CopyCited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 447, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1417, 1995 WL 511416
...4th DCA 1994), wherein the District Court certified the following as a question of great public importance: WHETHER A DEFENDANT WHO PLEADS NOLO CONTENDERE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF OR DEFENDING A CLAIM IN A SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS
772.14 AND
775.089(8), [1] FLORIDA STATUTES (1991)?
638 So.2d at 601-02....
...[3] Cohen counter-claimed for breach of contract and sought an accounting of funds owed him. The trial court denied a motion in limine filed by Starr Tyme to prevent Cohen from defending against its civil theft claim. The motion was based on Florida's civil remedies for criminal practices estoppel statute, section 772.14, Florida Statutes (1991)....
...[4] The question is rephrased as follows: WHETHER A DEFENDANT WHO IS ADJUDICATED GUILTY PURSUANT TO A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF OR DEFENDING A CLAIM IN A SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 772.14, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991)....
...minal prosecution is collaterally estopped from seeking affirmative relief in or defending against a chapter 772 civil claim that is based on the same conduct that resulted in the prior criminal charges. Our holding is based on the plain language of section 772.14, Florida Statutes (1991), [5] and the requirements of Florida *1067 Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(a). [6] Section 772.14 is a codification of the doctrine of collateral estoppel....
...Romano,
450 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1984). This rule of mutuality precluded the victim of a crime from using a criminal conviction to estop the defendant from contesting the facts underlying the conviction in a subsequent civil action. Romano,
450 So.2d at 845. Section
772.14 abrogates the requirement of mutuality of parties in the context of civil actions brought by crime victims under chapter 772....
...l proceeding that concerned the conduct at issue in the civil action. Thus, the question we are asked to resolve here is whether a final judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere is a "final judgment" within the meaning of section 772.14....
...of the statute must be given effect. See, e.g., Polakoff Bail Bonds v. Orange County,
634 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1994); Streeter v. Sullivan,
509 So.2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1987); Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). Under the plain language of section
772.14, all that is necessary to collaterally estop a defendant in a chapter 772 civil suit is "a final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state" in a prior prosecution addressing the conduct at issue in the civil suit....
...It does not address the collateral estoppel effect of a final judgment resulting from the plea. Moreover, even if the two statutes were in irreconcilable conflict, section
90.410 is a general provision of the Florida Evidence Code that was enacted in 1976; [8] whereas, section
772.14 is a later enactment [9] that specifically addresses the issue at hand. See Parsons (when two statutes, whether general or specific, are hopelessly in conflict, the more recent prevails). As noted above, section
772.14 collaterally estops a defendant in a civil action when a final judgment or decree has been entered in favor of the State in a criminal proceeding addressing the same conduct at issue in the civil action....
...For example, in this case the essential allegations underlying the criminal offense of petit theft necessarily were decided in the prior proceeding. For our purposes, section
812.014 defines petit theft as the theft of property valued at less than $300. Starr Tyme, therefore, was entitled to use section
772.14 to *1069 establish actual damages of $299.99 in its civil theft claim....
...been injured in any fashion by reason of any violation of the provisions of ss. 812.12-812.031 has a cause of action for three fold the actual damages sustained. .. . [4] It appears Starr Tyme based its claim of estoppel at the trial level solely on section 772.14. In its motion in limine, Starr Tyme maintained that section 772.14 precluded Cohen from defending against its civil theft claim....
...Starr Tyme referred to section
775.089(9) only to argue by analogy that a plea of nolo contendere can result in a "judgment" or "conviction." From our reading of the record, Starr Tyme did not directly rely on section
775.089(9) for its claim of estoppel. [5] Section
772.14 provides in pertinent part: A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this chapter ......
...Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) provides: Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. [8] Ch. 76-237, § 1, Laws of Florida. [9] Section 772.14 was enacted in 1986. Ch. 86-277, § 3, Laws of Fla. [10] Even if we were to consider the restitution order entered in the prior prosecution a "decree" under section 772.14, the result reached here would be the same....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 497991
...Petr Taborsky. Although the petition for certiorari presents a more difficult jurisdictional issue, since we conclude that the trial judge clearly departed from the essential requirements of law as enunciated by the Legislature in enacting sections
772.14 and
775.089(8), Florida Statutes (1991), we also grant the petition for certiorari and direct entry of summary judgment....
...By virtue of assignments from the other victims of Taborsky's theft, USF now owns all of this research and the right to pursue any claims against Taborsky relating to the research. USF then filed a civil action against Taborsky, seeking to enjoin him from using the protected research under the provisions of sections
772.14 and
775.089(8), which operate to collaterally estop a criminal defendant in a subsequent civil suit from requiring the civil plaintiff to relitigate facts resolved in the earlier criminal action, to obtain a civil injunction that would replica...
...ction and probation orders. This court's affirmance of the criminal action now precludes Taborsky from raising this purported defense. We conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the requested injunction because we find that sections
772.14 and
775.089(8) apply. The essential allegations of USF's amended and supplemental complaint which we conclude have successfully employed sections
772.14 and
775.089(8) to estop Taborsky from defending against them are as follows: Plaintiff, Board of Regents Of The State Of Florida, acting by and through the University of South Florida ("USF"), sues defendant Petr Taborsky ("Taborsky"), and alleges: 1....
