The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLI
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS

Chapter 726
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

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CHAPTER 726

FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

726.101 Short title.

726.102 Definitions.

726.103 Insolvency.

726.104 Value.

726.105 Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors.

726.106 Transfers fraudulent as to present creditors.

726.107 When transfer made or obligation incurred.

726.108 Remedies of creditors.

726.109 Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee.

726.110 Extinguishment of cause of action.

726.111 Supplementary provisions.

726.112 Uniformity of application and construction.

726.201 Fraudulent loans void.

726.101 Short title.—This act may be cited as the “Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.”

History.—s. 1, ch. 87-79.

726.102 Definitions.—As used in ss. 726.101-726.112:

(1) “Affiliate” means:

(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote.

(b) A corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:

1. As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or

2. Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote.

(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or

(d) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor’s assets.

(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:

(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;

(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or

(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.

(3) “Charitable contribution” means a charitable contribution as that term is defined in s. 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, if that contribution consists of:

(a) A financial instrument as defined in s. 731(c)(2)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) Cash.

(4) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(5) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.

(6) “Debt” means liability on a claim.

(7) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.

(8) “Insider” includes:

(a) If the debtor is an individual:

1. A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

2. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

3. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 2.; or

4. A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;

(b) If the debtor is a corporation:

1. A director of the debtor;

2. An officer of the debtor;

3. A person in control of the debtor;

4. A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

5. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 4.; or

6. A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.

1. A general partner in the debtor;

2. A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;

3. Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;

4. A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph 3.; or

5. A person in control of the debtor.

(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor.

(e) A managing agent of the debtor.

(9) “Lien” means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.

(10) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.

(11) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.

(12) “Qualified religious or charitable entity or organization” means:

(a) An entity described in s. 170(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or

(b) An entity or organization described in s. 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

(13) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.

(14) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.

(15) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.

History.—s. 2, ch. 87-79; s. 1, ch. 2013-189.

726.103 Insolvency.—

(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair valuation.

(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.

(3) A partnership is insolvent under subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership’s debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership’s assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner’s nonpartnership assets over the partner’s nonpartnership debts.

(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under ss. 726.101-726.112.

(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.

History.—s. 3, ch. 87-79; s. 936, ch. 97-102.

726.104 Value.—

(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor’s business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.

(2) For the purposes of ss. 726.105(1)(b) and 726.106, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.

(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.

History.—s. 4, ch. 87-79.

726.105 Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors.—

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:

1. Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

2. Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.

(2) In determining actual intent under paragraph (1)(a), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:

(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider.

(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer.

(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit.

(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets.

(f) The debtor absconded.

(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets.

(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred.

(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

(j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.

(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

History.—s. 5, ch. 87-79; s. 937, ch. 97-102.

726.106 Transfers fraudulent as to present creditors.—

(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.

History.—s. 6, ch. 87-79.

726.107 When transfer made or obligation incurred.—For the purposes of ss. 726.101-726.112:

(1) A transfer is made:

(a) With respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a good faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee.

(b) With respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under ss. 726.101-726.112 that is superior to the interest of the transferee.

(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under ss. 726.101-726.112, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action.

(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee.

(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred.

(5) An obligation is incurred:

(a) If oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or

(b) If evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.

History.—s. 7, ch. 87-79; s. 28, ch. 91-110.

726.108 Remedies of creditors.—

(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under ss. 726.101-726.112, a creditor, subject to the limitations in s. 726.109 may obtain:

(a) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim;

(b) An attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with applicable law;

1. An injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;

2. Appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or

3. Any other relief the circumstances may require.

(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

History.—s. 8, ch. 87-79.

726.109 Defenses, liability, and protection of transferee.—

(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under s. 726.105(1)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under s. 726.108(1)(a), the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:

(a) The first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or

(b) Any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee.

(3) If the judgment under subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require.

