Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...— If the thirty year period for filing notice under § 712.05 shall have expired prior to July 1, 1965, such period shall be extended to July 1, 1965." In Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954), this Court invalidated the retroactive portion of Section 689.18, Florida Statute, F.S.A., which attempted to place a twenty-one year limitation on reverter rights and interests....

...(now § 718.302(2)). 3. In Count IV on the inclusion of an escalation clause of the type prohibited by Section 711.231, Florida Statutes (now § 718.302(3)). 4. In Count V as constituting an illegal restraint against alienation within the meaning of Section 689.18, Florida Statutes....

...lage, Inc. The complaints allege that the appellant was the owner of such "possibility of a reverter" and "reverter rights and interest", respectively, and that such interest in each of the properties was outlawed by Chapter 26927, Acts of 1951, now Section 689.18, F.S.A....

...nce. [3] We come now to the contention of Vereen that the trial court improperly enlarged the City's interest in the land from that of grantee under a conditional deed of dedication with the possibility of reverter to a title in complete fee simple. Section 689.18(4), Florida Statutes (1975) renders void any reverter provision contained in any deed conveying real estate executed on or after July 1, 1951 after twenty-one years *984 from date of execution....

...to an abandoned street revert to adjacent owner and not to heirs and assigns of original platters. Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1953); Sun Oil Company v. Gerstein, 206 So.2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960), cert. denied, 211 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1968). [4] Section 689.18 is unconstitutional only to the extent it cancels reverter provisions in deeds executed prior to July 1, 1951....

...Count III relates generally to a theory of unconscionability. Count IV seeks to assert the homestead character of the condominium property as a bar to foreclosure. Count VIII seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that the long-term recreational lease and foreclosure provisions violate Section 689.18 Florida Statutes (1977) which prohibits certain capital reverter or forfeiture provisions as unreasonable restrictions on alienation of real estate....

...be used for a park. Here, the dedication expressly limited the City's use of the land. We also disagree with the City's contention that it held fee simple title to the property after the expiration of the twenty-one-year reverter period set forth in section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1987). Section 689.18(5) exempts conveyances to governmental entities from the statute's scope....

...F.C.A. brought its declaratory action below seeking to have the "sweeping" condition of the easement declared void and unenforceable. The trial judge declared the provision of the easement in question a "forfeiture provision" and unenforceable under section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1987). The pertinent portions of section 689.18 provides as follows: 689.18 Reverter or forfeiture provisions, limitations; exceptions.— (1) It is hereby declared by the Legislature of the state that reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration in the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein in th...

...such period of 21 years, the reverter or forfeiture provision shall become null, void, and unenforceable. Because a grant of easement is not a conveyance of a proprietary interest in real property, we conclude that the trial judge erred in applying section 689.18 to grants of easement....

...See Easton v. Appler, 548 So.2d 691 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So.2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Kempfer v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 475 So.2d 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Hayes v. Reynolds, 132 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). Section 689.18 was enacted as Chapter 26927, Laws of Florida (1951). It is of note that we can discover no case since its enactment applying section 689.18 to pure grants of easement....

...of Florida.... We conclude that a specified condition to the continuance of an easement agreed upon by the parties to the easement is not an encumbrance to the marketability of title to real estate sought to be protected against by the enactment of section 689.18....

...When the easement ceases, there is no reversion of title but merely a freedom from the burden. An easement may be created in fee absolute or defeasible, for life or for a term of years. An easement may be subject to a condition subsequent. (Footnotes omitted.) We, therefore, conclude that the trial judge erred in applying section 689.18 to void the "sweeping" provision of the easement at issue. Even if section 689.18 applied, under section 689.18(4), the provision in question would not have become void and unenforceable until twenty-one years after the date of the granting of the easement....

...Another issue — the validity of the reverter provision — though not raised by the parties, is suggested by the facts. But we need not decide whether the reverter provision in the original grant became null and void before the claimed 1958 reversion, based on an application of Section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: (6) Any holder of a possibility of reverter who claims title to any real property in the state, or any interest therein by reason of a reversion or forfeiture under the terms or provisions of a...

...on law,4 it is clear that section 95.36(1) is inapplicable, as the instant conveyance does not involve a “dedication of land,” but rather a fee simple conveyance with an automatic reverter clause. Indeed, a more specific statutory provision—section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1974)—addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property....

...it would automatically revert to the grantor and/or his successor. Thus, the time limitation contained in section 95.36(1) is simply inapplicable, since that statute, by its terms, applies to “dedications of land.” 7  Section 689.18 and the Instant Conveyance Indeed, there is another, more specific, statutory provision which controls the outcome of this case. Section 689.18 addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property. That statute provides in pertinent part: 689.18....

...expressly excepted from its scope: “Any and all conveyances of real property in this state heretofore or hereafter made to any governmental, educational, literary, scientific, religious, public utility, public transportation, charitable or nonprofit corporation or association.” § 689.18(5), Fla....

...Bar CLE 10th ed. 2020). 9 another: one law (§ 95.36(1)) gives the grantor thirty years to file suit against a grantee who violates the terms of an ancient dedication of land with restrictions; while another (§ 689.18) gives the grantor only twenty-one years to do so....

...construction that where two statutes appear to be in conflict, “a specific statute will control over a general statute.” Florida Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97, 102 (Fla. 2014). Applying that canon here, the more specific statute—section 689.18, which specifically addresses reverter clauses—would control over 10 the more general provision contained in section 95.36, thus leading us to the same result....

...The trial court erred in applying the time limitations contained in that section and in granting summary judgment in favor of the City, on that basis, as to counts I and II of the operative complaint. Instead, the applicable statutory provision is found in section 689.18, Florida Statutes, which also contains time limitations but which expressly exempts, from those time limitations, conveyances of real property made to a governmental entity. We therefore reverse the trial court’s final summa...

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 95.14, Fla.Stat. (1989); § 689.18(4), Fla.Stat. (1991).

...atutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.”) 4 reverter clause. Indeed, a more specific statutory provision—section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1974)—addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property....

...to be used as such, it would automatically revert to the grantor and/or his successor. Thus, the time limitation contained in section 95.36(1) is simply inapplicable, since that statute, by its terms, applies to “dedications of land.” Section 689.18 and the Instant Conveyance Indeed, there is another, more specific, statutory provision which controls the outcome of this case. Section 689.18 addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property. That statute provides in pertinent part: 689.18....

...2020). 8 in this state heretofore or hereafter made to any governmental, educational, literary, scientific, religious, public utility, public transportation, charitable or nonprofit corporation or association.” § 689.18(5), Fla....

...Legislature intentionally crafted two statutes which are in conflict with one another: one law (§ 95.36(1)) gives the grantor thirty years to file suit against a grantee who violates the terms of an ancient dedication of land with restrictions; while another (§ 689.18) gives the grantor only twenty-one years to do so....

...construction that where two statutes appear to be in conflict, “a specific statute will control over a general statute.” Florida Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97, 102 (Fla. 2014). Applying that canon here, the more specific statute—section 689.18, which specifically addresses reverter clauses—would control over the more general provision contained in section 95.36, thus leading us to the same result....

...we need not apply this canon of statutory construction. See DMB Inv. Tr. v. Islamorada, 225 So. 3d 312, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). 10 summary judgment in favor of the City on that basis. Instead, the applicable statutory provision is found in section 689.18, Florida Statutes, which also contains time limitations but which expressly exempts, from those time limitations, conveyances of real property made to a governmental entity. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedi...