RULE 9.130. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW NONFINAL ORDERS
AND SPECIFIED FINAL ORDERS

(a) Applicability.

(1) This rule applies to appeals to the district courts of
appeal of the nonfinal orders authorized herein and to appeals to
the circuit court of nonfinal orders when provided by general law.
Review of other nonfinal orders in such courts and nonfinal
administrative action shall be by the method prescribed by rule
9.100.

(2) Appeals of nonfinal orders in criminal cases shall be
as prescribed by rule 9.140.

(3) Appeals to the district courts of appeal of nonfinal
orders are limited to those that:

(A) concern venue;

(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve
injunctions, or refuse to modify or dissolve injunctions;

(C) determine:
(i) the jurisdiction of the person;

(ii) the right to immediate possession of
property, including but not limited to orders that grant, modify,
dissolve, or refuse to grant, modify, or dissolve writs of replevin,
garnishment, or attachment;

(iii) in family law matters:

a. the right to immediate monetary
relief;

b. the rights or obligations of a party
regarding child custody or time-sharing under a parenting plan; or

c. that a marital agreement is invalid
in its entirety;

(iv) the entitlement of a party to an appraisal
under an insurance policy;

(v) that, as a matter of law, a party is not
entitled to workers’ compensation immunity;

(vi) whether to certify a class;

(vii) that a governmental entity has taken
action that has inordinately burdened real property within the
meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes;

(viii) the issue of forum non conveniens;

(ix) that, as a matter of law, a settlement
agreement is unenforceable, is set aside, or never existed; or

(x) that a permanent guardianship shall be
established for a dependent child pursuant to section 39.6221,
Florida Statutes;
(D) grant or deny the appointment of a receiver, or
terminate or refuse to terminate a receivership;

(E) grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel;

(F) deny a motion that:

(i) asserts entitlement to absolute or
qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law;

(ii) asserts entitlement to immunity under
section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes; or

(iii) asserts entitlement to sovereign
immunity; or

(G) grant or deny a motion for leave to amend to
assert a claim for punitive damages;

(H) deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of the
qualifications of a corroborating expert witness under subsections
766.102(5)–(9), and (12), Florida Statutes;

(I) determine the entitlement of a party to
arbitration, confirm or deny confirmation of an arbitration award or
partial arbitration award, or modify, correct, or vacate an
arbitration award; or

(J) deny a motion under section 718.1224(5),
720.304(4)(c), or 768.295(4), Florida Statutes.

(4) Orders disposing of motions for rehearing or
motions that suspend rendition are not reviewable separately from
a review of the final order; provided that orders granting motions for
new trial in jury and nonjury cases are reviewable by the method
prescribed in rule 9.110.

(5) Orders entered on an authorized and timely motion
for relief from judgment are reviewable by the method prescribed by
this rule. Motions for rehearing directed to these orders are not
authorized under these rules and therefore will not toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal.

(b) Commencement. Jurisdiction of the court under
subdivisions (a)(3)–(a)(5) of this rule shall be invoked by filing a
notice with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed.

(c) Notice. The notice, designated as a notice of appeal of
nonfinal order, shall be substantially in the form prescribed by rule
9.900(c). Except in criminal cases, a conformed copy of the order or
orders designated in the notice of appeal shall be attached to the
notice. The notice must be accompanied by any required filing fee
except as provided in rule 9.430 for proceedings by indigents.

(d) Record. A record shall not be transmitted to the court
unless ordered.

(e) Briefs. The appellant’s initial brief, accompanied by an
appendix as prescribed by rule 9.220, shall be served within 20
days of filing the notice. Additional briefs shall be served as
prescribed by rule 9.210.

(f) Stay of Proceedings. In the absence of a stay, during the
pendency of a review of a nonfinal order, the lower tribunal may
proceed with all matters, including trial or final hearing, except that
the lower tribunal may not render a final order disposing of the
cause pending such review absent leave of the court.

(g) Cross-Appeal. An appellee may cross-appeal the order or
orders designated by the appellant, to review any ruling described
in subdivisions (a)(3)–(a)(5), by serving a notice within 15 days of
service of the appellant’s timely filed notice of appeal or within the
time prescribed for filing a notice of appeal, whichever is later. A
notice of cross-appeal shall be filed either before service or
immediately thereafter in the same manner as the notice of appeal.
The notice of cross-appeal must be accompanied by any required
filing fee except as provided in rule 9.430 for proceedings by
indigents.
(h) Review on Full Appeal. This rule shall not preclude
initial review of a nonfinal order on appeal from the final order in
the cause.

(i) Scope of Review. Multiple nonfinal orders that are listed
in rule 9.130(a)(3) may be reviewed by a single notice if the notice is
timely filed as to each such order.

Committee Notes

1977 Amendment. This rule replaces former rule 4.2 and
substantially alters current practice. This rule applies to review of
all non-final orders, except those entered in criminal cases, and
those specifically governed by rules 9.100 and 9.110.