(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under ss. 726.101-726.112, a good faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:

(a) A lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;

(b) Enforcement of any obligation incurred; or

(5) A transfer is not voidable under s. 726.105(1)(b) or s. 726.106 if the transfer results from:

(a) Termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or

(b) Enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

(6) A transfer is not voidable under s. 726.106(2):

(a) To the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a valid lien;

(b) If made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or

(c) If made pursuant to a good faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.

(7)(a) The transfer of a charitable contribution that is received in good faith by a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization is not a fraudulent transfer under s. 726.105(1)(b).

(b) However, a charitable contribution from a natural person is a fraudulent transfer if the transfer was received on, or within 2 years before, the earlier of the date of commencement of an action under this chapter, the filing of a petition under the federal Bankruptcy Code, or the commencement of insolvency proceedings by or against the debtor under any state or federal law, including the filing of an assignment for the benefit of creditors or the appointment of a receiver, unless:

1. The transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in making the charitable contribution; or

2. The transfer was received in good faith and the amount of the charitable contribution did not exceed 15 percent of the gross annual income of the debtor for the year in which the transfer of the charitable contribution was made.

History.—s. 9, ch. 87-79; s. 2, ch. 2013-189.

726.110 Extinguishment of cause of action.—A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under ss. 726.101-726.112 is extinguished unless action is brought:

(1) Under s. 726.105(1)(a), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within 1 year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;

(2) Under s. 726.105(1)(b) or s. 726.106(1), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or

(3) Under s. 726.106(2), within 1 year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

History.—s. 10, ch. 87-79.

726.111 Supplementary provisions.—Unless displaced by the provisions of ss. 726.101-726.112, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement those provisions.

History.—s. 11, ch. 87-79.

726.112 Uniformity of application and construction.—Chapter 87-79, Laws of Florida, shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of the law among states enacting it.

History.—s. 12, ch. 87-79.

726.201 Fraudulent loans void.—When any loan of goods and chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom or those claiming under her or him, possession shall have remained for the space of 2 years without demand and pursued by due process of law on the part of the pretended lender, or where any reservation or limitation shall be pretended to have been made of a use or property by way of condition, reversion, remainder or otherwise in goods and chattels, and the possession thereof shall have remained in another as aforesaid, the same shall be taken, as to the creditors and purchasers of the persons aforesaid so remaining in possession, to be fraudulent within this chapter, and the absolute property shall be with the possession, unless such loan, reservation or limitation of use or property were declared by will or deed in writing proved and recorded.

History.—s. 4, Jan. 28, 1823; s. 1, ch. 872, 1859; RS 1994; GS 2516; RGS 3871; CGL 5778; s. 938, ch. 97-102.

Note.—Former s. 726.09.

F.S. 726 on Google Scholar

F.S. 726 on Casetext

Amendments to 726

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 726

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 726.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. MAZARS USA, LLP, J. v. AG,, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 726-742 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Rao dissented. . . . concerns still linger in the air," and therefore it did not afford deference to the House. 940 F.3d at 725-726 . . .

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, v. PENNSYLVANIA, J. v., 140 S. Ct. 2367 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 723-726. The answer to the first question is indisputable. . . . See Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 723-726, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; Thomas , 450 U.S. at 715-716, 101 S.Ct. 1425. . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Davey , 540 U.S. 712, 726, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Everson . . .

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2082 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Comm'n , 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 286-289 (DDC 2011), aff 'd, 565 U.S. 1104, 132 S.Ct. 1087, 181 L.Ed.2d 726 . . .

SEILA LAW LLC, v. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Bowsher , 478 U.S., at 726, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Olson , 487 U.S. 654, 726, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Synar , 478 U.S. 714, 726, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986), and INS v. . . .

KANSAS, v. GLOVER, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (U.S. 2020)

. . . California , 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) )). . . .

