The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLI
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS

Chapter 726
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 726.102

726.102 Definitions.—As used in ss. 726.101-726.112:

(1) “Affiliate” means:

(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote.

(b) A corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote.

(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or

(d) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.

(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:

(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;

(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or

(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.

(3) “Charitable contribution” means a charitable contribution as that term is defined in s. 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution consists of:

(a) A financial instrument as defined in s. 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) Cash.

(4) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(5) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.

(6) “Debt” means liability on a claim.

(7) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.

(8) “Insider” includes:

(a) If the debtor is an individual:

1. A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

2. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

3. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 2.; or

4. A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;

(b) If the debtor is a corporation:

1. A director of the debtor;

2. An officer of the debtor;

3. A person in control of the debtor;

4. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

5. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 4.; or

6. A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.

1. A general partner in the debtor;

2. A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;

3. Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

4. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 3.; or

5. A person in control of the debtor.

(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor.

(e) A managing agent of the debtor.

(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.

(10) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.

(11) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.

(12) “Qualified religious or charitable entity or organization” means:

(a) An entity described in s. 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) An entity or organization described in s. 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(13) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.

(14) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.

(15) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.

History.—s. 2, ch. 87-79; s. 1, ch. 2013-189.

F.S. 726.102 on Google Scholar

F.S. 726.102 on Casetext

Amendments to 726.102

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 726.102

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 726.102.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE ROLLAGUARD SECURITY, LLC, LLC, C. LLC, v. TD N. A. C. LLC, v. PNC N. A. C. LLC, v. N. A. d b a, 591 B.R. 895 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . .

IN RE MONGELLUZZI, v., 591 B.R. 480 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 726.102(14). 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). . . .

RREF SNV- FL SSL, LLC, v. SHAMROCK STORAGE, LLC, M., 250 So. 3d 788 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. . . .

IN RE MONGELLUZZI A. B. T. S. HO II, LLC HO, LLC YJNK II, YJNK XI CA, LLC ABTS LLC B. LLC HQ, LLC LLC U, LLC USL H LLC LLP YJNK III, YJNK VIII, LLC, v., 587 B.R. 392 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . In any event, § 726.102(4) specifically defines "claim" as including disputed claims. . . .

KEARNEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LLC, v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA, LLC. LLC, FTBB, LLC,, 712 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 726.102(8). . . .

DZ BANK AG DEUTSCHE ZENTRAL- GENOSSENSCHAFT BANK, AM v. MEYER, 869 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 726.102(2), (12)). . . .

DZ BANK AG DEUTSCHE ZENTRAL- GENOSSENSCHAFT BANK, AM v. MEYER, 869 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 726.102(2), (12)). . . .

IN RE ROLLAGUARD SECURITY, LLC, LLC, C. LLC, v. TD N. A. C. LLC, v. PNC N. A. C. LLC, v. N. A. d b a, 570 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . .

J. CAFARO, v. ZOIS,, 693 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . In Section 726.102, Florida Statutes, FUFTA defines asset as “property of a debtor” but excludes from . . .

IN RE ANDERSON, v. W., 561 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . with, the intra-Trust transfers do not themselves constitute fraudulent transfers as contemplated by § 726.102 . . . Stat. § 726.102(2)(c). . Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. 873, 876 (Bankr. S.D. . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . Doc. No. 35-10, marked as Exhibit J. . Doc. No. 48-21. . . . . Stat. § 726.102(2)(c). . Dzikowski v. Delson (In re Delson), 247 B.R. at 876. . Malek v. . . .

NATIONAL AUTO SERVICE CENTERS, INC. a a D. LLC LLC, v. F R LLC, a F R LLC, a, 192 So. 3d 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 726.102(14) (defining a transfer as “every mode ... of disposing of or parting with an asset”). . . .

IN RE BOS, Jr., 561 B.R. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 101(31); § 726.102, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

In PSN USA, INC. PSN v. LLC,, 615 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 726.102(10). . . .

In PSN USA, INC. PSN v. LLC,, 615 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 726.102(10). . . .

S. YARALLI, v. AMERICAN REPROGRAPHICS COMPANY, LLC, a, 165 So. 3d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 726.102(4). . . .

