Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...at 94. The issue was whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive fifteen-day sentences for each violation of the same behavior order. Id. The court analogized the stacking of sentences for contempt with the stacking of periods of detention in section 985.26(2), and with a prohibition on using multiple instances of violation of probation as a basis for departure, and held that section 985.037 prohibited the stacking of periods of secure detention for juveniles found guilty of contempt....

PALMER, C.J. E.D., a juvenile, petitions this court seeking a writ of habeas corpus based upon the claim that he has been held in secured detention for more than 21 days in violation of section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes (2006)....

...inued detention, we deny E.D’s petition. On July 25, 2007, E.D. was detained on charges of burglary of a dwelling, petit theft, and criminal mischief. A trial was set for August 14, 2007, a date within the 21 days for secured detention provided by section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes....

...On August 14, 2007, the State orally requested a continuance because it was not prepared to proceed to trial. The trial court granted that motion. E.D. then filed a Motion to Release the Child from Detention, arguing that good cause for the continuance had not been shown as required by section 985.26(4)....

...acts were indeed the basis of the continuance. With these additional facts, the reasons given by the State for the continuance constitute good cause sufficient to allow E.D.’s continued detention. PETITION DENIED. PLEUS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes (2006) provides: 985.26 Length of detention.— [[Image here]] (2) A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court. . Section 985.26(4) of the Florida Statutes (2006) provides: 985.26 Length of detention.— ⅜ ⅜ * (4) The time limits in subsection (2) and (3) do not included periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state.

PER CURIAM. A juvenile petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from secure detention prior to an adjudicatory *971 hearing. See § 985.26(2), Fla....

...The child may continue to be held in detention care if the court makes a specific, written finding that detention care is necessary to protect the victim from injury. However, the child may not be held in detention care beyond the time limits set forth in this section or s. 985.26. Id. (emphasis added). Section 985.26(2) provides that "[a] child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court." We conclude that sections 985.255(2) and 985.26(2) clearly prohibit the trial court from ordering that a child charged with domestic violence be held in secure detention for more than twenty-one days in total....

...er grounds, 684 So.2d 814 (Fla.1996). However, we also conclude that the twenty-one-day maximum does not include the initial twenty-four hours under which the child may be placed in custody at the JPO's discretion prior to the detention hearing. See § 985.26(2) ("A child may not be held in ......

...was not in secure detention at the time of this adjudicatory hearing. On January 22, 2014, the court heard argument on the permissible length of detention following an adjudicatory hearing. B.R. maintained that she could only be held for seventy-two hours with a possible seventy-two-hour extension under section 985.26(5), Florida Statutes (2013). The State argued that under the plain language of section 985.26(3), B.R....

...The representative explained that “[B.R.] told us the last time we were in court in August, that she promised to comply with your orders and she didn’t ... she just ran to Lakeland.” The court found that B.R. presented a substantial risk of not appearing at her disposition hearing and that under section 985.26(3), she could be held in secure detention for fifteen days after her adjudicatory hearing. B.R. filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 27, 2014, alleging that pursuant to section 985.26(5), her continued detention was illegal because she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. The State responded that under the plain lan *198 guage of section 985.26(3), B.R....

...tial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing.” § 985.24(l)(a). Based on that finding, the relevant period at issue in the instant case is the time between B.R.’s adjudicatory hearing and her disposition. As such, the applicable statute is section 985.26(3), which provides in part that “a child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for more than [fifteen] days following the entry of an order of adjudication.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that B.R. could be held in secure detention for fifteen days following her adjudication. Consequently, we reject B.R.’s contention that section 985.26(5) applies here solely because she was not in secure detention at the time of her adjudication....

...was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing,” (2) “residential commitment is anticipated or recommended” for the child, and (3) the detention is explicitly “for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive evaluation.” § 985.26(5)....

...ent was anticipated or recommended or that the purpose of her detention was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation. And the instant record contains no indication of either of these circumstances. Failing to meet all three of the criteria set forth in section 985.26(5) must therefore preclude its application over the more general provisions of section 985.26(3) in order to achieve a consistent result....

