Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...We reject the argument that this presumption improperly infringes upon a criminal contempt defendant's fifth amendment privilege. See State v. Buchman, 361 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1978). This type of required response has been approved in other criminal matters. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...(1983) (statutory inference that a person proved to be in possession of recently stolen property knew or should have known that the property was stolen); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) (upholding an inference essentially identical to § 812.022(2))....

...ind of livestock.] [a fire extinguisher.] [2000 or more pieces of fruit.] [taken from a posted construction site.]] Inferences; give if Proof that a person presented false identification applicable not current in respect to name, address, place of F.S. 812.022(1) employment or other material aspect in connection with the leasing of personal property, or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. Inferences; give Proof of possession of recently stolen property, if applicable unless satisfactorily explained, give rise to an F.S. 812.022(2) inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...ent. Conversely, we consider that such inference could apply to facts such as those in the case before us and is one which the jury could properly weigh in its determination of guilt. The Florida Supreme Court, in sustaining the constitutionality of Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] reasoned that "[s]ince there [was] a rational connection between the fact proven (the defendant possessed stolen goods) and the fact presumed (the defendant knew the goods were stolen), the inference created by section 812.022(2) does not violate [the defendant's] due process rights." Edwards v....

...[26] Appellant's convictions on the charges of uttering a forged instrument and grand theft are reversed and remanded for further consistent proceedings. Appellant's conviction on the charge of forgery is affirmed. [27] McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr. and SHAW, LEANDER J., Jr., Associate Judges, concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.022(2) states: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...st prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. (Defendant) [trafficked in] [endeavored to traffic in] (property alleged). 2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that (property alleged) was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...d phone number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed, gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...--- Petit theft — second degree 812.014(3)(a) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So.2d 1205], and in 2007, by adding the Inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla....

...o elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. (Defendant) [initiated] [organized] [planned] [financed] [directed] [managed] [supervised] the theft of (property alleged). 2. (Defendant) trafficked in the (property alleged). Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...ne *329 number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed, gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...----------------------------------------------------------- None ----------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So.2d 1205], and in 2007, by adding the Inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla....

...Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 and 2007. NOTES [1] The amendments to instructions 14.2 — Dealing in Stolen Property (Fencing) and 14.3 — Dealing in Stolen Property (Organizing), add the four inferences enacted under sections 812.022(2)-(5), Florida Statutes, pertaining to evidence of dealing in stolen property....

...Subsequent to the Committee's approval of its proposed changes to instructions 14.2 and 14.3, on June 7, 2006, Chapter 2006-107, section 1, Laws of Florida, was signed into law, creating an additional inference in respect to evidence of dealing in stolen property, i.e., specific to possession of a stolen motor vehicle. See § 812.022(6), Fla. Stat. (2006). Because it appears that the Committee intended to incorporate all inferences created by section 812.022, Florida Statutes, relating to dealing in stolen property, instructions 14.2 and 14.3 are modified to include the inference under section 812.022(6), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...n from a posted construction site.] [a stop sign.] [anhydrous ammonia.]] i. [The value of the property taken was $100 or more but less than $300, and was taken from [a dwelling] [the enclosed curtilage of a dwelling].] Inferences; give if applicable § 812.022(1), Fla....

...ased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. Inferences; give if applicable § 812.022(2), Fla....

...State, 393 So.2d 1174 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), the respondent's unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped — that he bought it at a flea market — rendered the state's case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt....

...State, 512 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); N.C. v. State, 478 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853, 90 S.Ct. 112, 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969), citing Williams v. State, 40 Fla. 480, 25 So. 143 (1898). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, provides that proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to the inference that the possessor knew, or should have known, that the property was stolen....

...n of guilt upon one dealing in property he "should know was stolen." Id. at 1143; see also State v. Dickinson, 370 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1979). In Edwards v. State, 381 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1980), the supreme court considered whether the following provision of section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1977), violated due process: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...The supreme court rejected the argument that the inference created by this statute violated due process. Id. at 697. "Since there is a rational connection between the fact proven (the defendant possessed stolen goods) and the fact presumed (the defendant knew the goods were stolen), the inference created by section 812.022(2) does not violate Edwards' due process rights." Id....

...is similar to the element outlined in section 812.019(1), that the seller of stolen property should have known that a particular item was stolen. Also at work in a prosecution for dealing in stolen property is the evidentiary inference created by statute. Section 812.022(2) creates an evidentiary inference that "possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property ......

...We hold that the case was correctly presented to the jury and that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction of grand theft. II. The second issue raised on appeal is the trial court's giving of the following standard jury instruction on theft, an instruction *598 taken from Section 812.022, Florida Statutes: Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to the inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...ence that the possessor stole the property, as in Walton v. State, 404 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Griffin v. State, 370 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and (2) an inference that the possessor knew or should have known the property was stolen. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, supra....

...He denied stealing the items. He contended that he had previously sold junk to the same scrap metal dealer, although the two employees who testified were uncertain of this fact. The jury found the appellant not guilty of grand theft but guilty of dealing in stolen property. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows: (2) Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...oves the appellant was in possession of the recently stolen property. The law has provided a presumption of fact. Possession of recently stolen property gives rise to the presumption the possessor knew or should have known the goods are stolen. Sec. 812.022, Fla....

...He was not permitted to elicit testimony that Guerrero told the officer a girlfriend had given him the car and that he didn't know it was stolen. Over defendant's objection, the court instructed the jury that an inference of guilt arises from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...conceded, at the time of arrest, that he suspected the car was stolen. In view of the small size and apparently youthful age of the driver, the court could reasonably conclude that G.C.'s knowledge rose to a greater level than that of suspicion that the car was stolen. See also § 812.022(2), Fla....

