Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...We agree in part with appellant's arguments and so reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. Appellant first argues that the deputy commissioner erred in finding that Brevda had suffered a serious financial hardship pursuant to the terms of Section 960.13(7), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] and in not entering sufficient findings of fact to justify a lump sum award....

...d appellee the lump sum amount of $3,500 to compensate him for his injuries. The deputy is empowered by Section 960.14(1) to convert compensation to be paid into a partial or total lump sum amount. The award, however, is limited by the provisions of Section 960.13(3), providing that any award made shall be based either on claimant's actual weekly wage, or if he cannot establish an average weekly wage, it "shall be in an amount equal to the arithmetic average between the maximum and the minimum awards listed in the applicable portions of ss....

...s not possible for him to make a precise determination as to claimant's average weekly wage or his lost earnings. Yet it does not appear from his order that he complied with the alternative means of computing claimant's loss of income as required by Section 960.13(3)....

...The Williams court did not consider the impact, if any, that interpretations of the Workers' Compensation Act might have on the issue before it. There are obvious similarities between the Crimes Compensation Act and Chapter 440, relating to workers' compensation claims; for example, the requirement in Section 960.13(3) that any award be made pursuant to the schedule of benefits and degrees of disability set forth in Section 440.15....

...nforceable right in contract once the legislature, in its wisdom, determines to withdraw some or all of such benefits. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consistent proceedings. SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 960.13(7) provides: If the commission or commission member, as the case may be, finds that the claimant, if not granted assistance pursuant to this chapter to meet the loss of earnings, support, or out-of-pocket loss, will not suffer serious...

...At the time of sentencing, the state moved to impose a five percent surcharge on Wright's fine in accordance with Section 960.25. [2] In a single order, the trial court denied the state's motions in both cases, ruling that "the method of determining the award ... under Section 960.13 is a denial of equal protection and due process," [3] that "Section *877 960.17 violates Sections 9, 11 and 22 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Florida," [4] and that there is no rational way to distinguish Sections 960...

...ty of Section 960.17. We begin our analysis by eliminating from consideration issues which are either uncontested or not properly before us. First, since the offenses committed by appellees cannot be the basis for any victim compensation award under Section 960.13, and since neither Champe nor Wright is subject to the reimbursement requirements of Section 960.17, we decline to address the constitutionality of those provisions (except insofar as they depend on the severability issue later discussed)....

...[2] Section 960.25, Florida Statutes (1977), provides in pertinent part: In addition to any fine or civil penalty prescribed by law, there is hereby established and created an additional 5 percent surcharge thereon which shall be imposed, levied, and collected together with such fine or civil penalty. [3] In general, Section 960.13 defines the circumstances under which compensation will be made available to victims of crime, and places limitations on the amount of such awards....

...period the benefits were available. In addition, the Bureau argues that a claimant is obligated to use the annual leave and sick leave benefits he has earned and that depletion of those benefits may not create an "actual need" within the meaning of section 960.13(2), Florida Statutes (1979). Thus, the Bureau contends, the commissioner was unjustified in ordering a "wage loss" award under section 960.13(7)....

...is a need for government financial assistance for ... victims of crime... . [and that] it is the intent of the Legislature that aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of crime. Sections 960.13(2) and 960.13(7) [1] , Florida Statutes (1979), provide: (2) Any award shall be granted on an "actual need" basis and shall be provided subsequent to all benefits provided by primary insurance carriers, including, but not limited to, health and accident insurers, workers' compensation, and automobile accident coverage....

...Communications; State ex rel. Fronton Exhibition Co. v. Stein, 144 Fla. 387, 198 So. 82 (1940). We find that based upon the substantial, competent evidence presented at the administrative hearing, the commissioner correctly applied the statutory criteria contained in sections 960.13(2) and 960.13(7) to the facts of this case....

...Public Employees Relations Commission, 402 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We therefore hold that the commissioner properly exercised his discretion in awarding Reynolds lost wages under the Crimes Compensation Act for the first month of his incapacity. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 960.13(7), as amended by Chapter 80-146, section 11, Laws of Florida, presently provides: (7) If the division finds that the claimant, if not granted assistance pursuant to this chapter to meet the loss of earnings or support or out-of-pocket...

...State, 470 So.2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Hankerson v. State, 464 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Lastly, the court's imposition of both a fine, to be paid to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund, and restitution to the worker's compensation carrier was not erroneous. Section 960.13, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that any award made from the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund will be reduced by any amount a claimant receives from a worker's compensation award....

...(effective July 1, 2015). Nonetheless, the 2012 version applies to Latham. -8- case did not qualify for compensation by the Fund and Latham is not obligated for restitution to the Fund. The language of section 960.13, titled "Awards," provides further support for this conclusion. Section 960.13(1) states the following: (1)(a) No award shall be made unless the department finds that: 1....

...or intervenor; and 3. Such crime was promptly reported to the proper authorities. As discussed above, Latham's offense does not meet the definition of "[c]rime" in section 960.03(3)(b), which also applies to section 960.13. Furthermore, even if the offense of leaving the scene of the accident were to constitute a crime under section 960.03, the offense does not meet the requirement in section 960.13(1)(a)(2) that the crime directly result in the injury to or death of the victim....

...the Fund. Payne v. State, 873 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The State acknowledges that Latham's offense does not constitute a crime under section 960.03 and that the Fund's payment of an award to the victim was arguably unauthorized under section 960.13, but the State claims that the trial court was not required to refuse to impose the restitution....

...An award under the Florida Crimes Compensation Act is “provided subsequent to all benefits provided by primary insurance carriers, including, but not limited to health and accident insurers, workers’ compensation, and automobile accident coverage.” § 960.13(2), Fla.Stat....

...uch owner or operator for the accident. The parties to this appeal have noted the similarities between crimes compensation and workers’ compensation. For purposes of the uninsured motorists statute, section 627.727, we conclude that an award under section 960.13 is a benefit under a “similar law.” Thus, the uninsured motorists benefits payable by the *723 insurance company are over and above and do not duplicate the benefits received from the crimes compensation fund....