...For instance, under B.R.’s reading of the statute, if a juvenile with a risk assessment instrument (RAI) score of twelve points or higher is placed in secure detention but is subsequently released pending adjudication because an adjudicatory hearing did not take place within twenty-one days under section 985.26(2), then the juvenile could only be held in secure detention for seventy-two hours after the adjudicatory hearing under section 985.26(5), while a child with a simi *199 lar RAI but whose adjudicatory hearing did commence within the proper timeframe could be held up to fifteen days simply because there was no preadjudicatory gap in his or her detention. We decline to adopt a reading of the statute that would lead to such an inconsistent result. Accordingly, we clarify that when detention is already authorized based on a risk assessment of the child, section 985.26(5) does not act as a limit on the court’s authority to place the juvenile into secure detention simply because he or she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. Instead, when residential commitment is anticipated or recommended, section 985.26(5) merely authorizes the court to place juveniles for whom secure detention might not otherwise have been authorized into secure detention while necessary evaluations for the court’s ultimate disposition are conducted. But the court may order qualified juveniles into secure detention for up to fifteen days under section 985.26(8), even though the juvenile may not have actually been in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing....

...renumbered as section 985.037(2). [3] The Florida Supreme Court, however, did indicate that in the case of multiple violations of probation, sentences could be bumped one cell or guideline range for each violation. [4] This statute is now renumbered section 985.26(2), and modified slightly.

...ghteen days. (VIII 77:1-12, XVIII 192:22-193:5) A term of detention of more than twenty-one days requires a hearing before a Florida state judge, who is authorized to extend detention for “good cause” to a maximum of sixty-three days. Fla. Stat. § 985.26 (2); (XVII 25:11-26:10) A direct-file juvenile is housed at CCJ until adjudication or until eighteen, upon the occurrence of which Florida law requires a transfer to adult housing....

...The arresting officer filed a complaint alleging this new delinquent act was a violation of T.L.H.’s probation. The court placed T.L.H. in secure detention on December 13, 2010, but later changed his status to nonsecure detention. *398 He remained on detention status for the maximum time permitted by law. See § 985.26, Fla....

...J.S., a juvenile, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking his immediate release from custody. We grant the petition and order J.S.’s immediate release. A child may not be held in secure or non-secure detention for more than twenty-one days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced. See § 985.26(2), Fla....

...is entitled to be released. 1 HABEAS CORPUS GRANTED, IMMEDIATE RELEASE ORDERED. ORFINGER, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur. . While the State correctly argues that the twenty-one day period can be extended upon a showing of good cause, no such showing was made in this case. § 985.26(2), Fla....

...juveniles charged with delinquent acts "is entirely statutory in nature." W.C. v. Smith, 898 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Thus, courts must strictly comply with controlling statutory provisions. Id. Subject to exceptions not relevant here, section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes (2008), prohibits the detention of a juvenile for more than 21 days on the same offense: "A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days u...

PER CURIAM. ON CONFESSION OF ERROR As the State properly concedes, C.L.B. is being improperly detained in secure detention beyond the 21-day period authorized by section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes (2012); his adjudicatory hearing has been scheduled beyond the 21 days allowed....

...father in Orlando were he released. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the State’s motion and ordered that Petitioner be securely detained for an additional 21 days. Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. Section 985.26(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2023), provides: Upon good cause being shown that the nature of the charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the case or [that] the...

...of the circumstances. The court shall prioritize the efficient disposition of cases in which 3  the child has served 60 or more days in secure detention care. § 985.26(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023). Under section 985.26, “a finding of good cause must be predicated on a record containing competent evidence of the reasons for continuing the detention period.” E.D....

...Brown, 559 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). Here, the State failed to offer evidence that there is good cause to extend Petitioner’s secure detention care. To begin, the State’s focus on the nature of the charge in the abstract is misdirected. Section 985.26 allows for an extension where “the nature of the charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the case.” § 985.26(2)(b) (emphasis added)....

...It is undisputed that he does not score suffi- *1063 dent points on the risk assessment instrument for secure detention. At the initial detention hearing, the trial court ordered home detention for up to twenty-one days pending the adjudicatory hearing. See § 985.26(2), Fla....

...(“RAI”) and on the criteria of subsection (1). § 985.255(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). Accepting the State’s argument, as the trial court did, would allow a court to convert the remainder of the twenty-one day pre-adjudication detention period of section 985.26(2) to secure detention whenever a juvenile is alleged to have violated a condition of home detention....

...Further, a first contempt offense could be punished by up to five days in secure detention only. § 985.037(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). We agree with K.T.E. that a court may initiate indirect contempt proceedings to punish a violation of a pre-adjudication home detention order. We disagree with K.T.E., however, that what is now section 985.265(1), Florida Statutes (2012), pro *1064 vides an independent basis for ordering secure detention as occurred here....