...3d DCA 1972); J.O. and R.G. v. State, 384 So.2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The State urges that the adjudications ought to be affirmed upon a holding that the circumstances were such that the possession of recently stolen property was not satisfactorily explained. See Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Antinori overheard Ludwig's telephone call to the sheriff's department. When the officers entered the shop, they found the guns on a shelf behind the display counter. We conclude that these circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that Ludwig had dealt in stolen property in violation of section 812.022, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...This inference is sufficient to establish theft. [2] Possession of recently stolen property gives rise to two separate inferences: *355 First, that the person in possession of the property stole it; and second, the person knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...rily or permanently: (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. (b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the property. (Emphasis added) [3] § 812.022(2) provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...ch was eventually given to Officer Baldwin. After the defense rested, Jackson renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. As part of the instruction to the jury, the trial court read that part of the standard instruction based on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1997) which provides: Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...State, 62 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla.1952), because "[t]he cloak of liberty and freedom is far too precious a garment to be trampled in the dust of mere inference compounded." Harrison v. State, 104 So.2d 391, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). The state relies on the statutory inference of section 812.022(2), to argue that its evidence was sufficient to support a conviction....

...State, 433 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); R.M. v. State, 412 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); R.A.L. v. State, 402 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). II At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile the two lines of cases relied upon by the parties. To properly determine how the section 812.022(2) inference should operate, it is necessary to place the statute in its historical context. Section 812.022(2) was enacted by the 1977 legislature as part of the overall revision of the criminal statutes relating to theft and stolen property....

...tatute prohibits convictions for both offenses, when they relate to the same stolen property and the same defendant. See T.S.R. v. State, 596 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). A critical issue in this case is whether the legislature's enactment of section 812.022(2) in 1977 should be read to have adopted the common law rule of McDonald or that of Graham for Chapter 812 theft cases. Section 812.022(2) adopts the terminology of the common law rule....

...plainly specified in the statute." Ady v. American Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So.2d 577, 581 (Fla.1996); see Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977). Application of these rules of construction leads to the conclusion that section 812.022(2) should be read as having adopted the common law rule of Graham in Chapter 812 theft cases....

...In 1977, the definition of theft was expanded to include the same type of criminal conduct for which Graham had fashioned its rule. The reasons behind the supreme court's adoption of the rule in Graham are thus equally applicable to the expanded definition of theft under section 812.014. Reading section 812.022(2) in this manner is consistent with Law 's statement of the standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases and with the rationale underlying that rule....

...is R.A.L., supra, which looked to Fisk and A.R. in concluding that the defendant's unrefuted, exculpatory and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped that he bought it at a flea market rendered the state's case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2) ......

...without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt. 402 So.2d at 1337. Like A.R., R.A.L. does not specify the precise criminal statute involved in the juvenile court. R.A.L. appears to be the first case to clearly inject the reasoning and language of Graham into section 812.022(2) analysis....

...Weekly at D2052, 734 So.2d at 423; M.M., 547 So.2d at 139-40; R.M., 450 So.2d at 898; R.D.S., 446 So.2d at 1181-82; McNeil, 433 So.2d at 1295; R.M., 412 So.2d at 45. These cases hold that where a conviction for theft was based on nothing more than the section 812.022(2) inference, then the evidence was legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict, in the face of an unrefuted, exculpatory and not unreasonable explanation offered by the accused for his possession of the goods in question....

...As to the conviction of possessing a motor vehicle with an altered identification number, we also reverse. Section 319.33(1)(d) requires that a defendant's possession be "with knowledge" of the destruction, alteration or removal of the VIN number. The section 812.022(2) inference does not extend to this charge....

...nless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 14.1 at 270. Both jury instructions are derived from section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which reads verbatim like the theft instruction....

...ility of the witnesses, or the guilt of the accused). He further argues the instruction should not have been given by the trial court and that he is entitled to a new trial. The State counters by arguing that the basis for giving the instruction was section 812.022(2), not the trial court's opinion of the evidence....

...ination, and that the jury instruction was an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The Court indicated the instruction did not violate any of those principles. 412 U.S. at 846-47, 93 S.Ct. 2357. Likewise, in Edwards, we held that "section 812.022(2) does not violate the fifth and fourteenth amendment right to remain silent." 381 So.2d at 697....

...an not true. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 172, 99 S.Ct. 2213 (Powell, J., dissenting). Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court has addressed this type of jury instruction on more than one occasion and upheld its validity. In Edwards, we held that section 812.022(2) was constitutional and did not violate a defendant's right to due process and privilege against self-incrimination....

...ed outside the parameters of the crime itself. On the other hand, possession of recently stolen property involves the fruits of the theft or burglary and is therefore inextricably intertwined with the crime itself. In light of the lengthy history of section 812.022(2) [3] and the fact that such an inference *720 has been upheld on numerous occasions by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, it is clear that the instruction on possession of recently stolen property is not an impermi...

...[2] Six states have nearly identical theft or organized crime statutes. See Ala.Code § 13A-8-16 (2003); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-2305 (2004); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 514.110 (2002); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:432 (West 2004); N.Y. Penal Law § 165.55 (Consol.2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (2003). [3] The history of section 812.022(2) was discussed by the Fourth District in Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999): Section 812.022(2) was enacted by the 1977 legislature as part of the overall revision of the criminal statutes relating to theft and stolen property....

...[4] Consider what uncertainty might be created if we were to find that such an inference is an impermissible comment on the evidence. This affirmative answer would lead to the elimination of the numerous other inferences in Florida criminal law. See, e.g., § 812.022(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (providing that when a person uses false identification to lease personal property, this gives rise to an inference that the person used or will use the property to commit a theft, unless satisfactorily explained); § 812.022(3) (providing that when a person buys or sells property at a price substantially below fair market value, this gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling knew the property was stolen, unless satisfactorily explained); § 812.022(4) (providing that proof of purchase or sale of stolen property by a dealer in property creates inference that dealer knew the property was stolen, unless satisfactorily explained)....

...don't know what cannabis looks like) in order to overcome this presumption. In this regard, the defendant's obligation seems not unlike one found in possession of recently stolen property who must explain why he did not know the property was stolen. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1997); Currington v....

