Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Clark, Jr., of Clark, Partington, Hart & Hart, Pensacola, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. We entertain this appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County, Florida, because the final judgment of that court passed initially and directly on the validity of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Prior to October 1, 1976, uninsured motorist coverage would "stack," which means that the appellant would have $200,000 in uninsured motorist coverage for the death of each child ($100,000 uninsured motorist coverage times two vehicles). On October 1, 1976, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), became law and it stated that uninsured motorist coverage will no longer stack for accidents occurring on or after October 1, 1976. Appellant argued the passage of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The trial court again held adversely to appellant, finding that the $15,000 liability coverage of Lowell, tendered to the insured, operated to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage from $100,000 to $85,000. Renewing the arguments he made in the trial court, appellant posits that (1) Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he third-party tort-feasor's insurance carrier against the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In view of our disposition of appellant's second argument, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the facial constitutionality of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...With regard to appellant's contention that the insurance contract was impaired in contravention of Article I, Section 10, Florida Constitution, we agree. Appellant renewed his uninsured motorist coverage in August, 1976. On that date, uninsured motorist coverage would stack. The Governor signed Chapter 76-266 (Section 627.4132) into law on June 27, 1976, to apply to all claims arising out of accidents on or after October 1, 1976....

...of America, 25 N.J. Super. 183, 95 A.2d 632 (1953); County School Board of Fairfax County v. Town of Herndon, 194 Va. 810, 75 S.E.2d 474 (1953). Today we reaffirm this general rule and find that appellant was placed on notice of the effectiveness of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...[6] Thus, we find that the $15,000 liability coverage of the tort-feasor which was tendered to the insured reduced what the appellant could receive from his uninsured motorist carrier by that amount. Accordingly, that part of the trial court's judgment finding that the application of *1082 Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...o the insured is affirmed. This cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] § 627.4132, Fla....

...Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds." [2] Ch. 76-266, § 10, Laws of Florida (§ 627.4132) was passed on June 4, 1976....

...er a policy issued in 1980 naming the corporation as the insured. The trial court said they could. We disagree and reverse. Back in 1980, when the subject policy was issued, the anti-stacking statute did not apply to uninsured motorist coverage. See Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1980). Accordingly, we are concerned here only with the status of the insureds. To determine that status, we must decide whether the 1980 version of Section 627.4132 vitiates case law which provided that only certain classes of insureds could stack....

...Pac, 337 So.2d 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1977). [3] Since the creation of the UM statute in 1961, it has been affected on twenty-six occasions by legislative enactments. If one includes the closely related anti-stacking statute, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1989), another six legislative actions must be counted....

...overage than a liability policy without a per person limitation. "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. Prior to its amendment [1] effective October 1, 1980, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), mandated that every uninsured motorist policy provide total coverage only to the extent of coverage on one of the vehicles covered (called anti-stacking)....

...But for Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, this issue would be merely one of legislative intent. However, regardless of the intent of the legislature, a statute may not, constitutionally, alter, amend or impair the rights of the parties to an existing contract. Thus, the amendment to section 627.4132 does not apply in the instant case unless, between the effective date of the amendment (October 1, 1980) and the date of the accident (January 30, 1981), a new contract was made between the parties....

...ted after the issuance of the original policy. In the instant case, the addition of a driver (James Gray) to an existing policy of insurance did not in any material way change the terms and conditions of the existing policy and the 1980 amendment to section 627.4132 could not, constitutionally change the obligation of the insurance company under that existing policy....

...Assuming that the endorsement which added James Gray as an additional named driver to Richard Gray's policy of insurance constituted the issuance of a separate and severable contract and further assuming that under section 627.412(1), Fla. Stat., the provisions of section 627.4132 as amended in 1980, were incorporated into every uninsured motorist insurance policy issued after October 1, 1980, and were incorporated into the new "separate and severable contract" of insurance issued to James Gray and resulted in...

...Nancy Gray's policy and the statutes incorporated into that policy do not permit her to stack uninsured motorist coverage and the issuance of a "separate and severable contract" to James Gray should not be used as a device to allow an amendment to section 627.4132 to impair the rights of the insurance company with respect to Nancy Gray....

...REVERSED AND REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. DAUKSCH, J., concurs in conclusion only. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion. SHARP, Judge, dissenting. I dissent in this case because I think the October 1, 1980, amendment to the anti-stacking *221 statute, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1981), [1] is applicable to the insurance policy in this case because an additional driver was added to the policy by endorsement dated December 18, 1980....

...ge is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply: (1) To uninsured motorist coverage. § 627.4132(1), Fla....

...its sole intent and purpose. The history of the statute is set out in the legislative analysis summaries attached to this dissent and designated appendices A and B. These summaries explain that the legislature enacted a non-stacking statute in 1976, section 627.4132, that prohibited stacking and applied to all aspects of motor vehicle coverage but was particularly directed to uninsured motorist coverage....

...nt part, as follows: The bill provides that insurance policies may contain a provision that coverage on two or more vehicles will not be added together. This provision will apply to uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage. The present law, s. 627.4132, is the so-called "anti-stacking law." It prohibits insurance coverage on two or more motor vehicles from being "stacked" or added together....

...Staff of Fla.H.R.Comm. on Ins., HB 1029 (1987) Staff Analysis 1-2 (final July 1, 1987) (on file at the Florida State Archives). APPENDIX B The summary of the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement reads as follows: A. Present Situation: Section 627.4132, F.S., is the so-called "anti-stacking law." It prohibits insurance coverage on two or more motor vehicles from being "stacked" or added together....

...of Wells, Gattis & Hallowes, P.A., Orlando, for appellant. Thomas G. Kane of Driscoll, Baugh, Langston, Layton & Kane, Orlando, for appellee. DOWNEY, Chief Judge. The Circuit Court of Orange County has certified to this Court the following question: WHETHER FLORIDA STATUTE 627.4132 PERMITS THE PLAINTIFF, MICHAEL McLELLAN, WHO OWNS AN AUTOMOBILE AND HAS A POLICY OF INSURANCE ON WHICH HE IS THE NAMED INSURED, TO STACK THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES AVAILABLE UNDER THREE POLICIES IN WHICH HIS FATHER, JAMES McLELLAN, IS THE NAMED INSURED....