...Uliasz, 30 So.3d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), and C.H.M. v. Uliasz, 18 So.3d 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the Second District has indicated that a trial court can order secure detention by making written findings of “significantly changed circumstances.” Section 985.265(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provides: “If a child is detained under this part, the depaHment may transfer the child from nonsecure or home detention care to secure detention care only if significantly changed circumstances warrant such transfer.” (Emphasis supplied)....

...Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent. PALMER, C.J. E.D., a juvenile, petitions this court seeking a writ of habeas corpus based upon the claim that he has been held in secured detention for more than 21 days in violation of section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ntinued detention, we deny E.D's petition. On July 25, 2007, E.D. was detained on charges of burglary of a dwelling, petit theft, and criminal mischief. A trial was set for August 14, 2007, a date within the 21 days for secured detention provided by section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes....

...On August 14, 2007, the State orally requested a continuance because it was not prepared to proceed to trial. The trial court granted that motion. E.D. then filed a Motion to Release the Child from Detention, arguing that good cause for the continuance had not been shown as required by section 985.26(4)....

...ere indeed the basis of the continuance. With these additional facts, the reasons given by the State for the continuance constitute good cause sufficient to allow E.D.'s continued detention. PETITION DENIED. PLEUS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 985.26(2) of the Florida Statutes (2006) provides: 985.26 Length of detention. — * * * (2) A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court. [2] Section 985.26(4) of the Florida Statutes (2006) provides: 985.26 Length of detention....

PER curiam:. We deny the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. However, we remand this case to the trial court to conduct a healing pursuant to section 985.26(4), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...A juvenile petitions for habeas corpus challenging his continued home detention beyond twenty-one days after having been found incompetent to proceed. He claims that the trial court has no authority to extend his detention until his competency is restored. The trial court relied on section 985.26(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), to extend his detention, finding him to be a danger to the community were he to be released. We agree that the statute provides authority for this juvenile’s further detention....

...shall conduct a hearing at the end of each 72-hour period,  excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to determine the need for continued detention of the child and the need for further continuance of proceedings for the child or the state. § 985.26(4)(a), Fla....

...ered an amended order, this time 3 checking a box that recited the court had found competent evidence to show good cause for the continued detention, namely the “preservation of public safety.” Section 985.26(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), provides: Upon good cause being shown that the nature of the charge requires additional time for the prosecution or defense of the case or [that] the totality of the circumstances,...

...ences as soon as is reasonably possible considering the totality of the circumstances. The court shall prioritize the efficient disposition of cases in which the child has served 60 or more days in secure detention care. § 985.26(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022). Under section 985.26, “a finding of good cause must be predicated on a record containing competent evidence of the reasons for continuing the detention period.” E.D....

...2d at 995. Petitioner responds that even if the amended order could be supported by good cause, the trial court’s box-check does not constitute the written findings that the statute requires. We disagree. The statute requires the court “to make the required findings in writing.” § 985.26(2)(b). The only findings that the statute lists—and, therefore, the only findings to which the term “required findings” could refer—are that “good cause [has been] shown that the nature of the charge requires additional time fo...

...appeals from a final order of disposition. Because the disposition of forty-five days in secure detention was unauthorized, we reverse. Moreover, because this is “an issue capable of repetition and tending to evade review,” we write briefly to address why section 985.26(3), Florida Statutes (2012), is not a sentencing alternative....

...n *984 tion, with the fifteen-day periods to run consecutively. Defendant would then be placed in a level six moderate-risk commitment program for the fourth case. To support the forty-five-day secure detention disposition, the trial court relied on section 985.26(3). In part, section 985.26 provides: (2) A child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court....

...ny of the second degree involving violence against any individual. (3) Except as provided in subsection (2), a child may not be held in secure, nonse-cure, or home detention care for more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication. § 985.26(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). When read in conjunction with section 985.27(1)(b) (“Postcommitment detention while awaiting placement”), 1 it appears that section 985.26(3) applies when an order of adjudication has been entered but the trial court determines that continued secure detention is necessary for logistical reasons, such as keeping the child and public safe while awaiting space in a selected program. Section 985.26(3) does not, however, provide a disposition alternative....

detained longer than the term authorized in section 985.26 of the Florida Statutes (2017), which reads

detention. We disagree and deny the petition. Section 985.26(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), provides trial

...at 94 . The issue was whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive fifteen-day sentences for each violation of the same behavior order. Id. The court analogized the stacking of sentences for contempt with the stacking of periods of detention in section 985.26(2), and with a prohibition on using multiple instances of violation of probation as a basis for departure, and held that section 985.037 prohibited the stacking of periods of secure detention for juveniles found guilty of contempt....