...Section 90.401, Florida Statutes (1989). Specifically, defense counsel intended to use Appellant's testimony to overcome the statutory inference that a person in possession of recently stolen property knew or should have known the property was stolen. See section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Bronson Jr.'s only link to the crimes was his presence in the truck driven by his father that contained the stolen items. And it was his father who also had possession of the truck earlier that morning. Next, Mr. Bronson Jr. contends that the State's lack of evidence is not cured by the inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Moreover, unexplained possession of stolen property is sufficient to support a burglary conviction when it occurs as an adjunct to a theft. Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 134 (Fla.2001). To receive the benefit of the statutory inference, the State must establish, pursuant to section 812.022(2), that a defendant had "possession of property recently stolen." As to Mr....

...and thus fails to demonstrate his actual possession of the property. Also, his mere proximity to the items fails to establish even constructive possession. See Davis v. State, 761 So.2d 1154, 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accordingly, the State was not entitled to add the section 812.022(2) statutory inference to its quantum of evidence....

...The finder of fact has the right to infer guilt of breaking and entering with intent to steal from the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1968), citing Williams v. State, 40 Fla. 480, 25 So. 143 (1898). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to the inference that the possessor knew, or should have known, that the property was stolen....

...[the theft was committed within a county that was subject to a state of emergency that had been declared by the governor under Chapter 252, the "State Emergency Management Act" and the perpetration of the theft was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.] Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla....

...ty, or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained *571 or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...ar course of business or without the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...Proof that a dealer who regularly deals in used property possesses stolen property upon which a name and phone number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...1 are vehicles of the Florida Department of Corrections, as provided by section 316.003(1), Florida Statutes (2007). The definition of "dwelling" used in instruction 13.1 is also used in instruction 14.1. In addition, inclusion of the inference from section 812.022(1), pertaining to proof of false identification or identification that is not current, is modified to correctly reflect those two distinct bases underlying the inference....

...Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Marc E. Kirk, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. By this appeal, Kenneth Edwards seeks review of a trial court order finding sections 812.019 and 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to be constitutional. We affirm the order of the trial court. Section 812.022(2) states: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...State, 370 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (reversed on other grounds). Since there is a rational connection between the fact proven (the defendant possessed stolen goods) and the fact presumed (the defendant knew the goods were stolen), the inference created by section 812.022(2) does not violate Edwards' due process rights....

...to testify. Edwards could have attempted to explain his possession of the stolen goods by evidence other than his own testimony. Even if he had failed to present any evidence in explanation, the jury was not compelled to find him guilty. Therefore, section 812.022(2) does not violate the fifth and fourteenth amendment right to remain silent....

...rejected by this Court in State v. Dickinson, 370 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1979). We reaffirm our decision in Dickinson. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling by the circuit court of the nineteenth judicial circuit, upholding the validity of sections 812.019 and 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The appellant was adjudicated delinquent based on a finding that he was guilty of grand theft. That determination was in turn founded upon the presumption of guilty knowledge which arose from the fact that he was in possession of a recently stolen moped. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...fternoon following the burglary, and, therefore, insufficient to uphold the grand theft conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction. See Colvin v. State, 445 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Coleman v. State, 466 So.2d 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was part of the scheme to steal the first victim’s property, and not merely in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong crowd after the fact. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...We held in R.A.L. that: [T]he respondent's unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped — that he bought it at a flea market — rendered the state's case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt....

...I would agree that, standing alone, the circumstantial evidence introduced against R.D.S. is insufficient, applying the usually applicable rule on the subject, to establish his guilt. But, uniquely in a prosecution like this one for theft, the state is aided by the statutory inference of guilty knowledge supplied by Sec. 812.022(2), Fla....

...ome. See State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1970). I believe therefore that P.N. v. State, 443 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and State v. Fox, 404 So.2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rather than R.A.L., R.M., and A.R., control. I would affirm. NOTES [1] Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983) provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...State, 333 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Without considering Andrews' prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence, the only support for the appellants' conviction lies in the presumption raised by their possession of the recently stolen equipment. § 812.022, Florida Statutes....

...The evidence was sufficient to create an inference that appellant was guilty of theft, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes, since it showed that appellant purchased the Mercedes at a price substantially below the fair market value and that the low purchase price was not satisfactorily explained. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...At trial, the court instructed the jury over appellant's objection that: Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 148; § 812.022(2), Fla....

...The State may do so inferentially: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022, Fla....

...y set forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence that was not rebutted by the State. While we acknowledge that the evidence that Wilson knew the property was stolen was circumstantial, we do not agree that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[p]roof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." This court has previously examined the application of section 812.022(2) in Coleman v....

...dermined Wilson's credibility and placed Wilson's story highly in doubt. The trial court, as the trier of fact, therefore "was entitled to conclude that [the *77 defendant's] explanation was unsatisfactory," id., and that the inference arising under section 812.022(2) was unrebutted....

...And that he made mention that he had driven the truck." Finally, the State relied on Dellechiaie's possession of the recently stolen property which, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, would give rise to an inference that he knew or should have known that the property was stolen. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...State, 597 So.2d 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Moore's other claims are without merit. SENTENCE AFFIRMED; RESTITUTION REVERSED. HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 319.33(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 812.022, Fla....

...from a posted construction site.] [a stop sign.] [anhydrous ammonia.]] i. [The value of the property taken was $100 or more but less than $300, and was taken from [a dwelling] [the unenclosed curtilage of a dwelling].] Inferences; give if applicable § 812.022(1), Fla....

...ased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. Inferences; give if applicable § 812.022(2), Fla....

...t to a state of emergency that had been declared by the governor under Chapter 252, the “State Emergency Management Act” and the perpetration of the theft was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.] Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla....

...roperty, or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(1), Fla....

