CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 2500813
...Martinez, Public Defender, and Daniel Tibbitt, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heidi Milan Caballero, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and EMAS, JJ. CONFESSION OF ERROR PER CURIAM. The juvenile, T.H., was charged with escape pursuant to section 985.721(3), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...l. The State properly concedes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of dismissal because it failed to prove that T.H. was being "transport[ed] to or from any ... secure detention facility or residential commitment facility." § 985.721(3), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...red
into secure detention during a court hearing, and while waiting to be
removed from the courtroom while other cases proceed, instead absconds
the courtroom without permission, can be found guilty of escape from a
juvenile facility in violation of section 985.721(3), Florida Statutes (2018),
which provides in pertinent part: “An escape from … [l]awful
transportation to or from any ... secure detention facility or residential
commitment facility, constitutes escape ….” § 985.721(3), Fla....
...abilitation of children found
to have committed delinquent acts or violations of law, or from
lawful transportation to or from any secure detention facility
or residential commitment facility, in violation of Florida
Statutes
985.721 and
944.40[.]
The juvenile filed a sworn motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4)....
...Several minutes later a disruption occurred in the
courtroom and the juvenile was observed exiting the courtroom. The
juvenile was in the lobby outside the courtroom when pursued and cuffed
by law enforcement. Based on those undisputed facts, the motion argued
section 985.721 did not apply to the juvenile’s conduct, and although
other remedies were available for the juvenile’s conduct, “as a matter of
law escape is not the remedy herein.”
In response to the motion, the state filed a sworn traverse....
...troom to
go to the elevator; and when the juvenile left the jury box area, he stated,
“F*** this s***.” Based on the totality of facts alleged in the motion and
traverse, the state argued a prima facie case existed that the juvenile had
violated section 985.721(3), Florida Statutes (2018), by escaping from
lawful transportation to a secure detention facility.
The circuit court (a different judge than the judge before whom the
alleged escape occurred) denied the juvenile’s motion to dismiss....
...awaiting transport ….
When the circuit court asked if the parties had any other pretrial
matters, defense counsel stated, “I will say something … with regards to
your … ruling.” The court permitted defense counsel to do so. Defense
counsel argued, “[Section 985.721] requires that [this] is commitment
facilities … or being transported to and from a place of confinement …....
...van which transports the juvenile to a secure DJJ detention center
pending further action.
After the state rested its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of
dismissal, arguing that the state had not presented a prima facie case of
escape under section 985.721 because the juvenile had merely walked out
of the courtroom and was standing near the elevator when he was
apprehended....
...juvenile as delinquent, this appeal followed.
3. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
The juvenile argues the circuit court erred in denying his pre-trial
motion to dismiss and his in-trial motion for judgment of dismissal,
because section 985.721, as a penal statute which must be strictly
construed in the accused’s favor, does not encompass the juvenile’s
conduct in this case. More specifically, the juvenile argues section
985.721 concerns escape from a secure detention facility or residential
commitment facility, not leaving a courtroom after a detention order is
entered. At worst, the juvenile argues, his conduct amounted to only
contempt of court.
The state responds that the juvenile did not preserve the argument on
appeal that the circuit court misinterpreted section 985.721’s application
to this case, because that argument differs from the argument which he
made in the circuit court that the state failed to present a prima facie case.
On the merits, the state argues its evidence presented a prima facie case
of escape within section 985.721’s plain meaning. More specifically, the
state argues once the circuit court entered the detention order, the juvenile
5
was in custody and the transportation process had begun, thus satisfying
section 985.721(3) (“An escape from … [l]awful transportation to or from
any such secure detention facility or residential commitment facility,
constitutes escape ….”).
4....
...1982)).
The juvenile’s argument was preserved in the circuit court. Although
the juvenile’s trial counsel characterized the argument on the motions to
dismiss as a failure to prove a prima facie case, whereas the juvenile’s
appellate counsel characterizes the argument on appeal as the
misapplication of section 985.721 to the juvenile’s conduct in this case,
those characterizations are simply different phrasing of the same
argument – that the juvenile’s conduct of leaving a courtroom is not a
crime under section 985.721, because his conduct did not involve
escaping from a DJJ transport vehicle or facility.
On the merits, our review is de novo....
...4th DCA 2020) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
Applying the foregoing standards of review and the dictionary definition
of “transportation,” we conclude the circuit court properly denied the
juvenile’s pre-trial motion to dismiss and in-trial motion for judgment of
dismissal. Section 985.721(3) is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not
apply, and the juvenile’s conduct, as described in the state’s traverse and
trial evidence, proved he had violated section 985.721(3).
Section 985.721(3) provides in pertinent part: “An escape from …
[l]awful transportation to or from any ... secure detention facility or
residential commitment facility, constitutes escape ….” § 985.721(3), Fla.
Stat....
...Applying the foregoing authorities here, the circuit court properly
denied both the juvenile’s pre-trial motion to dismiss and his in-trial
motion for judgment of dismissal. The state’s sworn traverse alleged a
prima facie case that the juvenile had violated section 985.721(3) when,
after the prior judge entered the detention order, and while the juvenile
was awaiting transport from the courtroom to the DJJ detention center,
the juvenile left the courtroom without permission. Further, at trial, the
state proved a prima facie case that the juvenile had violated section
985.721(3) through the courtroom deputy’s testimony that, after the
circuit court entered the detention order, the deputy placed the juvenile in
the jury box and told the DJJ probation officer that the juvenile was now
in DJJ custody, but t...
...nile’s actions.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the state’s traverse and trial evidence showed
the juvenile had been taken into custody and the transportation process
had begun. Thus, his escape fell within section 985.721(3)’s plain
meaning....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2420480, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 8839
...King,
968 So.2d 658, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “Section
944.40 covers escape attempts by a prisoner, who is defined as someone in the custody of the [Department of Corrections] pursuant to section
944.02(6), Florida Statutes.... ” Id. In contrast, section
985.721, Florida Statutes (2010), “deals with escape attempts, as defined by section
944.40, from detention facilities for children.” Id. This section also governs escape while being lawfully transported to or from such a secure detention facility. §
985.721(3), Fla. Stat. (2010). 1 In this case, appellant’s escape was plainly controlled by section
985.721, Flori *454 da Statutes (2010), and therefore, appellant would be entitled to postconviction relief for pleading to the wrong offense....
...Reversed and remanded for appellant to be provided with an opportunity to withdraw his plea. WARNER, GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . A conviction under section
944.40, Florida Statutes (2010), is a second-degree felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years, while a conviction under section
985.721, Florida Statutes (2010) is a third-degree felony, punishable by *454 an imprisonment term not exceeding five years....