...Michael contends in this litigation that he is entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverage contained in each of those three policies on to the coverage contained in the policy on his own car. Thus, the certified question. It appears conceded that prior to the passage of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), Michael would have been entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverage contained in his father's three policies upon his own....

...In this case Michael was the named insured on his policy and his father was the named insured on his three policies, thus Michael argues the last sentence preserves his right to stack. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the Legislative purpose in passing Section 627.4132, supra, was to eliminate stacking entirely....

...State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 383 So.2d 966 (Fla.1st DCA 1980); Cox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 378 So.2d 330 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The issue in conflict concerns the application of the last sentence of the "anti-stacking" statute, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), which reads in its entirety as follows: Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...Christopher was not occupying either of the insured vehicles when he was killed. Each policy had $10,000 uninsured motorist coverage, and damages were stipulated to be in excess of $20,000. The single issue is whether these two policies could be stacked or whether only one policy applied. The trial court concluded that under section 627.4132 only the $10,000 limit of one policy was available. The Third District Court of Appeal held: "The entirely clear and totally unambiguous language of the concluding sentence of § 627.4132 explicitly provides under these facts, the preceding provisions of the section `shall not apply to reduce the coverage,' thus plainly leaving the availability of both policies intact." 380 So.2d at 491....

...I find as interesting as the legal issue here what this case illustrates with respect to the effect on the judicial branch of government of imprecise legislation. Seven trial judges and seven appellate courts, aggregating twenty-eight judges, have struggled to determine what the last sentence of section 627.4132 must have meant before the provision was amended last year....

...co, Jr.; Poland v. Phillips, 371 So.2d 1053 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Popple, 305 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); see Hanover Ins. Co. v. Publix Market, Inc., 198 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); and (c) Under the applicable pre- § 627.4132 law, [2] since Francisco, Jr....

...Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1973); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Furman, 341 So.2d 1056 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Andrews, supra. While the stacking of vehicles insured in one policy was precluded by § 627.4132, Fla....

...Subsequently both parties moved for summary judgment, which after hearing was entered in favor of Kuhn. From the judgment finding that Kuhn is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits, State Farm perfected this appeal. The dispositive question presented for our determination is whether Kuhn is precluded by Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), below, from recovery of the uninsured motorist benefits provided in the truck policy. "627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...nite meaning, *1081 the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and, therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction. Hialeah, Inc. v. B & G Horse Transp., Inc., 368 So.2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). A reading of Section 627.4132 clearly evidences a two fold purpose: (1) to prohibit the stacking of coverages, and (2) to restrict an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle which he was operating at the time of the accident....

...age in the policy issued on the motorcycle. Having rejected uninsured motorist coverage thereon, he is not entitled to the uninsured motorist benefits provided for in his truck policy under the plain terms of the statute. In an attempt to circumvent Section 627.4132, Kuhn argues that his motorcycle is not a "vehicle." However, we must reject this argument for the reasons cited in Standard Marine Insurance Company v....

...Corlett, Merritt, Killian & Sikes and Gerald E. Rosser, Miami, for appellee. Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ. SCHWARTZ, Judge. The sole issue before us involves the application of the last sentence of the recently-enacted "anti-stacking" statute, Section 627.4132, Fla. Stat. (1977). We conclude that the provision means just what it says and that the statute does not operate to prevent "stacking," in accordance with the pre-627.4132 law, when the policies involved have different named insureds....

...Since it was agreed that the plaintiff below, Christopher's estate, had sustained more than $20,000 in damages, the sole question in the trial court — as here — was the purely legal one of whether both or only one of the policies applied. The trial judge ruled with the insurance company that, under § 627.4132, only the $10,000 limits of one policy were available. We hold to the contrary. § 627.4132, which entirely governs this case, provides in its entirety as follows: If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other...

...ce policies insuring different named insureds. [e.s.] Under this statute, it is obvious that, on the facts involved here, the estate is entitled to the benefit of both policies. As the insurer concedes, that would be the case absent the existence of § 627.4132....

...*491 In other words, the plaintiff was provided with the $20,000 in "coverage [which is] available by reason of [the] insurance policies insuring different named insureds," the father and mother respectively. The entirely clear and totally unambiguous language of the concluding sentence of § 627.4132 explicitly provides that under these facts, the preceding provisions of the section "shall not apply to reduce the coverage," thus plainly leaving the availability of both policies intact....

...Co., 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We respectfully, but thoroughly, disagree with that decision. In our judgment, the conclusion reached in McLellan is inappropriately based upon the court's interpretation of the supposed intent of the legislature in enacting § 627.4132 to preclude stacking in every instance, notwithstanding the language in the statute itself which is unequivocally to the contrary of the court's view....

...Moreover, we do not share either the fourth district's apparent belief that there is an irreconcilable confusion or conflict between the final sentence and the remainder of the statute, or its concern that giving that provision its clear meaning would somehow emasculate the section as a whole. As worded, § 627.4132 serves, as in the Kuhn case, supra, and in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins....

...Robert Mettlebaum and Lee S. Damsker of Gordon & Maney, P.A., Tampa, for appellee. RYDER, Judge. State Farm appeals the summary judgment against it finding Wimpee entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. Appellant urges that the anti-stacking statute, Section 627.4132, Fla....

...e vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. Section 627.4132, Fla....

...ould not only permit coverage under the facts below, but also would permit stacking when an insured vehicle was involved in an accident. We reject this interpretation as contrary to the manifest intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Section 627.4132 provides an insured is protected only to the extent of coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident....

...Changes in those statutes, such as enactment of the anti-stacking provision, reflect changes in legislative expression of public policy. This court is bound to follow those changes, regardless of prior expressions of legislative public policy. As our supreme court recently said, in upholding the constitutionality of Section 627.4132, The appellants have cited cases in which "stacking" of coverage was permitted because the policy exclusions which purported to prohibit it were not authorized by statute....