JONES, v. LAMKIN,, 140 S. Ct. 2660 (U.S. 2020)

. . . No. 19-726. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

MONASKY, v. TAGLIERI, 140 S. Ct. 719 (U.S. 2020)

. . . in emphasis, in the standards they use to locate a child's habitual residence, see supra , at 725 - 726 . . . See also supra , at 725 - 726 (noting a Circuit split). . . . Ante , at 726. . . . Ante , at 726, 727 - 728, 730. Of course the concept of "home" is also multifaceted. . . . states that we "granted certiorari to clarify the standard for habitual residence," ante , at 725 - 726 . . .

C. HERNANDEZ, v. MESA, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 735 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Alvarez-Machain , 542 U.S. 692, 726, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) ). . . .

THOMPSON, v. HEBDON,, 140 S. Ct. 348 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Leake , 660 F.3d 726, 739-740 (C.A.4 2011) ; Zimmerman v. . . .

ALLERGAN SALES, LLC, v. SANDOZ, INC., 935 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Sandoz Inc. , 726 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc. , 717 F. . . .

L. SMITH, v. SHARP,, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). . . .

EDMO, v. CORIZON, INC. Al v. Al, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . . & Rehab. , 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Farmer , 511 U.S. . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL- DENVER, INC. v. M. AZAR II, U. S., 391 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 726 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. . . .

IN RE JUAREZ, v., 603 B.R. 610 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . the estate and a § 502(b) allowed claim that must be paid out of available estate funds pursuant to § 726 . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HOPPER,, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Brown , 726 F.3d 993, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), "[w]e will over-turn . . . assessment of whether the jury reached a reasonable verdict.' " Pulgar , 789 F.3d at 813 (quoting Brown , 726 . . . See Brown , 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting "an inference of conspiracy" based on evidence of "repeated . . .

RAWA, A. W. Jr. v. MONSANTO COMPANY, v., 934 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jeff D. , 475 U.S. 717, 726, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). . . .

SCRIMO, v. LEE,, 935 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Aboumoussallem , 726 F. 2d 906, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1984) (considering Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ). . . .

TURCO v. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY,, 935 F.3d 155 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 729, 120 S.Ct. 2480 Id. at 726, 120 S.Ct. 2480. Id. . . . Id. at 726-27, 120 S.Ct. 2480 ("[T]his 8-foot zone allows the speaker to communicate at a 'normal conversational . . .

UNITED STATES v. CRUM,, 934 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Sargent , 110 Or.App. 194, 822 P.2d 726, 728 (1991), as well as offering to sell a controlled substance . . .

BOXILL, v. P. O GRADY E. E. T., 935 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Consumers Energy Co. , 726 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. . . .

NALPROPION PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC., 934 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Sandoz Inc. , 726 F.3d 1286, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013). . . .

UNITED STATES v. NORMAN,, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carthorne , 726 F.3d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 2013) ; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). . . . Carthorne , 726 F.3d at 516. . . .

IN RE BROWN, s, 603 B.R. 786 (Bankr. S.C. 2019)

. . . D.S.C. 2018) ; In re Mazyck , 521 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2014). . . .

IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE S SUNDAY TICKET ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Jr. v. LLC LLC NFL LLC LLC LP LLC LLC NFL LP LLC LP LLC LP Co. LLC LP LLC, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law , 119 Yale L.J. 726, 732 (2010), while decreasing the number . . . McBee & Bruno's, Inc. , 792 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he legislative history demonstrates a . . . Nat'l Football League , 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984), the defendants in this case have effective . . .

LATURNER, v. UNITED STATES,, 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . SPI Spirits Ltd. , 726 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013), provides an illustration. . . .

IN RE M. STERLING,, 933 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . IMBS, Inc. , 368 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). . . . IMBS, Inc. , 368 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). . . .

HIGGS, v. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE,, 933 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Md. 2010), aff'd 663 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2011) ; and a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 . . .

UNITED STATES v. MARCHAN,, 935 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Douma , 796 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see United States v. . . .

HARDEMAN, v. CURRAN,, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lewis , 217 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding allegations of inadequate drinking water over four . . .