The advisory committee was aware that the common law writ
of certiorari is available at any time and did not intend to abolish
that writ. However, because that writ provides a remedy only if the
petitioner meets the heavy burden of showing that a clear departure
from the essential requirements of law has resulted in otherwise
irreparable harm, it is extremely rare that erroneous interlocutory
rulings can be corrected by resort to common law certiorari. It is
anticipated that because the most urgent interlocutory orders are
appealable under this rule, there will be very few cases in which
common law certiorari will provide relief. See Taylor v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 131 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).

Subdivision (a)(3) designates certain instances in which
interlocutory appeals may be prosecuted under the procedures set
forth in this rule. Under these rules there are no mandatory
interlocutory appeals. This rule eliminates interlocutory appeals as
a matter of right from all orders “formerly cognizable in equity,” and
provides for review of certain interlocutory orders based on the
necessity or desirability of expeditious review. Allowable
interlocutory appeals from orders in actions formerly cognizable as
civil actions are specified, and are essentially the same as under
former rule 4.2. Item (A) permits review of orders concerning venue.
Item (C)(i) has been limited to jurisdiction over the person because
the writ of prohibition provides an adequate remedy in cases
involving jurisdiction of the subject matter. Because the purpose of
these items is to eliminate useless labor, the advisory committee is
of the view that stays of proceedings in lower tribunals should be
liberally granted if the interlocutory appeal involves venue or
jurisdiction over the person. Because this rule only applies to civil
cases, item (C)(ii) does not include within its ambit rulings on
motions to suppress seized evidence in criminal cases. Item (C)(ii) is
intended to apply whether the property involved is real or personal.
It applies to such cases as condemnation suits in which a
condemnor is permitted to take possession and title to real property
in advance of final judgment. See ch. 74, Fla. Stat. (1975). Item
(C)(iii) is intended to apply to such matters as temporary child
custody or support, alimony, suit money, and attorneys’ fees. Item
(C)(iv) allows appeals from interlocutory orders that determine
liability in favor of a claimant.

Subdivision (a)(4) grants a right of review if the lower tribunal
grants a motion for new trial whether in a jury or non-jury case.
The procedures set forth in rule 9.110, and not those set forth in
this rule, apply in such cases. This rule has been phrased so that
the granting of rehearing in a non-jury case under Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.530 may not be the subject of an interlocutory
appeal unless the trial judge orders the taking of evidence. Other
non-final orders that postpone rendition are not reviewable in an
independent proceeding. Other non-final orders entered by a lower
tribunal after final order are reviewable and are to be governed by
this rule. Such orders include, for example, an order granting a
motion to vacate default.

Subdivision (a)(5) grants a right of review of orders on motions
seeking relief from a previous court order on the grounds of
mistake, fraud, satisfaction of judgment, or other grounds listed in
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.

Subdivision (a)(6) provides that interlocutory review is to be in
the court that would have jurisdiction to review the final order in
the cause as of the time of the interlocutory appeal.

Subdivisions (b) and (c) state the manner for commencing an
interlocutory appeal governed by this rule. Two copies of the notice
must be filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal within 30 days of
rendition of the order. Under rule 9.040(g) the notice and fee must
be transmitted immediately to the court by the clerk of the lower
tribunal.

Subdivision (d) provides for transmittal of the record only on
order of the court. Transmittal should be in accordance with
instructions contained in the order.

Subdivision (e) replaces former rule 4.2(e) and governs the
service of briefs on interlocutory appeals. The time to serve the
appellant’s brief has been reduced to 15 days so as to minimize
interruption of lower tribunal proceedings. The brief must be
accompanied by an appendix containing a conformed copy of the
order to be reviewed and should also contain all relevant portions of
the record.

Subdivision (f) makes clear that unless a stay is granted under
rule 9.310, the lower tribunal is only divested of jurisdiction to
enter a final order disposing of the case. This follows the historical
rule that trial courts are divested of jurisdiction only to the extent
that their actions are under review by an appellate court. Thus, the
lower tribunal has jurisdiction to proceed with matters not before
the court. This rule is intended to resolve the confusion spawned by
De la Portilla v. De la Portilla, 304 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974), and its
progeny.

Subdivision (g) was embodied in former rule 4.2(a) and is
intended to make clear that the failure to take an interlocutory
appeal does not constitute a waiver of any sort on appeal of a final
judgment, although an improper ruling might not then constitute
prejudicial error warranting reversal.