...urse of business or without the usual indicia of ownership other *731 than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...Proof that a dealer who regularly deals in used property possesses stolen property upon which a name and phone number of a person other than the offer- or of the property are conspicuously displayed gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...As to the second element, the “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” § 812.022(2), Fla....

...the conviction. Bertone was charged with "trafficking" in two DeWalt saws, which he had pawned and later retrieved from a pawn shop. To establish the statutory element that Bertone knew or should have known the saws were stolen, the state relied on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. In Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77, 83-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that the circumstantial evidence rule of State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla.1970), applied to the inference of guilty knowledge created by section 812.022(2)....

...that the goods were being sold at less than their value, possession of other stolen property, or other incriminating evidence and circumstances. 238 So.2d at 621 (citation omitted). A line of cases [1] following the reasoning of Graham holds that a section 812.022(2) inference, without more, is legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict, in the face of an unrefuted, exculpatory and not unreasonable explanation offered by the accused for his or her possession of the goods in question....

...nd there were other incriminating evidence and circumstances under Graham which supported the conviction. Haugabrook, 827 So.2d at 1069. However, Haugabrook cites to Patten v. State, 492 So.2d 748, 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), a case which holds that the section 812.022(2) inference is sufficient to create a jury question "once the state proves [a defendant] was in possession of the recently stolen property." Patten states that "in order to establish the criminal liability ... it is necessary for the state only to prove the items were stolen and the accused was dealing in it." Id. at 750. Patten is consistent with pre- Graham, pre-section *926 812.022(2) cases....

...Whether this was indeed the case was the key, if not the only issue below. There was no direct evidence of guilty knowledge introduced at the trial. Because the defendant was admittedly in possession of the vehicles soon after they had been taken, however, an inference *1089 of her knowledge of that fact arose under Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), unless the possession was "satisfactorily explained." See, Edwards v....

...902, 100 S.Ct. 1826, 64 L.Ed.2d 255 (1980). Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the use of the victim's stolen credit card at a store the day after the robbery. Such evidence was admissible pursuant to section 812.022, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...This testimony constitutes direct evidence of the theft. See M.L.K v. State, 454 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). "Direct evidence is that to which the witness testifies of his own knowledge as to the facts at issue." Davis v. State, 90 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla.1956). In addition, section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes(1993), provides "[p]roof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the prop...

...The conflicting and inherently suspect nature of the defendant's multiple explanations of his possession of recently stolen property, together with the fact that he was found with additional stolen items, presented what was clearly a jury question of his guilt. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979); State v....

...He contends that the jury was improperly instructed. We affirm. During the charge conference below, appellant properly objected to the giving of a proposed jury instruction concerning the inference to be drawn from the possession of recently stolen property. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1997), the model for the proposed jury instruction, provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...sh can near the pawnshop. He took it to the pawnshop and pawned it. Valdez said he did not know or believe the equipment in the trash can was stolen. The state's case consisted of circumstantial evidence and a reliance upon the inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida *752 Statutes (1983)....

...d a former address for himself where he still received mail. Valdez' "unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of ... [the stolen items] rendered the state's case, which was based solely on the inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes [(1983)], without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt." R.A.L....

...Moreover, the state proved that the motorcycle parts were in fact stolen, and "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." § 812.022(2), Fla....

...As we have held, the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that M.D.S. possessed the Acura. Moreover, it presented no evidence that established when the car was taken. Accordingly, it also failed to prove the Acura was "recently stolen." The inference in section 812.022(2) does not apply under these circumstances....

State’s case against Yudin is entirely based on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2009), which provides

...State, 785 So.2d 1182, 1199-1200 (Fla.2001) ("This Court has explained that a trial court has wide discretion in instructing the jury, and the court's decision regarding the charge to the jury is reviewed with a presumption of correctness on appeal."); see also Bozeman v. State, 931 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2008) provides that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the p...

...(Crim.) 13.1. And it was instructed: “Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the possession [sic] of the property knew or should have known that *254 it had been stolen.” See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...dant allows it to go to the jury either unexplained or with an explanation that is so palpably unreasonable and incredible that the jury rejects it entirely"); and (2) a statutory presumption that the possessor knew the property had been stolen, see § 812.022(2), Fla....

...5th DCA 1992) ("unexplained possession of recently stolen property is not only sufficient to support theft conviction, but when burglary necessarily occurs as adjunct, inference of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen goods also supports conviction for burglary"). [2] § 812.022(6), Fla....

...ately three weeks after it had been stolen. Unless satisfactorily explained, proof of possession of recently stolen property gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew, or should have known, that it was stolen. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...The jury found him not guilty of the burglary, but guilty of the other offenses. To convict Parks of dealing in stolen property one of the elements that the State had to prove was that Parks knew or should have known that the items were stolen. See § 812.019, Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that “[p]roof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” Ward v....

...Parks claims that counsel told him that if he testified, he would lose the “sandwich,” and the State would be allowed to reveal to the jury the exact nature of his prior convictions. Parks also claims that counsel failed to advise him about the “presumption” of section 812.022(2), and therefore his testimony explaining his possession of the stolen items was even more critical....

...He reasons that the state failed to establish a prima facie case of guilt because the state's only evidence was that he possessed recently stolen property, and that "something more" was required to prove guilty knowledge. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. The state relied on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2002), to establish that Kittles knew or should have known that the jewelry was stolen....

...an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. In Bertone v. State, 870 So.2d 923, 924 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 889 So.2d 72 (Fla.2004), we described the operation of the section 812.022(2) statutory inference: In Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77, 83-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that the circumstantial evidence rule of State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla.1970), applied to the inference of guilty knowledge created by section 812.022(2)....

...fact that the goods were being sold at less than their value, possession of other stolen property, or other incriminating evidence and circumstances. 238 So.2d at 621 (citation omitted). A line of cases following the reasoning of Graham holds that a section 812.022(2) inference, without more, is legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict, in the face of an unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation offered by the accused for his or her possession of the goods in question....