MARTINEAU, v. WIER, 934 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . . §§ 704(a)(1), 726. . . . J.A. 244; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 726. . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. PAUP,, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Donohue , 726 F. . . .

UNITED STATES v. WALKER,, 934 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carthorne , 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also . . . See Marcus , 560 U.S. at 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159 ; Carthorne , 726 F.3d at 516. B. . . .

E. ANDREWS, v. SIRIUS XM RADIO INC., 932 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Softech Int'l, Inc. , 726 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting 140 Cong . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. HARPER,, 934 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 726 F.3d 958, 967 (7th Cir. 2013). . . .

DOE, v. MCKESSON, 935 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Quality , 897 So. 2d 726, 728-729 (La. Ct. . . .

CHAVEZ, De E. De De De v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a, 933 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . ALM Media, LLC , 726 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013), we concluded that "American Pipe tolling does not extend . . .

IN RE W. PASLEY, W. v. W., 603 B.R. 6 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 726(a)(6), then the debtor is a 'person aggrieved' with standing to appeal." Id. . . .

ALONSO, LLP LLP S. v. J. WEISS, 932 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Employment Security , 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 30-31, 401 Ill.Dec. 895, 51 N.E.3d 726 (defining "deliberate . . .

O. CAMPOS, v. COOK COUNTY,, 932 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Parole Comm'n , 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990). III. . . .

UNITED STATES v. PRADO,, 933 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Davis , 726 F.3d 357, 362-67 (2d Cir. 2013), involved a "federally insured bank," see, e.g. , United . . .

HUBBELL, v. FEDEX SMARTPOST, INC., 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Consumers Energy Co. , 726 F.3d 802, 821 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Revis v. . . . on the case by an attorney, multiplied by his court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.' " Waldo , 726 . . . See, e.g. , Waldo , 726 F.3d at 821-22 (collecting cases). . . .

FRYE, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., 933 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Jay Indus., Inc. , 459 F.3d 717, 726 (6th Cir. 2006). . . .

GGNSC LOUISVILLE HILLCREEK, LLC GGNSC LLC GGNSC LLC, v. ESTATE OF C. BRAMER, BY AND THROUGH A. BRAMER, A., 932 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Fireproofing Co. , 464 F.2d 726, 729 (6th Cir. 1972) ("Nevertheless, arbitration is a matter of contract . . .

CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL PENSION FUND,, 932 F.3d 91 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Tilley , 490 U.S. 714, 726, 109 S.Ct. 2156, 104 L.Ed.2d 796 (1989) ). . . .

FLORES, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Dittmer, 726 F. Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MATHIS, a k a a k a a k a D- v. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a K. a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a v. a k a a k a a k a a k a, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carthorne , 726 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2013). . . . See Carthorne , 726 F.3d at 512. . . .

W. MAC NAUGHTON, v. HARMELECH,, 932 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds . . .

UNITED STATES v. FELDMAN,, 931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . DuBose , 598 F.3d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 2010) ). . . .

J. GILLIAM, C. Ad v. SEALEY, E. C. T. A. Sr. C. T. A. WTVD LLC J. C. Ad v. C. T. A. E. C. T. A. Sr. WTVD LLC, 932 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Higgs , 663 F.3d 726, 735 (4th Cir. 2011) ). . . .

BORCHARDT v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 931 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Graco, Inc., 913 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). . . .

UNITED STATES v. GALECKI, v., 932 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bd. , 822 F.3d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded on other grounds by --- U.S. ----, 137 . . .

DINE CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR ENVIRONMENT v. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS U. S. LLC,, 932 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 1046-47 ; see also Cook , 548 F.3d at 726 (holding that a corporation created by a tribe through . . .

MARAMBO v. P. BARR,, 932 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006). . . .

Z. J. a BY AND THROUGH Je JONES, v. KANSAS CITY BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS,, 931 F.3d 672 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Bolin , 795 F.3d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . Donnell , 726 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2013) ). . . . See Shockley , 816 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Donnell , 726 F.3d at 1056 ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. IWAI,, 930 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Etchin , 614 F.3d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The sound of someone walking around, for example, or a voice . . .