WELCH, v. HIGHLANDS UNION BANK,, 526 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015)

. . . . § 726.102(14). . . . Id. § 726.102(2)(a). . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . The Bank relies on the plain language of § 726.102(14), which provides that a “transfer” occurs only . . . Stat. § 726.102(14). . . . Stat. § 726.102(14) (emphasis added). .The Receiver cites as an example the Wire Request Form directing . . .

IN RE J. PEARLMAN, R. v., 515 B.R. 887 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 726.102(12). . . . .

In BIFANI, M. v., 580 F. App'x 740 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 726.102(8)(a). . . .

In BIFANI, M. v., 580 F. App'x 740 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 726.102(8)(a). . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. LLC, IRA LLC, LTD, IRA LTD, L. P. v. DANCING LLC,, 578 F. App'x 938 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 726.102(5), and “claim” is defined as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to . . . contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” id. § 726.102 . . . Id. § 726.102(2). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (7), (11). But the transfers were of the Hedge Fund’s funds, not Nadel’s. . . .

PULEO, v. GOLAN,, 201 So. 3d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . [In the present case, and under section 726.102, “insider” includes Yali’s wife Leslie]. . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. LLC IRA LLC IRA L. P. v. M. LEE, M., 753 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 726.102(4), (3). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2). . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (10), (12). . . . Stat. § 726.102(3). See also Cook v. . . . Stat. § 726.102(2), (12). . . .

EDWARDS a k a a k a D. v. AIRLINE SUPPORT GROUP, INC., 138 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . ASG alleged that Edwards was an “affiliate” and “insider” of DAE1 as defined in section 726.102, Florida . . .

SMITH, v. EFFECTIVE TELESERVICES, INC. a n k a LLC, a LLC, a F., 133 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .

NATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC. v. F. STRAUB LLC, F., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 726.102(5). . . . Stat. § 726.102(4). . . . Stat. § 726.102(8)(b)(6), as well as an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor, . . . Stat. 726.102(8)(d). . . .

S. JANVEY, v. SUAREZ,, 978 F. Supp. 2d 685 (N.D. Tex. 2013)

. . . . § 726.102 (West 2013). . . . .

SOUTH MIAMI HOLDINGS, LLC, a v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,, 533 F. App'x 898 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 726.102(4)-(5) (defining, for purposes of FUFTA, a “claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. LLC LLC L. P. v. MORGAN, III,, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 726.102(2). . . .

W. WIAND, L. P. LLC LLC L. P. v. DANCING LLC,, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 726.102(12). An "asset” is defined as "property of the debtor” Fla. Stat. § 726.102(2). . . .

BEDWELL, A. H. S. F. O J. J. B. I. v. E. RUCKS, R. Co- E. D. Co- E. L. L. P., 127 So. 3d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 726.102(3), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Friedman, 863 So.2d at 192. . . .

S. NEWMAN, L. P. II, L. P. L. P. v. WILLIAM L. GUNLICKS IRREVOCABLE TRUST f b o L. f b o L. f b o L. f b o L. f b o V. V. L. f b o V., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2012)

E. v., 134 T.C. 266 (T.C. 2010)

. . . Ann. sec. 726.102(12); UFTA sec. 1(12), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 15 (2006). . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(2)(b); UFTA sec. l(2)(ii), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 14. . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(2)(a) (West 2000); UFTA sec. 1(2)(i), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 14 (2006). . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(13); UFTA sec. 1(13), 7A (Part II) U.L.A. 15. . . . Ann. sec. 726.102(7)(a)(1) to include a “relative of the debtor”) for an “antecedent debt”. . . .

REPUBLIC CREDIT CORPORATION I, v. M. UPSHAW, 10 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 726.102(2)(c), Fla. . . .

W. WIAND, L. L. C. HKW LLC, HKW I LLC, v. J. WAXENBERG,, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 726.102(1),(12). Thus, the issue is not, as Mrs. . . .

In BANKEST CAPITAL CORPORATION, v. a, 374 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . §§ 726.102(2) and 726.102(12). A. . . .