...Relevant evidence is defined as evidence "tending to prove or disprove a material fact." § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2002). Agent Mann's testimony concerning Kittles' behavior in the driveway was arguably relevant to show Kittles's guilty knowledge concerning the stolen jewelry, in combination with the section 812.022(2) statutory inference....

...property is at issue. In this case, Capaldo was offered imaginary electronics merchandise at a price substantially below the fair market value, which would give rise to the inference that the property was stolen if not satisfactorily explained. See § 812.022(3), Fla....

...ter the second burglary. If the State had succeeded in showing Appellant's inexplicable possession of the DVD player, the evidence would have been sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for the burglary that took place on January 31, 2007. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...The State argued that the car was found parked outside near where A.D.P. lived and that his print was found in the car. In making its argument, the State relied on the statutory inference from the proof of possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...The statutory inference that the State relied upon provides that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” § 812.022(2)....

...5 (Fla.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The State is also mistaken in its reliance on the statutory presumption that, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, one in possession of recently stolen property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. Proof of possession of recently

...rned him not to purchase items from drug users who frequented the area to buy and sell stolen goods. Finally, the undercover detective testified that the initial sixty-dollar cash offer for both items was "way below market value for both items." See § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973). The trial court correctly denied the appellant’s motion to suppress. Affirmed. . We reject without further discussion appellant’s attack upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of guilt on the theft charges. § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat....

...State, 393 So.2d 1174 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), the respondent’s unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped — that he bought it at a flea market — rendered the state’s case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), 1 without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt....

...under Chapter 252, the “State Emergency Management Act” and the perpetration of the theft was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.] Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla....

..., or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1993). Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. -9-  § 812.022(5), Fla....

...stolen property upon which a name and phone number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...Two of the three purses were discovered in the car and the third was found in the possession of one of the other occupants. The prosecution relies in this case on the well-settled, and now statutorily reflected, inference arising from the possession of recently stolen property. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...intent. Mr. Tatum raises four issues; we reverse because we find merit in the first, that his due process rights were violated because the trial court gave a special jury instruction on a presumption of guilt in dealing in stolen property, based on section 812.022(4), Florida Statutes (1997), without a proper predicate....

...ee’s dealings with undercover officers during the sting operation. At the jury charge conference and over objection by defense counsel, 4 the State requested and the trial court acquiesced to a special jury instruction that tracked the language of section 812.022(4)....

...Tatum claims that the language of the instruction impermissi-bly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, as a reasonable jury would understand it. We find that no predicate was laid for the giving of this instruction, *334 and, thus, Mr. Tatum is entitled to a new trial with a properly charged jury. IMPROPER PREDICATE Section 812.022(4) states that if the State proves that a dealer in property purchases or sells stolen property “out of the regular course of business or without the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily expla...

...y of the stolen property. Furthermore, no evidence established that the accused had exercised any dominion or control over the stolen property. In the absence of such evidence, the First District held it was error to give a jury instruction based on section 812.022(2). Applying the reasoning of Boone to the analogous situation before us, we conclude that before a trial court may give an instruction based on section 812.022(4) in the prosecution of a dealer in property, the State must also demonstrate a factual basis for the instruction....

...ould be derived. The evidence failed to show that he, as a dealer, purchased any property, much less property that by the nature of the transaction suggested that it was stolen. Thus, giving the requested special instruction tracking the language of section 812.022(4) in this instance would be improper and only serve to bolster Mr....

...was harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial. CONSTITUTIONALITY Because we remand for a new trial with a properly charged jury, it is likely that the trial court will be required to resolve Mr. Tatum’s argument that tracking the language of section 812.022(4), Florida Statutes (1997), is unconstitutional. We discuss the following cases only as an aid to the trial court should it be required to determine this issue on remand. In Edwards v. State, 381 So.2d 696 (Fla.1980), our supreme court upheld the statutory inference created by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1977), against constitutional challenges of violation of due process and the privilege against self-incrimination....

...direct review of a state criminal conviction). See also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 390 , 119 S.Ct. 2090 , 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). With this background in mind on remand, if the trial court determines that any special instruction based on section 812.022(4) passes constitutional muster as a permissive inference rather than a mandatory presumption, it may be advisable to include clarifying language in the jury instruction to avoid any reasonable likelihood that the jury will apply the...

SUAREZ, J. Affirmed. § 812.022, Fla....

...At the adjudicatory hearing, the only issue before the trial court was whether C.T. knew that the car he was driving was stolen when stopped by the police. Because the case against C.T. was entirely circumstantial, the State relied upon the statutory inference of guilty knowledge provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2016), which states that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that...

...of another with the intent to deprive that person of the use of the property or to appropriate the property to the accused's use."). To establish that C.T. knew the car he was driving was stolen, the State relied solely on the inference set forth in section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained , gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." (emphasis added). The inference provided by section 812.022(2) is sufficient to support a theft conviction....

...nd there is no other evidence of guilt, the court must direct a judgment of acquittal."). As such, this Court held in R.A.L. v. State , 402 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), that where the State's case is based entirely upon the inference arising under section 812.022(2), a finding of guilt is precluded where the defendant offers a reasonable and unrefuted explanation for possession of the stolen item and there are no additional incriminating circumstances....

...In R.A.L. , this Court held that the respondent's unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped that he bought it at a flea market rendered the state's case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt....

...3d DCA 1983) (concluding "that the multiplicity of alternative versions advanced by the juvenile created an issue for the trier of fact as to whether his possession of the [stolen] moped had been satisfactorily explained so as to dissipate the statutory presumption" set forth in section 812.022(2) )....

...fore the trial court was whether C.T. knew that the car he was driving was stolen when stopped by the police. Because the case against C.T. was entirely circumstantial, the State relied upon the statutory inference of guilty knowledge provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2016), which states that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known...

...h the intent to deprive that person of the use of the property or to appropriate the property to the accused’s use.”). To establish that C.T. knew the car he was driving was stolen, the State relied solely on the inference set forth in section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” (emphasis added). The inference provided by section 812.022(2) is sufficient to support a theft conviction....