UNITED STATES v. HUNT,, 930 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kennedy , 726 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2013) (pursuit of one guideline objection amounted to waiver of . . .

L. JACKSON, v. BARTOW,, 930 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 726 F.3d 958, 966 (7th Cir. 2013). Jackson's case is identical to Gomez . . . .

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC v. PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR ACRES, PERMANENT OVERLAY EASEMENT FOR ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR ACRES IN MILFORD AND WESTFALL TOWNSHIPS, PIKE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBERS a c o L. P., 931 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . See Kimbell Foods , 440 U.S. at 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448 ("This Court has consistently held that federal law . . .

L. TATUM, v. SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INCORPORATED,, 930 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Precision Castparts Corp. , 726 F.3d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 2013). He fails to carry that burden. . . .

BRAEBURN INC. v. UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 726 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. . . .

IN RE LICKING RIVER MINING, LLC, v. LLC,, 603 B.R. 336 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2019)

. . . MascoTech, Inc., (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.) , 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) ] (quoting In re . . .

DISABILITY RIGHTS MONTANA, INC. v. BATISTA,, 930 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dep't of Corr. and Rehab. , 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that plaintiffs stated a . . .

CABRERA, v. P. BARR,, 930 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Commonwealth , 284 Va. 270, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338 (2012) ("A defendant charged with gang participation, . . .

NNEBE, v. DAUS, v., 931 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Green , 96 N.Y.2d 195, 199-200, 726 N.Y.S.2d 357, 750 N.E.2d 59 (2001). Compare N.Y. Crim. . . .

IN RE GAULSH,, 602 B.R. 849 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . . § 726(a). . . .

M. CROCE, v. NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY Jr., 930 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Outlet Commc'ns, Inc. , 133 Ohio App.3d 102, 726 N.E.2d 1084, 1091 (1999) (collecting Ohio appellate . . .

CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Herman , 600 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that "[t]he conflation of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional . . . Secret Serv. , 726 F.3d 208, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the D.C. . . .

GIBSON, Ca v. SCE GROUP, INC. d b a d b a s,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . Hellman , 284 A.D.2d 113, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2001) (finding that plaintiff's complaint was deficient because . . .

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN,, 929 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Kimball , 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2002) ; cf. United States v. . . .

SELLARS, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC., 385 F. Supp. 3d 803 (N.D. Iowa 2019)

. . . Sheriff's Office , 743 F.3d 726, 756 (10th Cir. 2014) ("An employer's knowledge that the harasser had . . .

GREEN, v. KENNEWAY,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Pike , 431 Mass. 212, 726 N.E.2d 940, 944 (2000). . . .

IN RE GILMAN, R. R. a v. R. R. a v., 603 B.R. 437 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miller (In re Miller) , 397 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The automatic stay does not apply to proceedings . . .

UNIVERSAL CABLE PRODUCTIONS, LLC, a LLC, a v. ATLANTIC SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Leather Co ., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). . . .

UNITED STATES v. MILLS,, 389 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Mich. 2019)

. . . Lamar, No. 14 Cr. 726, 2015 WL 4720282, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) ; United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BRIONES, Jr., 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 726, "even when they commit terrible crimes." Miller , 567 U.S. at 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455. . . .

FCS ADVISORS, LLC L. P. v. MISSOURI, 929 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Olson , 726 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo. banc 1987) ("[E]xpressions of opinion are insufficient to authorize . . .

RODRIGUEZ v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, 387 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ). . . .

WHITSERVE LLC, v. DONUTS INC. LLC, v. LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D. Del. 2019)

. . . Funai Corp. , 726 F. App'x 797, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same). . . .

EVANS, v. SANDY CITY, a R. P. C. C. J. E. I- XX,, 928 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Smith v. . . . Schuette , 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Smith v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. FLUTE,, 929 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963) ("[C]ourts do not substitute their social . . .