...D.P.O., a child, petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing she is being illegally held in nonsecure detention based on the trial court’s February 2, 2017 order placing her on electronic monitoring until March 30, 2017. She also claims she was illegally ordered to have no contact with the victim. Section 985.26(3), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that a child may not be held in secure or nonsecure detention care for more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication....

...Electronic monitoring is considered to be a form of nonsecure detention under section 985.03(18)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). Inasmuch as the order placing D.P.O. on electronic monitoring for more than 15 days following her adjudicatory hearing is unauthorized absent a delay pursuant to section 985.26(4), Florida Statutes, 1 we *1065 grant the writ and remand for entry of an order striking electronic monitoring. 2 PETITION GRANTED. BERGER, WALLIS and LAMBERT, concur. . Section 985.26(4) provides: The time limits in subsections (2) and (3) do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state....

...he is being illegally held in nonsecure detention based on the trial court’s February 2, 2017 order placing her on electronic monitoring until March 30, 2017. She also claims she was illegally ordered to have no contact with the victim. Section 985.26(3), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that a child may not be held in secure or nonsecure detention care for more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication....

...Electronic monitoring is considered to be a form of nonsecure detention under section 985.03(18)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). Inasmuch as the order placing D.P.O. on electronic monitoring for more than 15 days following her adjudicatory hearing is unauthorized absent a delay pursuant to section 985.26(4), Florida Statutes,1 we grant the writ and remand for entry of an order striking electronic monitoring. 2 PETITION GRANTED. BERGER, WALLIS and LAMBERT, concur. 1 Section 985.26(4) provides: The time limits in subsections (2) and (3) do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state....

PER CURIAM. Petitioner, M.D.E., a child, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging he is entitled to release pursuant to section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes (2016). Section 985.26(2) provides: A child may not be held in secure or nonsecure detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court, However, upon g...

...tion for an additional 9 days if the child is charged with an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual. § 985.26(2), Fla....

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. Petitioner, M.D.E., a child, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging he is entitled to release pursuant to section 985.26(2), Florida Statutes (2016). Section 985.26(2) provides: A child may not be held in secure or nonsecure detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court....

...days if the child is charged with an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual. § 985.26(2), Fla....

...ive days later, the court ordered that the juvenile remain detained and set a “DISPOSITION/UFC” hearing for August 22, 2017. In seeking habeas corpus relief, Z.J.’s sole argument is that she is being detained longer than the term authorized in section 985.26 of the Florida Statutes (2017), which reads, in part: 985.26 Length of detention [[Image here]] (2) A child may not be held in secure or nonsecure detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court....

...rties, after the court’s finding that Z.J. was a flight risk. Z.J. asserts “even if it is found that the State requested a continuance, which was not formally applied for or heard,” then the trial court should hold the hearings contemplated in section 985.26(4). That subsection reads: 985.26 Length of detention [[Image here]] (4) The time limits in subsections (2) and (3) do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state....

...er continuance of proceedings for the child or the state. The trial court’s authority to place a juvenile, who is charged with or found to have committed delinquent acts, in secure detention is entirely statutory. Therefore, strict compliance with section 985.26 is necessary....

...remain detained, with no end date specified, and sets a hearing for August 22, 2017. Neither party has supplied a transcript, and the “Setting Hearing Order” does not explain why the court ordered ongoing detention. Thus, unless the trial court granted a continuance for cause, this was error. See § 985.26(2) (forbidding pre-adjudication detention longer than twenty-one days); § 985.26(3) (forbidding post-adjudication, predisposition detention longer than fifteen days); see also M.D.E....

...was not in secure detention at the time of this adjudicatory hearing. On January 22, 2014, the court heard argument on the permissible length of detention following an adjudicatory hearing. B.R. maintained that she could only be held for seventy-two hours with a possible seventy- two-hour extension under section 985.26(5), Florida Statutes (2013). The State argued that under the plain language of section 985.26(3), B.R....