1992 Amendment. Subdivisions (a)(3)(C)(vii) and (a)(6) were
added to permit appeals from non-final orders that either granted or
denied a party’s request that a class be certified. The committee was
of the opinion that orders determining the nature of an action and
the extent of the parties before the court were analogous to other
orders reviewable under rule 9.130. Therefore, these 2 subdivisions
were added to the other limited enumeration of orders appealable
by the procedures established in this rule.
Subdivision (a)(3)(D) was added by the committee in response
to the decision in Twin Jay Chambers Partnership v. Suarez, 556 So.
2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). It was the opinion of the committee that
orders that deny the appointment of receivers or terminate or refuse
to terminate receiverships are of the same quality as those that
grant the appointment of a receiver. Rather than base the
appealability of such orders on subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii), the
committee felt it preferable to specifically identify those orders with
respect to a receivership that were non-final orders subject to
appeal by this rule.

Subdivision (c) was amended to require the attachment of a
conformed copy of the order or orders designated in the notice of
appeal consistent with the amendment to rule 9.110(d).

1996 Amendment. The amendment to subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vi)
moves the phrase “as a matter of law” from the end of the
subdivision to its beginning. This is to resolve the confusion
evidenced in Breakers Palm Beach v. Gloger, 646 So. 2d 237 (Fla.
4th DCA 1994), City of Lake Mary v. Franklin, 668 So. 2d 712 (Fla.
5th DCA 1996), and their progeny by clarifying that this subdivision
was not intended to grant a right of nonfinal review if the lower
tribunal denies a motion for summary judgment based on the
existence of a material fact dispute.

Subdivision (a)(3)(C)(viii) was added in response to the
supreme court’s request in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.
1994). The court directed the committee to propose a new rule
regarding procedures for appeal of orders denying immunity in
federal civil rights cases consistent with federal procedure. Compare
Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed. 2d 238 (1995), with
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed. 2d 411
(1985). The Florida Supreme Court held that such orders are
“subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on
an issue of law.”

2000 Amendment. The title to this rule was amended to
reflect that some of the review proceedings specified in this rule
may involve review of final orders.
Subdivision (a)(1) was amended to reflect that the appellate
jurisdiction of circuit courts is prescribed by general law and not by
this rule, as clarified in Blore v. Fierro, 636 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 1994).

Subdivision (a)(3)(C)(iv) allowing review of orders determining
“the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief”
was deleted so that such orders are not appealable until the
conclusion of the case.

Subdivision (a)(7) was deleted because it is superseded by
proposed rule 9.040(b)(2), which determines the appropriate court
to review non-final orders after a change of venue.

2008 Amendment. Subdivision 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) was amended
to address a conflict in the case law concerning whether orders
granting, modifying, dissolving, or refusing to grant, modify, or
dissolve garnishments are appealable under this subdivision.
Compare Ramseyer v. Williamson, 639 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th DCA
1994) (garnishment order not appealable), with 5361 N. Dixie
Highway v. Capital Bank, 658 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
(permitting appeal from garnishment order and acknowledging
conflict). The amendment is not intended to limit or expand the
scope of matters covered under this rule. In that vein, replevin and
attachment were included as examples of similar writs covered by
this rule.

Subdivision (a)(3)(C)(iv) has been amended to clarify that
nonfinal orders determining a party’s entitlement to an appraisal
under an insurance policy are added to the category of nonfinal
orders appealable to the district courts of appeal.

Subdivision 9.130(a)(5) is intended to authorize appeals from
orders entered on motions for relief from judgment that are
specifically contemplated by a specific rule of procedure (e.g., the
current version of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, Small
Claims Rule 7.190, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540,
and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150 and 8.270).

Subdivision (a)(5) has been amended to recognize the unique
nature of the orders listed in this subdivision and to codify the
holdings of all of Florida’s district courts of appeal on this subject.
The amendment also clarifies that motions for rehearing directed to
these particular types of orders are unauthorized and will not toll
the time for filing a notice of appeal.

2014 Amendment. Subdivision (a)(4) has been amended to
clarify that an order disposing of a motion that suspends rendition
is reviewable, but only in conjunction with, and as a part of, the
review of the final order. Additionally, the following sentence has
been deleted from subdivision (a)(4): “Other non-final orders entered
after final order on authorized motions are reviewable by the
method prescribed by this rule.” Its deletion clarifies that non-final
orders entered after a final order are no more or less reviewable
than the same type of order would be if issued before a final order.
Non-final orders entered after a final order remain reviewable as
part of a subsequent final order or as otherwise provided by statute
or court rule. This amendment resolves conflict over the language
being stricken and the different approaches to review during post-
decretal proceedings that have resulted. See, e.g., Tubero v. Ellis,
469 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Hurley, J., dissenting). This
amendment also cures the mistaken reference in the original 1977
committee note to “orders granting motions to vacate default” as
examples of non-final orders intended for review under the stricken
sentence. An order vacating a default is generally not reviewable
absent a final default judgment. See, e.g., Howard v. McAuley, 436
So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Orders vacating final default
judgments remain reviewable under rule 9.130(a)(5). Essentially,
this amendment will delay some courts’ review of some non-final
orders entered after a final order until rendition of another,
subsequent final order. But the amendment is not intended to alter
the Court’s ultimate authority to review any order.