UNITED STATES v. SMITH,, 928 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . California , 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) ; United States v. . . . Ct. 1623, 1629-30, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (emphasizing "there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness . . .

R. BROWN, E. R. A. v. COLLIER, R. R. A. v., 929 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 726-27, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) ). . . .

CHABAD LUBAVITCH OF THE QUAD CITIES, INC. v. CITY OF BETTENDORF, IOWA, P., 389 F. Supp. 3d 590 (S.D. Iowa 2019)

. . . Sarasota Cty. , 908 F.2d 716, 726 (11th Cir. 1990). . . .

E. D. v. SHARKEY BCRC- IFC BCRC- IFC BCRC- IFC, 928 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . County of McHenry , 726 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Porro v. . . . Dist. , 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) ). E.D.' . . .

UNITED STATES v. MORGAN,, 929 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 726. . . . Chapman's defense rested entirely on his claim that he never possessed the bag at all. " Id. at 726-27 . . .

BAKER v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L. L. C. EQR- LLC,, 390 F. Supp. 3d 246 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Surrette, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 99, 726 N.E.2d 967, 972 n.14 (2000). B. . . .

W. HOLMES, v. GROOMS,, 391 F. Supp. 3d 536 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010). . . .

UNITED STATES v. F. WHITE,, 928 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9, . . .

UNITED STATES v. FURLOW,, 928 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Carthorne , 726 F.3d 503, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2013) ("When we have yet to speak directly on a legal issue . . .

UNITED STATES v. D. LICKERS,, 928 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Franklin , 547 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A police officer who smells marijuana coming from a car . . .

IN RE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v., 385 F. Supp. 3d 138 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . ."); In re Texas Tri-Collar, Inc., 29 B.R. 724, 726-27 (Bankr. W.D. . . .

HALL- WADLEY, v. MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT,, 386 F. Supp. 3d 512 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. . . .

A. RUCHO, v. COMMON CAUSE, H. v. O., 139 S. Ct. 2484 (U.S. 2019)

. . . Nos. 18-422 18-726 Supreme Court of the United States. June 27, 2019 Paul D. . . . Sullivan for the appellants in No. 18-726. Michael B. . . . Kimberly, Washington, DC, for the respondents in No. 18-726. Phillip J. Strach, Michael D. . . .

IN RE PETTERS COMPANY, INC. LLC PC LLC LLC SPF LLC PL LLC MGC PAC LLC A. PCI PCI v., 603 B.R. 601 (Bankr. Minn. 2019)

. . . s Mem., Dkt. 101, Ex. 2 at 105:18-25, Ex. 3 at 722:25-726:7, 748:13-15, Ex. 4 at 39:21-40:5, 84:21-85 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DIGGLES, 928 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Alaniz , 726 F.3d 586, 602 (5th Cir. 2013). . . . Rouland , 726 F.3d at 733-34 (5th Cir. 2013). . . . See Rouland , 726 F.3d at 735 ("[S]pecial conditions may be tantamount to standard conditions under the . . . Rivas-Estrada , 906 F.3d at 348-49 ; Rouland , 726 F.3d at 733-34. . . . Rivas-Estrada , 906 F.3d at 348 ; see Rouland , 726 F.3d at 734 (accepting defendant's concession that . . .

UNITED STATES v. HEARTLAND HOSPICE, INC., 386 F. Supp. 3d 884 (N.D. Ohio 2019)

. . . Emergency Medical Association of Illinois, Inc. , 436 F.3d 726, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit . . .

LEFEBURE v. BOEKER, D. D J. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d 729 (M.D. La. 2019)

. . . Roberts , 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982) (Rubin, J.). Id. (citing Slotnick v. . . .

UCB, INC. UCB UCB GMBH, LTS AG, v. WATSON LABORATORIES INC. UT,, 927 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . International Trade Commission , 109 F.3d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appellants' Op. Br. at 48-49. . . .