...The trial court precluded the stacking and granted Florida Farm's motion for summary judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Hurtado was entitled to stack the available uninsured motorist coverage on automobile *1316 policies issued to his corporate employer under section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Florida Farm asserts that Hurtado is neither the named insured nor a family member, and thus he is not entitled to stack under his corporate employer's policy. Florida Farm relies on American States Insurance Co. v. Kelley, 446 So.2d at 1085, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trombley, 445 So.2d at 709, which construed section 627.4132 as permitting only named insureds and their resident family members to stack multiple uninsured motorist coverage. We begin by noting that there is nothing on the face of section 627.4132 to preclude Hurtado from receiving the benefits of stacking....

...although stacking was allowed for class-one insureds, it was not allowed for class-two insureds. Id. at 398. In 1976, the legislature directly addressed stacking for the first time by enacting chapter 76-266, section 10, Laws of Florida (codified at section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976)). This statute expressly prohibited the stacking of coverages, including uninsured motorist coverage. It provided: 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...e vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. § 627.4132, Fla....

...nd amended the statute. The words "uninsured motorist" were deleted from the first sentence and a new sentence was added stating that the antistacking section did not apply to uninsured motorist coverage. See ch. 80-364, § 1, Laws of Fla. (amending § 627.4132, Fla. Stat. (1979)). The law, as amended, provided: 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

....2d 1094 (Fla. 1981). In the absence of any evidence of legislative intent to the contrary and under a plain reading of the two pertinent statutes, we conclude that the legislature merely reinstated the status which existed prior to the enactment of section 627.4132 in 1976....

...*1320 SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs. BARKETT, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. Although I agree that section 627.4132 does not provide a remedy to Hurtado under preexisting case law, I believe the Mullis classifications should be reevaluated in the context of stacking uninsured motorist coverage, an issue this Court has never specifically addressed....

...Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion rigidly adhering to the Mullis class distinctions in the context of stacking uninsured motorist coverage. KOGAN, J., concurs. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. [2] Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1987), provides: 627.4132 Stacking of Coverages prohibited....

...v. Gray, 446 So.2d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. On March 1, 1979, Pohlman purchased an insurance policy from Fireman's Fund Insurance Company with an expiration date of March 1, 1982. At that time, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), provided that every uninsured motorist policy shall only cover the insured to the extent of the coverage the insured has on the vehicle involved in the accident. This law is commonly referred to as antistacking. Accordingly, Pohlman's insurance policy contained an antistacking provision. Section 627.4132 was amended, effective October 1, 1980, to remove this restriction and allow an insured to collect uninsured motorist coverage on all of the vehicles covered under all of his insurance policies....

...Government Employees Insurance Co., 214 So.2d 879 (1st DCA Fla. 1968); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. White, 330 So.2d 858 (2d DCA Fla. 1976). *644 "In the 1976 session, the Florida legislature revised the No-Fault Law in Florida and pursuant to Section 627.4132 (1976) prohibited stacking of such coverage effective 1 October 1976....

...proper subjects of this Court’s protection from injustice or injury.” Id. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Appeal’s decision and instructed that court to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 7. B. Section 627.4132 In 1976, the Florida legislature enacted Florida Statutes § 627.4132, which prohibited stacking of insurance coverages....

...Coverage of any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. 11 Fla. Stat. § 627.4132 (1976). However, in 1980 the legislature amended § 627.4132 to state that the statute did not apply to UM coverage....

...Therefore, appellant is entitled to set off the workmen's compensation benefits received by appellee. With the foregoing clarification the appellee's petition for rehearing is denied. DAUKSCH and MOORE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The accident in question occurred in 1975, thus Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), is not applicable....

...y. The motorcycle policy did not provide uninsured motorist benefits. Hausler filed a claim with State Farm for payment of proceeds under the uninsured motorist provision of the Chevrolet policy. State Farm refused to honor the claim, asserting that Section 627.4132, the anti-stacking provision of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, precluded recovery. The trial court entered a final order dismissing Hausler's cause of action with prejudice. It is from this final order that Hausler appeals. In their briefs the parties argue the issue of the definition of "vehicle" as used in Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977). We find that it is unnecessary to address this point because Section 627.4132 does not apply to this case. The policy in question was issued and delivered a month before the governor signed Section 627.4132 into law and four months before it became effective on October 1, 1976....

...accordance with the law in effect at that time which did not preclude stacking insurance coverage. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. White, 330 So.2d 858 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). Neither party was on notice of the limitations soon to be imposed by Section 627.4132....

...slation before the effective date of that legislation, for it is generally accepted that a statute speaks from the time it goes into effect . .. Today we reaffirm this general rule and find that appellant was placed on notice of the effectiveness of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1973); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 271 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1972); Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966). REVERSED and REMANDED. CROSS and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This case arose in 1975, therefore, § 627.4132 is not applicable.

...Although the motorcycle operated by the minor was not separately covered by a policy of insurance, the minor's father owned three vehicles which were covered by three separate policies issued by the appellee, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company. Prior to the adoption of the anti-stacking statute, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), the effect of our holding in Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, 207 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) would have permitted recovery. However, under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), we observed: A reading of Section 627.4132 clearly evidences a two fold purpose: (1) to prohibit the stacking of coverages, and (2) to restrict an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle which he was operating at the time of the accident. McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 366 So.2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). 374 So.2d at 1081. Like the claimant in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, supra , plaintiff here seeks to circumvent Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), by arguing that his motorcycle is not a "vehicle." We agree with Standard Marine Insurance Company v....

...1st DCA 1976), where the court correctly observes: The statutory definition of a "motor vehicle" found in the Financial Responsibility Act is far more consonant with the public policy of this state as to uninsured motorist than the "PIP" definition in the instant policy ... [footnote omitted] 333 So.2d at 499. Under Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), an insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage on the "vehicle involved in the accident." The term "vehicle" referred to in Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), is broader than the term "motor vehicle" contained in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act....

...other than a vehicle operated on rails or crawler heads, or a farm type tractor or equipment... ." The policy definition, as written, plainly embraces a motorcycle. If a vehicle owned by the insured or named insured is involved in the accident, *31 Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), mandatorily limits an insured or named insured to the coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident....