...all in violation of Section
812.081, Fla.Stats. 56. As a result of the foregoing, USF has been injured by reason of violations of Sections
812.012,
812.014, and
812.081, Fla. Stats., and is entitled to judgment against Taborsky as provided for under Section
772.14, Fla.Stats., and to damages, attorney's fees and costs as provided for under Section
772.11, Fla.Stats....
...or appropriate. As we earlier observed, we clearly have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(B) to address the denial of USF's request for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Even without employing sections
772.14 and
775.089(8), this case clearly cries out for injunctive relief as requested by USF. USF did not request injunctive relief in regard to the assignment of any patent rights. Such an injunction would simply prohibit Taborsky from using and/or benefitting from the protected research that he was convicted of stealing. When section
772.14 is considered and applied, injunctive relief is even more clearly required. Section
772.14 grants crime victims in Florida a valuable litigation tool that eliminates the victim's need to reestablish the convicted defendant's liability in a subsequent civil action relating to the same criminal conduct. Section
772.14 provides: A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this chapter, or in any criminal proceeding...
...USF is not a party to the criminal action and must channel any requests as victim through the state attorney's office. The Legislature recognized this limitation and modified Florida law to afford the victim full recovery as a party in a related civil action. §§
772.14,
775.089(8)....
...The Florida courts had long adhered to the requirement that the victim must have been a party to the criminal action. See Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano,
450 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1984); Nunez v. Gonzalez,
456 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). However, in 1986, by enacting section
772.14, the Legislature substantially changed Florida law by eliminating the requirement that the victim be a party to the criminal action in certain enumerated situations including, specifically, actions for civil theft arising from violations of sections
812.012 and
812.037, Florida Statutes (1991)....
...In Mandico, first of all, the supreme court found that a contractor's immunity under section
440.11 "is not apparent from a simple reading of the Workers' Compensation Law... ."
605 So.2d at 852. A defendant's estoppel is readily apparent from reading sections
772.14 and section
775.089(8)....
...Even more persuasive is the Mandico court's holding that "[t]he assertion that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the workers' compensation law is an affirmative defense, and its validity can only be determined in the course of litigation." The remedy of collateral estoppel provided for a victim in sections
772.14 and
775.089(8) is not in the nature of an affirmative defense but, on the contrary, provides that the defendant cannot defend. At best, any such attempted defense should be subject to a motion to strike and then a motion for summary judgment. The very intent of the Legislature in enacting sections
772.14 and
775.089(8) is to relieve a victim from the added expense, time and mental anguish of a second trial....
...As a special condition of probation, the trial court ordered Mr. Taborsky to pay restitution. Mr. Taborsky has appealed that revocation and the sentence imposed. I agree with the majority's decision not to impose an injunction requiring the assignment of the patent. Sections
772.14 and
775.089(8) cannot give estoppel effect to the conditions in a judge's order of probation....
...monetary loss, but it would not result in the requisite "irreparable harm." See Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage,
509 So.2d 1097 (Fla. 1987). If I were convinced that a trial court had no discretion but to grant a specific order under either sections
772.14 and
775.089(8), I would prefer to require entry of the order as a matter of mandamus....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 2018, 2006 WL 358261
...[2] After Appellant's criminal case was completed, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. The lower court entered summary final judgment against Appellant, from which this appeal was timely taken. As it did below, Appellee relies on sections
772.14 and
775.089(8), Florida Statutes, as support for its position. Those sections provide:
772.14 Estoppel of defendant....
...ions of that offense in any subsequent civil proceeding. An order of restitution hereunder will not bar any subsequent civil remedy or recovery, but the amount of such restitution shall be set off against any subsequent independent civil recovery. §§
772.14 and
775.089(8), Fla....
...Thus, a defendant who is convicted in a criminal proceeding involving the conduct that forms the basis of the civil claim is estopped from challenging "all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as if the plaintiff had been a party in the criminal action." § 772.14, Fla....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
...y judgment awarded to the Plaintiff in a state court proceeding for damages against the Debtor. In the Response, the Debtor denies all allegations of intoxication and injury to the Plaintiff therefrom. The Debtor further argues that Florida Statutes § 772.14 does not operate as to bar his denial of the allegation that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident....
...See First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,
391 U.S. 253, 289,
88 S.Ct. 1575,
20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Resolution Trust Corp. by the FDIC v. Clark,
741 F.Supp. 896 (S.D.Fla.1990); In re Pierre,
198 B.R. 389 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1996). I. Florida Statute §
772.14 Does Not Estop the Debtor from Denying Intoxication at the Time of the Accident....
...In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs assert that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the Debtor from denying the fact that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that under Florida Statutes § 772.14, the Debtor is estopped in a civil action from denying conduct for which he was found guilty of in an underlying criminal prosecution....
...In support of their argument, the Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen,
659 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 1995) Chapter 772 of the Florida Statutes is entitled the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act. As set forth in Chapter 772, Florida Statutes §
772.14 reads as follows:
772.14 Estoppel of defendant.A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this chapter, or in any criminal proceeding under chapter 895, shall estop the defendant in any action brought pursuant to this chapter as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as if the plaintiff had been a party in the criminal action. FLA. STAT. §
772.14 (1999)(emphasis added). The meaning of section
772.14 is clear....
...nd construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Hott Interiors, Inc. v. Fostock,
721 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(quoting Modder v. American Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Tex.,
688 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1997)). In order for section
772.14 to apply, the Debtor in the instant civil proceeding had to have been convicted in the underlying criminal proceeding for an offense that forms the basis of a "criminal activity" under chapter 772....