...other evidence of guilt, the court must direct a judgment of acquittal.”). As such, this Court held in R.A.L. v. State, 402 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), that where the State’s case is based entirely upon the inference arising under section 812.022(2), a finding of guilt is precluded where the defendant offers a reasonable and unrefuted explanation for possession of the stolen item and there are no additional incriminating circumstances....

...In R.A.L., this Court held that the respondent’s unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped that he bought it at a flea market rendered the state’s case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), without any additional incriminating circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt. 7 402 So....

...3d DCA 1983) (concluding “that the multiplicity of alternative versions advanced by the juvenile created an issue for the trier of fact as to whether his possession of the [stolen] moped had been satisfactorily explained so as to dissipate the statutory presumption” set forth in section 812.022(2)). IV....

explanation for his being in possession of the moped. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). The law is well settled

...The statute enhances the offense to grand theft in the third degree when the stolen property is, among other items, a firearm. § 812.014(2)(c)5., Fla. Stat. (2014). Principally at issue is the state’s underlying burden of proof that the appellant knowingly obtained or used the subject shotgun. Section 812.022(3), Florida Statutes (2014), creates the statutory inference that the trial court used here....

...The finder of fact has the right to infer guilt of breaking and entering with intent to steal from the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla.1968), citing Williams v. State, 40 Fla. 480 , 25 So. 143 (1898). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to the inference that the possessor knew, or should have known, that the property was stolen....

PER CURIAM. K.P. appeals from the disposition order withholding adjudication but finding him guilty of petit theft and burglary of a conveyance. The State’s case rested upon the inference in section 812.022, Florida Statutes (2015), that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should'have known that the property had been stolen.” See § 812.022(2)....

...Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. K.P. appeals from the disposition order withholding adjudication but finding him guilty of petit theft and burglary of a conveyance. The State's case rested upon the inference in section 812.022, Florida Statutes (2015), that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." See § 812.022(2)....

...(2012). Florida law provides that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” § 812.022(2), Fla....

...her people in the one-bedroom apartment where the stolen box was found. The state argues that because the defendant was in possession of recently stolen property, it was entitled to the inference that he knew or should have known that it was stolen. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.......

...possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” This instruction tracks the language of section 812.022, Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Carroll, 404 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat.(1983).

...The state relies on the presumption arising from the possession of recently-stolen property. “Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” § 812.022(2), Fla....

...2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974) (“[C]ourts should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the [trier of fact] may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite party can be sustained under the law.”); § 812.022(2), Fla....

...been no evidence to – satisfactorily to explain why this Defendant had that stolen chipper, mulcher, unless if he just stole it.” 2  The trial court instructed the jury on the presumption provided for in section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2013), namely that “[p]roof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that th...

...e jury instruction.3 On appeal, the state argued that the comment 3 Although the opinion does not quote the instruction that was given, it is clear that it was the presumption provided for in Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 14.2 and section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes....

...During closing arguments, the State referenced this inference and argued, "this $35 for this [air compressor] is an indication that [appellant] knew or should have known it was stolen. This is worth a lot more than $35." No objection was raised as to this argument. Section 812.022(3), Florida Statutes (2009) provides, "Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or sellin...

...had left the cellular phone in the classroom. J.H. took the phone from his left pocket and gave it to the investigating officer. J.H. argues on appeal that the state’s case rests wholly on circumstantial evidence and the inference of guilt under section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2001), for possession of recently stolen property. J.H. further asserts that his explanation of his possession of the stolen cellular phone is unrefuted, exculpatory and not unreasonable and, therefore, the inference of guilty knowledge is thereby dispelled. We agree. Section 812.022(2) provides as follows: (2) Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily....

...explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. (Emphasis added.) This court held in Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), “that where a conviction for theft was based on nothing more than the section 812.022(2) inference, then the evidence was legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict, in the face of an unrefuted, exculpatory and not unreasonable explanation offered by the accused for his possession of the goods in question.” Similarly, in Coleman v....

...3d DCA 1981), an adjudication of delinquency was reversed because the defendant’s “unrefuted, exculpatory, and not unreasonable explanation of his possession of a stolen moped that he bought it at a flea market rendered the state’s case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.022(2) ......

intention to rely upon the presumption provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985), that an individual

based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.-022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), without any additional

...Youngs offered no explanation at trial for his possession of the tools. Youngs argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that he knew or should have known that he pawned stolen property. Responding to this argument, the state relies on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. In Jackson v. State, No. 98-1171, 736 So.2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that in Chapter 812 theft and dealing in stolen property cases, section 812.022(2) adopts the common law rule of circumstantial evidence set forth in State v....

...stolen property. See id. at 397 . In addition, the timing of Youngs’s possession after the theft is significant. Unexplained possession of stolen property in the early morning, after a nighttime theft, is another facet of proof, in addition to the section 812.022(2) inference, which supports the conviction....

...able doubt: 1. (Defendant) [trafficked in] [endeavored to traffic in] (property alleged). 2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that (property alleged) was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...Stat. Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...ual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed, gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...Petit theft — second 812.014(3)(a) 14.1 degree Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205], 2007, by adding the inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla....

...The undisputed facts present a pri-ma facie case that defendant attempted to sell a recently stolen tool to a third party in violation of section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes (1989). See Douglas v. State, 597 So.2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Bailey v. State, 559 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990);. § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat....

...As we have held, the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that M.D.S. possessed the Acura. Moreover, it presented no evidence that established when the car was taken. Accordingly, it also failed to prove the Acura was “recently stolen.” The inference in section 812.022(2) does not apply under these circumstances....

...[a motor vehicle.] [a commercially farmed animal.] [an aquaculture species raised at a permitted aquaculture facility.] [a fire extinguisher.] [2000 or more pieces of fruit.] [taken from a posted construction site.]] Inferences; give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla-Stat....

...ased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. Inferences; give if applicable § 812.022(2), FlaStat....