...However, if, as in this case, plaintiff is injured while driving a vehicle which he owned but chose not to insure, he may not now seek recovery from his insuror based on coverage he may have on other vehicles which he owns. We find appellant's argument with respect to the last sentence in Section 627.4132 to be irrelevant simply because only one named insured was involved in the three separate policies....

...South Carolina Insurance Company, 380 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We note that the present anti-stacking law has been changed by Chapter 80-364, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 1980. This change removes uninsured motorist coverage from the ambit of Section 627.4132....

...Subsequently, based upon the fact that the underlying statute had been amended, the supreme court changed its position with reference to a similar exclusion in New Hampshire Insurance Group v. Harbach, 439 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1983). Coming full circle, the 1976 version of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, which furnished the underpinnings for the Harbach opinion, was amended in 1980 to delete reference to uninsured motorist coverage....

...Thus, the charging of a premium for each coverage is essential to the stacking of UM coverages. A requirement for stacking is not found in the statute. Indeed, after the supreme court permitted stacking in Tucker, the Legislature reacted by enacting section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), which prohibited stacking of any coverage....

...In reaching their decision the Stafstrom court distinguished Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So.2d 418 (Fla.1986), as addressing an issue entirely unrelated to uninsured motorist coverage. See id. at 632-33. Pohlman dealt exclusively with a question of statutory interpretation under section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1999), dealing with antistacking provisions and their retroactive applicability....

...In cases involving the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage two statutes are involved: The uninsured motorist statute, Section 627.727, Florida Statutes, which requires uninsured motorist coverage to be offered with automobile liability insurance, and Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, [1] commonly called the anti-stacking statute, which generally attempts to limit an insured to coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident and to prohibit various other insurance coverages from being added to or stacked upon that coverage....

...ffs without proration with General. *1352 This question involves the term "stacking" as it is sometimes used in a secondary sense referring to the adding together of coverage under different policies. [4] Before passage of the anti stacking statute, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), this second type of stacking was generally recognized and held to be proper....

...The excellent briefs submitted by counsel were of special value to the court in this case. As modified, the partial final summary judgment herein is AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Ch. 80-364, § 1, Laws of Fla. effective October 1, 1980, eliminates uninsured motorist coverage from Sec. 627.4132, Fla....

...e. In doing so, they traversed their assertion that there was no justiciable issue. II. Stacking. The trial court properly declared that the combined UMC provided by the two insurance policies was available to appellee. "Stacking," now prohibited by section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, occurs when an owner of several vehicles seeks recourse to the aggregate coverage afforded *839 by separate policies on each of those vehicles....

...st coverage under their second State Farm policy. The trial judge granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, ruling in their favor on both points as a matter of law. This appeal followed. The first issue concerns the application of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ten and issued in a neighboring state which prohibited stacking, where the policies obviously contemplated that they would not be stacked. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981). Accordingly, we find that section 627.4132, as amended October 1, 1980, may constitutionally be applied to the State Farm policies issued to the plaintiffs....

...PER CURIAM. Nancy Stephan, the plaintiff below, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Stephan contends that the trial court erred in awarding State Farm a summary judgment under Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), the antistacking statute....

...policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Stephan was also a named insured under four separate policies of insurance issued by State Farm, each of which included uninsured motorist protection. State Farm, however, declined coverage under any of the four policies contending that Section 627.4132 prohibited Stephan from "stacking" the uninsured motorist coverage of the State Farm policies upon the uninsured motorist coverage of the U.S.F. & G. policy. In Cox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 378 So.2d 330 (Fla.2d DCA 1980) we held that Section 627.4132 does not apply to situations in which an injured plaintiff attempts to combine uninsured motorist coverage from two separate policies when the two policies have different named insureds....

...case from the rationale of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Pac . Accordingly, we reverse the order appealed and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, Acting C.J., and OTT, J., concur. NOTES [1] The reader should note that § 627.4132, Fla....

...Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 1978), holds that § 627.4132 is not applicable to insurance policies issued prior to the effective date of this section.

...Florida law with respect to the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage has evolved over the last four decades. At present, although Florida law prohibits the stacking of most forms of motor vehicle insurance coverage, uninsured motorist coverage is expressly excluded from this prohibition. See § 627.4132, Fla....

...automobile could not recover under his father's policy. The Wimpee court interpreted the statute "to provide for no coverage when the insured has no coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident." This case is at cross-purposes with the statute, Section 627.4132, as determined by the supreme court in South Carolina Insurance Co....

...me named insured. Therefore, the statute deals only with determining which of multiple coverages issued to the same named insured will apply to a particular accident; it does not determine whether one will be entitled to coverage at all. In summary, section 627.4132 applies to bar coverage only where multiple coverages are issued to the same named insured; in such event, the policy describes which coverage will be available to the exclusion of all others....

...ld stack and that the uninsured motorist coverage in the second policy would be $100,000 per accident rather than $30,000 as listed in the second policy because no knowing rejection of the higher limits occurred. The Gants relied on the amendment to section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ment existed as to whether Gant knowingly rejected uninsured motorist coverage equal to the liability coverage limits of $100,000 in the second policy. The district court affirmed summary judgment on the stacking issue, holding that the amendment of section 627.4132 to permit stacking of uninsured motorist coverage could be constitutionally applied to insurance contracts in effect before the effective date of the statutory amendment....

...Nowhere in Hague is any mention made of impairment of contract or retroactive application of a legislative amendment. Thus, Hague has no relevance to the issue presented here. Our decision in Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 1978), is controlling. In Dewberry this Court held that applying section 627.4132 to prohibit the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage under an insurance policy renewed before the effective date of the antistacking statute would be an unconstitutional impairment of the preexisting insurance contract....

...Accordingly, we affirm the judgment appealed from. ANSTEAD and LETTS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Government Employees Insurance Company v. Taylor, 342 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Travelers Insurance Company v. Pac, 337 So.2d 397 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). [2] This case arose prior to the enactment of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), which prohibits stacking.