DILLON, L. I. G. El A. A. D. D. S. P. A. v. AXXSYS INT L, INC. f. k. a. Co. M., 185 F. App'x 823 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 726.102(4) (2005). . . . Stat. § 726.102(3) (2005). This language is extremely broad. . . .

In WINGATE, v., 377 B.R. 687 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . .

B. FREEMAN, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK,, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004)

. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether . . . contingent, matured, unma-tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102 . . .

BALSAMO v. GRUPPO CERAMICHE RICCHETTI, S. P. A. BMI, 862 So. 2d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . We recognize the broad scope allowed in an action under sections 59.29 and 726.102, Florida Statutes. . . . Section 726.102(12) defines “transfer” as, “[e]very mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional . . .

FRIEDMAN, M. D. v. HEART INSTITUTE OF PORT ST. LUCIE, INC., 863 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2003)

. . . See § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . As defined in section 726.102, a “claim” is broadly constructed and “means a right to payment, whether . . . , contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” § 726.102 . . . As noted by the court below, under section 726.102(3) and (4), a creditor is merely a person who “has . . . Friedman, 806 So.2d at 626 (quoting § 726.102(3)-(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)). . . .

In SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. S. v., 293 B.R. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 726.102(6) of SWS at the time she converted the cash received from Mr. . . . Stat. § 726.102(6), a “debtor” is defined as “a person who is hable on a claim.” Ms. . . .

MASON, v. E. SPEER ASSOCIATES, INC. a n k a C. V. E. a, 846 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Georgia and therefore its transfer to Speer could not have been a fraudulent transfer under section 726.102 . . .

UNITED STATES v. EXECUTIVE AUTO HAUS, INC. C. Sr., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Stat. ch. 726.102(7)(b)(l-6) (West 2001). . . . . Stat. ch. 726.102(3). . . .

NATIONSBANK, N. A. v. COASTAL UTILITIES, INC. F. J. Jr. a k a J., 814 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . .” § 726.102(12), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

G. LEVIN, v. ETHAN ALLEN, INC., 823 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . .” § 726.102(3) and (4). . . . See § 726.102(12), Fla. Stat. (1993). . . .

LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, v. PROFESSIONAL RECOVERY NETWORK,, 813 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . PRN argues that no assets, as that term is defined by section 726.102(2), Florida Statutes, were transferred . . .

In J. STEWART, Jr. v. J. Jr. K. v. J. Jr. J. Jr. a, 280 B.R. 268 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . See § 726.102(7) of the Florida Statutes, which defines an “insider” of an individual debtor to include . . . See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . .

FRIEDMAN, M. D. v. HEART INSTITUTE OF PORT ST. LUCIE, INC. a a, 806 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . .” § 726.102(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .” § 726.102(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

In WACHSMUTH Dr. GUSSEN Dr. J M B a a Dr. Dr. J M B a a v. E. P. A. S. P. A. Jr., 272 B.R. 766 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . either pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to the fraudulent transfer of the State of Florida, § 726.102 . . .

In H. LANKRY, K. v., 263 B.R. 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)

. . . Defendant further asserts that the entireties properties could not qualify as “assets” under § 726.102 . . . property held as a tenancy by the entireties is specifically exempt from treatment as an “asset” by § 726.102 . . . time of the transfer and are not excepted from treatment as fraudulently transferred “assets” under 726.102 . . . See Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2)(c) (2001). . . . upon dissolution any property formerly held as a tenancy by the entireties loses the protection of § 726.102 . . .

BEAL BANK, SSB, v. ALMAND AND ASSOCIATES,, 780 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2001)

. . . Stardust Marine S.A., 741 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that under section 726.102(c), . . .

In Re DELSON, A. v. d b a s, M S By a a a, 247 B.R. 873 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . . § 726.102(2)(b,c) (defining “asset,” as used, in turn, in the definition of “transfer” in Fla.Stat. . . . § 726.102(12)). . . . Fla.Stat. § 726.102(2). . . . Fla.Stat. § 726.102. In Roemelmeyer v. . . .

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, v. GRUSKY,, 763 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Section 726.102(4), Florida Statutes (1995), defines “creditor” as “a person who has a claim.” . . . Section 726.102(3) defines “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment . . .

MANSOLILLO, v. PARTIES BY LYNN, INC., 753 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 726.102(4); that, as an officer, director, and relative of an officer and director, Ms. . . . . § 726.102(7)(b)l.,2.,6.; and that Ms. Man-solillo knew that Stanley Roofing was insolvent. Ms. . . .

MING PROPERTIES, INC. v. STARDUST MARINE S. A. U. S. A. a U. S. A. a, 741 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . tenancy by the entirety when it was sold to Ming, it was not an asset within the meaning of section 726.102 . . . Section 726.102(2)(c) contains a qualification that such property is excluded “to the extent it is not . . .

In Re LEVINE, a. k. a. P. a. k. a. LEVINE, a. k. a. a. k. a. v. WEISSING,, 216 B.R. 1046 (11th Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 726.102(12). . . .

In Re LEVINE, a. k. a. P. a. k. a. LEVINE, a. k. a. a. k. a. v. WEISSING,, 134 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 726.102(12). . . .

GENERAL TRADING INCORPORATED, v. YALE MATERIALS HANDLING CORPORATION, M. Sr. M. Jr. Et Al. GENERAL TRADING INCORPORATED, v. YALE MATERIALS HANDLING CORPORATION, M. Sr. M. Jr. Et Al. GENERAL TRADING INCORPORATED, v. YALE MATERIALS HANDLING CORPORATION, a M. Sr. M. Jr. a M. FSB, N. A. s G. T. G. T. P. A. GTE C. A. GENERAL TRADING INCORPORATED, v. YALE MATERIALS HANDLING CORPORATION, a Sr. M. Jr. a M. FSB, N. A. s G. T. G. T. P. A. P. A. GTE C. A. S., 119 F.3d 1485 (11th Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 726.102(7)(b). . . . a general partner; or, (6) a general partner in a partnership of which GTI is a general partner. § 726.102 . . .

In MILLER, L. MEININGER, v. MILLER E., 188 B.R. 302 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . . § 726.102(2)(c) provides that an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties is not included . . .

In COVINO, R. KAPILA, v. COVINO a, 187 B.R. 773 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . annuity in the name of Todd Covino, constitutes a transfer as defined under Florida Statute Section 726.102 . . .

In FLORIDA WEST GATEWAY, INC. L. TABAS, v. J. MALONEY V., 182 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . . § 726.102(3) & (4). . . .

In H. BEAHM S. R. KAPILA, v. H. BEAHM S., 179 B.R. 329 (S.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . . § 101(54) and Florida Statute § 726.102(12). . . . Florida Statute 726.102(12) defines "transfer” as: “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional . . .

P. VEIGLE, D. D. v. UNITED STATES v. F. MEAD, D. D. D. HYSELL D. v. UNITED STATES P., 873 F. Supp. 623 (M.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 726.102(7)(a) (West 1988). . . .

In FLORIDA BAY TRADING COMPANY, FORD, v. FELDMAN, M. D. P. A. M. D. P. A., 177 B.R. 374 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 726.102(12) is basically the same if not broader. . . .

AMJAD MUNIM, M. D. P. A. v. AZAR, M. D. PULMONARY AND CRITICAL CARE ASSOCIATES OF FT. LAUDERDALE P. A. v. AZAR, M. D., 648 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . 726.105(2): the transfer of Munim, P.A. patient files and assets were to an insider as defined by section 726.102 . . .

In CRAWFORD, V. ALLEN, v. R. CRAWFORD J. Co- E., 172 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 726.102(12). . . . execution of the Trust Amendment was a transfer within the meaning of that term used in Florida Statute 726.102 . . .

MAPLEWOOD FARMS, INC. v. BAYWOOD MANOR FARMS, INC., 624 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . See § 726.102(7), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

In LEVINE a k a P. a k a WEISSING, v. LEVINE a k a P. a k a USA, 139 B.R. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)

. . . . § 726.102(12) as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditioned, voluntary or involuntary . . .

O. COOK v. POMPANO SHOPPER, INC., 582 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See § 726.102(3), Fla. . . .