....

...g attacking the validity of a prior violent felony conviction depends upon the construction and interpretation of the scope of responsibility and authority granted both to CCRC and private registry counsel in chapter 27, Florida Statutes (2002). [4] Section 27.7001, Florida Statutes, articulates the legislative intent in providing for collateral representation for persons sentenced to death: It is the intent of the Legislature to create part IV of this chapter, consisting of ss. 27.7001-27.711, inclusive, to provide for the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenced in...

...they are entitled in the interests of justice. It is the further intent of the Legislature that collateral representation shall not include representation during retrials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation. § 27.7001, Fla....

...hich is affirmed by the Supreme Court and undisturbed by any collateral litigation. § 27.711(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). Moreover, section 27.711(11) limits the authority of registry counsel in much the same way that CCRC representation is limited by section 27.7001 as set out above: An attorney appointed under s....

...[2] Section 27.704, Florida Statutes (2000), specifically allows law school graduates who are not qualified to serve as "full-time assistant capital collateral counsel" to serve on the CCRCs legal staff but not serve as the sole counsel on a case. [3] See § 27.7001, Fla....

...he representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state who is unable to secure counsel due to indigency, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge such conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner... ." § 27.7001, Fla....

...us court hearings that occurred in the 3.850 proceedings which are the subject of this appeal. These transcripts are to be included in the record on appeal. Appellant is represented by the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) pursuant to sections 27.7001-27.708, Florida Statutes (1995 & Supp.1996)....

...in the record on appeal. We rule on this motion by this opinion to express our conclusion that payment of all postconviction costs out of CCR's budget is not only statutorily required but is necessary to carry out the legislative intent expressed in section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...A written log detailing the date, time, name of the case, case number, attorney names and witness names shall be kept with the electronically recorded tape. ORDERED on August____, 1996. _______________________________ ROBERT P. CATES, CHIEF JUDGE NOTES [1] Section 27.7001 provides as follows: Legislative Intent.—It is the intent of the Legislature to create part IV of this chapter, consisting of ss. 27.7001-27.708, inclusive, to provide for the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenced in...

...In chapter 27, the legislature created CCR to provide collateral representation to persons convicted and sentenced to death. The legislative intent originally was to provide collateral representation for death-sentenced individuals who were "unable to secure counsel due to indigency." § 27.7001, Fla. Stat. (1995). The legislature recently amended this provision to express the intent that collateral representation be provided to "any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state." § 27.7001, Fla....

...Cox's current appeal amounts to a broad-based attack on the constitutionality of Florida's current lethal-injection protocol. Specifically, Cox: (1) assails the constitutionality of lethal injection as currently administered in Florida; (2) asserts that sections 27.7001 and 27.702, Florida Statutes (2008), as interpreted by this Court, are unconstitutional facially and as applied because these statutes prohibit CCRC from filing mode-of-execution challenges under 42 U.S.C....

...llateral regional counsel and other counsel appointed pursuant to part IV of chapter 27. This is evident from the fact that the express legislative objective for providing registry counsel is the same as it is for providing other collateral counsel. Section 27.7001 specifically includes the statutory provisions relating to registry counsel within its statement of legislative intent....

...In short, the statutory context points compellingly to the conclusion that the definition of "[p]ostconviction capital collateral proceedings" contained in section 27.711(1)(c) reflects a legislative understanding of the meaning of the limitations earlier set forth in section 27.7001—precluding "civil litigation"—rather than a legislative decision to impose a new special limitation that is only applicable to registry counsel. The definition in section 27.711(1)(c) thus is a positive statement of what the Legislature had previously stated negatively in the last sentence of section 27.7001. The reasoning of Butterworth concerning the constitutionality of limitations on state-compensated capital postconviction representation fully justifies the rejection of Cox's claim that section 27.7001 is unconstitutional....

...the execution team from providing relevant in-camera *661 testimony so long as "information . . . identif[ying]" these individuals is not publicly released). However, I must part ways with my brethren with regard to their interpretation of sections 27.7001 and 27.702, Florida Statutes (2008). In relevant part, section 27.702(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that CCRC and registry counsel "shall file only those postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute." In turn, section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that such "collateral representation shall not include representation during retrials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940 [i.e., executive-clemency proceedings], or civil litigation....

...This limitation does not apply to section 1983 actions. Under these circumstances, the rule and rationale expressed in State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404 (Fla.1998), are founded upon an untenable legal fiction. In that decision, we held that sections 27.7001 and 27.702, Florida Statutes (1997), prohibit CCRC from representing capital inmates during section 1983 actions, but not habeas proceedings....

...presenting her client without charge. Originally, representing Mr. Melton in his efforts to set aside a murder conviction and death sentence, the Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel for the northern region (CCRC) was appointed, pursuant to section 27.7001, Florida Statutes (2009), which authorized CCRC to undertake the “collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state.” Later, when the CCRC northern region was abolished (or “defunded”), see Ch....

...uch conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner and so as to assure the people of this state that the judgments of its courts may be regarded with the finality to which they are entitled in the interests of justice.” Fla.Stat. Ann. § 27.7001 (West Supp.1986).

...depth of familiarity” that CHU offered. The district court also 2 “Florida has an explicit statutory scheme in place to provide postconviction counsel to all capital defendants.” State v. Kilgore, 976 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 2007); see also Fla. Stat. § 27.7001–.711....

...ing federal habeas petition. Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs counsel, the Florida Office of Capital Collateral Representative (“CCR”) is not competent to act as class counsel. As an initial matter, Defendants maintain that Florida Statutes Section 27.7001 (1996), as amended, bars CCR from representing death-sentenced individuals in civil litigation other than “collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed.” Defs....

...Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC)-Southern Region to handle Lugo’s 3  Case: 11-13439 Date Filed: 04/24/2014 Page: 4 of 53 postconviction proceedings.2 See Fla. Stat. § 27.7001, et seq....