...the only individual who used the car during the rental term or used the spare bedroom in December 2016. Further, his fingerprints were not found on any of the recovered stolen items. The State argues that it is entitled to the inference set forth in section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2016): Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...in concert." Id. But, the possession must be more than superficial; it must be conscious and substantial. Id. at 485 (quoting Garcia v. State , 899 So. 2d 447 , 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ). Here, the State is not entitled to the inference set forth in section 812.022(2)....

...Second, the court determined that there was no evidence of Bronson's "exclusive" possession of the stolen goods. Specifically, he was not in actual possession or joint possession with a person with whom he was acting in concert. Therefore, the state could not rely on the inference of guilt set forth in section 812.022(2)....

...the only individual who used the car during the rental term or used the spare bedroom in December 2016. Further, his fingerprints were not found on any of the recovered stolen items. The State argues that it is entitled to the inference set forth in section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2016): Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...in concert." Id. But, the possession must be more than superficial; it must be conscious and substantial. Id. at 485 (quoting Garcia v. State , 899 So. 2d 447 , 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ). Here, the State is not entitled to the inference set forth in section 812.022(2)....

...Second, the court determined that there was no evidence of Bronson's "exclusive" possession of the stolen goods. Specifically, he was not in actual possession or joint possession with a person with whom he was acting in concert. Therefore, the state could not rely on the inference of guilt set forth in section 812.022(2)....

possession committed the burglary or theft. See § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing that proof of

...The detective seized a loaded gun from L.S.’s pocket. At the adjudicatory hearing, the Miami-Dade officer identified the gun taken from L.S. as the gun that was stolen from his residence. The state offered no evidence to support the charge that L.S. stole the firearm other than the provision of section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that possession of recently stolen property gives rise to the presumption that the possessor stole the property....

...Section 812.014(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), provides, “A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses ... the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently ... [djeprive the other person of a right to the property....” Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Except as provided in subsection (5), proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

...We conclude that such restrictions are permissible under the Second Amendment. For the foregoing reasons we reverse the adjudication for grand theft and direct L.S.’s discharge. We affirm the remaining adjudications. GROSS and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. . Our research has shown that in cases applying the section 812.022(2) presumption, the time between the theft and the defendant’s possession of the stolen item is typically very short....

...The State argued that the car was found parked outside near where A.D.P. lived and that his print was found in the car. In making its argument, the State relied on the statutory inference from the proof of possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

...2d at 1284. The statutory inference that the State relied upon provides that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen." § 812.022(2)....

use of the statutory inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2017), because A.L. did

use of the statutory inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2017), because A.L. did

...Defense counsel contended that someone other than A.L. must have placed the recently stolen property in the bedroom A.L. shared with his brother. Defense counsel also specifically argued that the State was not entitled to use of the statutory inference provided by section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2017), because A.L....

...the State was also required to present evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See M.F., 35 So. 3d at 1000; Bronson, 926 So. 2d at 482. To prove that A.L. committed petit theft, the State relied on the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2). Section 812.022(2) provides that "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stole...

...sufficient to support a burglary conviction when it occurs as an adjunct to a theft." Bronson, 926 So. 2d at 483 (citing Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 134 (Fla. 2001)). When the State's case is based entirely upon the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2), the trial court must direct a judgment of dismissal for the defendant where a reasonable explanation for possession of recently stolen property is totally unrefuted and there is no other evidence of guilt....

...3d DCA 2017). We first consider whether the State met the requisite two-part evidentiary predicate to warrant use of the statutory inference. To receive the benefit of the statutory inference, the State must have established "pursuant to section 812.022(2), that a defendant had 'possession of property recently stolen.' " Bronson, 926 So....

...item found in the jointly occupied bedroom as the item missing from her vehicle. We accept the State's concession. In sum, because there is no record evidence that the property underpinning count eight was found in the bedroom, the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2) could not have supported the petit theft charge in count eight. See Smith v. State, 15 So. 3d 849, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (concluding that the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2) could not have supported burglary conviction where no evidence in the record established that the defendant possessed the stolen DVD player, either constructively or actually). -6- ...

...4th DCA 1983); Walton v. State, 404 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Chamberland, the Fourth District reversed a conviction for possession of a stolen air conditioner where the State's case was based on the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022....

...had exclusive possession by acting in concert with another person. Given that the State's evidence did not establish that A.L. had actual or constructive, exclusive possession of the recently stolen property, it was error to rely on the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2). Without the benefit of the statutory inference, we cannot conclude that -8- there is no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the adjudication of delinquency in this case....

...2d DCA 2005) (reversing a juvenile probation order withholding adjudication because the evidence was insufficient to show that L.J.S. committed a burglary of a vehicle or that he damaged the vehicle). In conclusion, the State was not entitled to the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022(2) because it failed to establish that A.L....

...ir altered, dubious character. This being so, the evidence adduced below was clearly sufficient to sus *208 tain the adjudications under review. Coleman v. State, 466 So.2d 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat....

...conceded, at the time of arrest, that he suspected the car was stolen. In view of the small size and apparently youthful age of the driver, the court could reasonably conclude that G.C.’s knowledge rose to a greater level than that of suspicion that the car was stolen. See also § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat....

...under Chapter 252, the “State Emergency Management Act” and the perpetration of the theft was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla....

...or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Stat. - 10 -  Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1993). Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...out of the regular course of business or without the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...stolen property upon which a name and phone number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...ned it the next day. Appellant testified that he had thought the net could be pawned for $20 to $25. No concrete evidence of the net’s current fair market value was offered at trial. Nevertheless, over the objection of defense counsel, pursuant to section 812.022(3), Florida Statutes (1989), the trial judge gave the following instruction to the jury when instructing on the dealing in stolen property count: Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair...

