CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 462
...nsistent with this opinion. *1376 Reversed and remanded with instructions. SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This limitation is consistent with the provision in Florida's Uniform Commercial Code relating to goods to be severed from realty. § 672.107, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 979, 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 5929
...ing thereon, did not include such citrus crops. Therefore, since the notice of levy did not include the citrus crops, such notice of levy was restricted to the land itself, the crops having been previously constructively severed. It is our view that Section 672.107(3) as presently worded does not require the recording of a sale of citrus fruit in order to provide constructive notice to others of the nature of the buyer's interest in the crop....
...*735 HOBSON, Acting C.J., concurs. McNULTY, J., concurs specially. McNULTY, Judge (concurring specially). I would affirm but solely on the ground that the writ of attachment merely sought to levy on the realty and not on the growing crop thereon which, pursuant to § 672.107(2), F.S.A., is rendered "goods" or personalty....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2153, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1379, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10080
...Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing on these motions, the trial court denied Konas’ motion, but granted the motion of Coastal. The court found that the oral timbering agreement between Coastal and Fathaly constituted a present sale of “goods” pursuant to section 672.107(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which vested title to the timber in Coastal at the time the agreement was entered....
...Both parties agree that the single issue on appeal is whether an oral, unrecorded agreement for the sale of standing timber is superior to a subsequently-recorded mortgage on the same property. As previously noted, the trial court answered this question in the affirmative, based upon the 1979 amendments to section
672.107(2), Florida Statutes, which reclassified standing timber as “goods” within the meaning of Florida’s UCC provisions. While we agree with both Coastal and the trial judge that timber may now be classified as “goods” pursuant to sections
672.107(2) and 679.105(l)(h), Florida Statutes, we find Coastal’s reliance on these provisions, as well as section
672.401(3)(b) misplaced, since under section
672.401(1) “irrespective of the title to the goods,” sales under chapter 672 remain...
...to secured transactions. Thus, we reject Coastal’s assertion that the requirement that it record its timber interest in order for that interest to be superior to Konas’ subsequently-recorded mortgage was made permissive by the 1979 amendments to section 672.107, in derogation of the common law recording requirements for timber as real property. 2 See also, section 672.107, Florida Statutes Annotated, Sponsors’ Notes (Section 3, Chapter 79-398, Laws of Florida (1979)): The change [to section 672.107] makes timber to be cut under a contract of severance goods, regardless of the question who is to sever them ......
..."The provisions of this section are subject to any third-party rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer’s rights under the contract for sale_” Section 672.107(3), Florida Statutes (1983).
