CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1698
...The trial judge should not have departed from the guidelines based on the officer's disputed, unsworn statements. We also question whether, even with corroborating evidence of the dog's injuries, they would support a departure from the guidelines. Cannada was charged with injury to a police dog pursuant to section 843.19, Florida Statutes (1983). [1] For a conviction under that statute, a defendant must inflict "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or death upon a police dog." § 843.19(2)....
...At resentencing, Cannada may affirmatively select to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines. If he does not, the trial judge shall resentence him in accordance with laws in effect at the time of the underlying offense. CAMPBELL and FRANK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 843.19, Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Injuring or killing police dog prohibited; penalty.- (1) As used in this section, the term "police dog" means any dog which is owned, or the service of which is employed, by a law enforcement agency...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 4511343, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 16732
...We conclude that the burglary conviction should have been dismissed because there was no evidence that T.W. intended to aid in the burglary or that he committed any act in furtherance of the burglary. We further hold that the evidence was insufficient to find that the police dog suffered “great bodily harm” under section 843.19(2), Florida Statutes (2010), as a result of his encounter with T.W., and reverse that conviction as well....
...(1) intended to aid in the commission of the burglary and (2) actually aided in some way, the burglary conviction must be reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment of dismissal as to this count. Injuring a Police Dog T.W. was convicted of injuring a police dog, in violation of section 843.19(2), Florida Statutes, which states: Any person who intentionally and knowingly, without lawful cause or justification, causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or death to, or uses a deadly weapon upon, a police dog, fire dog, SAR dog, or police horse commits a felony of the third degree.... § 843.19(2), Fla....
...The police dog in this case, Rocky, did not die, no evidence of permanent disability was presented, and the state did not attempt to argue permanent disability below or on appeal. As such, the issue before us comes down to whether Rocky suffered “great bodily harm” pursuant to the statute. *243 Neither section
843.19 nor any Florida case law offers a definition of “great bodily harm” under these types of circumstances. However, cases discussing “great bodily harm” in the context of aggravated battery to a human being provide some guidance. Like section
843.19, section
784.045 (aggravated battery) does not define “great bodily harm.” Nonetheless, Florida courts have generally defined “great bodily harm” as “great as distinguished from slight, trivial, minor or moderate harm, and as...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
KUNTZ, J.
A juvenile appeals the circuit court’s order adjudicating him delinquent
for intentional or knowing malicious harassment or interference with a
police dog. The State charged the juvenile with violating section 843.19(4),
Florida Statutes (2017), which provides that “[a]ny person who
intentionally or knowingly maliciously harasses, teases, interferes with, or
attempts to interfere with a police dog ....
...they ultimately arrested the juvenile. Both officers testified they conducted
the search with no further interruptions or distractions after they arrested
the juvenile. The entire search lasted around five minutes.
The State charged the juvenile with violating section 843.19(4), Florida
Statutes (2017)....
...rfered or attempted to
interfere with K-9 Kona, so we’re asking the Court to enter an
Order dismissing the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
The court denied the motion and later adjudicated the juvenile delinquent
for violating section 843.19(4), Florida Statutes....
...3d 235, 237
2
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing Boca Airport, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue,
56
So. 3d 140, 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).
The juvenile asserts the State failed to establish that he acted “in a
knowingly malicious manner towards the police dog.” Section
843.19(4),
Florida Statutes (2017), states:
Any person who intentionally or knowingly maliciously
harasses, teases, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with
a police dog, fire dog, SAR dog, or police horse while the
animal is in the performance of its duties commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
s.
775.082 or s.
775.083.
§
843.19(4), Fla....
...So the issue is limited to whether the juvenile
had the requisite intent under the statute. That analysis revolves around
the word “maliciously.” First, what does it mean? Second, where does it
apply? Finally, we apply these answers to the case before us.
i. The Definition of Malice in Section 843.19(4), Florida Statutes
“Maliciously” is not defined in the statute, so it “must be understood as
a word of common usage having its plain and ordinary sense.” See Seese
v....
...appear in the statute at issue in Seese and the statute here. But we do
not determine the definition of the word malice by looking at individual
words in isolation. We must consider the words in the statute in context
and after considering the entire statute.
A review of section 843.19, Florida Statutes, shows that different
subsections within the section employ different terms. For example,
section 843.19(2) provides: “Any person who intentionally and knowingly,
without lawful cause or justification, causes great bodily harm . . . upon[]
a police dog . . . commits” a third-degree felony. (Emphasis added). Thus,
section 843.19(2) specifically applies the legal definition of malice. In
contrast, subsection 843.19(4), uses the terms “intentionally or knowingly
maliciously harasses[.]” (Emphasis added).
Using different terms in different portions of the same statute can
convey different meanings....
...White Mountain Ins. Group, Ltd.,
2 So. 3d 1041, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Maddox v. State,
923
So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006)); see also Barber v. State,
988 So. 2d 1170,
1172-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Thus, the use of the legal definition of malice in section
843.19(2), and
the different use in section
843.19(4), is “strong evidence” that the
definition of malice in section
843.19(4) means actual malice. 2 In other
words, section
843.19(4) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the juvenile intentionally or knowingly maliciously harassed
Kona, meaning with “ill will, hatred, spite, [or] an evil intent.” See Seese,
955 So....
...Maliciously Modifies Each Subsequent Word
The State also argues that the juvenile’s actions need not be malicious.
The statute provides: “. . . intentionally or knowingly maliciously harasses,
teases, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with a police dog . . . .”
§ 843.19(4), Fla....
...State,
106 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). In
Yarn, the relevant statute provided: “Any person who actually and
intentionally maliciously touches, strikes, or causes bodily harm to a
police dog” commits a first-degree misdemeanor.
106 So. 3d at 41 (quoting
§
843.19(3), Fla....
...to strike or cause harm to the police dog.” Id. at 42. So, in our case, the
State argues the Second District must have construed “maliciously” to
modify only “touches,” rather than also each other verb.
2 This construction, defining malice in section
843.19(4) as actual malice, is
consistent with the Rule of Lenity and section
775.021(1), Florida Statutes
(2017)....
...at 719.
In another case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that in
the statutory phrase “[w]illfully damage or tamper with any vehicle without
the consent of its owner,” the word willfully applied to both damage and
tamper. In re John R., 394 A.2d 818, 819 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
Section 843.19(4), Florida Statutes, therefore, requires the State to
establish that a defendant “intentionally or knowingly maliciously
harasses, [maliciously] teases, [maliciously] interferes with, or [maliciously]
attempts to interfere with a po...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...instructions, as
well as others that are not the subject of the instant case. After the Committee filed
its report, the Court did not publish the proposals for comment.
In chapter 2019-9, section 1, Laws of Florida, the Legislature amended
section 843.19, Florida Statutes, to broaden the statute covering crimes against
police, fire, and search and rescue (SAR) “dogs” to encompass crimes against
police, fire, and search and rescue “canines.” New instructions 21.19(a), (b), and
(c) instruct upon the offenses outlined in section 843.19, for which standard jury
instructions had not previously been authorized.
Having considered the Committee’s report and the FPDA’s comment, we
authorize new instructions 21.19(a), 21.19(b), and 21.19(c) as set forth in the...
...-3-
APPENDIX
21.19(a) [CAUSING [GREAT BODILY HARM] [PERMANENT
DISABILITY] [DEATH] TO] [OR] [USING A DEADLY WEAPON UPON]
A [POLICE] [FIRE] [SEARCH AND RESCUE] [CANINE] [HORSE]
§ 843.19(2), Fla....
...The [canine] [horse] was a [police] [fire] [search and rescue]
[canine] [horse].
3. (Defendant) knew the [canine] [horse] was a [police] [fire] [search
and rescue] [canine] [horse].
Definitions. Give as applicable.
§ 843.19(1), Fla....
...minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.
Lesser Included Offenses
[CAUSING [GREAT BODILY HARM] [PERMANENT DISABILITY]
[DEATH] TO] [OR] [USING A DEADLY WEAPON UPON] A
[POLICE] [FIRE] [SAR] [CANINE] [HORSE] -
843.19(2)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
None
Battery
843.19(3) 21.19(b)
Police/Fire/SAR
Canine/Horse
Harass
843.19(4) 21.19(c)
Police/Fire/SAR
Canine/Horse
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
-5-
Comments
It...
...Trial judges must make that determination until
the case law develops.
This instruction was adopted in 2020.
21.19(b) MALICIOUSLY [TOUCHING] [STRIKING] [CAUSING BODILY
HARM] TO A [POLICE] [FIRE] [SEARCH AND RESCUE] [CANINE]
[HORSE]
§ 843.19(3), Fla....
...(Defendant) knew the [canine] [horse] was a [police] [fire] [search
and rescue] [canine] [horse].
Definitions.
R.N. v. State,
257 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
“Maliciously” means with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.
Give as applicable.
§
843.19(1), Fla....
...vity, enforcement
of laws, or apprehension of offenders.
Lesser Included Offenses
MALICIOUSLY [TOUCHING] [STRIKING] [CAUSING BODILY
HARM] TO A [POLICE] [FIRE] [SEARCH AND RESCUE]
[CANINE] [HORSE] — 843.19(3)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
...-7-
21.19(c) MALICIOUSLY [HARASSING] [TEASING] [INTERFERING
WITH] [ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE WITH] A [POLICE]
[FIRE] [SEARCH AND RESCUE] [CANINE] [HORSE] WHILE IN
PERFORMANCE OF ITS DUTIES
§ 843.19(4), Fla....
...(Defendant) knew the [canine] [horse] was a [police] [fire] [search
and rescue] [canine] [horse].
Definitions.
R.N. v. State,
257 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
“Maliciously” means with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.
Give as applicable.
§
843.19(1), Fla....