...Each of these policies carried $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. Both had been continuously renewed, without modification, every six months until the date of the accident. May sought to aggregate coverage on these two policies with a third policy issued after October 1, 1976, the effective date of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, the anti-stacking statute. [1] After a non-jury trial the trial court held that section 627.4132 was incorporated into each of the contracts of insurance at renewal time and stacking was, therefore, precluded....

...In Dewberry, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the anti-stacking statute could not be applied retroactively to diminish the value of an insurance contract that was renewed prior to the effective date of the statute. Dewberry's policy was renewed on August 3, 1976, prior to the October 1, 1976, effective date of section 627.4132....

...nacted after the creation of the original contract relationship." In our view, Dewberry reaffirmed this same proposition as the law of Florida: Today, we reaffirm this general rule and find that appellant was placed on notice of the effectiveness of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...or the right to stack. Nor are we faced with a situation where the contract provides for stacking and the statute provides to the contrary. Accordingly, we approve and affirm the decision of the trial court. HERSEY and HURLEY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...h provided for the inclusion of a stacking provision in that portion of the contract that related to the added vehicle. In answering this question, the Pohlman court held that a new contract on the added vehicle was created so that the provisions of section 627.4132, adopted between the issuance of the original policy and the addition of the new vehicle, would govern the "new contract." However, section 627.4132, unlike section 627.727, did not have a provision limiting its applicability to future contracts. The Pohlman court probably would have reached a different conclusion had section 627.4132 provided: This provision shall not apply to any policy issued hereafter which is an extension, modification or change to a preexisting policy with the same bodily injury liability limits....

...sehold member" exclusion unenforceable. Appellee argues that Mullis is no longer valid, [1] in that the public policy upon which it (and its progeny) relied was repudiated by the legislature by the enactment of the so-called "anti-stacking" statute, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), and great reliance is placed upon State Farm v....

...her, in which only the father's car was listed. The son was injured (by an uninsured motorist) while driving his own car. We held that the son could not recover uninsured motorist benefits under his father's policy because the anti-stacking statute (§ 627.4132) specifically directs that "an insured is protected only to the extent of coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident." We interpreted that language to mean that since the son had no uninsured motorist coverage on his own car, he necessarily had no uninsured motorist coverage under his father's policy. Whether our analysis and conclusion in Wimpee was right or wrong is of no consequence here. The case before us now involves separate policies, separate vehicles, and separate named insureds. The concluding sentence of section 627.4132 expressly exempts such situations from its purview....

...if (the vehicle) is not insured for this coverage under this policy." The trial court disagreed and entered a judgment against State Farm for $15,000. State Farm, while acknowledging earlier case law invalidating a similar provision, asserts on appeal that section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976) has superseded the case law by specifically authorizing such limitations on uninsured motorist coverage....

...are legally entitled to recover damages, namely those from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury" and is not to be "whittled away" by exclusions and exceptions. Id., at 233. In 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted section 627.4132. 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...policies insuring different named insureds. (Emphasis supplied.) State Farm argues that the first sentence of this statute repeals the public policy announced in Mullis. To support this contention, appellant cites a line of cases, all decided under section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976) and under policy exclusions similar to that in the instant case: Indomenico v....

...3d DCA 1979); Allstate Insurance Company v. Alvarez, 414 So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We agree that most of these cases appear to support the proposition that section 627.4132 constitutes a legislative overruling of the holding in Mullis. In McLellan the court construed the last sentence of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), an issue irrelevant here....

...Co. v. Spencer, 397 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Hines v. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co., 408 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); and Harbach v. New Hampshire Insurance Group, 413 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Each of these cases was decided while section 627.4132 was in effect and under policy exclusions similar to those in the instant case. In Spencer, the court held that uninsured motorist coverage on a father's car covered him while driving his son's uninsured car, reasoning that the Mullis public policy argument controlled. The court did not mention section 627.4132 explicitly and perhaps did not consider whether that section manifested a changed expression of public policy....

...rage as well. His coverage contained a clause precluding him from receiving benefits if he were driving a car owned by him or a family member but not insured under his policy. The court held that the public policy of Mullis survived the enactment of section 627.4132 and that the insurance company's purported exclusion was invalid....

...arents' policy, when he was driving his own uninsured car. Their rationale was that Mullis controlled. They interpreted Wimpee to conflict with South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Kokay, 398 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1981), which they interpreted as holding that section 627.4132 solely *606 dealt with situations where more than one policy applied to an accident. We believe the reasoning of the cases cited by appellees is more persuasive. It is true that section 627.4132 may be literally read to apply to the instant case....

...Rather, we believe the legislature was solely concerned with the situation where the insured may have more than one policy of uninsured motorist insurance, as in the case of his ownership and insurance coverage for several automobiles, and intended by the enactment of section 627.4132 to prevent the insured from "stacking" these various coverages, and, in the case where the insured is occupying one of his insured vehicles at the time of the accident, to limit his coverage to the coverage for that vehicle....

...pecified in subsection (1), and any insurer paying the benefits shall be entitled to recover from each of the other insurers an equitable pro rata share of the benefits paid and expenses incurred in processing the claim." [3] Under the newly-enacted Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Co., amicus curiae. OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal reported as Harbach v. New Hampshire Insurance Group, 413 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). We again must resolve conflicts in the interpretation of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...A decision consistent with the district court's decision in the instant case is State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 425 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We disapprove the decision of the district court and find that section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In Mullis we held that an insured under a policy was entitled to uninsured motorist protection " whenever or wherever bodily injury is inflicted upon him by the negligence of an uninsured motorist." Id. at 238 (emphasis in original). The district court also determined that section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...*1385 If the issue of coverage was determined solely by the terms of his parents' policy, the respondent would not be covered because of the exclusion in issue. The question here, however, is whether Florida's statutory provisions permit this type of exclusion. We must determine whether the legislature, by enacting section 627.4132 in 1976, intended to change the rule set by this Court in Mullis in 1971. Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rent named insureds. (Emphasis added.) It is important to note that our decision is of limited applicability since this statute was amended in 1980 to omit reference to uninsured motorist protection. Ch. 80-364, Laws of Fla. Petitioner contends that section 627.4132, as it read between 1976 and 1980, is controlling in this case....