...The representative explained that "[B.R.] told us the last time we were in court in August, that she promised to comply with your orders and she didn't . . . she just ran to Lakeland." The court found that B.R. presented a substantial risk of not appearing at her disposition hearing and that under section 985.26(3), she could be held in secure detention for fifteen days after her adjudicatory hearing. B.R. filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 27, 2014, alleging that pursuant to section 985.26(5), her continued detention was illegal because she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. The State responded that under the plain language of section 985.26(3), B.R....

...ntial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing." § 985.24(1)(a). Based on that finding, the relevant period at issue in the instant case is the time between B.R.'s adjudicatory hearing and her disposition. As such, the applicable statute is section 985.26(3), which provides in part that "a child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for more than [fifteen] days following the entry of an order of adjudication." Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that B.R. could be held in secure detention for fifteen days following her adjudication. Consequently, we reject B.R.'s contention that section 985.26(5) applies here solely because she was not in secure detention at the time of her adjudication. That section provides that [a] child who was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hea...

.... . . was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing," (2) "residential commitment is anticipated or recommended" for the child, and (3) the detention is explicitly "for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive evaluation." § 985.26(5)....

...ed or recommended or that the purpose of her detention was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation. And the instant record contains no indication of either of these circumstances. Failing to meet all three of the criteria set forth in section 985.26(5) must therefore preclude its application over the more general provisions of section 985.26(3) in order to achieve a consistent result....

...For instance, under B.R.'s reading of the statute, if a juvenile with a risk assessment instrument (RAI) score of twelve points or higher is placed in secure detention but is subsequently released pending adjudication because an adjudicatory hearing did not take place within twenty-one days under section 985.26(2), then the juvenile could only be held in secure detention for seventy-two hours after the adjudicatory hearing under section 985.26(5), while a child with a similar RAI but whose adjudicatory hearing did commence within the proper timeframe could be held up to fifteen days simply because there was no preadjudicatory gap in his or her detention....

...We decline to adopt a reading of the statute that would lead to such an inconsistent result. -4-  Accordingly, we clarify that when detention is already authorized based on a risk assessment of the child, section 985.26(5) does not act as a limit on the court's authority to place the juvenile into secure detention simply because he or she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. Instead, when residential commitment is anticipated or recommended, section 985.26(5) merely authorizes the court to place juveniles for whom secure detention might not otherwise have been authorized into secure detention while necessary evaluations for the court's ultimate disposition are conducted. But the court may order qualified juveniles into secure detention for up to fifteen days under section 985.26(3), even though the juvenile may not have actually been in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.1 MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur. 1 We also note that B.R....

...His secure detention has continued since then because of the “good cause” demonstrated for continuances of his adjudicatory hearing. This court granted R.N.’s first petition and directed the trial court to immediately conduct the hearing required by Florida Statute section 985.26(4) to determine if there exists the “need for continued detention of the child.” We noted that the need for further continuance of the proceedings is a separate inquiry apart from the need for continued detention....

...Upon reviewing the applicable statute we maintain that once detained for thirty days, 1 the trial court shall hold a hearing at the end of each 72 hour period to “determine the need for continued detention of the child and the need for further continuance of proceedings for the child or the state.” See § 985.26(4), Fla....

...In this case, thirty days is the applicable time period because it involves an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, "a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual.” See § 985.26(2), Fla....

...His secure detention has continued since then because of the "good cause" demonstrated for continuances of his adjudicatory hearing. This court granted R.N.'s first petition and directed the trial court to immediately conduct the hearing required by Florida Statute section 985.26(4) to determine if there exists the "need for continued detention of the child." We noted that the need for further continuance of the proceedings is a separate inquiry apart from the need for continued detention....

...Upon reviewing the applicable statute we maintain that once detained for thirty days, [1] the trial court shall hold a hearing at the end of each 72 hour period to "determine the need for continued detention of the child and the need for further continuance of proceedings for the child or the state." See § 985.26(4), Fla....

...NOTES [1] In this case, thirty days is the applicable time period because it involves an offense that would be, if committed by an adult, "a capital felony, a life felony, a felony of the first degree, or a felony of the second degree involving violence against any individual." See § 985.26(2), Fla....

...Effective January 1, 2007, this statute was renumbered as section 985.037(2). . The Florida Supreme Court, however, did indicate that in the case of multiple violations of probation, sentences could be bumped one cell or guideline range for each violation. . This statute is now renumbered section 985.26(2), and modified slightly.