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...This uncontradicted evidence of possession of recently stolen property was sufficient to sustain a delinquency adjudication for the theft of the moped unless the juvenile could give a satisfactory explanation for his being in possession of the moped. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. As to the grand theft charge, there was evidence that appellant had possession of the recently stolen van, which gave rise to the presumption that he knew, or should have known, it was stolen. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

stolen radio was found inside it. Although Section 812.022, Florida Statutes (1987), permits the inference

relied solely on the presumption accorded by section 812.-022, Florida Statutes (1987), and failed to introduce

property was not satisfactorily explained. See Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979). This determination

unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, Section 812.-022(2), Florida Statutes (1979). State v. Young

...Midgette asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction establishing an inference that a burglary or theft conviction may b'e justified, in part, by an accused’s unexplained possession of recently stolen property. This instruction is based on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.” See, e.g., Nshaka v....

90 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla.1956). In addition, section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes(1993), provides “[p]roof

...We reject defendant’s first argument that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property. The proof of defendant’s possession of property recently stolen was sufficient to give rise to an inference that he stole the property. See § 812.022(2), Fla.Stat....

...The proof that defendant purchased or sold stolen property as a dealer in such property, out of the regular course of business and without the usual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, was sufficient to give rise to an inference that he knew the *182 property purchased or sold to be stolen. See § 812.022(4), Fla.Stat....

...The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the inference of guilt that arises when an individual purchases or sells property at a price substantially below fair *849 market value. Although this instruction was a correct statement of the law as set forth in section 812.022(3), Florida Statutes (2013), giving the instruction in this case was error because no concrete evidence was presented of the market value of the stolen property at the time of the alleged theft....

in possession of a recently stolen moped. Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981). When he was stopped

...That is, that he operated this stolen vehicle_ lam satisfied that ... I can find him to be lying.... ” The court correctly considered the applicability of the statutorily created inference that a person in possession of recently stolen property either knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Section 812.022(3) Florida Statutes (1987)....

...for $1,200 in cash. He offered no documentary proof of the purchase. Along with the statutory presumption, there was sufficient evidence to create a jury question of whether appellant knew or should have known that the pawned items were stolen. See § 812.022(2) and (3), Fla....

...On the remaining issue, we find that the victim's testimony that the pawned machines were stolen from his store renders the admission of the detective's hearsay testimony about ownership to be harmless error. DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 812.022(2) and (3) provide: (2) [P]roof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Garrett v. State, 335 So.2d 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Cox v. State, 243 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); § 812.014, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1980); § 812.022(2), Fla....

...he committed grand theft and burglary. 3 However, the still image in question does not prove that Appellant had possession of the stolen items. Even acknowledging the legal possibility of constructive possession, 4 in this case the State’s still image showing 3 Pursuant to section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2011), “proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had...

PER CURIAM. See § 812.022(2), Fla....

Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) pp. 135-136 (1981). . § 812.022(1), Fla.Stat. (1979) (failure to return leased

...State, 512 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); N.C. v. State, 478 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); State v. Young, 217 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853 , 90 S.Ct. 112 , 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969), citing Williams v. State, 40 Fla. 480 , 25 So. 143 (1898). Section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes, provides that proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to the inference that the possessor knew, or should have known, that the property was stolen....

...Macriello of her right to the property or to appropriate the property to his own use. 13 See § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). 13 We are cognizant that theft can be charged where there is a knowing and intentional possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); § 812.022(2), Fla....

...There was undisputed evidence at trial that copper was a valuable commodity, then selling for several dollars a pound. Over objection from defense counsel, the trial court gave the jury the standard instruction on proof of possession of stolen property, which is based on section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...om the possession of recently stolen property should be given. Our record does not disclose that either party brought this case to the trial court's attention. "To receive the benefit of the statutory inference, the State must establish, pursuant to section 812.022(2), that a defendant had `possession of property recently stolen.' " Id....

...NOTES [1] When the caretaker again checked the building a few days later, he noticed that the board covering a glass entrance door had been pried loose at the bottom and the glass panel of the door was knocked down, thus allowing access to the building but concealing the point of entry. [2] Section 812.022(2) provides in relevant part: "proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had...

should have known the jewelry was stolen. See § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“[P]roof of possession

...under Chapter 252, the “State Emergency Management Act” and the perpetration of the theft was facilitated by conditions arising from the emergency.] Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(1), Fla....

..., or failed to return leased property within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...1st DCA 1993). Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price substantially below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. - 12 -  § 812.022(5), Fla....

...stolen property upon which a name and phone number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...asonable doubt: 1. (Defendant) [trafficked in] [endeavored to traffic in] (property alleged). 2. (Defendant) knew or should have known that (property alleged) was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. - 20 -  Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...ual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed, gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...Petit theft — second 812.014(3)(a) 14.1 degree Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205], 2007 [962 So. 2d 310], by adding the inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla. Stat., 2013 [121 So....

...1. (Defendant) [initiated] [organized] [planned] [financed] [directed] [managed] [supervised] the theft of (property alleged). 2. (Defendant) trafficked in the (property alleged). Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(2), Fla....

...Stat. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(3), Fla....

...below the fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. - 23 -  Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(4), Fla....

...ual indicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property knew or should have known that it had been stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(5), Fla....

...number of a person other than the offeror of the property are conspicuously displayed, gives rise to an inference that the dealer possessing the property knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Inferences. Give if applicable. § 812.022(6), Fla....

...NO. Dealing in stolen 812.019(1) 14.2 property None Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1989 [543 So. 2d 1205], and in 2007, by adding the Inferences in § 812.022(2)-(6), Fla....

...ed a continuance. See State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So.2d 470 (Fla.1973). There was sufficient evidence against defendant on the basis of which to deny his motion for directed verdict of acquittal, especially in view of the presumption under section 812.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), that guilt can be inferred if it is shown that the accused was in possession of recently stolen property and the presumption under section 812.022(3), Florida Statutes (1983), that knowledge that property is stolen can be inferred if the accused sells the property for a sum considerably below market value, coupled with defendant’s admission that he had suspected the property was stolen when he bought it for a very low price....