...coverage on another vehicle regularly used in the insured's household without the necessity of paying a premium. Petitioner argues that our decision in Mullis does not control in this case because the legislature invalidated the rule in Mullis when section 627.4132 was enacted in 1976....

...les specifically identified in an insurance policy. Respondent argues, on the other hand, that the scope of the uninsured motorist protection as defined by section 627.727 and interpreted by our decision in Mullis was not changed by the enactment of section 627.4132 in 1976. Further, respondent claims that our decision in South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Kokay, 398 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1981), interpreting section 627.4132 as barring coverage where multiple coverages are issued to the same named insured, also held that the only purpose of that statute was to prohibit the stacking of multiple coverages. Therefore, respondent contends, since this is not a multiple coverages case, section 627.4132 is not applicable here. We conclude that section 627.4132, as written when this action arose, had two purposes....

...First, the statute limited an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle involved in the accident. Second, the statute prohibited the stacking of coverages. We concur with the reasoning of the Second District Court of Appeal in Wimpee. Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...uninsured motorist statute. The Third District Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In addition, the legislative staff analysis of the 1980 amendment of section 627.4132 states, in part, that, under the 1976 version of the statute, the first sentence ties UM coverage to the particular vehicle insured under a policy....

...House Committee on Insurance, Bill Analysis for House Bill 1315, chapter 80-364, Laws of Florida: Florida State Archives RG 920, Series 19, Box 532, file HB 1315. We reject the district court's conclusion that our decision in Kokay limited the applicability of section 627.4132 to situations involving the stacking of multiple coverages....

...Kokay involved a factual situation different from that in the instant case and our decision rested solely on our interpretation of the last sentence of the statute, which refers to the stacking of multiple coverages. Here, we are concerned with an interpretation of the first sentence of section 627.4132. Although we recognize that there may be a basis for disagreement on how section 627.4132 was intended to operate, we find that the reasoning of the Second District Court of Appeal in Wimpee and the Third District Court of Appeal in Kuhn should prevail. We conclude that the exclusion in the respondent's parents' policy is valid and that under section 627.4132, as written between 1976 and 1980, there is no uninsured motorist protection when the vehicle involved in an accident was not covered by the insurance policy on which the uninsured motorist claim is made....

...C. Miner Harrell of Harrell, Wiltshire, Stone & Swearingen, Pensacola, for appellees State Far Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and Jimmy L. Boyette. PER CURIAM. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the last sentence of the "anti-stacking" statute, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), permits an individual as an insured to combine uninsured motorist coverage, on a vehicle involved in an accident, with coverage under a policy issued to the father of the individual insured when the named insured in each policy is different. Section 627.4132 reads: If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named...

...We hold that the injured insured may combine such coverage and agree with Kokay v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 380 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), [1] insofar as it reasoned: The entirely clear and totally unambiguous language of the concluding sentence of Section 627.4132 explicitly provides *967 that under these facts, the preceding provisions of this section "shall not apply to reduce the coverage," thus plainly leaving the availability of both policies intact......

...This language is plain enough. The coverage cannot be stacked. If the legislature had intended the result reached by the Third District in Kokay, I am of the opinion that the drafters would have repeated the use of the word "stacked," so that the last sentence of Section 627.4132 would read: This section shall not apply to prevent coverage from being stacked under policies insuring different named insureds....

...the larger uninsured motorist coverage of Associated Indemnity. Unfortunately for State Farm, this court has recently taken a contrary position. [3] In Stephan v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 384 So.2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), we held that Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), does not *1102 preclude a person injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist from recovering uninsured motorist claims from his host's carrier as well as his own....

...Appellant also relies on Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla.1986), where our supreme court held that an insured entered a "separate and severable contract of insurance" when an automobile policy endorsement added coverage for an additional vehicle after section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, had been amended to permit stacking....

...xisting policy created a `new policy' for purposes of requiring a new UM selection form."); Gasch v. Harris, 808 So.2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that Pohlman decision "dealt exclusively with a question of statutory interpretation under section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1999)[sic], dealing with antistacking provisions and their retroactive applicability" and "directly distinguished it[self] from cases dealing with `explicit rejection of uninsured motorist coverage.'" (quoting Pohlman, 485 So.2d at 420))....

...State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 449 So.2d 293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The exact exclusion that is contained in the Hartford policy was disallowed by the Florida Supreme Court in Mullis. This exclusion remained invalid until the legislature enacted section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976) (the "anti-stacking statute"), thereby changing the public policy, as expressed by the legislature. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Wimpee, 376 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1980). Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The Harbach decision, however, had limited applicability since the statute was amended in 1980 to omit reference to uninsured motorist protection. Id. at 1385; Ch. 80-364, Laws of Fla. We are now presented with the same factual situation as set forth both in Mullis and in Harbach, but without the impediment of section 627.4132 applying to uninsured motorists. § 627.4132, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1980). Appellant contends that the public policy behind Mullis was changed with the passage of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...84-41, Laws of Fla. (emphasis in original; text additions). Appellant urges that even though this amendment post-dates Beem's accident, it was intended to clarify the legislature's previous actions and should be considered in construing the relevant provision of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). We are unpersuaded that the new section 627.727, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984) intended to clarify section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...coverage was in excess of the liability coverage by some $50,000. After reaching this conclusion, the court concluded the liability coverage which had actually been paid was not a set-off which the U.M. carriers could rely upon. We find error and reverse. Initially, it should be noted that Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977) does not apply to this claim because the accident occurred before October 1, 1976....

...coverage under this last mentioned policy, issued to his mother and step-father. These facts were admitted by the appellee, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, however, it was contended that no stacking was possible under the provisions of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977). The pivotal question in this appeal is whether the last sentence of Section 627.4132 relieves the appellant, Michael Day, from the provision which forbids stacking under certain circumstances. Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes provides: 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited.-If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that t...

...This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. *353 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held, in McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), that Section 627.4132 prohibits stacking entirely, even in cases where the policies sought to be stacked are issued to different named insureds....

...The court reached this conclusion by what we believe to be a strained judicial interpretation of legislative intent. The Third District Court of Appeal, in Kokay v. South Carolina Insurance Company, 380 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), reached an entirely different result, holding that the last sentence of Section 627.4132 simply means what it says and that is the prohibition against stacking does not apply to insurance policies insuring different named insureds....

...the holding in McLellan. We respectfully, but thoroughly, disagree with that decision. In our judgment, the conclusion reached in McLellan is inappropriately based upon the court's interpretation of the supposed intent of the legislature in enacting s. 627.4132 to preclude stacking in every instance notwithstanding the language in the statute itself which is unequivocally to the contrary of the court's view....

...3d DCA 1980); and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). We disagree with the appellant's reasoning. Those cases relied upon by the appellant involve cases which were decided upon interpretation of the antistacking statute, Section 627.4132 Florida Statutes (1976) or involved a situation where the injured party sought underinsured motorist's coverage under her parent's policy when she was not an insured within the terms of the policy in that she owned a private passenger automobile and was not a relative within the definitions of the policy....

...000 each person, $100,000 each accident. *706 The trial court, in granting summary judgment, concluded that coverage existed in the amount of $50,000 per plaintiff, for a total of $150,000. In our view, this was error. The anti-stacking provision of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), in effect at the time of these events, provides that "......

...Miner Harrell of Harrell, Wiltshire, Stone & Swearingen, Pensacola, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This case is on appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, in which the court passed upon the constitutionality of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977). [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. The question presented is whether, on its face, section 627.4132 is an unconstitutional infringement of the right of persons to freely contract....

...See Manning v. Travelers Insurance Co., 250 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1971). We hold that it is constitutional. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...of Kuhn. On appeal, the Third District reversed that summary judgment, holding *780 that Kuhn was restricted to the coverage in the policy issued on the motorcycle since the motorcycle was involved in the accident, not the truck. Id. at 1081. Citing section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), which prohibits the stacking of UM coverage, the court held, "[h]aving rejected uninsured motorist coverage thereon [his motorcycle], he is not entitled to the uninsured motorist benefits provided for in his truck policy under the plain terms of the statute." 374 So.2d at 1081. Accord Indomenico v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 388 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We note in passing that since Indomenico and Kuhn were decided, section 627.4132 has been amended to omit its reference to UM coverage....

...as explained below, we believe is still in effect. It is true that Sellers and Tucker were decided before the legislature addressed the subject of stacking uninsured motorist coverage. In 1976, after those cases were decided, the legislature enacted section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), which specifically prohibited stacking of automobile insurance coverage....

...e vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. § 627.4132, Fla. Stat. (1976). However, in 1980, the legislature amended section 627.4132....

...licy. This appeal ensued. We affirm. *1074 The appellant seeks PIP coverage because she was injured while occupying a “commercial vehicle” and not a “motor vehicle”. However, the appellant overlooks the wording of the “no-stack” statute [Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976)] to the effect that “....

the state. Section 10 of Chapter 76-266 (now Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes [Supp. 1976]) prohibits

...The judgment is affirmed on the authority of Indomenico v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 388 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), which, applying the identical policy exclusion to facts on all fours with those in this case, held that by virtue of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977) the uninsured motorist coverage was not applicable to the injuries sustained by the insured....

...Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section does not apply: (1) To uninsured motorist coverage, which is separately governed by s. 627.727. (2) To reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds. § 627.4132, Fla....

...he policies are different or are the same.” S.C. Ins. Co. v. Kokay, 398 So.2d 1355 , 1357 (Fla.1981). In an earlier decision from this court, we held that a policy’s anti-stacking provision relating to uninsured motorist coverage was contrary to section 627.4132 and therefore unenforceable....

claim that these provisions conflict with section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), which they contend

...UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., and JAMIESON, FRANCES ANN, Associate Judge, concur. ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION PER CURIAM. In entering a summary final judgment for the appellant, Jerilyn Gallup Ne-duchal, in Neduchal’s action for injuries arising from an automobile accident, the trial judge ruled that section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), prevented Neduchal from stacking uninsured motorist coverage under a policy issued to him upon the uninsured motorist coverage under a policy issued to Stapp, the owner of the car in which Neduchal was a passenger at the time of the accident....

...Two insurance policies were issued by State Farm Mutual. Policy One was issued to Joseph Lowry, individually, as named insured. Policy Two was issued to Joseph Lowry and to Mrs. Lowry as named insureds. The trial court correctly concluded that to permit stacking in this instance would be a violation of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), which prevents stacking separate policies involving the same named insured....

which rendered the “anti-stacking” statute, section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), inapplicable to

...ies. When appellee refused to stack coverage on both policies this suit ensued. Appellee moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint on the grounds that, in seeking to recover for an accident which occurred October 9, 1976, appellants were precluded by Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976) from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of the two policies....

...The trial court granted said motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The trial court did not have the benefit of the decision in Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla.1978), wherein the Supreme Court restricted the application of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976) to insurance contracts entered into after October 1, 1976, the effective date of the statute. It appears the policies in question were issued prior to October 1, 1976, although the pleadings are not clear on that point. We simply hold here, in accordance with Dewberry , if the policies in question were issued prior to October 1, 1976, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976) is not applicable....

...State Farm contends that its liability is limited to the policy insuring the motorcycle which Northrop was operating at the time of the accident, relying upon the Third District Court’s opinion in Lowry v. State Farm Mutual Autumobile Insurance Co., 421 So.2d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). In Lowry , the court held that Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), prohibits stacking of multiple policies when the policies contain the same named insured, even if one or more of the policies contain an additional named insured. On the narrow issue of statutory construction argued by the parties, 3 we agree with the decision in Lowry, supra, that the language in Section 627.4132, in effect on July 18, 1980, was intended to prohibit “stacking” of uninsured motorist coverage in the circumstances of this case....

...We reverse the judgment below that allows stacking of benefits under the three policies, and reverse the allowance of attorney’s fees and costs. 4 The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and WENTWORTH, J., concur. . Section 627.4132 provided as follows on July IS, 1980, the date of the accident in this case: 627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...acts of this case, which language apparently was the basis of the trial court’s partial summary judgment against State Farm. Neither party addressed whether the statute is self-executing in view of its language that “the policy shall provide,” Section 627.4132, Fla.Stat....

...ary to the public policy expressed in Florida’s Financial Responsibility Law. The state of affairs after Mullís was that insurance policies could not validly prohibit stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. In 1976, the Legislature first enacted Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he stacking of coverages in certain circumstances. See New Hampshire Insurance Group v. Harbach, 439 So.2d 1383 (Fla.1983). Between 1979 (the year in which the instant policy was issued) and 1982 (the date of the accident causing injury to Pohlman), Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes, was again amended so as to remove uninsured motorist coverage from the statutory prohibition on stacking....

...We do not decide, since this question of fact has yet to be resolved in the trial court, whether the appellant did or did not knowingly reject higher available limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. . Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), re-enacted in 1981 and in effect in 1982, provided: "627.4132....

...Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply: "(1) To uninsured motorist coverage. "(2) To reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds.’’ The statute in effect at the time the policy was written, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), provided: "627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited....

...Our decision makes it unnecessary for us to address the appellants’ alternative claim that the endorsements and changes to the insurance contract after October 1, 1980, constituted the issuance of a new policy which incorporated the statutory amendment to Section 627.4132 effective October 1, 1980.

...Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company appeals a final declaratory decree entered against it below finding that the insured Gary M. Stern was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage for injuries sustained in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist. Lumbermens contends that Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), permits an insurance company to exclude from uninsured motorist coverage any accident, as here, occurring while the insured occupies a vehicle owned by him, but not insured under the subject insurance policy....

...driving his 1974 Dodge which, without dispute, was not covered by the said policy. The central issue, then, is whether this exclusionary provision in the uninsured motorist coverage of the subject policy is a valid exclusion. We conclude that it is. Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), provides as follows: “If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the pol...

...denied, 385 So.2d 762 (Fla.1980), with which we entirely agree. We recognize that this holding is in conflict with Harbach v. New Hampshire Insurance Group, 413 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), but respectfully decline to follow that decision. We believe our result here is consistent with the plain meaning of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), as well as consonant with recent judicial rulings on this subject....

So.2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), we held that Section 627.-4132, Florida Statutes (1977), does not *1102preclude

...insured Julio Moreno was entitled by law to stack the underinsured motorist coverages in the two subject insurance policies, which entitlement could not be abrogated by policy provision, as the accident herein occurred prior to the effective date of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), which prohibits such stacking....

17, 1976, prior to the effective date of Section 627.-4132, Florida Statutes (1977), prohibiting stacking

policies would in this instance be a violation of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), which prohibits

...Appellee’s reliance on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Wimpee, 376 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) is misplaced. In that case, the injured party claiming uninsured motorist benefits had occupied a vehicle that was not insured. Under Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), aggregation is allowed if the claimant is a named insured on one policy and an additional insured on another....

stacking of uninsured motorist coverage under Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1980). On May 19, 1981

COWART, Judge. The trial court relied on McLellan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 366 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), to hold that section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), prohibited stacking of uninsured motorist coverages in policies insuring different named insureds....

...Polgar, 551 So.2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (where partnership policy lists both partners and the partnership as named insured the partners are class one insureds and may not be denied uninsured motorist coverage). In 1976, the Florida legislature adopted section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976), prohibiting the stacking of any form of insurance coverage, but in 1980, the statute was amended and the prohibition repealed. § 627.4132, Fla.Stat....

...s family’s, regular uninterrupted use while he remained Miranda’s employee. Those findings do not conclude the analysis, however. Hurtado is in the class of individuals the Senate Statement 3 contemplated would benefit from the 1980 amendment to section 627.4132....

...ough the House Analysis 5 also states that the bill revives prior case law, House Analysis at 2, it does not discuss the effects of the amendment on uninsured motorist coverage. The Senate Statement provides a more complete analysis of the effect of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1980), which is identical to section 627.-4132, Florida Statutes (1987), in effect at the time of this accident. We are persuaded by its conclusions. We therefore hold that Hurtado falls within the class of insureds expressly deemed to benefit from the 1980 amendment to section 627.4132, allowing the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage....

HERSEY, Judge. This appeal involves construction of the phrase “different named insureds” as used in Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), the anti-stacking statute....

...In Lowry two insurance policies were issued by State Farm Mutual. One was issued to Joseph Lowry as named insured and the other was issued to Joseph and Mrs. Lowry as named insureds. The court concluded that “to permit stacking in this instance would be in violation of Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), which prevents stacking separate policies involving the same named insured.” 421 So.2d at 669 ....

...5th DCA 1983), which involves similar facts, the 1979 statute, and follows Lowry , and State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Northrop, 437 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) wherein the first district held on the narrow issue of statutory construction that it agrees with Lowry that Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979) prohibits stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in these circumstances....

...Leatherby Insurance Co., 372 So.2d 214 (Fla.4th DCA 1979) and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Curry, 371 So.2d 677 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), cert. granted, 395 So.2d 530 (Fla.1980). Reversed and remanded. . This accident occurred in 1975; therefore, the “antistacking” statute, Section 627.4132, enacted in 1976, is not applicable.

...Various other coverage issues between other parties were also determined, but we need not consider these points. We affirm. The issue at the non-jury trial concerned the stacking of appellant’s uninsured motorist insurance policy. Plaintiff/appellant relied upon the anti-stacking statute, Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1979), effective October 1,1976....

...age if multiple policies, with different named insureds, exist. In the version of the statute affecting the results in Piatt and Kokay, however, there was specific provision for an exception to "insurance policies insuring different named insureds." Section 627.4132, Fla....

ORFINGER, Judge. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of appellee on the authority of New Hampshire Insurance Group v. Harbach, 439 So.2d 1383 (Fla.1983). At issue here, as in Harbach , is the interpretation of section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (the anti-stacking statute) for uninsured motorist coverage, as the statute existed between 1976 and October 1, 1980....